

Egypt Human Development Report 2010

Egypt Human Development Report 2010

Youth in Egypt: Building our Future



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Preface

Today, about one quarter of Egypt's population — young men and women between the ages of 18 to 29 years — aspire to full and productive lives as they move from education to work, to citizenship, marriage and the establishment of independent households. As the next generation, many will take on positions of leadership, while others will contribute significantly to productivity and rising prosperity. It is clear therefore that their wellbeing will affect the growth and welfare of Egypt as a whole.

The outcome of youth's transition to adulthood, if badly managed, becomes highly problematic. Many will suffer from poorer skill and job outcomes and therefore prolonged periods of unemployment; young cohorts with little experience of community participation and civic duties will acquire a fragile understanding of citizenship and its responsibilities; and many will develop an unproductive dependency on family and state, when what is needed is a young and dynamic body of industrious and resourceful citizens able to meet development goals in a fruitful and inventive manner.

A positive outcome to this susceptible transition phase to adulthood depends on an environment that will enable young people to successfully negotiate the drawbacks and difficulties they may have to face. Emancipation and empowerment are essential to egalitarian participation — not only as a commitment from government but also from young people themselves. Civic freedoms and personal liberties need to be accompanied by the performance of public and national duties, by responsible and accountable citizenry. And as one young contributor to this report suggests, commitment to such obligations must also come from families, learning institutions, academia, NGOs, private voluntary organizations, the private sector, youth led-organizations, the media, political parties and religious institutions. Each of these institutions has a vital role to play in ensuring that the Egypt of tomorrow will meet the ambitions of today.

Many national governments have also devised comprehensive youth strategies, youth policies, employed youth lenses, formed youth development bodies or established independent youth budgets to help youth overcome obstacles in their path to adulthood. Egypt is no exception. Youth's modest participation and little civic engagement are being addressed through the creation of clubs, sports and leisure centers, while political parties, the ruling National Democratic Party in particu-

lar, are promoting youthful membership and contributions to the political debate. Young people's high unemployment rates, particularly for those entering the labor market for the first time, are a source of great concern to the Government of Egypt, and efforts are being exerted so that the mismatch between higher educational and labor market requirements is significantly reduced. Indeed, the education system as a whole is being reformed to introduce pedagogical practices that promote not only marketable skills, but also critical thinking, creative problem-solving, and at a more fundamental level, the values of tolerance and openness.

This report suggests that to complement such enabling conditions, a number of prerequisite must be addressed. Egypt's record of democracy and respect for human rights must match internationally accepted standards, corruption and deteriorating individual and community values must continue to be attended to, and religious intolerance eradicated. These are concerns that have been frequently articulated by young people in this report. More attention needs to be given to enable the culture of voluntarism and civic engagement to grow. Participatory mechanisms can be further developed for young people to have a greater say in the planning and implementation of affairs that will impact their lives, notably with regard the design of political platforms and the partaking in local and national elections.

The government is committed to develop and adopt a multidimensional concept of youth welfare that gives greater focus to the interrelated dimensions of education, access to ICT, employment and the quality of jobs, income levels, gender parity, health, civic participation, and so forth, and to translate these into an integrated strategy and action plan. The government is also committed to attain an equitable distribution of capabilities and opportunities for all of Egypt's youth. What will be more difficult will be to address such issues as leisure, well-being, and even the dynamics of the family including social cohesiveness, which fall under the umbrella of civil society. In this respect, it is clear that both older and younger generations alike must bear an equal responsibility for preservation of the environment, citizen safety, community values, positive aspects of culture, and oversight for good governance.

Osman Mohamed Osman
Minister of Economic Development
Chairman of the Board,
Institute of National Planning

Foreword

I am delighted to write this foreword for the latest Egypt Human Development Report (EHDR), which focuses on the vital issue of youth in Egypt: their aspirations, the opportunities available to them, the challenges they face in realizing their personal goals, and their potential to contribute to human development in Egypt. This is the eleventh such report produced by the Institute of National Planning, Ministry of Economic Development, with support from the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP).

According to the 2006 census, approximately 40 percent of Egyptians are between the ages of 10 and 29. The 2010 EHDR analyses the opportunities and constraints facing youth from a human development perspective. It examines the role of youth in Egypt's development process on issues such as education, health, gender, poverty, employment, housing, and participation in society. The Report showcases success stories of youth-centred initiatives, programmes, and projects, calling for greater consultation and communication among young people, the Government and civil society. It also identifies and assesses the most pressing issues affecting youth in Egypt, with the aim of formulating a 'vision for youth' that is based on equity, opportunity, ownership and their participation in the development process. As such, the Report highlights Nine Main Messages to ensure youth's inclusion and full participation in society.

It is auspicious that this Report coincides with the International Year of Youth. Under the theme 'Dialogue and Mutual Understanding,' the Year of Youth aims to encourage dialogue and understanding across generations and promote the ideals of peace, respect for human rights, freedoms, and solidarity. The Year of Youth also encourages young people to do their part to help achieve the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) for all people, including women and children and people living with disabilities, with special attention to those areas of Egypt where poverty rates are highest.

As illustrated throughout the Report, Egypt's youth aspire to a socially inclusive society in which they feel valued, with opportunities to learn well, find decent work, engage productively in the community, have a voice, afford marriage, and establish their own homes. Achieving such outcomes for youth requires a coherent framework for action that sets priorities, provides clear lines of accountability, and is integrated within national planning and implementation mechanisms.

The Egypt Human Development Report (EHDR) for 2010 was prepared by a core group led by Heba Handoussa, with the participation of a multidisciplinary team of 26 authors, and in collaboration with Egypt's Institute of National Planning, the Ministry of Economic Development, and the National Council for Youth. Young people in Egypt were also actively involved in preparing and contributing at all stages of the report. A draft of the report was presented for comment at a youth conference held at Cairo University in March 2010 and hosting over 1500 attendees from across Egypt. This same draft was reviewed by a team of six distinguished readers whose comments were incorporated into the material available. A small team of eight young Egyptians conducted numerous focus groups with their peers and subsequently contributed a full chapter to the report themselves. Many chapters also provide young peoples' views and proposals through direct quotations.

Evidence from large and recent surveys is used throughout the chapters of this report, providing a number of rich and comprehensive data sets which have been analyzed in the context of youth dimensions of human development, forms of deprivation, behavioral changes, attitudes and aspirations. These include the Population Council's comprehensive 2009 Survey of Young People in Egypt (SYPE), undertaken in collaboration with the Information and Decision Support Center (IDSC) of the Egyptian Cabinet, with support from UNFPA, UNICEF, UNIFEM, and UNDP, as well as the Ford Foundation, World Bank, CIDA, the Netherlands Government and SIDA.

EHDR 2010 has also used data from the 2008 official Household Income Expenditure and Consumption Survey (HIECS), the Egypt Chapter of the World Values Survey 2008 conducted by IDSC, and the 2005 and 2008 Demographic and Health Survey (DHS) for Egypt. And, for the first time, an original Youth Well-Being Index was also designed and applied, and is featured in a full chapter to measure all forms of youth exclusion, starting with those that are highly correlated with being poor.

On behalf of UNDP, I wish to sincerely thank Professor Heba Handoussa and her EHDR team of authors for their invaluable contributions to this Report.

It is our hope that this Report will stimulate policy dialogue to create a more favourable environment for youth in Egypt – one where they can realize their full potential and play a bigger role in Egypt's development process.

James W. Rawley
UNDP Resident Representative

Preamble

Defining the ages that constitute youth has no internationally agreed convention. For an analysis of Egypt's young cohorts, youth, in this report, are defined as belonging to the 18 to 29 age group — which constitutes about 20 million individuals or close to a quarter of the population. The definition accommodates for the lower age limit of 18 years adopted by Egyptian law as the transition from childhood to adulthood as well as the upper age limit of 29 years when society and most youth themselves expect and hope to have formed a family and acquired a house. A profile of these young cohorts, whether from an urban or rural stratum, whether privileged or underprivileged, suggests that they are familiar with the impact of the revolution in ICT, and have been touched by the consequences of a newly globalized world. Although their circumstances may not allow access to their benefits, they often chose to merge traditional values with new perceptions of freedom and democracy. These factors are covered throughout the report, and a special emphasis is placed on the impact of poverty as it affects young Egyptians.

One characteristic predominates in the profile of young Egyptians today. Egypt's youth bulge is at its peak, but opportunities appear much less promising than those of previous generations. The outcome of overly generous job creation in government in the 1970s and 1980s, little or no reform in the education and training systems, and the failure to control population growth has resulted in a serious loss in productivity and an accompanying decline in real wages and stagnation in the standard of living of those employed in the public and private sectors. The prospect of integrating Egypt in the global economy and reap the benefits of its young and fast-growing labor force must now be vigorously identified and exploited in all traditional and modern sectors of the economy.

Young women and men are a formidable force for change. They are ready to take up new initiatives as entrepreneurs, acquire additional skills to access better jobs, and engage in community and political decisions and programs. This is a critical time when life decisions are made — whether to work or pursue further studies, accept a low paying job or start a new enterprise, participate in or refrain from engagement in community affairs, delay marriage or opt to marry and settle under less than optimal conditions. These decisions, if well directed and taken under an enabling socio-economic environment, will thrust young human capital into the foreground, as a principal factor in the growth and development of the country as a whole. On the other hand, the consequence of a mismanaged transition — most often through no fault of young people themselves — becomes prolonged periods of unemployment, a fragile

understanding of citizenship and its responsibilities, a greater dependency on family and state, and a marked slowdown on the road to national prosperity.

The EHDR 2010 very properly uses the concepts of exclusion and inclusion as a framework for understanding the environment in which youth are situated. Social exclusion contains two parties, the excluders and excluded. It may be measured in terms of factors such as unemployment, or youth crime or drug use. It is also multi-dimensional, including poverty and other forms of social disadvantage. Additionally, youth exclusion is exacerbated by gender, whether due to sex segregation, parental supervision, or other cultural or religious reasons. There is considerable concern that these isolated youth are exploited by extremist groups who prey upon their sense of social hopelessness.

Inclusion, on the other hand, implies that youth are situated at a social advantage in joining institutions and organizations in their societies. As recommended in the nine messages of this 2010 Egypt Human Development Report, this will require a reorientation by government and civil society — a new paradigm, such that young people are included in national planning and implementation mechanisms, that education system failures are tackled and overcome, that poverty among youth and its main attributes, namely lack of education and skills, are addressed, that tolerance and respect for the other are promoted, whether directed at religious or gender affiliation, that youth are permitted to participate in ‘responsive governance’ with administrative or political bodies likely to shape their future, that facilities are provided for financing start-up projects or ownership of some assets — such as land — by youth.

This report on youth in Egypt, as one contribution to the current international ‘Year of Youth’ is only one example of national efforts to draw young people into mainstream society. The report proposes that a ‘Wellbeing Index’ should be prepared annually for Egypt, possibly by the National Youth Council, and that this would assess progress on indicators such as access to services, income and deprivation, gender, employment, as well as civic participation, family life, leisure and security. The objective would be to inform policy makers on youth areas needing attention and would set the stage for an integrated Action Plan, the outcome of which could be a comprehensive strategy at the policy and programmatic levels. The goal, clearly, would be to create a socioeconomic setting that allows Egypt’s young and abundant human resources to better contribute to development.

Heba Handoussa
Lead Author

Acronyms

| | |
|--------|--|
| BDSSP | Business Development Services Support Project |
| BMI | Body Mass Index |
| CAOA | Central Agency for Organization and Administration |
| CAPMAS | Central Agency for Public Mobilization and Statistics |
| CBHRM | Competency Based Human Resource Management |
| CCT | Conditional Cash Transfer |
| CEDAW | Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination |
| CEED | Centre for Entrepreneurship Education & Development |
| CPI | Consumer Price Index |
| CRC | Convention on the Rights of the Child |
| CSO | Civil Society Organization |
| DHS | Egypt Demographic and Health Survey |
| ECEU | European Training Foundation of European Commission Union |
| EFSA | Egyptian Financial Supervisory Authority |
| EHDR | Egypt Human Development Report |
| ELMS | Egypt Labor Market Survey |
| ELMPS | Egypt Labor Market Panel Survey |
| ESD | Education for Sustainable Development |
| ETP | Enterprise Training Partnerships |
| EVQ | Egyptian Vocational Qualifications |
| FDI | Foreign Direct Investment |
| FGM | Female Genital Mutilation |
| FPL | Food Poverty Line |
| GAFI | General Authority for Investment and Free Zones |
| GALAE | General Authority for Literacy and Adult Education |
| GDP | Gross Domestic Product |
| GEM | Global Entrepreneurship Monitor Survey |
| GOE | Government of Egypt |
| GYWI | General Youth Well-Being Index |
| HCV | Hepatitis C Viral Infection |
| HD | Human Development |
| HDI | Human Development Indicator |
| HIECS | Household Income & Expenditure Consumption Survey |
| HR | Human Resources |
| ICT | Information and Communications Technology |
| IDA | Industrial Development Authority |
| IDSC | Information and Decision Support Center of the Cabinet |
| ILO | International Labor Organization |
| IMC | Industrial Modernization Center |
| INP | Institute of National Planning |
| ITC | Industrial Training Council |
| LE | Egyptian Pound |
| LPC | Local Popular Council |
| MDGs | Millennium Development Goals |
| MCIT | Ministry of Communication and Information Technology |
| MENA | Middle East and North Africa |
| MIT | Massachusetts Institute of Technology |
| MKI | Mubarak-Kohl Initiative |
| MOA | Ministry of Agriculture |
| MOE | Ministry of Education |
| MOH | Ministry of Housing |
| MOHE | Ministry of Higher Education |

| | |
|--------|---|
| MOF | Ministry of Finance |
| MOI | Ministry of Investment |
| MOSS | Ministry of Social Solidarity |
| MOTI | Ministry of Trade and Industry |
| NCCM | National Council for Childhood and Motherhood |
| NCD | Non-Communicable Diseases |
| NCSCR | National Center for Social and Criminology Research |
| NCW | National Council for Women |
| NCY | National Council for Youth |
| NDP | National Democratic Party |
| NGO | Non-Governmental Organization |
| NHP | National Housing Program |
| NSSP | National Skills Standards Project |
| SC | Social Contract |
| SCC | Social Contract Center |
| SDP | Skills Development Project |
| SFD | Social Fund for Development |
| SME | Small and Medium Enterprises |
| SYPE | Survey of Young People in Egypt |
| TPL | Total Poverty Line |
| TVET | Technical and Vocational Education and Training |
| UNDP | United Nations Development Program |
| UNFPA | United Nations Population Fund |
| UNICEF | United Nations Children's Fund |
| UNIFEM | United Nations Development Fund for Women |
| WB | World Bank |
| WEF | World Economic Forum |
| WFP | World Food Program |
| WVS | World Values Survey |
| YEN | Youth Employment Network |
| YWBI | Youth Well-Being Index |

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


With some cash
I could start my own
business

...and it's great
to have a skill



Chapter One



THE STATUS OF YOUTH

Egypt's young people matter because their aspirations, participation, energies, imagination, values and ideals will shape the country's future. Like youth across the world, they hope to lead full and productive lives, form their own families and engage in a wider national and global context. Their decisions, as the next generation heading households, communities, the government and the work force, will affect the welfare of the entire nation. In some countries, youth transitions appear smoother and young adults appear to have greater opportunities for blooming mentally, physically, emotionally and spiritually than in others. They have wider choices, greater access to information for decision-making, more space for civic participation, and their voice is heard. The aim of this report is to show how outcomes for youth in Egypt will depend on building their human capital with appropriate policies, investments and programs.

Box 1.1: International Year of Youth to Promote Inclusion and Participation

On December 18, 2009, the UN General Assembly adopted a resolution declaring the International Year of Youth to commence on the 12th of August, 2010. The date coincides with the 25th anniversary of the first International Year of Youth (1985) which had the theme of Participation, Development and Peace and called for the full participation of youth in society through partnerships with youth organizations. The theme for 2010 promotes dialogue and mutual understanding across generations while advocating for the ideals of peace, respect and freedom.

Most importantly, youth are encouraged to dedicate themselves to fostering progress, particularly with regards the MDGs. The United Nations Programme on Youth encourages youth themselves to organize activities that promote a greater understanding of the importance of youth participation in all aspects of society and those that further the goal of mutual understanding. As early as January 2010, the UN asked any and all youth to submit 1-5 word slogans that would summarize the Year and its theme via Facebook and to then vote on the most favorite one. All in all, it is hoped that through the attention paid to young people on this Year of Youth, a greater understanding of the concerns of youth and their potential contribution to society can be realized.

In Egypt, preparation for the Year of Youth started in March of 2010 with a consultation at Cairo University, bringing together more than 1,500 young people from all governorates of Egypt. The purpose of the occasion was to create awareness and help start a dialogue that would have the young people getting involved and organizing events. Moreover, the day allowed the Human Development Report team to elicit worthwhile feedback for the 2010 report and incorporate in it the views of a wide variety of young Egyptians. *Source: <http://social.un.org/youthyear/> Prepared by Defne Abbas for EHDR 2010*

Young people constitute a formidable and once in a nation's history demographic bulge. This transition – whereby the youth age group peaks relative to the child and aging segments of the population pyramid – is perhaps Egypt's biggest challenge, representing both a risk and an opportunity. On the positive side, it could mean a significant lowering in the dependence rate and the opportunity for more bread winners to earn income within each family. The youth bulge in Egypt first appeared in 1995 and is expected to last throughout the next thirty years ending in 2045.¹ This large cohort of young men and women in the age group 18 to 29 years is estimated at 23.5% of the total population in 2010, or 19.8 million.

This is the time when youth transition from school to work, to higher education, to citizenship, to marriage and the establishment of independent households. These five transition periods, if well guided, will propel young human capital into a significant factor in the growth and development of the country as a whole. On the other hand, if badly managed, the consequence becomes poorer skill and job outcomes and therefore prolonged periods of unemployment, a fragile understanding of citizenship and its responsibilities, and a greater dependency on family and state

prior to and after marriage.

As illustrated throughout the chapters of this eleventh in the series of Egypt Human Development Reports, a vision of a socially inclusive society is one in which all young Egyptians would feel valued and have the opportunity to participate fully in the life of their society. Achieving this vision means that young Egyptians would have the resources, opportunities and capability to learn well, find work, engage productively in the community, have a voice, afford marriage and establish their own home.

If such an inclusion agenda for young people is to be implemented, youth must be given a voice in the design of policies and programs that affect them, as well as participate in new partnerships with their communities and with business. Independence of thought and new ideas must be encouraged rather than censored. Teaching environments and educational programs must open up rather than reduce young peoples' chances of finding employment and meeting market requirements. Inclusion also means that forums – whether student councils, political parties, youth clubs or the internet – must allow youth to freely discuss issues important to them and to par-



take in the creation of agendas that reflect their needs. This report, in many cases, quoting perceptions and expectations of youth themselves, concludes that in Egypt, these conditions in many cases have yet to translate into concrete action.

This is not to suggest that all youth are a passive group.²As this report also details, most want a better life for themselves. Many pursue a technical or university education in hopes of better job prospects; some join the informal or SME economy or set up private businesses; some migrate in search of job opportunities elsewhere; and finally, a number of the less fortunate have opted out of education earlier to work and earn an income, with little prospects for more options throughout their lives.

IDENTIFYING THE CONSTRAINTS

There are common areas of difficulty for Egypt's youth and frequently these are associated with poverty or unemployment, although cultural factors and state policies also play a role. This report suggests that these constraints, often interlinked, fall under but are not limited to the following themes:

Waithood

Consequences of youth exclusion have included young people entering 'waithood', a period during which they simply wait for their lives to begin, most notably by queuing for long periods of unemployment during which they live with parents and are finan-

cially unable to pursue marriage or home ownership. According to the SYPE labor market and youth study presented in this report, the share of the youth aged 15-29 grew significantly from 1988 to 2006, posing huge pressures on the labor market in terms of creating sufficient jobs for new entrants. While the current young generation is the best educated ever, this has not translated into better employment opportunities. The psychological impact is also evident, with unemployment leading to apathy, as evidenced in the extremely low youth participation rates in elections, volunteer activities or membership of youth clubs. There is also considerable concern that some isolated youth are marketed to by extremist groups who prey upon their sense of hopelessness.³ While delayed marriage is a trend seen in many societies, in Egypt, an increasing number of youth are engaging in *urfi* or informal marriages that offer little security to the wife and any subsequent offspring.⁴

Paradoxically, a major source of inclusion for young Egyptians is the traditional support system of the family, with parents shouldering the bulk of the responsibility for financing education, marriage, and nascent entrepreneurship well beyond the age of 18 at which young people elsewhere are considered capable of caring for themselves. While this robust family culture provides a safety net and compensates for the shortfalls that come with 'waithood,' it also fosters dependency. Further, in many respects, it transfers responsibility from the public to the private

Box 1.2: Youth as Vehicles of Change

Young people in Egypt may have low participation rates because they believe their engagement and activism do not count.

This feeling of exclusion may come from a social understanding that places them as passive recipients of goods and services and which gives no rewards for innovation and activism. One practical and successful approach to draw in the active participation of young people at the level of national issues is exemplified by Nicaragua's successful literacy campaign of the late 1990s. The campaign reduced overall illiteracy from 50.3% to 12.9% in just five months. The government-sponsored campaign called for mobilizing the literate half of the population, particularly youth. Over 225,000 volunteers registered to provide their services, with the burden of actual teaching falling on 100,000 volunteers. The organization of the campaign depended heavily on youth volunteerism which contributed to its success.

Since the early 1990s, the Government of Egypt demonstrated a commitment to eradicate illiteracy through a set of policies and programs. In 1994, the General Authority for Literacy and Adult Education (GALAE) launched a 10-year literacy campaign aimed at enabling adults to learn how to read and write Arabic and to use written arithmetic. The strategy, however, was less effective in poorer and more rural districts where illiteracy is highest. The idea of mobilizing young people to carry out a massive literacy campaign on the national level has the potential of leading to exceptional results. In Egypt, the ratio of registered university students to the estimated number of illiterates is about 1:6, and the number of registered high school students to illiterates 1:5, indicating that if all registered high school and university students taught five illiterate people, illiteracy above 15 years of age in Egypt would be completely eradicated. It is also possible to focus the campaign on a smaller sub-category of illiterates, namely those aged 10-35 (5.8 million illiterates according to the latest census), making the ratio of registered high school and university students to illiterates approximately 1:2.

Source: Salma el Fawal, Social Contract Center, Egypt

domain and reinforces dependent behaviors and attitudes on the family. The prevalence of private tuition at all educational levels, for example, obviates the claim that public education in Egypt is free. Lack of proper public health facilities, insufficient middle to low income housing, and poor mortgage facilities all point to gaps in services for youth that are frequently privately compensated for by parents. Not many families are able to provide this kind of support to their young members, which creates serious new obstacles to equal opportunity, equal access and social mobility for Egypt's young generation. The challenge lies squarely with government to upgrade and expand such services.

Education

The age structure accompanying the youth demographic bulge places enormous pressures on the education system, and the quality of education. While Egypt has made great strides in achieving the MDG goal of universal basic education enrollment, 27% of young people aged 18-29 have not completed basic education (17% have dropped out of school before completing basic education and 10% have never

enrolled in school).⁵ Socio-economic status and family background are considered the main predictors of education achievement in Egypt. Children whose families are in the middle and upper wealth quintiles are more likely to perform better in certificate examinations and to join the higher education system. Urban/rural residency is another major predictor. In fact, rural areas have a staggering 80% of those who never enroll in school. The gender dimension is particularly pronounced in this group, with females constituting 82% of those who never enrolled in school.⁶

Issues related to inequality of access to education and education quality remain central, as discussed in Chapter Four. In terms of school type, while the majority of so called 'achievers' (achieving 90% in the secondary stage completion exam) come from government schools, the likelihood of being an achiever increases exponentially if a student is in a private school or in a governmental experimental school. Primary and secondary school level education have not fared well in terms of quality. The large numbers of students and the shortage of qualified teachers have affected the possibility of delivering quality learning experiences.



The poor are consistently worse off than the rich in terms of school enrollment and girls from poor households are significantly more likely not to attend school.

Without including the independent Azhar system, the total number of public Egyptian universities in 2008 was seventeen, with a total of 1.43 million enrolled in the academic year 2008/09. While this high number can be a positive indicator of development, there has been a notable decline in the quality of higher education over the last three decades, manifested in the mismatch between labor market needs and the ever growing supply of unemployed graduates. Overcrowding strains available facilities, and an overworked, poorly paid and limited number of academic staff has led to the deterioration in free public universities. Entrance requirements to university specializations are based on the single factor of their grades in the nationwide secondary school completion examinations and may need to be reviewed (see Chapter Four). Second chance programs for the less privileged through the technical or vocational path are proving successful internationally, but require incentives such as upgraded curricula and equipment, cost-sharing for training and tax incentives to employers (see Chapter Twelve). Accountability is also necessary with the introduction of proper certification, based on recognized and internationally based standards of performance.

Poverty

The dreams and aspirations of the most disadvantaged are significantly more modest, as can be expected. Multidimensional poverty measures assign an important weight to a number of variables other than income and consumption. For youth, these are shown to include density/crowding, a decent job (occupation and job quality), access to housing, and even ownership of a mobile telephone, as seen in Chapter Six. Egypt is no longer a subsistence economy and yet some 20% of the population can be ranked as poor by all these related dimensions. Poverty, especially rural poverty, and the lack of job opportunities has resulted in high levels of migration to the periphery of large towns, and particularly to that of Greater Cairo, thus perpetuating the problems of informal settlements and slum areas. It has thus taken more than 30 years for the government to come to grips with the housing problem, but it is now moving with proper urban planning, mortgage schemes and incentives for housing construction.

Poverty in Egypt has a strong inter-generational dimension. A youth lens points to the important link between family conditions, child and youth poverty. This is consistent with the life cycle approach adopted by many chapters in this report. The poor of one generation are typically the children of the poor of the previous generation. Several factors lie behind the presence and persistence of poverty, such as household size and composition, gender and education of

head of household, low school enrollment rate, high dropout and illiteracy.

Lack of a permanent job is also highly correlated with poverty. Poor youth can ill afford to remain unemployed for long and therefore give up on the idea of getting formal employment sooner than other cohorts and take up whatever employment they can find, whether temporary or seasonal. It is therefore not getting a job which presents a route out of poverty. Rather, it is getting and keeping gainful employment which is effective at raising young people out of poverty. Employment through migration is also a significant contributor to poverty reduction for the migrant's household, and remittances contribute to increased schooling.⁷

Unemployment

According to the labor market analysis presented in Chapter Eleven, youth unemployment is the dominant form of unemployment in Egypt and the most serious kind of youth exclusion. At least 90% of the unemployed are aged less than 30 years and many more are affected by underemployment.⁸ Youth unemployment in Egypt is therefore high by any measure. The challenge is not only creating more jobs, but also about creating better jobs, since the informal economy currently represents the main source of employment for new labor market entrants. The 2006 Census data indicates that the total number of workers in the informal sector increased to 7.9 million, up from 5 million in 1996.⁹

There are some indications that unemployment has begun to decline, notwithstanding the recent financial crisis. The male jobless rate has fallen by a third from 32% in 1998 to 24% in 2009. This trend aside, unemployment is an indicator of labor market insertion problems experienced by young people as they negotiate their transition from school to work. Because of a highly gendered labor market structure, these transitions are significantly differentiated by gender. While nearly all young men eventually transition into employment, whether in the formal or informal sectors, less than a fifth of young women do. Female labor force participation has fallen, a decline that is concentrated among females aged 20 to 24 and among technical secondary and university graduates.¹⁰ Gender

disparities are rooted in cultural norms and may also indicate the need for greater private sector incentives in support of women in the labor force following the strong withdrawal of state support in the form of jobs and entitlements.

There is evidence of increased resort to the informal labor market by all youth for their first jobs. This argues for active labor market policies, including employment services and job search assistance, enforcement of minimum wages, training programs for the unemployed, and job creation through wage and employment subsidies. It also suggests the need for educational reform to overcome the mismatch between education and labor market needs.

Vocational Training

Today, Egyptian labor does not fulfill the market requirements and it is a critical impediment to private sector's growth and competitiveness. A proposed national employment strategy must also take labor demand factors into account. The problem is further deepened by lack of an adequate human resources strategy at the level of firms to offer employers clear directions on labor or hiring issues. Not all of Egypt's youth have the same access to networks of support and opportunities for decent jobs and comfortable incomes. On one level, university-educated youth are experiencing high unemployment rates as a result of the mismatch between their education and formal labor market needs. On a second level, graduates of technical and vocational education and training (TVET) have also been beset by low employment rates.

Entering the vocational education track has held the dead-end label for those who are pushed away from general or higher education. However, most TVET institutions are supply-driven and have a lack of clear standards for curriculum development and training delivery, and they use outdated equipment that is misaligned with technological development. The result is under-skilled graduates who cannot fill the specialized requirements of industry, of the upper end services sectors, and must turn to the informal sector for jobs. Evidence also indicates that, paradoxically, unskilled labor holds an advantage in terms of

employment opportunities, perhaps as a result of a boom in construction.

Gender

There have undoubtedly been improvements in gender parity over the past decade, as reported in Chapter Seven, and especially in education. According to SYPE, 74% of the young women interviewed have completed basic education or above. More than half of university enrolment is by women, and they constitute 56% of those who complete university and 54% who completed their education in two-year higher education institutions with diploma credentials. Nevertheless, the twin problems of school dropouts and non-enrolment continue as a phenomenon that is mostly peculiar to poor girls, and reflects the persistence of gender disparities, with Upper Egypt being the most disadvantaged region. More regional and residence-specific programs targeting these young girls are needed if they are to be helped out of the cycle of poverty that accompanies lack of education.

Overall, young women in Egypt face the most difficult school to work transition. Egypt has one of the lowest female labor participation rates in the world at 18.5%.¹¹ This high rate of inactivity is partially driven by market conditions, by cultural norms, and partly by women's choices. The unemployment rate is highest among those aged 18-24, that is, at a time when the difficulties of finding a job or obtaining fair wages encourages them to abandon the idea of participating in the labor market altogether. The legal minimum age of marriage for girls has been raised from 16 to 18 (the same as for boys). About 40% of females aged 18-24 in the SYPE sample are already married and 81% are married by the time they reach the age of 29. Cultural factors play a role. Half of young women and two thirds of young men also interviewed in SYPE disagree that work improves a girl's marriage opportunities.

Among 2,496 married females surveyed and aged 15-29, all but one had at least one child.¹² These figures point to a generalized trend whereby women bear a heavier burden in housework and in child care, and indeed may choose to focus on their role as caretakers. Activities in the public sphere are limited as

a result, although participation in the broader social sphere — starting with employment — is vital for the future if young women are to learn to become leaders in their families and communities, and to increasingly take part in the workplace and in the community.

Jobs must be encouraged through special incentives, possibly a government subsidy contribution for a specified list of interventions by civil society organizations that cater to women's needs. The lesson here is also that policies and programs are sorely needed for young Egyptian women to access the labor market via tailor-made training programs for self-employment, as well as programs to support the capacity of young mothers to work if they so wish.

Sexual harassment is a new phenomenon in Egypt and is often ascribed to a breakdown in traditional behavior.¹³ Survey results indicate that 50% of young women respondents had been subjected to sexual harassment, whether verbal or physical, and frequently by strangers, in public transport, in the street or by colleagues at work. An increase in vivid stories by the media on the growing incidence of rape has added to a climate of fear and anxiety among young women as reported by many young women in Chapter Eight, with 'safety' given as a primary concern in the public arena. The unfortunate consequence is reduced participation in public events and recourse to more traditional values that circumscribe their behavior to certain narrow norms.

Family Formation

Early marriage is primarily a rural phenomenon in Egypt with more than 70% of females in the age group 15-21 married by age 18. Similarly, 93% of males married in the same age group live in rural areas. Poverty is a common factor. Delayed marriage, on the other hand, is primarily an urban phenomenon and two factors have been at work; the first is the decline in job opportunities and the second is the cost of marriage. Prospects for family formation have somewhat improved as a result of the easing of mortgage credit and the increased availability of affordable public housing, although SYPE reports that more than one third of young people continue to live with their parents upon marriage.

Box 1.3: Young Egyptians: An Untapped Resource

Youth-led civil society in Egypt has witnessed a revival of sorts over the past 10 years and the increasing number of youth-led NGOs and student-led clubs and associations, albeit small, is an indication of changes in youth organization. Examples include the Youth Association for Population and Development, and student clubs like Resala and Alashanek Ya Balady. Media tools now used by youth and for youth, including ICT, are also testimonies to this revival. This new phenomenon is promising because youth-targeting programs led by youth are more understanding of their peers' needs and priorities. Youth-led civil society now confronts both opportunities and challenges. Sources of funding available for development initiatives from the corporate and foundation sectors are beginning to materialize. There is a changing trend in funding away from traditional short-term relief and charity to the support of development and empowerment projects. Other opportunities derive from a rising national and international interest in youth issues. Large projects such as the Arab League's program on the empowerment of youth or the Brookings Institute's Wolfensohn Centre research program on Middle East youth are aimed at improving society's understanding of youth through research. At home, the International Youth Forum hosted by the Suzanne Mubarak International Women for Peace Organization, held in 2007, indicates the increased presence of official support. Moreover, the number of corporate donors and UN agencies supporting youth led initiatives has been on the increase. *Source: Ehaab Abdou, former Nahdet El Mahroussa*

Customary or urfi marriage has become an increasingly widespread phenomenon in Egypt as described in Chapter Seven. Urfi marriage may be seen as one religiously sanctioned way to avoid the increasing cost of legal or officially registered marriage and to permissibly circumvent restrictions on premarital sex at a time when marriage occurs later in the life cycle. This type of unregistered union provides little of the social advantages of a formal marriage, but recourse to it is, in urban areas, often prompted by the long period of 'waithood' between youth and the social inclusion of adulthood.

Housing and Transportation

Finding affordable housing is often flagged as a serious impediment to youth's transition into marriage, a leading feature of social inclusion. Reasonably priced housing units have not kept pace with middle-class and luxury housing. A comprehensive review in Chapter Fourteen suggests that the forecasted increase in construction costs will likely pose a great budgetary challenge for any housing program in the coming years given that most subsidy programs within it are tied to specific income levels and unit price targets. Accordingly, pressure is likely to build on the government to fill the gap with subsidies that are additional to those provided in its National Housing Program (NHP). The National Democratic Party in its 2009 housing working paper has emphasized the need to

adopt subsidy reform to better reach the real beneficiaries and avoid current distortions, in addition to providing flexible and varied subsidy packages that are affordable to different income groups.

Four years on, the NHP is moving towards realizing its target of 500,000 units within a six year period, targeted mainly to lower income groups and youth. As of end of December 2009, 235,000 units and land plots have been built or delivered to beneficiaries, while some 190,000 units are under construction. However, the NHP is already proving to be very expensive for the government. Another concern is affordability, since some axes of the NHP (such as the private sector axis) require a contribution by young people that is beyond their financial means.

Nevertheless, Chapter Fourteen reports that given the success of the ongoing NHP so far, the Ministry of Housing has adopted plans to support this program by increasing the contribution of the private sector in the various social housing schemes, moving towards a more efficient mortgage-linked finance system with the government in providing housing for the most deprived groups, and developing the institutional framework for the policy of subsidized housing which complies with and reflects the subsidy mechanisms and its annual budget on the national level.

Box 1.4: The Nine Messages of EHDR 2010

Influencing youth transitions requires a coherent framework. The proposed national youth policy must set priorities, coordinate action and provide clear lines of accountability for youth outcomes. It must be integrated with national planning and implementation mechanisms throughout key ministries and stakeholders. Initiatives from civil society organizations must also be encouraged to respond to the needs of special groups (such as girl's illiteracy) or to promote programs that tackle national issues (such as poverty reduction), and they would benefit from the inclusion of young people volunteering and leading these projects. There must also be a stronger voice from young people themselves in promoting good governance and providing feedback on the quality of service delivery. Young people should also become the agents of change in favor of reclaiming such traditional cultural norms as tolerance and of new ones and especially gender equity. The following nine messages highlight this report's key recommendations for action to support expanded opportunities for youth in Egypt.

Message 1: Overcoming education system failure: Policy makers and educators should strive to achieve a better match between the outputs of educational institutions at all levels and the demands of the labor market. This will involve a review of the balance of enrollment across subjects, skills and disciplines, the upgrading of technical education, and the review of curricula to instill problem-solving skills, entrepreneurial and management capacity, and the value of self-employment. As to illiteracy and early school attrition (dropouts), 80% of this phenomenon can be attributed to poverty and gender bias in rural areas. The answer is geographically targeted interventions and especially conditional cash transfers which combine financial support to households with support for literacy, education and training in second chance skill formation programs geared for the job market.

Message 2: Breaking the cycle of poverty: This must focus on youth, given the two-way interaction between poverty and its attributes, namely lack of education and skills, and absence of decent jobs. The answer is again geographic targeting of poor households with a battery of cross-sectoral interventions including on-the-job training, literacy and income generation. The National Project for the 1000+ Villages provides a unique opportunity for Egypt to mobilize all of the government, private sector and civil society resources — both financial and managerial — so as to uproot severe poverty in all of its manifestations. A key role in the mobilization effort should be given to youth, providing them with a goal and purpose in the national cause through volunteer activity. There exist a number of national projects in Egypt's current Five Year Plan that are MDG anchored and can use the human capital of Egypt's youth. The national programs could be offered for small business start-ups.

Message 3: Job creation: Many job opportunities exist in the formal and informal private sector but the state must bear its responsibility in making these jobs respectable, safe and rewarding. The answer is for the state to provide a contribution to social security payments for new jobs for youth as recommended in the EHDR 2005. Education and training in addition to the proposed wage subsidy (social security share) will mean higher incomes earned in the SME sector and higher taxable income for the government which can promote what is in fact a self-sustaining budgetary scheme. Appointment of youth to government positions should be where there is a real need and a real job opportunity in existence. Despite the overstuffed government bureaucracy, there are some areas of deficit, such as for teachers and nurses in many governorates, but there are insufficient applicants either because of inadequate pay or remote location. Here again, what is proposed is a time-bound national program for jobs for youth targeted at meeting all MDG-related objectives and their indicators.

Message 4: Focus on culture: There is growing evidence of regression in attitudes of tolerance and respect of the other, whether directed at religious or gender affiliation. NGO-led youth initiatives in areas of social concern could overcome the bias towards narrow group attachments. Evidence also indicates that teacher values and attitudes as well as constricted curriculum content are responsible in part for this unfortunate trend. More emphasis on liberal educational material, and on music, theatre and the arts in general, would generate creative thinking and inventiveness. It would attenuate the bias towards limited perspectives. Alliances with global youth initiatives would promote the ideas of both children and young people who have the mindset and talent to overcome limited world views. In Egypt, the culture of invention and innovation by young people needs to be reinvigorated after decades of neglect. As a precondition, open-mindedness will allow the energy of young people — who are the leaders of the future — to create novel and original solutions to current problems.

Message 5: Eliminate gender discrimination: The exclusion of young girls and women is still a serious problem in Egypt. A mix of legislative and programmatic interventions is needed to fight culturally rooted sources of discrimination. Schooling has a role to play, but reforms under the new Child Law should also be expanded to include benefits for 18 to 29 age women. With regards socio-economic participation, three vital projects that impact on girls and young women need scaling up: preschool education, the one classroom schools for girls and the conditional cash transfers. All three programs were adopted in the current Five Year Plan following recommendations in the EHDR 2005, but their implementation has fallen well behind their 2012 target.

Message 6: Youth Well-Being: The National Youth Council should take the lead in issuing an annual review of the National Youth Well-Being Index. The Index, which was prepared as part of the present 2010 EHDR (see Chapter Fifteen) assesses progress on youth indicators in access to services, income and deprivation, gender, employment, as well as civic participation, family life, leisure, and security. The objectives of the Index are fourfold: To monitor the levels and severity of youth deprivation, to situate Egypt's youth as compared to youth in other countries, to measure progress in youth well-being over time, and to raise awareness on all aspects of youth welfare. Other studies and research initiatives, whether publicly or privately initiated, should be used to supplement the data base for the Index and serve to inform policy makers on youth areas needing special interventions.

Message 7: Governance: Enhancing youth participation for 'responsive governance' will improve government performance. In the government sector, the opportunities for youth can be found in a Pay for Performance system, a Competency Based Human Resource Management system, more utilization of e-government to combat corruption, and a reconfiguration of the social contract binding employers and employees. Strict abidance by a merit based Human Resource Management system would limit nepotism, patronage and '*wasta*' as entry points to employment or to promotion. In civil society organizations and through the independent media, youth can also push for government sector reform by holding it accountable and monitoring its performance.

Message 8: Migration: The benefits of migration from the perspective of employment and remittances far outweigh the cost of brain-drain — especially given Egypt's current youth bulge. However, the state should support migration under a holistic and institutionalized approach that is dictated by the current structure of Egypt's human resources. It should also study future prospects and demand in the labor markets of Europe and its aging populations, and in the labor markets of emerging oil economies, so as to cater for these in Egypt's education and skill formation programs. Moreover, the state should negotiate labor movements with host countries on the basis of temporary migration (4-5 years) and terms that are win-win for all concerned.

Message 9: Breaking the land constraint: A national scheme, 'project land' proposes the distribution of parcels of land to youth in Egypt's new regions such as the desert fringes (*zaheer sahrawi*), along the Nile Valley, the coastlines, and new cities and urban developments. The conditions are that youth beneficiaries will settle the lands and engage in innovative projects in small-scale tourism, eco-friendly agriculture, and other high value-added activities such as ICT, transport and housing. Entrepreneurship needs to start from ownership of some asset in addition to human capital and providing youth with physical capital assets will thus open new avenues of employment and prosperity. The purpose is to introduce a key element that caters both for distributive justice and for good investment fundamentals. *Source: Heba Handoussa, Lead Author EHDR*

2010

Civic Participation

A portion of the blame for modest participation and little civic engagement from youth should be placed on the present cultural and political environment in Egypt rather than on the youth themselves. About 82% of the World Values Survey sample — covered extensively in Chapter Five of this report — stressed the importance of preserving customs and traditions rooted in religion and family as characteristics that

apply to them completely. The potential for the creation of an enabling environment also appears to be undermined by the country's record of democracy and by a security apparatus that is intolerant of any form of public display. However, this report clearly demonstrates that youth are interested in inclusion, discuss the ills of their society as they see them, and dream about what they consider to be better conditions. Aspirations revolve around better education,



suitable job opportunities, decent wages, and family encouragement for civic engagement. These opinions, illustrated in a number of chapters, also reflect the conviction amongst youth of the current futility of participation, the perception that opportunities are unequally distributed, the presence of nepotism and favoritism, and the many economic and social hardships faced, largely as a result of unemployment.

Nevertheless, 86% of the sample from the World Values Survey said that they were happy with their life. Surprisingly, 62% held the state responsible for meeting their needs and aspirations. If a good quality life requires that an individual should take responsibility to achieve it, this response seems to imply that the transition to the values of a market economy is not complete. Given Egypt's high youth unemployment figures, their perception of their relationship to work takes on great importance. Overall, attitudes to work — identified as indispensable — are positive, as expressed by 85.5% of the same sample. Work as a social duty is expressed by 91.7%. However, 44% believed that being given any work opportunity was more important than matching skill to job.

Youth appear to endorse the importance of democracy but do not perceive it as much a priority as earning a living in the future. To 72% of the sample, concern over the future is over economic improvement. This suggests that prospects for work opportunities and regular income amid growing unemploy-

ment are a more urgent preoccupation than political issues. Further, 87% of the sample said that in case of scarce employment opportunities, priority should be given to men who are, it appears, considered the principal breadwinners. In line with these findings, 66% of the sample believed that a woman's role as a housewife can give her the same satisfaction as work outside home.

Health

Chapter Thirteen suggests that most young people make the transition into adulthood in good health. Generally, the health problems commonly occurring relate to malnutrition, to reproductive health, sexually transmitted diseases (including HIV infection), in addition to substance use and violence. Further health problems arise from social and cultural pressure such as early marriages and female genital cutting, nutrition related non-communicable diseases, some prevalent infectious diseases such as tuberculosis and hepatitis, and food borne diseases that are often a result of poor hygiene and inadequate sanitation facilities. Faulty childcare practices among young mothers are the cause of repeated diarrheal episodes and malnutrition. The common precipitating factor is most often poverty, especially in rural areas. Some health problems result from interpersonal violence, or from the consequences of an unsafe abortion or unattended childbirth. Furthermore, the health of adolescents and youth may have an intergenerational effect. Babies born to adolescent parents, or to moth-

ers who are undernourished, carry a higher risk of being underweight and of dying.

It is proposed to revisit current national programs targeting youth health and wellbeing for strengthening of their youth dimensions. Mechanisms are needed that facilitate and enhance cross-sectoral collaboration within the government for programs/interventions/activities aiming at the protection and promotion of the health security of youth and foster initiatives to better understand the intricate relationship between public health and these sectors. This may be an opportune timing since three sectors, namely, health, education and social solidarity are in the midst of a reform process. The coordination role awaited from the Family and Population Ministry is expected to benefit from the design of information sharing systems, of a financial management model to facilitate accounting and accountability in jointly implemented programs, and a management model for multi-partner interventions. Promoting behavior change through peer groups and maximizing use of youth services and modern IT communication modalities can also promote healthy behavior. The role of Civil Society Organizations can bring added value.

Youth Well-Being

To see improvements in all of these areas, it is necessary to first have measures by which progress can be tracked over time and even provide cross-country comparisons. Chapter 15 makes a first attempt at identifying and quantifying indicators of youth wellbeing and aggregating them into a proposed Youth Well-Being Index (YWBI). While education, health and income indicators are included, the greater benefit will come from the ability to measure such qualitative indicators as leisure and satisfaction, the quality of jobs, and even social capital and cohesiveness.

The YWBI is a composite index in which the ten domains and 54 indicators are calculated from the Household Income and Consumption Survey, the World Value Survey, the Demographic and Health Survey and the Survey of Young People in Egypt. Selected variables from each domain were adjusted to cope with the direction towards maximum well being at 100%, and the resulting composite YWBI for Egypt

was calculated to be 61%. When differentiated by gender, disaggregated data shows that young women are still severely more disadvantaged than young men on a number of fronts, specifically with regards labor force participation, unemployment rates and absolute poverty figures.

NATIONAL ACTION PLAN ON YOUTH EMPLOYMENT

Public policy and institutions are only very slowly emerging to create a different set of conditions to help forge a new life course for Egypt's youth. Heading the list of challenges to be addressed is the issue of youth unemployment. This requires "an integrated strategy for growth and job creation, as well as targeted interventions to help young people overcome the specific barriers they face in entering and remaining in the labor market".¹⁴ It also requires partnerships with different actors. In this respect Egypt as a lead partner in the UN Secretary General's Youth Employment Network (YEN)¹⁵ has prepared a National Action Plan on Youth Employment (NAP) with support from the ILO and YEN.

The process has been driven and supported by the Ministry of Manpower and Migration, with multiple social partners, national and international actors, youth organizations, development agencies and donors. To date, the initiative has produced a fully comprehensive draft document that sets specific objectives and outcomes, as well as a division of labor, financial commitments and monitoring mechanisms for an integrated approach to meet the youth employment challenge in Egypt. It is to be ratified by Parliament and incorporated into Egypt's current and next Five Year Plans at an estimated LE 17 billion at LE 3.4 billion per year over five years. There are three policy priorities: (i) Technical education and vocational training (TVET) to increase youth employability; (ii) Enterprise development, to improve the success rate of micro, small and medium enterprises (MSMEs); (iii) Labor market policies and programs, to activate minimum wage rule and its enforcement and to upgrade employment offices and encourage the establishment of private recruitment agencies. This would improve the information and knowledge base that youth can access on work opportunities,

Box 1.5: The Proposed National Policy for Youth in Egypt

The Egyptian National Youth Council reports that after extensive deliberations with private and civil society organizations responsible for youth activities, a unified document defining the national policy towards youth has been developed that focuses on twelve different sector areas. It also proposes the actions to be undertaken by all concerned parties. Listed below are the different sector areas and the main proposed activities required:

1. Employment:

- Developing and implementing a national employment strategy based on a partnership between public, private and civil society organizations;
- Promoting a culture of entrepreneurship and self employment;
- Providing adequate funding for small projects for young people;
- Encouraging the private sector to provide training opportunities and volunteer work for young people;
- Determining an employment quota for youth with special needs;
- Promoting awareness among youth concerning labor laws and rights.

2. Political Participation:

- Instilling the value of participation in youth through educational institutes, the media and civil society;
- Expanding civic education and young leaders programs that foster knowledge of political systems, citizens' rights/ duties;
- Calling on political parties to provide an opportunity for youth to take on leadership positions.

3. Education:

- Enhancing the role of youth in formulating and reviewing educational policies;
- Combating the 'drop-out' phenomenon in education;
- Improving technical education;
- Boosting the relationship between the private sector and educational institutions with the purpose of increasing training and employment opportunities.

4. Health:

- Developing an overall framework for dealing with youth health;
- Increasing awareness campaigns regarding addiction, transfer of contagious diseases and family planning;
- Conducting studies on nutritional habits of young people;
- Supporting the partnerships between public, private and civil society organizations providing health services to youth.

5. Population:

- Introducing population education programs at various education stages;
- Expanding the reliance on youth in family planning awareness campaigns;
- Making use of youth public service programs in serving the objectives of family planning.

6. Culture:

- Developing a comprehensive framework for cultural work related to youth;
- Developing the infrastructure for cultural institutions to enable better cultural development of youth;
- Providing more space for the private sector and civil society to participate in the development of the societal cultural infrastructure.

7. Mass Media:

- Giving more opportunity to youth to participate in the public policy making process for mass media;
- Devoting more space for coverage of youth issues in the media;
- Using more of an interactive communication style in the media discourse;
- Encouraging the issuance of newspapers, magazines and electronic websites that deal with youth issues.

8. Social Activities and Volunteer Work:

- Supporting the role of youth in civil society organizations and NGOs and allocating a number of seats in their governing bodies to young people;
- Promoting the culture of volunteerism and social responsibility among youth.

9. Social Welfare:

- Intensifying awareness campaigns by youth and targeting the protection of youth from all forms of deviant behavior, especially addiction and extremism;
- Supporting government and civil society organizations working on the provision of social and psychological care to young people.

10. Sports and Recreation:

- Paying more attention to sports activities in schools and universities and providing educational institutions with the required resources to establish the required courts and gyms;
- Expanding the establishment of sports courts and encouraging private sector and civil society to help achieve that goal;
- Supporting and developing youth festivals and sports tournaments at the national, local and regional levels.

11. Environment:

- Emphasizing the importance of environmental issues in educational curricula;
- Providing adequate training to teachers on environmental issues;
- Encouraging the participation of youth in spreading environmental awareness;
- Encouraging the creation of environment clubs and societies, in schools, universities and clubs;
- Supporting youth NGOs working in the field of the environment.

12. Studies and Research:

- Encouraging in ministries concerned with youth to study the issues that are of concern to young people and come up with recommendations;
- Establishing a Youth Research Center in universities;
- Emphasizing the importance of field research in dealing with youth issues, polling youth opinions on a regular basis and making use of the academic theses and dissertations that deal with youth issues and are available in various universities.

Source: Mohamed Abou el Khir, The National Youth Council, 2009

wage conditions, and training and study programs.¹⁶ A further significant step taken by the Government of Egypt has been to create a National Youth Council (NYC) mandated to enhance youth engagement and contribution to public affairs.

Egypt's National Youth Council

The NYC is responsible for the development and implementation of a plan for youth and the mobilization of human and financial resources to disseminate a youth culture. The Council has produced a document proposing a National Youth Policy focusing on twelve different sector areas as a first step towards a holistic and inclusive reform strategy. At a second stage, it is expected to develop the policies and proposing legislation to define and regulate all youth related activities.

The proposed National Youth Policy for Egypt (Box 1.5) realizes the multi-disciplinary nature of the work that needs to be done to better serve Egyptian youth. It thus mentions that the implementation of the policies will be the responsibility of the various concerned stakeholders. There is also a clear recognition of the inevitable role to be played by the private sector and civil society organizations in formulating and implementing the policies, and this is emphasized in more than one point. What remains, and after the paper is ratified, is a clearer division of roles and responsibilities.

The policy document recognizes the importance of an integrated approach to the human development of youth. However, within each sector, there is a need to consider the current and potential obstacles that

may face the implementation of the various goals and actions proposed; this would definitely render the proposed actions more realistic. Unless the policy paper is supplemented with action plans, nothing much is likely to happen.

Responsibility of the Youth Council also includes initiating or approving youth related systems and programs, and creating a database for all youth activities. A number of steps have already been taken, notably a review and upgrade of existing youth centers across Egypt:

- Setting up new youth centers for cultural, educational, sports, social and recreational services for youth at all villages and cities in Egypt. In 2008, 143 new youth centers were established at an overall cost of approximately LE 200 million; while the plan is for 260 additional centers at an estimated overall cost of LE 390 million;
- A process to upgrade existing youth centers is underway with the addition of libraries, technology clubs and sports courts. In 2008/2009, 373 new libraries were added to centers in the 29 governorates at a total cost of L.E 26.2 million. The plan is for an additional 260 libraries at an estimated cost of LE 18.2 million. Similarly, 811 technology clubs were established in 2008/2009 and the plan will add 400 more. In 2008, 110 new sports courts with special flooring were added; the plan is to build 100 more;
- In 2008/2009, five new hostels were established in the cities and towns of Port-Said, Alexandria, Hurghada, Ras El Bar, and Luxor, at an overall cost of LE 257 million; future plans involve two additional hostels in Sharm El Sheikh and in Al-Arish.
- Youth 'Forums' are expanded and innovated into multi-purpose youth centers.

Although all these tangible outputs are indeed important, in the assessment of the NYC's real achievements, we need to know more about the longer term impact of these investments and to what extent they enable the Council to achieve its mission and mandates, and to reach significant numbers of youth. Various chapters in this EHDR suggest that at present, very few young people are attracted to youth centers.

On the official Council website, successes of initiatives, to date, cover mainly physical accomplishments such as buildings and sports facilities.¹⁸ According to SYPE, however, only 0.01% actively participated in youth centers.¹⁹ Moreover, Youth Ministry Article 882/2002 states that youth centers are aimed at training youth in leadership and life skills, vocational and ICT proficiency, and also at nurturing democratic practices that promote debate and free discussion. These goals have received less support in staffing or financial resources.

Through the coordinating role of the NYC, perhaps an annual report on youth well-being in Egypt needs to be prepared that would look into progress achieved in each of the twelve sectors outlined in the National Youth Policy; for example, whether political participation has risen, and whether youth health and education have improved or deteriorated. While clearly part of the Council's mandate, a refocus of youth centers on social and cultural activities could reorient and reemphasize feelings of citizenship. It would give room for girls — at present largely excluded — to engage in enriching pursuits outside of the home. Centers also provide an enormous opportunity that should be consciously seized to attract all youth — Muslim and Christian alike — and reinforce their allegiance to a larger identity, which is that of the nation as a whole. At present, however, most youth engaging in socially productive work act through religiously affiliated organizations and clubs. A large 67% of youth look for volunteering opportunities in religious institutions against only 23% in non-government organizations.

YOUTH'S IDENTIFICATION OF CRITICAL ISSUES

Youth themselves are increasingly aware of their exclusion in community and public life in Egypt. They have identified obstacles to participation and freedom of expression as two additional areas of concern, highlighted by young contributors to this report, and that were substantiated during focus group discussions and youth consultations held in March 2010 at Cairo University.

Box 1.6: Youth, Volunteerism and Development in Egypt

Youth volunteerism is a means for strengthening youth participation. It has the potential to overcome traditional obstacles for youth development such as economic status, educational attainment, geographic location, gender roles and vulnerability to social conditions. Community involvement is critical for promoting young people's development and learning. From a youth perspective, volunteerism brings a strong sense of confidence and self-satisfaction and it enables young people to develop new skills such as leadership, creative thinking, and problem solving. In fact, volunteering empowers young people and expands their social networks, often representing their first channel of involvement with the work environment. The UN system promotes volunteerism for development through the United Nations Volunteers programme (UNV) administered by UNDP. UNV was designated by the General Assembly resolution of 16 December 1976 as the major operational unit of the UN for the execution of youth programmes. The UNV programme has been active in Egypt since 1988. It has been growing over the past years in conformity with the growing need for UNV volunteers' assistance to various community development activities carried-out by the UN system, the Government, NGOs, bilateral donors and the private sector. It is also succeeding in facilitating the setting up of mechanisms for promoting and engaging different stakeholders through various projects and initiatives in civil society groups.

There are various volunteering opportunities in Egypt. Examples of formal volunteering include the work done in partnership with the UNV programme by the National Council for Childhood and Motherhood (NCCM), INJAZ, Sailing the Nile for the MDGs, and the Youth Association for Population and Development (YAPD). Informally, one can join any community's efforts that contribute to national efforts towards reducing poverty, organizing the young people around development activities, promoting social capital, and assisting civil society, local groups and organizations to participate in their own development. In addition, the UNV programme offers the Online Volunteering (OV) service that brings volunteers and non-profit organizations, government institutions, academia and UN agencies together to collaborate online and contribute to improving the lives of beneficiaries in developing countries *Source: Leticia Troncoso, UNV, Egypt*

Obstacles to Participation²⁰

There is not only a need to expand all youth programs, as mentioned in the proposed national policy for youth. It is also important to review the current syllabi of civic education taught to students. For example, at the third secondary level, a good section of the curriculum is devoted to a discussion of the achievements of the 1952 revolution in all sectors of the economy. No objective assessment is provided and no room given to a discussion of possible improvements on current public policies. Moreover, no mention is made of political parties, their role in a democracy, or citizens' rights or duties.

A related hurdle is the apathy among youth towards political participation, borne of the conviction that that their voice will largely remain ignored. Whether the case of student councils or national elections, it is common knowledge that these or their outcomes are often tampered with. There is sufficient evidence from many court cases that indicate that the national election process was neither impartial nor its results

open to public scrutiny.

The limited three month period, from the first of November to the end of January, during which any citizen can be issued with a voting card, may also be a procedural hurdle. It would appear simpler to allow citizens to use their national ID cards for voting rather than have to apply during a short window of time for a voting card that can easily be forged. It would also be more useful to ask why Egypt currently has weak opposition parties and why these have not developed into more viable opposition movements, rather than ask political parties to solicit youthful participation in their programs or appoint youth in leadership positions within this context. The ruling National Democratic Party has been taking steps towards the inclusion of youth in many of its activities and programs, but this initiative is still in its early stages.

There is subtle, and sometimes overt, harassment of university students by the security forces if they engage in activities within the university that are

deemed harmful or dissident. Political activities are frowned upon if not in line with the ruling party program. Parents often advise youth not to engage in any kind of activity that could be construed as rebellious or non-conformist, so as to avoid trouble with campus police or the university authorities. This occurs across universities and affects all students, even those affiliated to the Faculty of Economics and Political Science, whose main pedagogical purpose is to teach the practice of politics.

Before calling for the participation of young people, via Youth Centers, NGO or volunteer work, there is need to understand why these have been unable to attract youth in large numbers. Do they provide the means by which youth are able to develop their own capabilities and pursue interests that contribute to their well-being? Are they sufficiently open to consultation and feedback from young people? Do they give young people equal opportunity to develop, to be empowered within the organization, to grow and gain influence over policy decisions and development directions? Are they aware that the voice of young people can also improve service delivery by monitoring and evaluating its quality?

Freedom of Expression

The overall national media policy — as a result of various legislative prohibitions and the Emergency Law that is still in force — has an adverse impact on media liberties. Rather than calling for the publication of more newspapers and magazines dealing with anodyne youth subjects, or the development of websites dealing with predetermined youth issues, there is a need to discuss the real hurdles facing freedom of expression by youth, especially over the net, and there are reported cases of prosecution of some active bloggers over the past years. The content of programs, talk shows, movies, and advertising send the message that entertainment is paramount, and little attention is directed towards subjects of critical concern to development or participation.

CONCLUSION

There is little argument over the need to adopt a coherent framework for a youth-inclusive strategy in Egypt. A first step would be to upgrade the status of Egypt's

National Youth Council so that it can better fulfill its mandate and implement a national youth policy. A second step would be to adopt the Youth Well-Being Index (YWBI) proposed in this report. This YWBI captures all aspects health, education, employment, recreation and culture for young men and women that number close to 20 million citizens in the critical age group 18-29 years. The index would therefore become the benchmark whereby the government is held accountable for progress, along with the contributions of stakeholders in civil society and the business community. As shown in Box 1.4, the list of priority areas for positive intervention on behalf of youth is vast.

Unemployment among young people is perhaps the biggest challenge faced by the Government of Egypt today. The youth bulge is a major contributing factor since it has doubled the annual number of new entrants to the labor force over the past two decades. The rate of decline in the annual number of youth entering the job market in the longer term will depend on the rate of fertility decline in this critical decade. Equally problematic is the mismatch between employment opportunities, education and skill formation. Type and level of education matter in the search for jobs, with university and technical education graduates at the greatest disadvantage, requiring a serious review of educational standards, quality and relevance. For those numerous young people who remain illiterate or drop out of basic education, the need is to improve access to the foundations of education, by targeting poor and rural areas specifically, with special attention given to girls.

A proposed national employment strategy must also take demand factors into account. The need to improve the compatibility between the outputs of the educational institutes and the labor market has been emphasized in this report. Despite high unemployment rates, many employers (whether in the public or private sector) complain from lack of availability of the required skills and competencies needed. This is especially true for technical work positions. The upgrading of technical and vocational proficiency would open doors to skilled and semi-skilled jobs in industry, as discussed in Chapter Twelve, and an upgrade of entrepreneurial skills would encourage youth to look for opportunities outside of the traditional chan-

nels, and to have the optimism and audacity to venture into their own business (see Chapter 10). There is also a bias against young women across the work force, and whose participation rate has declined even further in the past few years. Sufficient incentives for young women, such as facilitated transportation and childcare facilities, would promote work, as would the enforcement of legal provisions on work conditions.

A strategy such as Egypt's National Action Plan on Youth Employment (NAP) needs also to pinpoint where present employment opportunities lie, especially for youth with a higher education, and not only in an expanded private sector, but also in niche areas in the public sector. In some professions such

as teaching and nursing, for example providing fair compensation would attract the needed young caliberers to apply for vacant positions. The spread of patronage and nepotism might, in part, be challenged through the establishment of a transparent system of job advertising and recruiting for both public and private openings.

Finally, a change in cultural norms towards greater tolerance of youth freedom is closely interlinked with a more liberally oriented education system, a greater degree of economic independence among young people, as well as with the removal of any coercive measures applied to limit youths' choice of expression and action.


Endnotes

1. Figures provided by the Information and Decision Support Center of the Cabinet.
2. See World Youth Report (2007), *Young People's Transition to Adulthood: Progress and Challenges*, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, UN Secretariat, New York.
3. Ibid, Silver (2007).
4. Diane Singerman, *The Economic Imperative of Marriage: Emerging Practices and Identities among Youth in the Middle East*, Middle East Youth Initiative Working Paper, Brookings Institute, (September 2007)
5. National Census, 2006
6. Population Council (2010), Survey of Young People in Egypt
7. El Badawy and Assaad (2004)
8. Ministry of Manpower and Migration/ILO, Egypt Youth Employment National Action Plan 2010-2015
9. Ibid
10. See Chapter 11 for more details on specific study results.
11. Assaad and Roushdy 2007, and Barsoum et al., 2009.
12. However, poor labor prospects and difficulties in securing housing among some subgroups, notably young people with a university education, have also led to delayed marriage.
13. SYPE Preliminary Results, 2010
14. Ministry of Manpower and Migration/ILO, Egypt Youth Employment National Action Plan 2010-2015
15. Ibid
16. Op.cit.
17. Mohamed Abou el Khir, The National Youth Council, 2009.
18. The official website of the National Council for Youth is <http://www.alshabab.gov.eg/AR_Youth_Clubs.aspx>
19. SYPE Preliminary Results, 2010
20. Contributions to critical assessment by Laila el Baradei, American University in Cairo

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Chapter Two



As in previous Egypt Human Development Reports, Chapter Two is dedicated to assessing progress in the trends of human development indicators in Egypt at the national and local levels, in addition to monitoring gender and regional gaps reflected in these indicators. The chapter also reviews Egypt's achievement in attaining the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), and the most important challenges that remain, especially since only five years remain until the target date of 2015. Finally, the chapter analyzes the evolution of the poverty indicators in addition to their dynamics and those factors influencing their trajectory, and — for the first time — details the ambitious national program adopted by the National Democratic Party for the development of the neediest villages in Egypt.

Table 2.1: Evolution of the Human Development Index

| The report* | 1995 | 1996 | 1997/98 | 1998/99 | 2000/01 | 2003 | 2004 | 2005 | 2008 | 2010 |
|-------------------------|-------|-------|---------|---------|---------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|
| Human Development Index | 0.524 | 0.589 | 0.631 | 0.648 | 0.655 | 0.680 | 0.687 | 0.689 | 0.723 | 0.731 |
| Income Index | 0.357 | 0.503 | 0.598 | 0.632 | 0.649 | 0.655 | 0.607 | 0.622 | 0.681 | 0.727 |
| Education Index | 0.544 | 0.569 | 0.599 | 0.614 | 0.643 | 0.682 | 0.703 | 0.685 | 0.718 | 0.689 |
| Life Expectancy Index | 0.672 | 0.695 | 0.695 | 0.698 | 0.702 | 0.702 | 0.752 | 0.760 | 0.772 | 0.778 |

Source: INP. See Technical Notes. * Note: Each year refers to the data of publication of the EHDR. The reduction in the education index in the EHDR 2010 is due to the reintroduction of sixth primary grade which led to a decline in the measure of school enrollment.

TRENDS IN THE HUMAN DEVELOPMENT INDICATORS

In spite of considerable efforts exerted to raise the level of human development (HD) and the general upward trend recorded by the human development index (HDI) over the past 20 years, there remains a gap not only between what has been achieved across governorates, but also between rural and urban areas in Egypt. Moreover, a gender gap is still evident in some indicators. This section will therefore focus on monitoring the following:

- The general trend of the human development index since 1995;
- The ranking of governorates in terms of the human development level and the extent of the variation between Lower Egypt governorates and Upper Egypt governorates on the human development level;
- Trends and elements of the gap between rural and urban areas; and
- Trends in the gender gap across relevant indicators.

General Trend of the Human Development Index

Table 2.1 and Figure 2.1 show a continuing improvement in HDI, reaching 0.731, up from 0.524 recorded in the 1995 Egypt Human Development Report (EHDR).

Although the values of the three indexes, education, life expectancy, and income, play an important role in the HDI, and besides the continuing improvement of each of these indexes (Figure 2.2), the recorded values for the progress of the income index indicates a noticeable improvement in its value in the EHDR 2010, where it reached 0.727 compared to 0.681 in



2008, an improvement that is also larger than that of education and health.

It should be noted that the increase in average GDP per capita between the 2008 and 2010 EHDRs took place despite the rise in the percentage of the poor from 19.6% to 21.6%, and the increase in the absolute number of poor.¹

The decline in value of the education index in the EHDR 2010 compared to its value in the EHDR 2008 refers to the decrease in enrollment at all educational levels, from 76.4% in 2005/2006 to 66.0% in 2007/2008. This is due to the reintroduction of the sixth primary grade, which has led to a significant reduction in the numbers enrolled in some school years and especially in the first secondary grade. Thus, the decline that appears in the education index value should not be considered a real decrease in educational enrollment over the period.

Another two challenges faced by the educational system are the persistent absence of enrollment and the school dropout rates, which are not reflected in the gross enrollment ratios but evidenced by the final results of the General Census of Population and Establishments 2006² and confirmed by the Survey of Young People in Egypt (SYPE) which was conducted in April 2009. Moreover, earlier studies indicate that the dropout rate from education is high in some particular grades.³

The quality of education in relation to market demand continues to be a problem. Current education policy pushes more than 60% of the preparatory completers toward technical secondary education, in which unemployment is the highest. The rate of

Figure 2.1: Evolution of the Human Development Index**Figure 2.2: Evolution of Sub-Indexes of the Human Development Index in Various Reports**

unemployed persons who obtained an intermediate qualification reached 62.4% of the total unemployed persons in 2007, and this may push large numbers to drop out after the preparatory grade, and as evidenced in the enrollment in secondary education, which reached 46.1% in 2007/2008.

Ranking of Governorates in Human Development

Tracking the level of HD achieved in different governorates since 2005, five governorates occupied the first five rankings in HD level, namely Port Said, Suez, Cairo, Alexandria and Damietta, while the governorates that occupied the bottom five ranks are Fayoum, Assiut, Menia, Beni Suf and Suhag.

EHDR 2010 records changes in the ranking of governorates. Cairo has dropped out and Ismailia has entered the top five, whereas Qena has joined the bottom group.

The entry of Ismailia into the top five governorates is so for the first time since the 1995 report. Ismailia now ranks fifth with a rise of 0.025 in its human development index in EHDR 2010 compared to EHDR 2008. The exit of Cairo from the group is related to the modest increase of 0.006 in its value of HDI over the two year interval (2008-2010). Analysis of the three sub-indexes shows continuation of the lowest five governorates group in the HD level. There is very little movement in ranking within the bottom five group, although the increase in the value of the HDI is significant – no less than the increase achieved by the top group – and is higher in some cases. Analysis

of the three sub-indexes was performed in order to trace the decline in Cairo's ranking. Table 2.2 clearly shows that the education index plays an essential role in the decline of the Cairo governorate ranking and in the progress of the Ismailia governorate. This may be due to the increase in the numbers of slum dwellers in Cairo, which amounted to more than 3 million people, representing about 28% of slum dwellers in the Arab Republic of Egypt in January 2008, according to data from the Central Agency for Public Mobilization and Statistics (CAPMAS). Studies point to the negative impact on the educational process of these massive immigrations into peri-urban Cairo, which is clearly reflected in the education index.⁴

Disparities Between Lower and Upper Egypt Governorates

Urban governorates have again achieved the highest level in human development at 0.794 in the EHDR 2010 compared to Lower Egypt governorates at 0.734, Upper Egypt governorates at 0.708, Frontier Governorates at 0.753 and of course the national level as a whole at 0.731.

However, when tracking the increase achieved in HDI, it can be seen that the governorates of Upper Egypt have achieved the largest increase, which amounted to 0.247 units. In fact, they have achieved the largest increase in all three indexes of income, education and life expectancy, which amounted to 0.445, 0.192, 0.103 units, respectively (Table 2.3).

Furthermore, the increase achieved by Upper Egypt governorates in the education index has exceeded the

Table 2.2: Comparison between Cairo and Ismailia Governorates

| Index | 2008 | | 2010 | |
|-------------------------|-------------------|----------------------|-------------------|----------------------|
| | Cairo Governorate | Ismailia Governorate | Cairo Governorate | Ismailia Governorate |
| Human Development index | | | | |
| Life Expectancy index | 0.737 | 0.733 | 0.743 | 0.758 |
| Education index | 0.773 | 0.759 | 0.772 | 0.765 |
| GDP Index | 0.762 | 0.749 | 0.748 | 0.774 |
| | 0.675 | 0.690 | 0.710 | 0.735 |

Table 2.3: Absolute Increase in HDI According to Region

The amount of the increase in index

| Governorates | HDI | Income Index | Education Index | Life Expectancy Index |
|--------------------------|-------|--------------|-----------------|-----------------------|
| Urban Governorates | 0.187 | 0.281 | 0.053 | 0.092 |
| Lower Egypt Governorates | 0.206 | 0.370 | 0.157 | 0.092 |
| Upper Egypt Governorates | 0.247 | 0.445 | 0.192 | 0.103 |
| Frontier Governorates | 0.210 | 0.428 | 0.174 | 0.073 |
| Egypt | 0.207 | 0.370 | 0.145 | 0.106 |

increase achieved in Lower Egypt governorates by 0.035 units. Additionally, the increased differences in the life expectancy index between Upper and Lower Egypt governorates declined, reaching only 0.009. This suggests that although the human development level in Upper Egypt governorates is still lower than in other regions, significant developmental efforts are reflected in the amount of the increase achieved in Upper Egypt (Figure 2.3).

Moreover, geographical targeting to combat poverty and the selection of the poorest 1000 villages in Egypt (of which 923 villages are located in Upper Egypt governorates of Assiut, Menya, Suhag, Qena, Beni Suef and Aswan) indicates a positive policy orientation which is consistent with the human development indicators.⁵

Human Development and the Gap Between Rural and Urban Areas

The measurement of the HDI gap between rural and urban areas has focused on calculating rural as a percentage of urban area for four indicators: Population, population with access to safe water, access to sanitation and the literacy rate.


In terms of population, and over all of the reports, the size of the rural population has always been higher than the urban population. The ratio of the rural to

the urban population has fluctuated from a low 127% (EHDR 1995) to a high of 135% (EHDR 2005), to reach 133% in EHDR 2010. However, there is a clear reduction in the gap between urban and rural areas in terms of safe water supply, sanitation and the literacy rate. The gap was highest with regard to sanitation in EHDR 2008 where the ratio of sanitation supply in the rural to urban areas reached only 29.5%, after which it significantly improved to reach 41.8% in EHDR 2010. The gap in access to safe water also decreased, with the ratio moving from 94% in EDHR 2008 to 96.9% in EHDR 2010. Furthermore, the gap in literacy rate decreased to 78.4% in EHDR 2008 and 79.4% in EHDR 2010 (Table 2.4)

The targeting program to combat poverty and the selection of the poorest 1000 villages can thus be considered a welcome attempt to further narrow the gap between rural and urban areas.

The Gender Gap

The measurement of the gender gap focuses on each of the following: Life expectancy at birth and share of population, the literacy rate, the enrollment rate in each of primary, preparatory and secondary education, and the percentage in the labor force. The gap value is calculated as the ratio of females to males for each indicator, with a ratio of less than 100 in favor of male and a ratio of more than 100 in favor of female.

Figure 2.3: Regional Trends in the Human Development Index

The only indicator that has shown an advantage in the status of females as compared to males is life expectancy at birth, which is true of all countries, and the indicators exceeded 100 in all the Human Development Reports. However, in terms of absolute numbers in total population, females in Egypt's population are far outnumbered by males at a ratio of 95. The labor force indicator has shown the worst gender difference rate of 31.3, meaning that for every 100 males in the labor force, there are only 31.3 females.

The literacy indicator shows improvement with the gap narrowing and the ratio increasing from 57 (EHDR 1995), to 78.9 (EHDR 2008), and reaching 80.7 in EHDR 2010. As to school enrollment rates, except for the continued superiority of females in primary school enrollment, indicators were lower than 100 indicating a continuation of the gap despite the decline in EDHR 2010.

The Status of Women

The gender gap has emphasized the importance of reviewing women-specific indicators over the period since 1995. The indicators have included: Life expectancy at birth, maternal mortality rate, the average age at first marriage, gross enrollment ratios at the level of basic education (primary and preparatory) and secondary education, the percentage of females (+15 years) with secondary education or higher, female workers in specialized occupations and females in the labor force.

The gross enrollment ratio in basic education can

clarify the status of literacy and may be able to interpret the gap between males and females, as the total female enrollment in basic education reached its best value in the 1997 report, where it amounted to about 91%, but it retreated somewhat in the EHDR 2008 and amounted to 87.1%. In EHDR 2010, it reached 93%, which refers to the presence of 7 females for every 100 persons out of basic education, although the female education initiative has led to an improvement in the situation reflected in the high ratio of female enrollment in basic education in the primary stage, which reached 104.8% in EHDR 2010.

As for the percentage of females in the labor force, the value of this indicator is still limited. It amounted at best to 24% in EHDR 2005, declined somewhat to 23% in EHDR 2008, and reached 23.9% in EHDR 2010. This reflects the status of women in terms of work or search for a job, as the unemployment rate among females reached 25% in EHDR 2008 and then 18.6% in EHDR 2010.

ACHIEVING THE MDGs IN THE FIVE YEARS TO 2015

Only five years remain until the 2015 target to achieve the MDG goals that were agreed upon globally by 147 countries, including Egypt. The evidence is that the Egyptian government has taken this commitment seriously, especially in the past few years. It has not only incorporated these goals within the economic and social development plans, but it has also been following up and assessing progress in four reports issued by the government in collaboration with UNDP

Table 2.4: Gap between Urban and Rural Areas

(Rural area as percent of urban area)

| Report | 1995 | 1995 | 97/1998 | 2000/01 | 2003 | 2004 | 2005 | 2008 | 2010 |
|---------------|------|------|---------|---------|------|------|------|------|------|
| Population | 127 | 127 | 134 | 135 | 133 | 135 | 140 | 135 | 133 |
| Safe Water | 63 | 63 | 73.2 | 76.7 | 84.2 | 84.2 | 84.2 | 94 | 96.9 |
| Sanitation | 59 | 59 | 73 | 90.3 | 78.5 | 78.5 | 78.5 | 29.5 | 41.8 |
| Literacy Rate | 55 | 55 | 62.5 | 63.7 | 67.6 | 67.7 | 67.7 | 78.4 | 79.4 |

over the past decade.

Although Egypt seems to be moving in the right direction, some of the goals remain out of reach and some of the governorates and territories still suffer from a significant disparity in the degree of progress achieved. In addition, the global economic crisis has imposed new challenges that may hinder or decelerate achievement in the agreed timeframe. Further, these challenges represent the minimum level to be achieved. It is necessary not only to achieve this low ceiling of ambition but also to seek raising this ceiling, commensurate with Egypt’s circumstances and capabilities.

This section aims at briefly highlighting the size of achievement in accomplishing the development goals as reflected by the latest data and the available follow-up reports, but also concentrates on the tasks to be addressed. It pays attention to the global economic crisis and the challenges that this imposes by suggesting a number of areas in which youth can participate to overcome obstacles and accelerate the achievement of the desired goals within the deadline.


Ten Years of Work on MDG Targets

A number of key messages supported by figures and facts reveal the size of achievement towards meeting MDG goals made during the past years.⁶

Goal One: Eradicating Extreme Poverty and Hunger

Egypt’s commitment toward mitigating the severity of poverty is represented in the explicit recognition to reduce poverty to 15% by 2011/2012 in the Sixth Five-Year Plan for Economic and Social Development (2007- 2012). This goal is based on national poverty lines, taking into account that Egypt has already ful-

Figure 2.4: Gap between Males and Females over Different Reports



filled its international commitment toward reducing extreme poverty (at the rate of \$1 per day) by half.

There is a clear commitment from the Government of Egypt toward reducing regional disparities in poverty rates and living standards. This is with particular regard to Upper Egypt, identified by the last economic and social development plans as a core priority, given that it is the most deprived area in Egypt. One third of total public investment has been allocated over the past decade to Upper Egypt, and this has reflected positively in narrowing the gap in economic and social development indicators between Upper Egypt and the rest of the Republic’s territories.

Moreover, a ‘Poverty Map’ was developed to identify the neediest regions and groups, and based on this the “Geographical Targeting” and “Supporting the Most Vulnerable Households” programs were implemented. These programs target the villages and households suffering most from poverty across Egypt, using a processing method that allows both integration and empowerment because of its reliance on the redistribution of resources, public expenditure, and political interventions to reach the neediest catego-

ries and the poorest regions.

The upward trend of the poverty rate during the period 2000-2005 was reversed as a result of the slowdown of economic growth during this period, but became a downward trend in the period 2005-2008 as a result of the economic boom witnessed by Egypt at this time. However, the preliminary analysis of the results of the national Income and Expenditure Survey, conducted in 2008/2009, indicate a return of the upward trend in the poverty rate during 2009 as a direct result of the global economic crisis. This was accompanied by a decline in rates of investment, employment and economic growth. It confirms that poverty in Egypt is linked to economic performance, and this calls for intensified efforts to bring back economic growth to the higher levels that prevailed during the three years preceding the global crisis.

Unemployment rates decreased slightly during the period 2005-2008, but rebounded in 2009 as a result of the global economic crisis. There are still serious challenges, especially with regard to full productive employment, particularly in respect of women and young people. Further, the private sector still suffers from the widening gap between the demand for skilled labor and the provision of unskilled labor, as well as the spread of the informal sector.

The significant differences between children who are underweight across different governorates is a cause for some anxiety, as the ratio of children under five years who are classified as underweight ranges from 16% in Assiut (Upper Egypt) to 1.2% in South Sinai (Frontier governorate). This gap requires a swift resolution if Egypt is to achieve the MDG target.

There is still a need for specific policies and strategies to reduce poverty, as this reflects on the economy and on social cohesion. There is also a need for economic policy outcomes of political choices to focus on economic sectors in which the poor work and from which they benefit.

Goal Two: Achieving Universal Primary Education

Educational enrollment has improved significantly

for both males and females during the last few years, but rates of enrollment and dropout remain quite high in certain areas and in specific groups; this is in spite of intensive efforts directed to these areas and groups. However, it can be expected that almost all children of primary school-age will be enrolled by 2015.

Egypt is moving towards completely eliminating illiteracy among the 15-24 age group. This improvement primarily reflects the progress achieved in school enrollment. However, about 30% of the population in the 15+ age bracket was illiterate in 2007, which constitutes a serious challenge that requires new strategic directions.

Goal Three: Promote Gender Equality and Empower Women

Egypt has put the issue of woman's empowerment at the top of its priorities during the past decade, through institutional arrangements and legislative changes. In addition, a large number of initiatives and procedures have been initiated, the latest of which is a quota for women to participate in the People's Assembly.

There are still significant challenges. The three fronts – political, economic and social participation – which have been the focus of the MDGs still call for intensified efforts and procedures.

On the education front, Egypt has already achieved the Millennium Development Goals with respect to the enrollment of girls in general secondary education and it is on its way to achieve the same goal in primary education. However, technical education for girls remains a real challenge, as this sector absorbs about 70% of students, with a percentage of females to males of 85%. This ratio is concentrated mainly in the commercial and agricultural sections, which are less competitive in the labor market.

The low quality of technical education is a fact, and the current reform efforts need to recognize clearly the specificity of female enrollment in this educational sector. Political and economic participation of women do not show any signs of progress, as these two fronts need a greater prioritization and the formulation of further strategies supported by a detailed



working program and steps for implementation.

Goal Four: Reduce Child Mortality

Egypt's attempt to reduce the child mortality rate has achieved real gains and the Government of Egypt is moving toward accomplishing the objectives of the MDG target.

However, the disparity in living standards between different social groups and geographical areas, and hence in the rate of child mortality, still represents a real challenge. Among the health challenges are reducing the high infant mortality rate where this manifests itself, and developing a comprehensive national program for vaccines and combating the spread of diseases among children, especially with regard to diarrheal and acute respiratory infections.

Goal Five: Improve Maternal Health

Egypt's commitment towards improving maternal health, in addition to its many national programs, have translated into a large and impressive reduction in the rate of maternal mortality ratios and in a higher proportion of births attended by skilled personnel. However, the accuracy of measures needs confirmation given the significant and speedy decline in the rate of maternal mortality on the one hand, and the existence of a gap between the official data and the data obtained from the national Demographic Health Survey (DHS) on the other.

Regional disparities in all the available measures for maternal and reproductive health, especially in rural Upper Egypt, require more effective targeting.

The additional and significant gains that have been achieved with regard to women's health can materialize through the adoption of a "reproductive health model." This model would include a strong gender component for the social and qualitative determinants, in addition to a broader definition of reproductive health challenges.

Goal Six: Combat HIV/AIDS, Malaria and Other Diseases

Egypt is taking major steps towards achieving this goal. It has begun the battle against AIDS since the appearance of the first case in the country and it has succeeded in controlling malaria and reduced the incidence of tuberculosis and schistosomiasis. Despite these achievements, Egypt should take steps to avoid the risk of facing a turning point from a low to higher level of the HIV epidemic. The infection is not limited to high-risk groups, but exists also in the productive age group, and a relatively high share of females suffers from the risk of this disease. Moreover, Hepatitis B and C represent a serious health threat in Egypt.

The Ministry of Health and Population has developed preventive and remedial programs for all major diseases. Egypt is also seeking the reform of the health insurance system. The challenge that needs to be

addressed is the excessive burden incurred by the Ministry in the treatment of those who need health care in addition to the responsibility for formulating a multi-sectoral and integrated health policy in order to address health within a social context.

Goal Seven: Ensure Environmental Sustainability

Ensuring environmental sustainability in Egypt still represents a major challenge despite government policies and increased investment in protection measures. The main challenges are the need to reduce the rate of population growth with its negative impact on the environment, improving the level of monitoring and/or managing the increasing demand on natural resources, and addressing the challenges of climate change and water shortages.

Goal Eight: Develop a Global Partnership for Development

The focus here is on the progress achieved in global commitments towards providing better aid assistance and a more equitable basis for trade and debt relief. This goal largely determines the success achieved with regard to the first seven MDGs by 2015. During the past few years, Egypt witnessed growing official developmental assistance from a variety of rich countries and international organizations, which aim at meeting the development needs of different sectors. Moreover, Egypt has benefited from a number of bilateral and multilateral trade agreements, and the share of exports of goods and services in Egypt's GDP increased over the years. Egypt's foreign debts witnessed stable movement during the past few years, with a decline of the ratio of debt interests to exports of goods and services.

The ICT sector in Egypt has seen rapid growth during the past years, especially with the increase of investments directed to it, leading to the availability of more landlines and mobile lines and to the increased use of personal computers and access to the Internet.

Additional Challenges to Achieve the MDGS

The global financial and economic crisis that began in the last quarter of 2008 has imposed new challenges

for the attainment of the Millennium Development Goals in Egypt and within the specified timeframe. It is expected that the decline of investment rates and economic growth, the shrinking of global demand and the increase in unemployment rates and the budget deficit will have a negative impact on achieving the goals of reducing poverty, hunger and disease, promoting equality, improving the environment and strengthening the global partnership for development.

Egypt has pursued an expansionary fiscal and monetary policy during the last period to reduce the negative effects of the global crisis on the operational objectives and on eradicating poverty in particular. As a result, public expenditure has been increased by about LE 15 billion. Most of this amount was directed to investment projects in the infrastructure and social development areas (education, health, social security), which are characterized by the intensive use of labor, in order to achieve a dual goal: Stimulating domestic demand and limiting rising unemployment and poverty rates. Monetary policies to reduce interest rates and encourage domestic credit have mainly targeted the promotion of investment and thus maintain acceptable rates of achievement with regard to the goals of reducing poverty, hunger, unemployment, as well as other development objectives.

Despite the conditions brought on by the crisis, the provision of subsidies, grants and social benefits in Egypt have increased from about L.E. 92.4 billion in June 2008 to L.E.126.8 billion in June 2009, an increase of nearly 37%. Further, the volume of expenditure on the wages and compensation of employees increased by about 20% and amounted to L.E.75.2 billion during the fiscal year 2008/2009, compared to L.E. 62.8 billion in the previous year. The increase in the subsidy of supply commodities has amounted to about 28%, its value reaching about L.E.21 billion in the year of the crisis against L.E.16.4 billion in 2007/2008. Thus, the average subsidy per capita has risen from about L.E.220 to L.E.276 in the two years respectively, according to the Ministry of Economic Development in 2009.

The expansionary economic policies on one hand and the social protection policies on the other hand were reflected in the maintenance of high rates of

domestic demand (the consumption expenditure in particular) and in achieving an economic growth rate that has exceeded the expectations at 4.7%. This has eventually minimized the social damage of the crisis, especially at the levels of living standards, education, health and other areas related to achieving the Millennium Development Goals.

However, this did not prevent the contraction of employment opportunities generated, which reached 600 thousand employment opportunities during 2008/2009 compared to 690 thousand jobs during the previous year and about 750 thousand jobs targeted by the Presidential electoral program. This has led to an increase in the unemployed at an unemployment rate - according to the official estimates - by a full percentage point (from 8.4% to 9.4%) during the last two years, respectively, according to statistics from the Ministry of Economic Development in 2009.

Furthermore, the findings of the preliminary analysis of the Income and Expenditure and Consumption Survey conducted in 2008/2009, refer to a return of the upward trend in the poverty rate during the last year after it had been declining before the global crisis. There is no doubt that the continuation of the crisis for a longer period will have a profound and negative impact on the potential of achieving the Millennium Development Goals in the specified timeframe, not only in Egypt but in other developing countries as well.

YOUTH: ACCELERATING ACHIEVEMENT ON THE MDGs

Although youth in the 18-29 year age group constitute nearly a quarter of Egypt's population, all evidence confirms that this human capital is still unexploited at the optimal level. It is important, as a first step, to create an appropriate framework as a catalyst for the participation of youth in the development and implementation of strategies that support the MDGs. Youth, of course, are not just objects of public policy but agents in their own right to achieve MDG targets. In this respect, government must create and implement a strategy that would mobilize young Egyptians, either via new forums or by taking advantage

of youth organizations already in place. The need is to hear their point of view in the stages of planning and policy development, and enhance their participation on a larger scale in the various stages of implementation, monitoring and evaluation. This is no easy task in a traditional and paternalistic society, since a necessary precondition is to value them as independent and dynamic young adults capable of new and fresh ideas. Under present and restrictive conditions, engaging youth would require what amounts to a paradigm shift in attitudes as well as concrete proposals and plans to solicit their inclusion.

Nevertheless, there are signs that there is recognition in government circles and political parties of the need to include young people in the processes of planning and implementation. In Egypt, and under conditions where civil society has become increasingly active and vocal, young people can begin to hope to join the body politic and contribute to the MDGs in a number of preliminary ways, with great expectations that this space will become larger with time.

Eradicating Extreme Poverty

A major step forward would be to promote the involvement of young people and youth organizations in identifying problems, monitoring and evaluating solutions via interviews and group discussions, with the participation of local community leaders.

Organized youth initiatives could support the development programs and plans for the 1000+ poor villages adopted recently by the government to combat poverty and to shore up the most vulnerable households in these villages. Focus could be on awareness campaigns covering key MDG areas such as health, hygiene and environmental protection. Volunteer work towards literacy programs or the skill preparation required in the competitive job market outside the agriculture sector is another possibility, as is training in agricultural technologies, to raise the volume of agricultural production. For urban areas, information centers in poor districts and managed by youth could mobilize and activate participation in the development of their communities; this experience has had success in India.

Non-traditional initiatives can reduce unemployment, thereby reducing poverty among young people, and the following actions are proposed:⁷ Creating a mechanism to monitor the needs of the labor market and publicize them; establishing centers for recruitment of young people and providing them with vocational training in collaboration with government, employers and non-government organizations; providing credit at low interest rates to finance enterprises by young people; offering the necessary finance to improve the educational level of the unemployed persons in the framework of informal education programs.

Achieving Universal Primary Education

Young people can help in achieving the goal of universal primary education in their spare time by implementing educational projects for children at primary school age but not enrolled in schools. A prominent example is the 'Achievement' program, where private-sector employees devote ten hours of their time to teach underprivileged youth. This initiative can be extended to youth groups and NGOs.

Promote Gender Equality and Empower Women

Young people can contribute to reduce gender disparity in primary and secondary education by raising awareness. Young people could also participate in the empowerment of girls through youth association training in community participation and leadership to activate women's role in the community and by creating channels for their formal participation, such as representation in student unions or the youth wing of political parties. Support, however, is needed from governments and civil society to young women leaders in assessing local needs and implementing successful projects.

Reducing Child Mortality and Improving Reproductive Health

Young people are able to design and implement programs that are consistent with the needs of society, such as vaccination campaigns and raising awareness in the area of neonatal and infant hygiene. Young people can help in non-specialized areas of health care services, through voluntary work in hospi-

tals and clinics. This form of contribution is rare to non-existent in Egypt and would require an awareness and recruitment campaign. However, they can be educated on and spread awareness of sexual and reproductive health issues, for example. Young married women need to learn how to access their best reproductive options. Some challenges in the prevailing culture encourage early marriage and early pregnancy and the absence of a sufficient spacing period between one pregnancy and the other. Information and services to married and unmarried youth alike would offer care and guidance during pregnancy and childbirth.

Combating HIV and Serious Diseases

Young people can participate in awareness campaigns to their peers by visiting schools, clubs and youth centers, places of worship and other assembly points, following short training on the seriousness of these diseases and their prevention. The necessity of providing information to young people about available health services and preventive health includes medical aspects on how to reduce the risk of infection, as well as providing resources to young people to mobilize efforts.

Ensuring Environmental Sustainability

Policy-makers can consult young people when developing local and national policies on the environment because of their ability to generate new ideas. Officials can build and support cooperation between youth organizations that aim at promoting sustainable environmental development, and they can provide incentives such as grants to young people that operate projects to support this. Awareness of the impact of personal behavior and consumer options on the environment begins in schools, which supports a sense of individual responsibility for protecting the environment.

Developing a Global Partnership for Development

The opportunities for global partnerships are available and in application. Bilateral and multilateral trade agreements bring governments and businesses together across the world. International aid and donor agencies provide openings to the global environment.

These could become even more impactful through annual events targeted at youth to clarify their plans and visions and introduce new technologies and management skills to a wider audience. Exchange programs for young students could foster increased dialogue between cultures and civilization and the spread of information and communication technologies allow the world to become available at youth's fingertips. They bolster internal communications on markets, as well as present external trade opportunities, and they foster international friendship through blogs and email. Moreover, they provide further educational opportunities online via world class institutions. And mobile telephony reduces isolation and bridges the communication gap between rural and urban, national and international.

THE POVERTY MAP AND THE POOREST 1000+ VILLAGES PROGRAM

The Government of Egypt (GOE) is committed to the reduction of the poverty burden through integrated development, to empower the poor and most needy categories and to contribute to their economic and social development, in addition to raising their standard of living. In order to achieve this ambitious goal, the government has used more than one mechanism or method of targeting (that is, directing public resources towards a particular set of social groups to achieve specific goals of development policy). Sometimes it has resorted to targeting with its broad meaning, i.e. providing the services or social benefits for all the people, without specifying a particular group as beneficiary, which is the case with supporting the health and education services. It has also occasionally resorted to a kind of narrower targeting, limited until recently to self-targeting in the program of subsidized bread and the direct targeting of subsidized supply commodities.

The observed reality indicates that all of these mechanisms have significant disadvantages that have prevented complete success in targeting at the lowest possible financial cost; leakages are high and subsidies or other social benefits also reach the non-poor. There is also the high financial cost of implementation. As a result, the effectiveness of these programs has been reduced and the efficiency of public expen-

diture and public investment has declined. Hence, there is a need for new methods and mechanisms to geographically target the poor, especially in rural areas and villages.

The Poverty Map in Egypt

The Ministry of Economic Development, in collaboration with the World Bank, issued its Poverty Assessment Report in Egypt in mid-2007. This report included a presentation of a 'Poverty Map' in Egypt. It provides detailed information about the determinants behind the low standard of living and high rate of poverty, in addition to related indicators at the smallest administrative local unit (village and district). The map can help combat poverty and raise the efficiency of public expenditure through the accurate targeting of poor areas and by identifying their actual needs as well as reducing the leakage of benefits to the non-poor.

To estimate poverty at the village level, about 37 indicators have been used. Each one reflects one or more of the economic and social dimensions related to poverty and the standard of living. The poverty dimensions include indicators on education (literacy rate, enrollment rates), on employment (unemployment rates, the percentage of permanent workers, of casual workers, of temporary workers, the participation rate in the labor market), on utilities (the percentage of houses connected to a safe water network, connection to a sanitation network, to an electricity network), as well as demographic indicators (average family size, dependency ratio). All governorates were covered except the Frontier governorates, which were excluded from the poverty map due to their low population density.

The most important outcome of the poverty map has been the identification of the 1000+ poorest villages in Egypt and the setting of the basis for targeting poor households to eliminate extreme poverty.

What the poverty map shows is that more than one million poor households live in the 1000+ villages, at a total of about 5 million people, representing about 46% of the total population of these villages. The number of poor in these villages represents

Table 2.5: Updated Poverty Map: Geographic Distribution of Poorest Villages

| Governorate | Number of Poorest Villages* | Number of Population | Number of the Poor | Number of Households | Number of Poor Households |
|-------------|-----------------------------|----------------------|--------------------|----------------------|---------------------------|
| Menia | 356 | 3049039 | 1270324 | 654148 | 272083 |
| Suhag | 271 | 2733101 | 1268608 | 593151 | 274016 |
| Assiut | 236 | 2530302 | 1436795 | 527027 | 298569 |
| Qena | 150 | 1497021 | 587743 | 305470 | 119167 |
| Sharkia | 74 | 606968 | 227576 | 131022 | 49182 |
| 6 October | 8 | 46656 | 17109 | 9983 | 3660 |
| Helwan | 10 | 86945 | 31702 | 18394 | 6697 |
| Beni Suef | 13 | 86807 | 31162 | 15542 | 5584 |
| Behera | 19 | 16406 | 5839 | 2786 | 996 |
| Aswan | 4 | 6518 | 2391 | 1803 | 655 |
| Total | 1141 | 11849763 | 5349249 | 2489326 | 1130609 |

Source: Ministry of Economic Development, the National Project for geographic targeting of poverty, June 2009.

Note: * These villages include 142 villages distributed within the local units of the governorates of Menya (46) and Suhag (21) and Assiut (2) and Qena (38) and Sharkia (19) and Behera (16).

about 54% of the total of Egypt's rural poor and about 42% of the total poor population at the level of the Republic. Three governorates in Upper Egypt (Assiut, Menya and Suhag) account for about 82% of the total poor in the poorest 1000+ villages, and for 794 villages.

The National Project for Geographic Targeting of Poverty⁸

Since the completion of the Poverty Assessment Report in 2007, the GOE has been working on a development plan that aims to reduce poverty in the 1000+ poorest villages. It hopes to achieve this through the 'National Project for Geographic Targeting of Poverty.' In order to implement this project, a ministerial group for social development was formed in 2007. It includes the Ministers of Housing, Utilities and Urban Development, Environment Affairs, Social Solidarity, Education, Higher Education, Health, Transport, Local Development, and the Secretary of the Social Fund for Development. The group aims at coordinating design and implementation between different ministries whose missions are to upgrade service delivery in the villages covered by the project.

Moreover, new partners were added to this group in 2009, namely the Ministry of Family and Population, the National Youth Council, the National Sports Council, the General Authority for Literacy and Adult

Education, and the National Post Authority.

The philosophy of geographic targeting is to achieve a qualitative leap in the standard of living of citizens through state intervention via an integrated and comprehensive upgrading of public services in the targeted villages. Given the strong relationship between public services and poverty, the approach is to break the vicious cycle of poverty by removing those poor infrastructure conditions that perpetuate it.

According to the latest report on the poverty map issued by the Ministry of Economic Development, the number of poorest villages has reached 1141, spread over the ten governorates (Menia, Suhag, Assiut, Qena, Sharkia, Behera, 6 October, Helwan, Beni Suef and Aswan) as indicated in Table 2.5. The total population of these villages is 11.8 million people. More than 1.1 million poor households live in these villages with 5.3 million poor people, representing about 45% of the population there. Again, almost three-quarters of the poor are concentrated in the three governorates of Menia, Suhag and Assiut.

Stages and Interventions of Project Implementation

Implementation of the National Project for Geographic Targeting is planned in three phases, as follows:

First Phase: The development of 151 villages, followed by 750 hamlets.

These villages include nearly 1.5 million people and are located in 24 local units (between 3-5 villages in each local unit) spread across six governorates (Menya, Assiut, Suhag and Qena, Sharkia and Behera). Implementation of this stage will take 3 years. The development of these villages is carried out through 14 developmental interventions which are:

- Activating the participation of civil society organizations in every local unit to assist in the implementation of housing and waste recycling projects;
- Providing beneficiary households at a rate of 20 housing units for each village from within the 'National Project for Housing';
- Improving the drinking water and sanitation services through the establishment or expansion and renovation of water networks and stations, lifting and processing stations for sanitation and home connections;
- Developing an integrated system to deal with the problems of collection and recycling of solid waste, and the clearance of canals and drainage canals;
- Establishing a fire fighting and civil defense center and providing a fire truck in every local unit, as well as training on the work of firefighting and civil defense.
- Upgrading the health units, providing equipped ambulances, organizing the medical convoys, and providing qualified medical crews;
- Improving the quality of basic education by developing or establishing new schools and training teachers;
- Expanding the coverage of social security and social services and providing a social worker for every 50 to 70 households;
- Eliminating the illiteracy of the 15-35 years age group by making the education faculties in regional universities assume the task. This task will involve preparing trainers and training courses. The role of the Adult Literacy Authority is to provide the classrooms, textbooks and training assistance, and to conduct the exams.
- Providing employment opportunities for young

people by offering soft loans for small and micro projects from the Ministry of Local Development and the Social Fund for Development.

- Upgrading the services of youth and sports, through the creation and development of youth centers, sports arenas and stadiums, and the provision of sports equipment, in addition to upgrading summer camps for young people.
- Reinforcing the road networks, developing the existing road network, and providing benchmarks;
- Conducting managerial training for local cadres and consolidating the concept of project maintenance;
- Urban planning through the development of new urban boundaries for villages and hamlets, and the redistribution of land use, in addition to controlling the random urban sprawl, and improving the urban environment.

Second Phase: Developing another 912 villages.

These villages belong to 43 centers distributed over four governorates (Menya, Assiut, Suhag and Qena). The implementation of this phase will take three years. This will be achieved through several main interventions as follows:

- Activating the participation of civil society organizations to assist in the implementation of the project;
- Paving and lighting the entrances to villages;
- Improving environmental conditions and dealing with solid waste;
- Improving the health, paramedic and emergency services;
- Enhancing the quality of basic education;
- Expanding the coverage of social security and social services;
- Construction of houses for the most vulnerable households at a rate of 20 houses per village; the programs and projects during this stage will be financed through the allocations provided for in the state investment budget in collaboration with civil society organizations, businessmen, and the private sector.
- A pilot project in one village of each governorate of Sharkia, Assiut and Behera will train youth

on construction and building skills (carpentry, plumbing) through training centers of the Central Agency for Reconstruction.

Third Phase: Developing 78 villages in the governorates of Helwan, 6th October, Beni Suef and Aswan

The implementation of this phase will begin within one year of the start of implementation of the second phase.

National Project for Targeting Needy Households⁹

The State is now implementing, through the Ministry of Social Solidarity, a national project in order to target more accurately the most vulnerable households within poor areas. This project was launched during 2008 and the Ministry has set itself the following goals:

- Determining the neediest households with regard to social welfare;
- Identifying the needs of households which are eligible for care and support;
- Monitoring the appropriateness of services provided by the State to meet these actual needs;
- Establishing a database of the neediest households with regard to social welfare;
- Developing social welfare policies and programs in a way that suits the needs of households.

This project is based on two main types of interventions, which are geographic and qualitative targeting, in an effort to reach the most needy households.

Qualitative targeting was achieved through the design of a standard digital socioeconomic model (one model for rural areas and a second for urban areas) to identify and classify the levels of need of households. The implementation of this model depends on preparing a detailed and comprehensive map of each household condition (through social field research) and preparing a file for each household that determines the human and financial capacity of the households besides their livelihood needs. The measures rely on a number of economic and social indicators of the household which are strongly related to the level of household expenditure.

These indicators have been divided into three groups: The first is related to the head of household (education, work, the existence of insurance or a pension, land ownership); the second belongs to housing data (type of dwelling, number of rooms, the value of the electricity bill and telephone, the ownership of a washing machine/color TV/vacuum cleaner); and the third is related to data on family members (the number of working individuals, the presence of an individual in special education, the presence of a sick or disabled person).

Households are classified according to the degree of poverty and into four groups in line with these criteria, namely, the extremely poor, the poor, the near-poor, and non-poor. Each group has specific characteristics that determine the size and the quality of the benefits that they will get. To illustrate the set of criteria set, for example, the characteristics of extremely poor households (in rural and urban areas) are:

- Family members are five or more (rural area), and six or more (urban area);
- The percentage of working individuals is less than 25%;
- Rooms per capita are less than 50%;
- Household head does not have social security;
- There is no private bathroom;
- The electricity bill is less than LE 15 (rural areas), and less than LE 20 (urban areas);
- There is no landline telephone;
- The household does not live in an independent apartment or a rural house built of red brick or better (in rural areas);
- The head of the household does not have a permanent job or is illiterate (in urban areas).

In line with this project, the Ministry of Social Solidarity is in the process of reformulating the social services and programs and activating the role of social services centers in addition to maximizing the role of social researchers in order to improve the effectiveness of targeting.

Implementation Update

Overall, success or failure in applying programs for the 1000+ poorest villages in Egypt will rest on the ability of all parties to sustain the financial require-

ments necessary for this huge and ambitious project in all its phases. It will also require a high degree of coordination amongst all ministries and government bodies involved.

A detailed presentation of the first phase of the project and the executive position until June 2009 shows that the estimated cost of the project during the first phase amounts to about LE 4 billion, which will be funded from the allocations provided for in the state investment budget and distributed over the following ministries and agencies: Housing, Health, Education, Transport, Environment Affairs, Social Solidarity, Local Development, Social Fund for Development, the Adult Education Authority, the National Youth Council, and the National Sports Council. The Ministry of Housing alone holds nearly 68% of the total estimated cost for this phase. The average cost share of each governorate varies according to the number of (the poorest) villages that it includes and the priorities of those villages' needs from different services. The allocations amount to LE 733, LE 552, LE 612, LE 665, LE 837, and LE 467 million for each of the

governorates of Menia, Assiut, Suhag, Qena, Sharkia, Behera, respectively; this is besides an additional amount of LE 365 million which includes LE 160 million to cover drains and LE 205 million as the cost of buying land distributed over the governorates.

The implementation of the first phase of the project started in October 2008, and it is planned to complete this phase within two years starting from the financial year 2009/2010. The executive position of various ministries and agencies would show that the implementation of several projects in various domains is completed during this phase. However, the problem of land allocation in the targeted villages is still the main obstacle to the implementation of various projects during this phase. It is expected that 158 projects in the first phase of the program in housing and sanitation, health, education, environment, youth and sports will be completed in 2009-2010, besides commencement of work in about 350 additional projects, to be completed successively during the period of implementation of the program.

Endnotes

- 1 The poverty rates in the 2010 report relied on the results of Income and Expenditure survey 2008/ 2009.
- 2 The final results of the General Census of Population and Establishments 2006 indicate that 10.4% of the population in the 6-18 years-old age group has not enrolled in education and that 4.3% dropped out.
- 3 Tobala, Zinat, *Education and the Effect of Poverty*, a series of research papers, Human Development Report in Egypt 1996, National Planning Institute and the United Nations Development Program.
- 4 Institute of National Planning. "The Population Characteristics and the Implications of Social Values", *Planning and Development Issues*, No. 210.
- 5 Ministry of Economic Development (2008). *The Geographical Targeting Program to Combat Poverty: The Poorest 1000 villages in Egypt*
- 6 This section depends mainly on the results of the follow-up report of the implementation of the Millennium Development Goals issued by the Ministry of Economic Development in collaboration with the United Nations Development Program 2008
- 7 UNDP, 2004
- 8 This section relies mainly on the National Project Report issued by the Ministry of Economic Development, 2009.
- 9 Musilhy, Aly (2009), Targeting to Raise Efficiency and Effectiveness. Paper submitted to the Conference on Integrated Social Policies, Ministry of Social Solidarity, July, Cairo.

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Chapter Three

YOUTH LIFE TRANSITIONS: OPPORTUNITIES,
CAPABILITIES AND RISKS



Egypt's demographic profile shows a pronounced “youth bulge” – a situation in which the proportion of youth in the population is significantly large in comparison to other age groups. The 2006 census data show that around 25% of the Egyptian population is between the ages of 18 and 29.¹ This youth bulge is the result of a population increase in the 1980s followed by relative fertility decline.

This demographic profile represents both an opportunity and a challenge. Once these young people reach their working age, their ratio to the older and younger non-working populations will constitute a “demographic gift” of low economic dependency. However, the large size of this group places enormous pressures on the educational system and the labor and housing markets. Failures in these institutions will result in the social and economic marginalization of a large proportion of youth that will be unable to compete in an increasingly globalized economy,


hence constituting a “demographic burden” rather than a gift.

This chapter provides a profile of young people in Egypt, focusing on the transitions that young people undergo in terms of their health, education, entry into the labor market, family formation and civic participation.² The analysis will focus on the differentiated experience of youth in terms of gender, age group, socio-economic background and residence status in rural or urban areas.

The analysis is based on data from the 2009 Survey of Young People in Egypt (SYPE). The survey is a nationally representative sample of 15,029 young people aged 10 to 29 reached through interviewing 11,372 households. Out of this sample, 8,488 young people are in the age category of 18-29. The sample is distributed proportionately to population size in all geographic regions covering all Egyptian governorates, including frontier governorates. The sample also included a representation of slum areas. However, in most cases the results showed no significant difference between urban slum youth and other urban youth. Therefore, data on slum areas have been merged with data on other urban areas. Overall, 58.7% of households included in the sample were in rural areas, 31.9% in urban non-slum areas and 9.4% in urban slum areas.

Following the life cycle approach to young people’s transition to adulthood, the analysis starts with a focus on health issues, noting that health outcomes determine, to a large extent, the life opportunities of young people. Secondly, the analysis shifts to schooling, with focus on the education status of young people showing the profile of those who drop out or never enroll in the education system, those who are tracked to vocational education and those who obtain higher education. Section 3 discusses the employment status of young people in Egypt, with particular focus on the profile of unemployed youth. Section 4 analyzes migration and young people’s intentions to migrate. Section 5 observes patterns in family formation focusing on marriage status, with data on early marriage, incidence of divorce and widowhood among married youth. Section 6 explores patterns of civic engagement and social activities while section 7 looks at

Figure 3.1: Young People’s Smoking Behavior in Egypt




young people’s time. Finally, the chapter concludes with a summary of findings.

YOUTH HEALTH OUTCOMES

A person’s health determines to a large extent his or her life opportunities including access to education, work, forming families and civic participation. Health outcomes could lead to a virtuous or a vicious life cycle. This section addresses the prevalence of disability and chronic diseases among youth; nutrition and diet habits including issues of obesity; smoking and drug abuse; and female genital cutting/mutilation (FGM/C).

The survey shows that 1.5% of Egyptian youth aged 18 to 29 suffer from some form of disability. Forty seven percent reported physical disabilities and 37% mental. However, a breakdown by gender shows 2% of male youth and 1% of female youth reported a disability. There is little explanation for the gender difference in disability distribution. One culture-specific explanation is that families fear that if their daughters are labeled as disabled, this might hamper their chances at marriage. The prevalence of disability is highly correlated with the socio-economic background, with 30% of those who are disabled in the lowest wealth quintile and 12.5% among the wealthiest group. This is confirmed in the international literature on disability which shows the strong association between poverty and disability, with disabled children from a young age facing challenges to acquire the necessary medical services. The prevalence of cases of youth with disability is strikingly correlated with region of residence, with 65% of the disabled being located in rural areas.

Youth with chronic health conditions (diabetes, heart problems, respiratory and kidney related diseases) constitute 1.5% of the age group (18-29). Similar to the geographic distribution of disability, rural areas show the highest level of incidence (58%). However, data shows no gender differences in the prevalence of

Figure 3.2: Education Status of Youth in Egypt

such chronic diseases.

While the Egypt Demographic Health Survey (DHS) of 2008 has shown alarming signs of obesity and overweight among married females aged 25-29 (66%) and even among never married adolescents aged 10-19 (around 20%), data from SYPE shows that young people are not aware of this problem. A staggering 75% of young females and 84% of young males believed that they had the right weight for their height. Socio-economic status correlates with the awareness about weight issues, with those in the highest wealth quintile having the highest level of awareness about their weight issues.

Egypt has the highest rate of tobacco consumption in the Arab world. According to SYPE data, 33% of male youth aged 18-29 smoke. Data shows a very low prevalence among female youth, which can be taken as a sign of under-reporting, given the social stigma associated with female smoking. The majority of those who smoke in the sample are from among the males in the age category 22-29. These young men are financially independent and there is no social stigma associated with their smoking.

Alcohol and substance abuse is a serious factor in the exclusion and marginalization of certain groups of youth (see Chapter Thirteen). SYPE data shows that 2% of male youth reported drinking alcohol and 3% reported having tried illicit drugs. Similar to smoking, the age group of 22-29 showed the highest level of incidence compared to younger males. Also similar to smoking, the data from female respondents showed

very little incidence of use.

Youth health risks and outcomes in Egypt are highly gendered. While male youth are at highest risk of smoking, substance and alcohol abuse, female youth have their gender-specific issues. Females carry the heavy brunt of a serious health-related social practice: female genital cutting/mutilation (FGC/M). The DHS of 1995 provided the first information on the national extent of the practice of FGC/M. The survey showed that over 97 percent of women aged 15-49 were affected.³ Efforts to combat this practice have recently gained momentum with the adoption of the issue by Egypt's National Council for Childhood and Motherhood. Data from SYPE also show that prevalence rate of FGM decreases by age, showing the impact of these efforts in younger cohorts. Among females aged 22-29, 91% have undergone some form of genital cutting. These results correspond with data from the 2008 DHS, which reported a rate of 94% among 25-29 year old women.

However, among girls aged 10-14, the prevalence rate is 66%. Given the fact that FGM is generally practiced in Egypt around age 9, these statistics show the positive impact of the government efforts to eliminate this practice. Again, these results correspond with the 2008 DHS, which show that 64% of girls have been cut by age 14. While SYPE data confirms a decline in the practice among younger females, four in five girls still have to undergo the practice, which supports the need for continued efforts on this front.

SCHOOLING

Increasing access to education has been a development priority for decades in Egypt. While enrollment rates increased significantly over the last 20 years, Egypt has not yet reached universal primary education. SYPE data shows that in 2009, 11% of youth aged 18-29 have never been to school – 81% of them are girls. That is 16 % of females 18 to 29 have never been to school. These data are consistent with census data, which indicate that 10% of those aged 6-18 have never been to school. It is mainly girls living in rural areas who are most likely to have never been to school. SYPE data shows that rural girls comprise 80.4% of those who never enrolled in school. Moreover, it is also girls from the poorest households who

have never been to school schooling. El-Kogali and Suliman (2002) showed that the poor are consistently worse off than the rich in terms of school enrollment and that girls from poor households are significantly more likely not to attend school.⁴

Confirming a pattern that once in school, girls have an equal chance of dropping out of education to boys (Assaad et al, 2001), SYPE data shows that 17% of both girls and boys in the ages 18-29 drop out of school before finishing basic education. Similar to data on non-enrollment, the majority of those who drop out of school (66%) are in rural areas.

At the secondary level of education, SYPE data shows that over a third (36%) of youth aged 18 to 29 have been tracked into vocational and technical secondary schools. This group does not usually join higher education institutions and suffices with technical secondary completion certificates. The gender distribution of this group is relatively skewed, with more females being represented among technical students and graduates than males (53% versus 47%). The urban-rural distinction is very clear in vocational secondary tracking whereby youth in rural areas constitute more than two thirds of vocational school graduates.

Access to higher education plays a critical role in social mobility as it directly influences labor productivity and the ability to compete in a globalized economy. Research evidence has repeatedly shown that higher education can offer greater opportunity to low-income students for better employment and higher income prospects. SYPE data shows that about 28% of Egyptian youth aged 18-29 are or have been to a higher education institution. In terms of gender, the data on higher education shows a small gap where 30% of men and 26% of women are attending or have attended university. However, the gender distribution of university students and graduates in the age group shows a greater share of women (53%) than men (47%).

Household wealth level is a major determinant of higher education enrollment. While almost half of those who are or have been to university come from the richest wealth quintile (richest 20%), only 4% come from the poorest wealth quintile (poorest 20%).

Figure 3.3: Youth Labor Force Participation




Figure 3.4: Unemployment Rates Among Men and Women (15-29) in Egypt 1998, 2006, 2009.

| | Unemployment Rate | | |
|--------------|-------------------|--------------|--------------|
| | ELMPS (1998) | ELMPS (2006) | SKYPE (2009) |
| Female 19-29 | 15.9 | 9.7 | 12.4 |
| Male 15-29 | 51.9 | 36.7 | 32.0 |
| Total | 25.6 | 16.9 | 16.7 |

These results show the little impact of decades of policies that promulgated higher education as a free right since 1962. There is also an urban/rural differential where 39% of rural youth compared to 61% of urban youth finish higher education.

YOUTH LABOR MARKET PARTICIPATION

The natural transition for young people after school completion is to enter the labor force. However, in Egypt, SYPE data shows that about 58.5% of youth aged 18-29 are out of the labor force; that is, they are not working, not searching for work, nor willing or interested to work. Gender differentials are astounding where women who are out of the labor force (83%) are 3 times more than men (27%).

Ninety percent of women ages 18 to 21 are out of the labor force. While school attendance may explain non labor force participation among these young women, it does not explain why 80% of those ages 22 to 29 are out of the labor force. Among men, more than 48% of males in the age group (18-21) are out of the labor force while only 13% of males in the older age group (22-29) are out of the labor force.

Among youth who are in the labor force, 34.5% are employed and 7% are unemployed. However, disag-

gregating by gender shows that 6 times more men are employed than women in the same age group. Hence, while female youth are more likely to be out of the labor force, male youth are more likely to be employed.

Youth unemployment is a major issue preoccupying policy makers in Egypt. Chapter Eleven shows that unemployment in Egypt is primarily an issue of youth insertion to the labor market and that the profile of the unemployed in Egypt is that of a young person who is entering the labor market for the first time. SYPE data supports this argument. Data shows that among youth aged 18-29, 7% are unemployed. The majority of unemployed youth are females in the age group 22-29, constituting 36% of the unemployed. Male youth in the same age group constitute 33% of the unemployed. Unemployment is more among youth living in rural areas (55%) than among those residing in urban areas (45%).

The unemployment rate among youth aged 18-29, that is the proportion of the unemployed to the labor force, is 17%. The unemployment rate is highest among female youth (18-29), at 33% compared to 12% among males. Other research shows that young females are about 4 times as likely to be unemployed as young males.⁵ Comparing unemployment rates between 1998 and 2006, it is noted that unemployment for those aged 15-29 had declined between the two points in time from 25.6% to 16.9%. SYPE data on the same age group (15-29) shows that the unemployment rate has not changed much in 2009 with a 0.2% decline.

The correlation between the unemployment rate and socio-economic background shows an interesting pattern. Unemployment is highest among youth who come from households in the fourth wealth quintile, slightly drops for those in the highest wealth quintile, and is lowest among youth who come from households in the lowest wealth quintile. This can be explained by the fact that young people in poor households have a lower reservation wage, and hence accept any possible form of employment. On the other hand, young graduates from the highest socio-economic classes can afford to be unemployed until a suitable job is found.

MIGRATION

Migration broadens young people's opportunities and offers them a way to earn higher income and gain skills. The World Bank (2007) estimates that 190 million people in the world live outside their countries, with 82% of this group migrating from poor countries to countries in the North.⁶ According to CAPMAS (2005), there are 1.9 million temporary Egyptian migrants working outside Egypt.⁷ The majority of these temporary migrants (87.6%) are in Saudi Arabia, Libya, Jordan and Kuwait.⁸ The profile of Egyptian migrant workers is that of a male youth who has completed secondary education.⁹

SYPE data includes information on intention to migrate among youth. More than 28% of male youth expressed their intention to migrate. The intention to migrate is skewed by gender, as only 5.9% of females expressed their intention to migrate. This yields a total of 15.6% of youth of both genders having the intention to migrate. Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and United Arab Emirates were the main attraction of this group. The list of countries to which young people showed intention to migrate to includes Italy, the United States, France and Germany. The profile of youth who expressed their intention to migrate is very similar to the profile of migrants in Egypt. They are predominately male, with 78.6% of those who expressed the intention to migrate being young males (18-29). Data shows that the socio-economic background is positively correlated with the intention to migrate, as those who showed intention to migrate are coming from the highest socio-economic level. Place of residence does not have a great impact on the intention to migrate, as youth who had the intention to migrate come from both urban and rural areas in similar rates.

FAMILY FORMATION

Young people in Egypt begin to think about forming families at a relatively young age. The legal age of marriage in Egypt is 18. The 2009 SYPE data shows that 55% of young women aged 18-29 and 18% of young men, are or have been married. The majority of married young people from both genders – 67% live in rural areas. The survey shows that about 42% of young women have been married between ages 20-24,

and that corresponds with data from the 2008 DHS which showed the median age at first marriage for females is 21. Rashad and Khadr (1998) showed that in the age group of 20-24, the percentage of young women who got married by the age of 20 has dropped from 65% in 1970 to 41% in 1995. Focusing on the same age group, El-Kogali and Al-Bassusi (2001) note that in 1997, about 43% of young women were married by age 20. Hence, while it seems that the age at first marriage has increased in the 70s and 80s, there has not been much change over the past two decades.

Assaad and Ramadan (2008) highlighted the role of housing policy reforms in curbing delays in the age of first marriage for young people. Using the Egypt Labor Market Survey 2006 data collected, the authors found that the median age of marriage among urban and rural females born in the 1940s is five years lower than those born in 1970, which was 23 for urban areas and 20 for rural areas.¹⁰ Although focusing on a younger age population (15-29), with a smaller proportion of ever married females, SYPE data shows that the median age of marriage of females born in the mid of 1980s was 22 in urban and 20 in rural areas. This suggests that among young females age at marriage might be decreasing in response to housing policy reforms, especially in urban areas.

The situation of age at first marriage for young males is slightly similar. Assaad and Ramadan show that the age at first marriage among urban males born in the 1940s was below 27 years, reaching its peak at over 29 for those born in 1972. SYPE data, focusing on a younger age population (15-29) with a smaller proportion of ever married males, shows that the 25th percentile of age of first marriage for males born in the mid of 1980s is much lower, at 25 years old. The same pattern is discerned for rural youth.¹¹ The earlier situation of delay in marriage has been documented in many ways, which propelled Singerman (2007) to coin the term “waithood” to describe this prolonged stage of waiting for marriage among youth in Egypt.¹² SYPE results show a decline in the waithood phenomenon, showing that the peak of age at marriage for young males born in 1970s was the highest recorded along 50 years from 1940s to 1980s.

Egypt, like many other countries in Africa and the Middle East has a tradition of extended family living arrangements. The data from SYPE shows a continuation of this tradition whereby 37% of married young people continued living with their families; over 95% lived primarily with the husband’s family. The extended family living arrangement was highest among those who married at an earlier age and are in rural settings. Households in rural areas had 79% of extended family living arrangements. The extended family living arrangements is highest among those married in poorest households. In fact, the incidence decreases with the increase in socio-economic status. Similarly, data on consanguine marriages show that more than 73% of such marriages take place in rural settings and among youth from lower socio-economic backgrounds.

Data on incidence of divorce among young people shows that 2% of ever married women who are 29 years or younger have been divorced. Rural areas account for 72% of divorced young people, given that there is a higher concentration of married youth living in rural areas. Data on incidence of widowhood among young people shows that less than 1% of those ever-married are widowed. All widowed youth in the sample were females, which can possibly be explained in view of the persistence of the phenomenon of early marriage, where the husband is usually much older than the wife.

EXERCISING CITIZENSHIP

The SYPE data collection tool included a special section on youth civic engagement, which comprises volunteerism, social integrity and political participation. The results show that less than 3% of young people are participating in volunteer work. The participation rate does not exceed 4.5% among males, and 1.5% among females. The types of volunteer works in which both male and female youth engage are similar. Charitable activities represent 64% of all voluntary work undertaken by this small group of youth. The highest proportion of youth charitable activities were among male youth aged 18-21, followed by those in the age group of 22-29. Among females, voluntary activities were mainly charitable but also included providing tutorial and training assistance to others.

SYPE data on group membership includes participation in youth centers and sports clubs, political parties, unions and associations, and housing and school boards. Only 4% of young people appear to have participated in any of these groups. The majority of youth participate in recreational activities with 67% participating in youth centers and sports clubs. Youth centers tend to focus on sports activities (and tend to be male-oriented) while sports clubs offer a venue for socializing and tend to have greater female representation. Hence, women tend to be more concentrated in sports clubs than youth centers while the same proportion of young men are engaged in activities in sports clubs and youth centers.

Political party membership constituted only 2.2% of the civic engagement activities of young people in Egypt. Those who participate in political parties represent only 0.12% of the total young people in the age group of 18-29. Data on voting behavior shows a high level of youth apathy and lack of engagement. Eighty four percent of eligible youth did not exercise their right to vote in the last election. Only 21% of young men and 11% of young women voted. In terms of socio-economic characteristics, those who voted tended to come from the middle and upper middle wealth quintile, with the lowest level of participation among the poorest.

TIME USE AND CIVIC PARTICIPATION

SYPE data included information on how young people use their time. It is interesting to look at the role of gender and age in defining how young people spend their time. Data shows that housework is the main burden for females in both age groups (18-21) and (22-29). The older group has the largest share of housework, with 55% of women 22-29 spending on average 3 hours per day in housework, compared to thirty minutes for males in the same age group.¹³ Care for the elderly or for children is another activity that is generally shouldered by females, with women spending double the time spent in this activity by men on average.

Young men have the largest share of leisure time; they spend on average double the time spent by

females in the same group meeting friends or playing sports (two hours compared to one hour on average). Sports are exercised by only 3.6% of young people, who dedicate one hour to this activity. On the other hand, watching television is the activity that seems to be equally enjoyed by youth regardless of age or gender. On average, young people spend 120 minutes per day watching television. Similarly both young men and women, regardless of age tend to talk to friends over the phone, as opposed to going out with them, talking an average of 15 minutes daily. Also equally undertaken by young people of both genders and age groups are the religious activities, which take an average of 40 minutes per day. Use of the internet is also relatively low with 15% of young men and only 5 percent of young women using the internet. Men spend an average of two hours and women an average of an hour and half per day on the internet.

CONCLUSION

The preparedness of young people for their future and their successful transition to adulthood is contingent on a number of issues that the analysis in this chapter has highlighted. Primarily, household socio-economic status is a major determinant for a successful transition to adulthood. Young people from poor households are faced by a constraining environment that hampers their health, education and employment potentials. The limited labor market and education potentials of young people from poor households perpetuate an intergenerational cycle of poverty. Place of residence is another major determinant, with those in rural settings consistently performing poorly in terms of health, education and labor market outcomes. Gender is also a major determinant, with female youth at the losing end in education and employment.

In terms of health, the analysis shows that while young people are a healthy population in general, risk factors persist. One major risk factor is obesity among youth. Despite prevalence of obesity and being overweight, young people are generally satisfied about their weight and seem to be unaware of its harmful impact. Analysis shows that the prevalence of disability is mainly among the poor, showing the impact of the limited health services available to this group.

Findings highlight the gendered nature of health outcomes, with male youth suffering the impact of harmful habits such as smoking, substance and alcohol abuse, and with female youth suffering from the harmful practice of female genital mutilation (FGM). While the data shows a decline in the prevalence of FGM, comparing younger females to earlier cohorts, more efforts are needed to combat this harmful practice that still affects two thirds of girls ages 10 to 14.

The opportunity structure for youth in Egypt is highly gendered. Gender is central to schooling and labor market outcomes. Females constitute the majority of those who do not enroll in the education system or drop out early. In terms of labor market participation, females are most represented among those who are out of the labor force or among the unemployed.

Young people do not escape traditional practices of

early marriage, extended family living arrangements and consanguine marriages. These continue to persist mainly in rural settings and among the poorest households. Early marriage is particularly relevant to hampering successful transitions to adulthood. It is largely connected with limited education and limited female labor market participation.

In terms of civic participation, a disquieting finding is that young people seem to be extremely disengaged. The proportion of youth who actively participate in their communities or in the political process, or even exercise their right to vote is alarmingly low. Youth, as data on time use shows, spend most of their time either working or socializing, with television playing a prime role in their pastime activities. Females spend disproportionately longer hours in household chores and childcare compared to males, which reflects their limited labor market participation.

Endnotes


- 1 CAPMAS, 2007
- 2 This framework of analysis builds on the World Bank's World Development Report (2007)
- 3 DHS, 2000
- 4 El-Kogali and Suliman, 2002
- 5 Assaad, 2007
- 6 World Bank, 2007
- 7 CAPMAS, 2005
- 8 Zohry and Harrell-Bond, 2003
- 9 *ibid*
- 10 Assaad and Ramadan, 2008
- 11 *ibid*
- 12 Singerman, 2007
- 13 Analysis in this section is based on median number of minutes spent in an activity

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Chapter Four

CHAPTER 4: EDUCATION FOR THE 21st CENTURY



Education critically affects all stages of the youth life cycle, and the evidence indicates that all levels have a cumulative effect. However, this chapter focuses mainly on secondary and tertiary education as they impact on Egypt's young cohorts and job seekers. It will discuss some of the shortcomings of the existing system and suggest what needs to be done to develop higher and adult education into a world class system that produces proactive, value adding, competent and innovative youth that are well engaged in their society, as well as in the global economy.

There are several milestones that have been achieved in the reform of the education system in Egypt. In higher education, opening the door for private sector provision, applying cost sharing in some special programs in public universities, utilizing performance based remuneration schemes for new staff in public universities, and the new proposed draft law that allows the establishment of non-profit higher education institutions are some of these reforms.¹ Furthermore, utilizing ICT to educate students and train teachers to effectively use technology and acquire technological skills needed to act effectively in a technology enhanced education environment has become fully integrated in the educational policies of the Ministry of Education.²

Despite this, there has been a notable decline in the quality of higher education over the last three decades that is manifested in the mismatch between the needs of labor market and the ever growing supply of graduates. The overcrowding of universities, strained available facilities, and an overworked and limited number of academic staff has led to the deterioration of the quality of education.³ Second chance programs for school dropouts have not kept up with the needs of the market nor have they been successful in reaching to underprivileged youth.

In order to correct this, elements of the education system need to be aligned with Egypt's economic development orientation, which is mainly a mix of industry and service economy, with the latter taking a more leading role. However, it would be a fallacy to focus solely on the economic dimensions of education. Education is an important means to correct the ailments affecting contemporary Egyptian society. Combining both the economic and social dimensions requires that education serve as an all-encompassing tool for inclusion, social empowerment and competitiveness. As tool for inclusion this means that access and quality should be sensitized to the needs of youth, especially vulnerable youth and those from poor households. Empowering youth through education means that it should aim to instill values and build citizenship to transform society in a democratic manner. In order for education to serve as a tool for competitiveness it should aim to equip youth with

the knowledge and skills set needed to compete in a knowledge-driven global economy.

EDUCATION: A TOOL FOR INCLUSION?

About 22% of Egypt's population is in school age, that is between the ages of six and seventeen, another 10.5 % are in the age group 18-22 of whom fully one third are in higher education.⁴ This age structure places enormous pressures on the education system. Despite the great strides made to achieve universal education, issues related to inequality of access to education and education quality remain central (see Box 4.1). Research has repeatedly shown that the system in Egypt provides differentiated quality of schooling and that the poor consistently perform poorly in education. They have low enrollment rates, leave school early, or are tracked to majors that have second-rate learning and labor market outcomes. While Egypt has made great strides in achieving the MDG goal of universal basic education enrollment, 27% of young people aged 18-29 do not complete basic education (17% have dropped out of school before completing basic education and 10% have never enrolled in school). According to the Survey of Young People in Egypt (SYPE), those who come from the poorest households are distributed among three main groups: those who never enrolled (29%), those who dropped out before finishing basic education (24%), and those who completed technical secondary education (29%).

Socio-economic status and family background are considered the main predictors of education achievement in Egypt. Children whose families are in the middle and upper wealth quintiles are more likely to perform better in certificate examinations and to join the higher education system. Those who come from poor households constituted 5.3% of achievers⁵ in the primary education stage, 3% of achievers in the preparatory stage and only 0.5% of achievers in the general secondary education stage, implying that the presence of students from poor families is at its highest rate in the primary stage. The pressure of household poverty and poor educational facilities takes its toll as students advance in the education system, and lowers their achievement levels.

Box 4.1: Education Reform in Egypt

The Egyptian pre-university education system is considered one of the largest in the region. It encompasses more than 43,000 schools, some 1.6 million personnel (teachers, administrators and others) and over 16 million students. It is one of the most important social services in which Egypt has invested heavily, raising the level of schooling of the population substantially from a low base in the 1970s. Education is a right guaranteed by the state and is compulsory at the basic primary stage. The state is now working to extend the period of compulsory education to the other stages.

The enrolment rate in Early Childhood Care and Education (ECCE) increased to 24.4% in 2007/08 with a total enrollment of 835,297 children. The Early Childhood Education Enhancement Project (ECEEP), in collaboration with the World Bank, CIDA, and World Food Program established an important initiative for improving the quality and institutional capacity of ECCE, aimed at increasing the total enrollment of four to five-year-old children by 2012 through providing some 2,000 classrooms, giving priority to remote areas. In basic education, total gross enrollment rates including public, private and Al-Azhar schools in both primary and preparatory stages has surpassed 100%.

Major Pillars of Reform

Central to the success of education reform is the move from effective access to an education of quality for all. To this effect, the criteria for accreditation based on the Egyptian standards for quality in education has been designed, and a new teachers' cadre was established in 2007 and followed by the creation of the Professional Academy for Teachers. A 2006 law also established the National Authority for Quality Assurance and Accreditation of Education (NAQAAE) to assess both the instructional process and institutional capacity of schools for accreditation.

Since its inception in 2006, school based reform lies at the core of all education reform in Egypt, consisting of important integrated quality targeted areas and allowing schools exposure to a continuous improvement cycle, including self-evaluation and the development of a school improvement plan. It is expected that schools will have a great deal of autonomy and will be accountable for their processes and results. A comprehensive system of educational assessment, monitoring and evaluation is needed. Within that context, the Ministry of Education (MOE) in collaboration with international partners developed some standardized tests which provide benchmarks for progress in education such as CAPS, SCOPE and MAP. Teachers and the teaching profession have received significant consideration during this educational reform review period (2003-2008) through different laws, decrees and incentive mechanisms. MOE has been giving great attention to training and capacity building of its most important change agents – 'teachers'. This has resulted in training a total number of 1,832,568 trainees to date in different education levels and fields.

Under an initiative by the First Lady of Egypt, Mrs Suzanne Mubarak, the 100 Schools Project, began with the development of 100 public schools in the lowest income areas of Cairo. The funds provided for this stage were made available through donations by community participation institutions and the private sector. 124 schools had been rehabilitated and prepared for accreditation in Cairo governorate by the end of 2008 including various educational stages. After the success of this stage, three other reform stages have been advanced for 2008-2010 to include an additional 208 schools that serve more than 300,000 students. Expansion plans are underway to include two additional governorates (Giza and Luxor). The MOE is also now taking the lead in the application of decentralization, working jointly with relevant stakeholders to activate decentralization program and setting basic pillars of gradual transformation to the desired decentralized education system. MOE is piloting decentralization in three governorates (Fayoum, Ismailia, and Luxor). They are also enhancing a paradigm shift in pedagogy that aims at moving from a traditional rote memorization approach with strong focus on content to an approach which supports learner-based education, active learning and comprehensive assessment.

With regards ICT, the overall goal is to develop, create and maintain the infrastructure and technical support needed to implement and sustain modern pedagogy, effective education management and planning, while the objectives such as modernizing and strengthening the technology infrastructure in all schools, activating the role of information system management in the educational process, providing 301,131 PCs in schools, connecting 25,800 schools to the internet, increasing the number of Egyptian Education Initiative EEI schools to 2000 preparatory schools, increasing the number of 'Smart Schools' to 173, teachers trained on ICDL to 240,000, teachers to 44,000 and teachers trained on 'Learning for Future Program' to 266,000.

Future plans include enhancing effective and sustainable educational reform, continue effective access to an education of quality for all, maximizing access for ECCE, achieve a universal 9-year basic education program, harmonize technical and general secondary education, enhance literacy – the first step towards lifelong learning, expand provision of different educational delivery systems, institutionalize effective decentralization and accountability, and introducing a systemic transformation of leadership, capacity building and continuing professional development

Source: Hassan el Bilawi, Ministry of Education

Urban/rural residency is another major predictor of school achievement. School achievers predominately come from urban areas. The impact of being in a rural area increases as the student advances in the education system. Rural students have their lowest presence among achievers in the general secondary completion exam and their highest presence in the primary education stage.⁶ In fact, rural areas have a staggering 80% of those who never enroll in school. The gender dimension is particularly pronounced in this group, with females constituting 82% of those who never enrolled in school.⁷ The situation of school drop-out is slightly different. Similar to non-enrollment, the majority of school drop outs are in rural areas (65%). However, the gender dimension is less pronounced among school drop-outs than those who never went to school, with females constituting only 52% of drop-outs. In terms of socio-economic background, school drop-out is more evenly distributed than school non-enrollment. However, those in the lowest two quintiles representing 55% of drop-out cases.⁸

In terms of school type, while the majority of achievers come from government schools (90% in the secondary stage completion exam), the likelihood of being an achiever increases exponentially if a student is in a private school or in a governmental experimental school. More than 50% of those in governmental experimental schools are achievers, compared to 9% of those who come from regular governmental schools. Among students in private schools, 35% were among the achievers. It is important to note that school type is a proxy for socio-economic background, with private and experimental government schools charging relatively high fees compared to regular government schools.

The presence of children from poor households diminishes as they advance in the education system as success in one stage is a major predictor of success in subsequent stages. Only 4.3% of higher education students come from the lowest income quintile. Those in university predominately come from the highest fourth (27.1%) and fifth (46.5%) wealth quintiles. The poor tend to be more represented among students in two-year institutions, constituting 11% of the student body and with higher rural representation. Among those who completed university education, 52% come from the highest wealth quintile and are predominately urban, showing the strong connection between schooling achievement and the socio-economic background of students. In terms of urban and rural distribution, urban students constitute more than 63% of those who finished university education among the youth and 50% of those who finished education in two-year education institutions.⁹

While accessibility to higher education was one of the main principles guiding the expansion of public universities in the post revolutionary era, the policy of free public education has in many ways compromised the quality of education. Without including the al Azhar religious system (which has 18 % of total enrolled undergraduates), the total number of Egyptian universities in 2008 was seventeen public universities, with a total of 1.43 million enrolled in the academic year 2008/09 (Table 4.1). While the high number of higher university graduates can be a positive indicator of development, the problem of labor market insertion has exacerbated unemployment (see Chapter 11 for more details). Primary and secondary school level education have not fared well in terms of quality either. The over-crowding of students, and the shortage of qualified teachers (see Table 4.2), have affected quality learning experiences to the students.

Box 4.2: Admission Policies in Higher Education

The current university admissions system is a single opportunity based on the scores obtained in the general secondary certificate obtained the same year. Given that students are accepted on the single factor of their grades in the nationwide secondary school completion examinations, a student's future will be determined by the single opportunity which experts call a "high stake exam". The whole educational process and curricula are directed to that single exam, and the educational process as a whole is reduced to rote learning of educational material on which the final examinations are based. This system is considered one of the main reasons for private tutoring..

A national conference for the development of secondary education and admission policies in higher education was held in May 2008 under the auspices of the President of the Republic. The conference adopted a set of important reform recommendations, chief of which was that students obtaining the certificate of completion of secondary education should be admitted to higher education by sectoral capacity testing conducted by the Ministry of Higher Education through specialized assessment centers; and that the sectoral capacity test could be taken more than once within a period of five years.

This is an important issue which should be discussed in national dialogue. Voices from some quarters in Egypt are now demanding that there be what is called the estimated total, which consists of a percentage of the total sectoral capacity test by the higher education plus a percentage of total general secondary certificate examination. This latest proposal is a grave proposal because it re-links high school and admission to universities known as the "coupling system" while the world is moving in the direction of their disengagement, known as "decoupling" secondary education and universities.

A study of current global trends in university admission systems shows that most countries of the world base their admission policy: either on the final high school exams called the Exit Exam, as in Tunisia, England, Malaysia; or only on capacities test for admission to university called the Entrance Exam, as in most of the United States, Turkey and other countries.

The Exit Exam is tough and often the bottleneck in the educational system and causes the growth of private tutoring. Therefore, many countries that adopt this are working to open the door to considering a student's portfolio and his performances part of the certificate of completion of the high school stage as is done in England's GCSE. However, this type of national examination earns countries advanced positions in global tests internationally.

The American system does not depend on a national exam for the completion of high school education, but relies on admission capacity tests called the Scholastic Aptitude Test SAT or, in some U.S. states the American College Test (ACT). This system is meant to reduce tension within the pre-university stages. It makes the educational process pay attention to learners' activities, performance and interests. It also pays attention to life skills, and critical and creative thinking. Under this system, private tutoring decreases or is almost non-existent as a phenomenon in the secondary stage. However, this system has not made the countries that adopt it rank high in global tests such as PISA. *Source: Hassan el Bilawi, Ministry of Education*

Many of the factors influencing the quality of higher education are of a financial nature. Inefficiency of public spending on higher education is a major concern with 78% of Egypt's higher education budget allocated to current expenditures and only 22% allocated to capital expenditure (i.e. maintenance and upgrading of infrastructure to meet increasing number of students enrolled in post secondary education). At least 75% of current expenditures go to salaries and wages. The picture is grimmer when the fact that 50% of total staff in Egyptian universities is administrative as opposed to academic staff is taken into account.¹⁰ On a positive note, the gender gap in higher institution enrollment has been closed with females consti-

tuting 56% of those who completed university. They also constitute 53.8% of those who completed their education in two-year higher education institutions, which provide diploma credentials.¹¹

GLOBAL COMPETITIVENESS

It is essential to foster education initiatives that address the intricate relationship between human capital and the labor market. Economic success is increasingly based on the effective utilization of intangible assets, such as knowledge, skills, and innovative potential as the key resource for competitive advantage. Education is the bedrock of competitiveness. Most developed countries have already made the shift

Table 4.1: Number of Enrolled and Graduates by University Academic Year 2008/2009

| University | No. enrolled | % | No. graduates (2007/08) | % |
|----------------|--------------|-------|-------------------------|-------|
| Cairo | 189948 | 13.29 | 30865 | 10.99 |
| Alexandria | 175379 | 12.27 | 30187 | 10.75 |
| Ain Shams | 170913 | 11.96 | 36100 | 12.85 |
| Assiut | 71096 | 4.98 | 13271 | 4.72 |
| Tanta | 96842 | 6.78 | 20493 | 7.29 |
| Mansoura | 125012 | 8.75 | 24163 | 8.60 |
| Zagazig | 102816 | 7.20 | 20570 | 7.32 |
| Helwan | 100401 | 7.03 | 18401 | 6.55 |
| Menia | 47454 | 3.32 | 11548 | 4.11 |
| Menoufia | 73279 | 5.13 | 17626 | 6.27 |
| Suez Canal | 49693 | 3.48 | 11546 | 4.11 |
| Ganoub el Wadi | 44099 | 3.09 | 9066 | 3.23 |
| Beni Suef | 43307 | 3.03 | 8347 | 2.97 |
| Fayoum | 23777 | 1.66 | 4722 | 1.68 |
| Benha | 60551 | 4.24 | 11543 | 4.11 |
| Kafr el Sheikh | 25204 | 1.76 | 6228 | 2.22 |
| Suhag | 29101 | 2.04 | 6244 | 2.22 |
| Total | 1428872 | - | 280920 | - |

Source: Supreme Council of Universities website, Higher Education Development Statistics

to a service economy with fewer jobs in manufacturing and more in information services. This trend has moved in tandem with supply side changes reflected in the increased emphasis on higher education and a demand driven education system that responds to the skills needed by the new economy.

While new growth theories suggest that developing nations have better chances of catching up when they have a workforce that can develop new technologies or can adopt and use foreign technology¹², in the case of Egypt one finds that its competitiveness performance is hampered by the low attainment of higher education and the lack of competitive industries capable of absorbing oversupply of graduates and skilled workforce.¹³ Another obstacle is the strong preference for education that prepares for administrative careers. About 64% of students enrolled in Egyptian universities in the academic year 2007/2008 were enrolled in social studies (Commerce, Law, Arts and Education). Those enrolled in Engineering, Medicine, Pharmacy and Science have a limited share in the total numbers of students, representing 17.6% of students enrolled. The same holds true for graduates of applied sciences which represent about 15.2% of the total percentage of graduates. In this context, it is of no surprise that in Egypt, there is a high reliance in development proj-

Table 4.2: Numbers of Qualified and Non Qualified Teachers in 2005/2006

| Educational level | No. of qualified teachers at Faculties of Education | No. of non-qualified teachers without pre-service education formation |
|-------------------|---|---|
| Preparatory | 146,773 (72%) | 53,776 (28%) |
| Secondary | 69,822 | 31,313 |

Source: MOE 2007, National Strategic Plan for Pre-University Education Reform in Egypt, Annexes

Table 4.3: Distribution of Young Workers' Skills Assessment by Employers SWTS 2005.

| Workers' skill | Percentage (%) | | |
|--|----------------|------|------|
| | Very Good | Fair | Poor |
| Required technical skills | 18.2 | 50.5 | 31.3 |
| Practical training at school | 10.1 | 42.4 | 47.5 |
| Communication skills | 38.6 | 49.4 | 12 |
| Writing skills | 39.2 | 41 | 19.8 |
| Ability to apply knowledge learned at school | 22.4 | 37 | 40.6 |
| Commitment and discipline | 62.9 | 28.9 | 8.2 |
| Overall preparedness | 13.5 | 66.1 | 20.5 |

Source: ILO (2006) School-To-Work Transition, Evidence From Egypt: Final Report

ects on foreign expertise.¹⁴ It can also be argued that the capacity of the service and manufacturing industries to develop using credentials produced by higher education institutes is limited.



The ability of graduates to apply knowledge acquired to the workplace has not been promising (see Table 4.3). According to an ILO survey¹⁵, the level of satisfaction of employers with their young recruits is generally fair (66%). However, many employers have criticized the low abilities of the youth graduates in applying knowledge learned (41% of employers assessed it as poor). The same low ranking is given to the practical training provided to young applicants at school (48% of employers). The education and training system visibly fails to produce skills that are required to perform jobs (see Box 4.2).

University graduates constitute about 12.2% of the work force in Egypt, while holders of higher diplomas, M.A. and PhD. degrees constitute another 0.4% of the labor force. As regards to the ordering of graduate unemployment in different fields of specialization, the highest unemployment rates during the period from 2002 till 2004 were in commerce (34.7%), followed by arts and archeology (about 15.3% for each), then agriculture and law (14.5% for each), other fields of specialization (10%), social work (7.3%), and finally engineering (3.8%).¹⁶

Private universities supposedly enhance the quality of graduates given that they are fee-based institutions. However, to a large extent, they complete and duplicate public university curricula with no qualitative addition, often using the same pool of teaching staff and attracting students with lower entry grades.

Their focus is mainly on engineering, medicine, management and media, but they do not contribute to the improvement of the quality of graduates that are demanded by the labor market.¹⁷

Nevertheless, some positive changes are taking place. Many new initiatives in both private and public universities have been introduced to enhance the spirit of entrepreneurship, with some programs linked to regional projects. One example is EFHAM, a joint initiative between Cairo University and the Egyptian Junior Business Association, which aims to encourage students to create their own entrepreneurial opportunities. This extra-curricular program introduces the values of risk taking, creative and critical thinking, and civic responsibility. The Center for Small and Medium Business at Helwan University offers young graduates services and training on how to start up a business and offers access to finance.

A preliminary assessment of most of these initiatives indicates that there is a lack of coordination, follow up and evaluation. Some programs overlap and the route to entrepreneurship remains unclear. Students are engaged in several projects, but programs are lacking a clear vision and connectivity to the main stakeholders. Linkage projects are also rare. In this respect corporate social responsibility can play a significant role in developing a coherent vision, plan of action and programs to enhance the impact of entrepreneurship education.

Box 4.3: The Battle Against Unemployment?

Egypt is currently experiencing the most intensive growth in the number of youth aged 15-29, putting an enormous strain on the ability of the labor market to secure jobs for new entrants. Securing employment for the ever-increasing pool of labor supply is one major challenge facing policy makers. To meet this challenge, the Egyptian government is developing a National Action Plan to focus on youth as an asset. As part of the plan, and in collaboration with the ILO, the School to Work Transition Survey was conducted and analyzed to help develop sound policies for young people. The survey analyzes the employment and education situation of young people through the school to work transition concept, designed to assess the ease with which a young person moves from school to his/her first 'career' job:

The survey used a sample of 4000 youth, found in 5520 households around the country. The scope covered 10 governorates randomly selected representing urban, rural, lower and upper Egyptian governorates. The survey design ensured an adequate representation of males and females.

An additional 300 employers were interviewed representing both formal and informal enterprises.

Of employed respondents, 22% are skilled agricultural workers, 21% craftsmen and a mere 3.4% are clerks.

78% of the unemployed reported that the main reason for not finding a decent job was the lack of current job opportunities.

Almost 50% of sampled employers find applicants' practical training received at school and ability to apply training to be very poor.

7% of the young employees/self-employed youth had received training for their current activity.

Of the small percentage of self-employed youth, 77% did not receive help from friends and family to establish their business and 90% said their activity was profitable.

On the ease of transition from school to employment, most employed youth in the agriculture/fishing sector experience an easy transition, while the majority of transited youth in all other occupations experience a difficult transition, particularly those in higher skilled jobs.

Nearly 50% of those who had an easy transition had never been to school compared to only 24% of those with technical secondary education and 32.6% of those with university education.

The facts presented by the survey crystallize the understanding that today, educational attainment is no guarantee of securing employment. An educated young person is at no advantage when it comes to finding his/her way in the job market. In fact, the opposite seems to be true. Again, this is a reflection of the mismatch between job seekers' skills and what is on offer by employers

The market is currently incapable of offering sufficient opportunities catering to all job seekers, particularly those with an education. It is therefore time to turn to the alternative solution, shaping youth to suit market needs. While the above is not meant to diminish the importance of formal schooling, it strongly points to the need to offer some form of training and especially gearing towards sectors capable of absorbing more people. There is a strong need to focus on vocational education training and skill building. Private sector companies, factories and local level business should be encouraged (perhaps legally obliged) to shoulder some of the responsibility of absorbing the enormous youth capacity. Massive initiatives such as Mubarak Kohl have their limitations because of limited capacity for existing private factories to absorb trainees. The solution would seem to be to provide incentives whereby the private sector regularly and systematically takes trainees, trains them and offers secured, decent employment. *Box prepared by Nihal Ehwani for EHDR 2010*

SOCIAL EMPOWERMENT

There have been several forces pushing today's campuses toward increased civic engagement, which include:

- A renewed call for relevance of academic knowledge with real-world questions;
- A consensus about the importance of national civic participation and the university's responsibility in relation to it;
- Public concerns over economic and human insecurity, environmental degradation, hunger, poor schooling, poverty, housing, health care;

- Universities are strategically situated for civic engagement; they have faculty members with credentials in academic disciplines and professional fields that have great potential for identifying solutions at the societal level; this implies a change in the traditional view of their role from producing basic and applied knowledge to practical problem-solving;
- Civic engagement plays a major role in keeping a strong connection between the universities and the community.

In Egypt, facing complex social changes, it becomes imperative to align university curricula and extra-curricular activities to addressing and responding to new challenges. One problem is that of lack of appropriate curricula addressing education for sustainable development (ESD) as well as lack of teaching methodologies that can support the infusion of ESD across many disciplines. To address this, Cairo University is now part of a regional project to help partner higher education institutions develop curricula and education methods addressing ESD through capacity building of university staff and in turn transfer those skills and knowledge to students to be able to incorporate principles sustainable in their work and lives.¹⁸ Another successful civic engagement project on campus is the Hepatitis C Virus Awareness and Combat Program currently incubated in Cairo University Kasr El Aini teaching hospital and funded by a private foundation.

Further, in order to engage students in global issues, the UNDP Egypt has partnered with Cairo University in an award-winning MDG advocacy program that raises awareness of the MDGs through a series of high visibility seasonal and youth supported activities. The program aims to sensitize youth on the MDGs and develop a research platform on the perception and the desirable path to adapt the implementation of MDGs to Egyptian society through an interactive learning and research system.

What is currently missing is a total vision for civic engagement that properly engages students in broad community activities that have an impact on society. The concept of civic engagement, as a core educa-

tional subject, does not exist in traditional education. In addition, reorienting existing education at all levels to address sustainable development is urgent and necessary

ADDRESSING THE CHALLENGES

There are pertinent questions facing the reform of the education system that can be classified as short, medium to long-term challenges as follows:

Labor Market Absorption of Graduates from the Humanities & Social Sciences

The lack of a clear relationship between university education in these disciplines and potential employment opportunities has been documented.¹⁹ With 65% of university students enrolled in humanities and social sciences, the urgent question becomes how to enhance the employability, production and earning capacity of these graduates? One way is to create employment vacancies that fit their education and interests. For example, it was found that female graduates in the humanities were more interested in varied social life, personal development and doing something useful for society.²⁰ Based on this, jobs such as working in kindergarten and nursery schools could be seen as a good working environment for female students who represent the majority of graduates in the humanities.

Nevertheless, in the short-term, attention needs to be paid to getting the message across to youth that they may be enrolling in fields that suffer from potential unemployment. The media, the Ministry of Education, Ministry of Higher Education and Ministry of Manpower need to invest in publicity campaigns to reach out to youth from all social strata to inform them about the skills and specializations for which there is a shortage in the labor market. To complement this, efforts should be directed towards reducing the popularity of studies that involve status symbols. Such as, medicine. Furthermore, an efficient career counseling system is important for matching the demand with supply for university students.

In Egypt, the information available to young people does not allow them to make realistic choices concerning the options available to them. A database

needs to be developed and made publicly available on the demand for occupations and the growing sectors in the economy. In addition, more emphasis should be placed on entrance requirements that link up to market needs. Complimenting university education with high quality and well integrated training programs that equip young students with the basic skills needed in the labor market is also needed (see Chapter 12). Language and computer skills, in addition to life skills, have become basic, necessary and elementary (see Chapters 8 and 14).²¹

Reallocation of Post Secondary Education Finance

Weak internal democracy is a problem constraining the performance of higher education institutions in Egypt. University councils are appointed, as opposed to elected, by the Minister of Higher Education, and students are rarely, if at all, consulted on issues of education policy. This is contrary to the experience of Europe, where students and academic staff have a say in the management of their universities.²²

Achieving autonomy requires reforms aimed at allowing more freedoms in deciding optimal number of students, hiring academic and non-academic staff, and regular assessment and performance-based payment schemes. It also implies more freedom in creating new funding sources that include cost recovery, providing training programs, technical and consultancy services, as well as collecting donations. Autonomy also means more freedom in distributing financial resources amongst different chapters and departments based on objective criteria.²³

Introducing competition between universities requires that the public finance of higher education shifts from a supply-side strategy to a demand-side one. Rather than direct funding, indirect funding should be used where allocations are forwarded based on a formula that uses various performance indicators such as: Full-time enrollment, specializations, publications in mainstream journals, research projects awarded by competition and the number of distinguished academic staff. Further, cost sharing, although socially and politically sensitive, is a potential mechanism for financing higher education, where

the burden of the cost of higher education shifts from the government to the students, through tuition fees. This should be paralleled with financial assistance schemes to ensure equal access for the poor.²⁴

Inclusion of Poor through Education

Policies need to seriously address the limitations that face children of poor families to achieve in school education and to qualify for higher education. Programs need to address two major limitations that start at the household. The first relates to the financial aspect of education, with targeted programs providing cash or in-kind support that would be conditional on children's enrollment in schooling. Nutrition and meal plans are important for poor students and help subsidize the cost of education for those who come from poor families. The second equally important domain relates to educating parents on the need for parental involvement in their children's education and the necessary environment for children to learn and grow in a healthy manner.²⁵

The schooling system also needs to address the inequality in resource distribution. More resources need to be allocated to improving the schooling environment in poorer areas along with the student-teacher ratios. Special incentive programs are needed for schools in rural and poor areas to attract experienced teachers that can make a difference in the education process.

For higher education, grants, scholarships and vouchers should be directly made to students, with eligibility contingent on performance²⁶. Applying a grant system requires an efficient and independent body that selects eligible students. Another means through which higher education can be made more equitable is by making income contingent loans (ICL) available to finance their education. ICLs allow students to cover the cost of tuition and living expenses, against their future income earning capacity. The question becomes which students to finance given the information asymmetries related to tracking performing students. Here, government can play a role in selection and tracking of students; it can also play a role in collecting repayments through the tax authorities.²⁷ Another means of financing higher education is

though a graduate tax. Under this scheme, students obtain funds through issued government debt. When they graduate, they pay a fraction of their lifetime income to government in the form of a graduate tax. The government pools revenues from graduate tax to repay government debt including interest. Both the ICL and graduate tax scheme have disadvantages associated with insuring income risks.²⁸

Cross subsidizing tuition fees in private universities through private sector sponsors or endowments are perceived as one mean through which more equal access to private sector universities can be achieved. NGOs can play a major role in solving the financing problems of higher education. Most Arab countries have long experienced religious-based volunteering participation in providing educational services (*Awqaf*). This type of participation needs to be encouraged and extended to represent not only religious motivations, but also secular social responsibilities.²⁹ Improving the quality of private universities is also necessary. Selection of students by ability as opposed to market mechanism is perceived as one mean through which quality of private university education can be improved. The argument is that better quality students enhance the quality of universities and thus of competition. The United States takes it a step further by applying aptitude tests that rate students according to their innate intelligence and suitability for higher education, rather than simple ability or knowledge, which can be acquired through extra tutoring.³⁰

DEMAND-DRIVEN EDUCATION FOR A SERVICE SOCIETY

Evidence indicates that a highly skilled work force can raise economic growth by about two-thirds of a percentage point every year. This is quite a boost to GDP growth given that the average annual GDP growth rate worldwide for more than half a century is 2 to 3%. Nevertheless, the definition of a highly skilled workforce depends on the nature of the local economy, changes in the global economy and the associated drivers of competition.

In advanced economies, the demand is for more educated workers with the ability to respond flexibly to complex problems, communicate effectively, manage

information, work in teams and produce new knowledge. Since such countries have a high capacity for innovation and their strategies are global in scope, the workforce required to deal with this environment is agile and able to deal with cross-border perspectives and solutions, and apply tangible skills such as language proficiency and skills that are less tangible, including greater sensitivity to cultural differences, openness to new and different ideas, and the ability to adapt to change. Thus, essential learning outcomes for higher education can include knowledge of human cultures and the natural world, intellectual and practical skills, personal and social responsibilities, and integrative learning.

To capitalize on the cumulative effect of education, it is important to infuse these skills throughout the educational system starting from primary school. In Egypt, what is highly needed is a demand driven education system that responds to the needs and challenges of the marketplace and the global environment in a timely fashion. For instance, for rapidly computerizing industries and companies with heavy ICT investments, there is a rising demand for problem solving, expert thinking and complex communications skills. Egypt's nascent outsourcing services require proficiency in languages other than Arabic. An understanding of other cultures demands integrative learning. Given the complexity of the development process, growth challenges and global competition, the nature of educational reforms need to reflect these eminent realities by devoting more resources to creating incentives for better educational output.³¹

There is therefore the necessity to improve curricula and extra-curricular content to reflect the increased demand for soft and hard skills demanded by Egypt's service economy. At the same time, the government cannot provide all educational services but should utilize partnerships (contractors, alternative providers and complementary sponsors of certain educational activities) in a flexible manner that takes into consideration priorities of partners.³² Indeed, an important element of reform is close coordination with the private sector to understand where the skills shortages are, where partnerships can help address shortages and where the public sector should inter-

vene to address market failure. However, partnering with the private sector is not simply about joint projects and contracting out education services, but rather it is more about having a shared vision about where education should be heading and how to best achieve this.

More importantly, a concerted effort from society, governments and business needs to be directed towards dismantling the culture of hierarchy in knowledge creation and dissemination that has emerged in Egypt over several decades. Too much emphasis on higher education and credentials as being the prestigious route while downplaying the role of adult education (lifelong learning, second chance programs, vocational education) are counterproductive and impact on economic development, creating serious shortfalls in skilled and semi-skilled labor.³³ This unfortunate trend labels vocational education as socially and educationally inferior since it attracts mainly students with limited scores in the lower secondary (preparatory) education stage. This reinforces negative stereotypes and social constructs while contributing to a system of plentiful university students with social status but no jobs. There is in Egypt a serious need to move to a merit-based system that respects and rewards all types of education.³⁴

There are many promised positive returns to demand-driven education by modernizing and strengthening ICT infrastructure in all schools, activating the role of information system management in the educational process, supporting the best use of ICT in distance learning and training, building capacities in the ICT domain, and merging different departments which deal with ICT into one sector to achieve unity and efficiency. However, at present, most projects are taking place at preparatory and secondary levels of education. And even though many schools are equipped with computers, these are not used effectively due to lack of specialized personnel educated and trained on the use of ICT.³⁵

Currently, a number of schools and administrative departments are provided with computers, technol-

ogy infrastructure and equipment, technology labs, information systems, and ICT administrative management. Computer textbooks for students with special needs, as well as students of technical and nursing schools have been produced. In higher education, ICT infrastructure is growing and ICT services are reaching more universities. Yet, universities still suffer a shortage of qualified academic and administrative staff; students who are capable of implementing ICT solutions and applications to achieve quality learning; incentives to maintain qualified personnel; relevant learning material that suits the nature of e-learning; and awareness of undergoing ICT projects and services among students, and even among faculty staff.³⁶

A number of actions could help maximize the impact of ICT on education outcomes:³⁷

- Coordinate planning among MOE, MOHE and MCIT for unified ICT solutions across the education system;
- Expand training activities to include all schools, universities and higher education institutions;
- Plan a long term-matrix for ICT training to avoid duplication of efforts and guarantee unified level of ICT skills at specified milestones by the end of each educational stage;
- Increase awareness of e-learning and ICT capabilities among students, staff and parents and on how ICT can relate to better learning;
- Integrate more ICT courses into school or university curricula and assure that those courses are presented accurately and effectively;
- Motivate and teach students and instructors to employ e-learning as part of the school or university daily learning activities;
- Take advantage of youth eagerness to use internet communication tools such as chat rooms and emailing services and employ these tools by encouraging new information, submitting assignments electronically, or online discussion of school or university-related issues;
- Invite skilled and qualified students to collaborate and participate in the planning of ICT integration and training at their universities.

Endnotes

- 1 Fahim and Sami, 2009
- 2 El-Shair, 2009
- 3 Elwan, 2009
- 4 CAPMAS, 2007
- 5 Achievers are identified as those who scored more than 90% in the final examinations in the final year of each education stage.
- 6 *ibid*
- 7 *ibid*
- 8 *ibid*
- 9 *ibid*
- 10 El-Araby, 2009
- 11 Barsoum, 2009
- 12 World Bank, 2008
- 13 World Economic Forum, 2007
- 14 Nassar, 2009
- 15 The ILO survey was undertaken to assess the opportunities and challenges facing young Egyptian people age 15-29 in the labour market as they first exit school. The survey targets 5 different groups of respondents, as well as employers and managers hiring young workers.
- 16 Nassar, 2009
- 17 *ibid*
- 18 Identified by the UNESCO Regional Bureau for Education in the Arab States-Beirut
- 19 Elwan, 2009
- 20 Lightbody and Dumdell, 1996
- 21 Nassar, 2009
- 22 Jacobs and Van der Ploeg, 2006
- 23 El-Araby, 2009
- 24 *ibid*
- 25 Barsoum, 2009
- 26 Vouchers are not necessarily grants but a mixture of grant and loan. The composition of the voucher may vary with type of study and student characteristic (El-Araby, 2009)
- 27 Barsoum, 2009
- 28 *ibid*
- 29 Kanaan et al, 2009
- 30 Jacobs and Van der Ploeg, 2006
- 31 World Bank, 2008
- 32 *ibid*
- 33 Handoussa and Abou Shnief, 2009
- 34 Handoussa and Abou Shnief, 2008
- 35 El-Shair, 2009
- 36 *ibid*
- 37 *Ibid*

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ANNEX 4.1: TDC ICT Infrastructure Outcomes In Relation to MOE Strategic Plan 2008

| MOE planned objectives 2007-2012 | MOE planned targets 2007-2012 | MOE planned activities 2007-2012 | TDC achievements by 2008 |
|--|---|--|---|
| Modernize and strengthen the technology infrastructure in all schools to enable them to effectively apply the new curriculum, innovated learning and teaching methodology, school based management, and pupil assessment | Provide schools with the minimum requirements of technology infrastructure needed to support educational practices within the school. | Provide (25,600) school buildings with six computers (for each) Provide schools (17,350) in the plan with school network and broadband internet connection. | 30,1131 computers 35,431 data show equipment 24,000 science labs |
| | Provide 50 % of primary schools with technology infrastructure during the five years of the plan | Provide 49,956 classrooms in the pre-primary level with one computer and one data show. | 22,000 satellite and receiver equipment 1400 computer labs |
| | Complete installation of ICT infrastructure in the preparatory schools (that are not covered by EEI) during the five years of the plan (2007/2012). | Provide 13,333 community classroom schools with one computer and one data show. | 1000 smart board 500 physics laser lab |
| | Provide secondary schools with ICT infrastructure during the five years of the plan (2007/2012). | Provide 3,500 (25 %) of the primary schools with a lab containing ten computers, data show, screen, and a LAN. | 22,000 schools with internet connection 64 distance training centers |
| | | Provide 3,500 (25 %) of the primary schools with a mobile computer unit, one laptop, and data show. | 105 Mps Internet connectivity 368 multimedia software |
| | | Provide 100 % of primary schools with the needed software for visual labs. | 82 e-courses 1000 satellite internet connected remote areas –schools |
| | | Provide 7,000 prep. schools with computer lab, LAN, and data show, a mobile computer unit, laptop and a data show | 500 laser physic labs 1 graphic movie |



Chapter Five

YOUTH AND SOCIAL VALUES: A READING INTO
THE WORLD VALUES SURVEY – EGYPT 2008



At any given time, value systems act as points of reference and beliefs adopted by persons as a general orientation to direct their lives, and they are an integral part of their perception of the world. A set of social values — with its range of consensus and contradiction — is a mirror that reflects on certain human behaviors in a given period of time. Youth in Egypt, like all social categories, perceive the present and the future through such a set of values. But young people do not constitute a homogenous group,¹ even though together, they represent a large segment of the total population; they belong to many different groupings, socially, economically and culturally. This proposition implies that young people belong to diverse and changing value landscapes, and are becoming moral agents in identity formation for the social groups that generate ethical codes — such as family,² peer groups and friends,³ the local community⁴ and the world of consumption.⁵

In the West, the emergence of individualism, a rejection of convention,⁶ and the increasing value placed on self expression⁷ has weakened the social bonds created by group conformity and cooperation. Has this new environment had an impact on Egyptian youth? How far are Egypt's youth similar to or different from their counterparts in other countries? How do youths' perceptions sometimes differ from those of older persons living in the same country?

The World Values Survey (WVS) and its application to Egypt gives some answers to these questions. The WVS is a worldwide investigation of socio-cultural and political change. It is conducted by a network of social scientists at leading universities all over the world and is coordinated by the central body, the World Values Survey Association. These social scientists survey the basic values and beliefs of the public of over 90 societies on all continents (covering 85% of the world's population). The WVS is designed to test the hypothesis that economic and technological changes transform the basic values and motivations of the people of industrialized societies.

Each survey in the WVS is conducted through local funding, and in exchange for providing data with the representative national sample of a minimum of 1,000 people in their society, each research group is allowed instant access to the data of all countries. This allows for immediate cross-cultural comparisons with regards the basic values and beliefs of people in all societies. Moreover, the database makes it possible to examine cross-level linkages, such as between public values and economic growth or between political culture and democratic institutions.

The analysis presented in this section focuses on Egypt and depends on a *limited* number of 18 comparator countries plus Egypt for the purposes of simplification. These include a number of developing countries with diverse cultures as well as a number of economically developed countries, all of which reflect a cultural and historical diversity expected to have an impact on the entire body of values.

The survey in Egypt was made on a sample of 3050 adults aged 18 or more. The sample data were col-

lected in 2008 at several stages: First, a stratification of the general frame in 26 governorates was made across Egypt; second, each governorate was divided into blocks according to population categories; and third, each sample was divided according to the standard of education; finally, the fourth stage was a random selection of a household sample within the general framework of the sample. In light of these procedures, data were collected by personal interviews. The *subsample of Egyptian youth* was 712 individuals aged 18-30 and represented 23% of the total sample. The males in the youth sample represented 40% compared to females at 60%. Another feature was that 61% live in rural areas compared to 39% in urban areas. Intermediary or lower level education predominated.


Following are some of the salient features emerging from the youth sample. An interpretation of results is provided according to the determinants that affect young peoples' orientations, in addition to a comparison with the older generation, whenever possible. Further, a comparison is made with the data from the group of 18 countries selected other than Egypt to explore whether value orientations of young Egyptians are similar to the values expressed by young people in other countries.

DESIRE FOR THE GOOD LIFE BUT WITH NO RESPONSIBILITY


Expressed values clearly show an identification of what constitutes 'good' living, largely in line with modern lifestyles. A good life worth living is identified in six main qualities, chief among which is independence. Sixty-eight percent of the sample surveyed said they preferred to develop an independent character rather than emulating others. This percentage increases among youth with a university education. This is followed by the achievement of success, fulfillment and happiness, the application of science and technology, paying attention to the environment, protecting nature and finally, leading a risk-free life.

Happiness

Eighty-six percent of the sample said that they were happy with their life. More than half said that it was important for a person to have a good time and sci-

Figure 5.1: Values of the Meaning of the Life

Source: World Values Survey - Egypt (2008).

Figure 5.2: Government's Responsibility to Meet an Individual's Needs by Country

Source: *Ibid*

ence and technology were considered the basis of a good life for 67% of the youth sample. Interest in the environment and protection of nature were of less importance to 60% of the sample. Success in life was very important for only 57% of the sample, but the percentage is higher among those with a university education.

These results (Figure 5.1) point to a clear tendency among youth to associate themselves with modernist values that uphold the spirit of individuality and scientific knowledge as the foundation for a good quality

life. There is a similarity between young people and adults in aspiring to the 'good life' except with regard to the desire to have a 'happy' time. This is four percentage points higher among young people and suggests that they are more inclined to seek gratification, possibly because they are more in tune with the luxury consumption patterns of leisure activities in modern society. Also noticeable is the high percentage of older people who would avoid 'adventures' in life (by more than six points compared to youth); this reflects their greater conservatism in life style. The majority of youth strongly opposed to risk-taking are less educated. Nevertheless, 62% of the youth tended to agree that a risk-free life does not achieve the type of modern life they prefer. Risk-taking appears to fall in line with degree of educational status.


Responsibility

If a good quality life requires that an individual should take a certain degree of responsibility to achieve it, responses seem to fall in the opposite direction for young Egyptians. A high 62% of the sample held the state responsible for meeting their needs and aspirations. Only 11% fully agreed on the importance of wealth and of costly possessions. This could imply a failure to shoulder responsibility, or the lack of personal accountability and perseverance in achieving wealth, and it appears to contradict aspirations elsewhere which acknowledge the need for more personal responsibility.

Sixty-four percent of the youth sample believed that the government should reduce pollution without requiring individuals to bear any cost. The percentage of those who support this view is higher among those with less than university education (66%). This suggests that a higher level of education may contribute to a greater awareness of personal responsibility with regard the public good.

The results also show that belief in the responsibility of the state to meet the needs of individuals is a common denominator among young and older people alike. This mixed bag of responses suggests an incomplete acceptance of the exigencies of a modern life style as a common denominator among young people and adults alike.

Figure 5.3: Youth's Work Values



Source: *Ibid*

Egyptian youth ranked third after Morocco and North Korea among selected countries in holding the state more responsible for meeting individuals' needs (Figure 5.2). This is more than 19% higher than the international rate scored among the selected countries overall. Egypt was also sixteenth in rank with regard to the view that a state was responsible for reducing pollution, with a difference exceeding 23.2% compared to the international rate. Egypt also ranked sixteenth at the international level with more than 23 percentage points higher than the percentage of supporters of the role of the state, where the average was 42%.

The expectation that the state should be responsible for meeting youths' needs is clearly less evident in developed countries such as Sweden, the USA and Britain respectively. This implies that many countries prepare their youth to take part in socially responsible behavior and towards creating a better life. The reason could be that the quality of public services and social protection programs in developed countries give citizens a clear model of socially responsible behavior.

Overall, although Egypt is one of those sampled countries still in transition, young peoples' aspirations for a good life reflect affirmative and constructive qualities, especially in the domain of individual autonomy and aspirations to successful achievements. There is also belief in the positive application of the benefits of science and environmental protection. However, these values remain tied to other values, such as over-reliance on the state in some areas, and they constitute a burden on state capacity. If individuals depend on the state for the achievement of their aspirations, this by implication means that for youth, the state is expected to bear a double responsibility: First to pro-

vide the conditions by which youth can improve their lives, and second to carry blame for failure if youth are unable to attain their goals.


HOPE FOR WORK REGARDLESS OF COMPETENCE

Survey results show that work is vital to youth for self-fulfillment and for the achievement of life objectives. Given Egypt's high youth unemployment figures, the perception of youth of their relationship to work takes on great importance. Overall, attitudes to work — identified as indispensable — are positive, as expressed by 85.5% of the sample. Work as a social duty is expressed by 64% of the sample and figures prominently in the list of interests identified. Over 93% of youth gave work great priority even if it were at the expense of leisure time.⁸ Sixty-one percent describe a person who does not work as lazy and 54% of the sample said that it was humiliating and undignified to obtain money without work, regardless of the level of their incomes (Figure 5.3).


Youth's perception of work is not limited to having job but is associated with seriousness over work. Data indicate that 74% of young people see that hard work leads to a better life in the long term. These results indicate that a large proportion of youth subscribe to a work ethic. In contrast, only 3% who believe that work will not necessarily lead to success in the long term, which is in their view a matter of luck and the right connections. However, 23% are neutral on the positive outcome of work in the long run.

Professional Competence

In the context of childhood learning, only 54% of the sample stressed the importance of hard work as

Figure 5.4: Priority in Job Search

Source: *Ibid*

Figure 5.5: The Value of Aptness and Fulfillment in Work by Country

Source: *Ibid*

something to be learnt at a young age. This very average figure may suggest that young people are more focused on their own lives and future rather than on the education of the coming generations. Continued employment for themselves over the longer term is more central to 92% of respondents and many young people expressed the belief that work was also of vital interest in the nearer future.


Thus, it appears that work is seen to provide the opportunity for betterment. It is with this hope that a person can fully aspire to achieve objectives and life goals. However, young people appeared to see no point in identifying the type of work pursued, and 44% believed that a full development of skills primarily depended on first being given any work opportunity rather than matching job choice to career expectations.

The majority of those who expressed these views were males with a university degree. This suggests that the wish for any employment rather than a career path is largely associated with young men, especially those with a higher education and striving to enter and remain in the labor market. Given high unemployment rates among these specific young cohorts, it is not surprising that a priority is the prospect of achieving a minimum standard of living to enable them to achieve the basic necessities for marriage and family formation.

Survey data support the following fears in the search for work: Respondents were asked to choose between four options and rank them as first and second priority in their search for employment. The options included good pay to avoid financial worries, a secure job without the risk of firing or unemployment, working with persons one likes, or doing work that gives a sense of fulfillment. The results (depicted in Figure 5.4) indicate that getting a secure (permanent) job is the top priority for 41% of the sample. This is followed by 39% expressing preference for a good paying job. The next priority is work that gives a sense of fulfillment as expressed by 11% of the sample, while work with 'persons we like' was chosen by only 8%. Although the percentages are close between males and females in the order of priorities, the percentage of males is higher regarding the quest for a secure job and good pay. Women scored slightly higher regarding the values of self-fulfillment in work and close relations with colleagues.

Data also indicate that persons with less than a university education represent a large percentage of those who consider the values of secure jobs and good pay important to them — 40% and 42% respectively, in contrast to only 36% and 37% respectively of university graduates. The percentage of persons with university education was higher with regard to personal fulfillment and close relations with colleagues. Overall, findings suggest that males with less education are more pragmatic and materially concerned, while females with a higher education tend to see moral considerations important in their attitude to work.

Figure 5.6: How Far Youth Values are linked to Free Economy



Source: *Ibid*

International comparisons show that Egypt ranks fourteenth with regard the values of aptness and fulfillment as their top priority in their search for work. Those who had this preference represent 11% compared to the international figure of 20% at the levels of both the selected 19 countries in this survey and that of the total 56 countries in the overall and larger survey on youth and social values. There appears to be no clear relation between level of progress and youth opting for excellence and fulfillment. Support for these values is high in advanced countries such as Sweden as well as in other less developed countries such as Iran and Brazil. However, the high percentage in Sweden and the lower percentages in other advanced countries such as the UK, Japan, the US and South Korea show that there are discrepancies even among the developed countries themselves (Figure 5.5).

A comparison of Egypt to other countries with similar social, economic and cultural conditions, notably Iran, Brazil and Turkey, shows that Egypt lags relatively in terms of aptitude for and fulfillment in work (Figure 5.5). This suggests that the difficulties associated with finding employment impact young people’s priorities strongly in Egypt. For youth, getting a secure job with a good income becomes more important than other considerations such as capacity or personal satisfaction. In addition, a certain fatalism among Egypt’s youth partly explains the acceptance of any secure job – there is reluctance to turn down ‘a lucky break’ or to ‘tempt fate’ or risk losing an opportunity.⁹

VALUES OF A FREE ECONOMY

Starting with the economic structural adjustment program in 1991, Egypt underwent dramatic economic changes over a period of eighteen years towards cre-

ating a free economy. Previously, the state had been responsible for all aspects of the economy including employment, asset ownership, production, distribution, price setting and the implementation of a large subsidies program.

The relative change in conditions has been accompanied by a shift in youth values. Young people appear to be adopting values in line with a free and open economy, as observed in the expression of positive attitudes associated with income distribution, competition and acceptance of the private creation of wealth (Figure 5.6). On the other hand, some values appear to contradict the foundations of an open economy, such as derisory attitudes to savings, continued support for state ownership of the business and industrial sectors, and support of high taxation for the rich but state support for the poor.

Rewards for Performance

Ninety-five percent of the sample expressed support for the principle of justice or fair dealing in linking differences in income to efficiency at work. Supporters of this position are mostly university educated. This finding reflects a major change in the views on social justice. Previously, it was confused with the concept of egalitarianism, especially among generations of civil servants. These found it acceptable that most staff received equal pay and promotion, regardless of disparities in levels of performance and efficiency. The survey indicates that this is no longer acceptable in the view of both younger and older generations. It suggests a general realization of the significance of differentials: Equating equality with egalitarianism holds back rewards for distinction and efficiency in work performance.

Competition is an important value to 68% of the youth sample. This is believed to generate greater commitment to work and encourage creative thinking. Supporters of this viewpoint are more numerous among university graduates accounting for 75% in contrast to 67% of young people with lower levels of education. This suggests that education plays an important role in promoting the values of competitiveness among youth and that the young generation — especially those with a better education — is more open to developing skills, acquiring knowledge and new experiences, and is more apt to compete for improved work opportunities. However, belief in competitiveness remains contingent on the presence of prospects for social mobility, recognition of talent, and on equal opportunities for all — regardless of circumstances and social recognition.

Attitudes to Wealth Creation

Societies progress and become more affluent through the opportunities they give to citizens for wealth creation and accumulation. In this respect, the survey shows that more than half the youth sample felt positive about prospects for increasing wealth in society, provided there is ‘enough for everybody.’ On the other hand, 11% of the sample expressed the view that “people can only get rich at the expense of others.” Thirty-seven percent adopt a moderate stand vis-a-vis wealth in society working for the good or the bad. The survey data show that 60% who see competition as positive also see wealth creation as possible and the potential resources sufficient for all. The correlation between competition and wealth creation is positive and supports growth in a free economy.¹⁰

Among the less educated, supporters of increased wealth through work for all was 53%, compared to 46% among university graduates. This may suggest that young people with less education believe the road to wealth is not restricted to levels of education. Evidence of social change among some groups in society, especially with regard to manifestations of wealth, indicates that this is not contingent on education (and this is the case in the areas of trade and business). On the other hand, some middle class categories that have received a higher education are not able to enjoy any like degree of affluence most notably

among teachers, lawyers, university professors, and other salaried professional groups. This represents the erosion of a financial mobility enjoyed previously.

Similarly, the data also indicate that the positive attitude towards wealth in society is higher among the unemployed than among those who are employed, at 57% versus 49%, respectively. This may reflect wishful thinking or the recognition that it is possible to get rich without work as a result of the unrealistic promotions of the culture of luxury consumption by advertising and the media. Manifestations of corruption that have made some rich without hard work or excellence may also be a contributing factor.


Savings Behavior

As confirmation, data have shown that in the past years, the families of most youth were less used to saving, which is a core value supportive of economic growth and capital formation. As seen in Figure 5.7, those in favor of saving represent only 6% but are at 14.3% among university graduates and drop to 5% for those with lower than university education. Saving as a value youth would like to develop in their children is at a low 28%.

Poor savings behavior among Egyptian youth may be due to the spread of a consumer culture that encourages spending beyond actual economic means. This could imply that the consumption style among many young people is no longer based on the needs-resources equation.¹¹ Further, the link between low saving trends and low educational level could indicate that the less educated youth — often with less disposable income — also find self-fulfillment in spending.

According to data at the international level, the poor rating for ‘saving’ in Egypt ranks it last among 19 countries, with a difference of less than 18 percentage points and which reaches 24%. Japan, Sweden and the USA occupy the first top three positions in youth’s resolve to make savings, ranging from 37% to 45%. The value of saving is usually linked to the level of progress in developed societies, but in countries facing economic and social conditions similar to Egypt — that is, India, Morocco, Vietnam and Jordan, for example — the value of saving still ranks higher than in Egypt.

Figure 5.7: Youth Value of Savings by Country




Source: *Ibid*

Public Versus Private Ownership

Some values from Egypt’s socialist era still remain. This is evident in attitudes towards ownership of business, the private sector and taxation policy. Regarding business and industry sector ownership, 50% of the sample expressed support for the need to increase state ownership, compared to only 9% supporting private sector ownership. As for the remaining 41% of young people in the survey, they fall at the midpoint between the two positions (Figure 5.8). On this issue, attitudes are close irrespective of the level of education.

A comparison of Egypt’s rank with other countries with regard to private ownership shows that Egypt lags far behind at eighteenth position in respect to strengthening the role of the private sector. The difference is 14% less than the international 15%. Egypt’s position is relatively lower than Arab, African and Asian countries similarly in economic transformation, notably Jordan (which ranks first), Vietnam, India, Iran, South Africa and Morocco. However, regarding support of state ownership of the business and industry sector, Egypt ranks second in the world after Argentina. The difference is more than 18 points above the international average support of state ownership of 32%. Sweden, Japan and the USA rank at

Figure 5.8: Ownership of Business or Industry by Country




Source: *Ibid*

bottom of the list.

These results are not necessarily an indication of the success of the public and government sectors as much as indicative of the failure of the private sector to win trust as an engine of economic transformation. In spite of the many investment opportunities given to the private sector and in spite of its important role in absorbing unemployment, it is still having real problems with development goals, social responsibility and poverty reduction. Further, the conditions of employment often lack the permanence provided by the public sector.

The media in Egypt has played an unhelpful role by promoting negative images of the private sector and businessmen in the community, through TV drama and films, as well as provocative reports on nepotism and corruption. For these reasons, many young people perceive the state as a more dependable and secure employer despite its poor pay. This is confirmed by the results of a survey conducted in collaboration between the Information and Decision Support Center and the National Center for Social and Criminological Research on the ‘dreams’ of Egyptians. The results showed that 76.8% of the sample of young people will seek government work for their children

Figure 5.9: Major Concerns in Life

Source: *Ibid*


in the future. Those who aspired to work in the private sector accounted for only 21% of the sample of young people.

The World Values Survey asks respondents whether a state policy to impose taxes on the rich and support the poor is one of the main features of democracy; three quarters of the sample regarded such a policy as an essential characteristic of democracy. It is worth noting that both young and older respondents held close views in this regard. Most of the young respondents had only a pre-university education, were employed, lived in rural areas and considered themselves poor. This may suggest the prevalence of low social and economic conditions and poor quality of life for a considerable segment of youth, especially those who are less educated. It is not surprising that they place a high priority on state support for the poor and the landless through taxation policy, which is one of the constants of the socialist system from which Egypt is emerging. However, to describe this policy as one of the basic characteristics of democracy reflects a degree of confusion among young people and adults alike of the differences between the concepts of democracy and equality.

POLITICAL VIEWS

Low Interest in Formal Politics

The results of the survey confirm an extremely low interest in politics and political action among youth. Those strongly interested in politics represent 6% of the sample. This is consistent with the order of interests in life for young people. These are, respectively, the family by 97%, religion by 96%, work by 60%, friends by 47%, leisure by 14%, and finally, politics which ranks sixth and last in the order of key areas in youth's life by not more than 7% (Figure 5.9). Interest in politics is higher among males. It is clear that this

Figure 5.10: Interest in Politics by Country

Source: *Ibid*

is linked to social norms that consider political work in public a male privilege in contrast to family life and home as reserved for females.

There is a greater interest in politics among those with a university education (15%) and professionals (11%). This suggests that there is a relatively limited impact from levels of education and engagement in the labor market on the formation of political awareness among young people. However, low interest in politics among young people and adults alike is linked to many complex factors relating to the nature of social upbringing; these downplay participation in political work, exhibit lack of faith in the political process and loss of confidence in its ability to initiate change, or fear of the consequences of taking part in political activity.

In this respect and as seen in Figure 5.10, comparative data shows that youth's low interest in politics puts Egypt in the fifteenth position among the list of 19 in the survey, with a 7% difference between it and the 14% expressed interest in politics worldwide. It is worth noting that young peoples' interest in politics is relatively weak everywhere surveyed. Interest in politics ranges from 23 % registered in South Africa and

4% registered in Poland.

Comparative data also point to a regression in interest in politics in countries with a long record of democracy such as the United States, where those who consider politics important in their lives represent only 9% of the sample. In this respect, the USA ranks fourteenth while Japan and Britain come sixteenth and seventeenth, registering 7% and 6%, respectively. These results could mean that youth’s interest in politics is not necessarily linked to the general climate of progress or to the level of democracy available, but manifests itself rather in relation to major political events or conflicts or to the social turmoil evident in some countries.

Political Behavior

The results of the survey indicate that voting by young people did not exceed 29% of the sample in the last parliamentary elections. Political party work is also extremely limited and the number of party members was at only 3% of the sample. This reflects a degree of marginalization and exclusion of youth, some of which is self-imposed since nearly all party programs and platforms in Egypt appear not to attract youth or cater to youth issues.

There are social and demographic determinants that have an impact on participation in political action, including gender, work and rural-urban considerations. Data indicate that the majority of those who take part in voting behavior are males, accounting for 45% in contrast to the lower female 17%. Most males have university education and females with pre-university education keep away from politics. It is remarkable that a high percentage of youth participating in elections are without work, with a 5% difference between them and participants who have work, representing 45%. This may indicate that social attitudes view political activity as being in competition with work and as though politics required fully available and dedicated commitment.

With regard to the politics of opposition, there is a marked tendency among young people to stay away from petition-writing, demonstrations and sit-ins (Table 5.1). Social characteristics of respondents

Table 5.1: Youth Participation in Opposition Political Action

| | % Participated | % Participate | % Not Participate |
|----------------|----------------|---------------|-------------------|
| Petitions | 6 | 16 | 78 |
| Demonstrations | 3 | 10 | 87 |
| Sit- ins | 2 | 10 | 88 |

Source: World Values Survey – Egypt 2008 – IDSC

show that participation in opposition political action is higher among males with university education, youth still studying, and youth living in urban areas.

There are striking similarities in social characteristics among those who have already participated in radical political activities on one hand, and those who might participate on the other. The prospects of future participation of young people in opposition action is higher among males, those with a university education and those who are urban residents – in addition to those who are unemployed. This suggests that the lack of employment of highly educated urban young men (especially) can be one of the reasons that might drive participation in political opposition.

There is a high prevalence among females with less than a university education, that are employed and that live in rural areas to avoidance of political activity altogether. This may be attributed to several factors: First, there is a stereotype that ‘a woman’s place is in the home’ and not in public life; second, that low level education does not provide opportunities for political education; and third, that the lesser the education, the earlier is entry into and exit from the labor market, with precedence given to marriage and family formation. A further disincentive to political participation is that this activity is socially labeled as ‘not serious’ and at the expense of earning a stable living.

Comparing Egypt’s position internationally shows that youth participating in opposition political action represent 6%, with a 12% difference from the international figure of 18%. With regard to submitting petitions and participating in demonstrations, the percentage is 3%, with an 8% difference from the international average. In sit-ins the percentage drops to 2%, and the difference from the international average is 3%. Thus, Egypt’s position ranges between

fourteenth and sixteenth among four other countries at the bottom of the list in most forms of opposition political action, namely Jordan, Vietnam, Russia, Indonesia, and Egypt respectively. Egypt's positions range between sixteenth and last in all fields of opposition political action in the world.

These and other results on intention to participate in the future indicate that youth involvement in political activities depends on several factors, chief among which are the level of social and economic progress and welfare, the level of the exercise in democracy and its link with the quality of life in general, conditions of political transformation, a clear accompanying space to allow transformation, and the extent of political openness and scope of restrictions on political action.

Political Moderation with some Leftist Inclinations

However, Egyptian youth do have a political sense. The survey indicates that they have a clear political vision, an attitude to political practice and the value of democracy, an outlook on the state's political objectives, and expectations for the future.

There is a general trend towards moderation in youth's political orientation. Almost half of the sample classified themselves as moderate. These were followed by those leaning to the left (38%) and rightists representing only 12% of the sample. There are no gender or marital divides in political orientations in general, but there are clear educational differences. Most rightists or moderates have a university education while the majority of those who classify themselves as leftists have below university level education.

It is obvious that a moderate political current is predominant among youth worldwide. They represent 55%, with the USA topping the list. Egypt ranks eleventh with a 5% difference from the world percentage. Youth with rightist orientations represent 28% of the sample, with Egypt ranking eleventh with 16% less than the world percentage (in a list of countries where Vietnam ranks first).

As seen in Figure 5.11, very few young people on the international scale saw themselves as leftists, not exceeding 17%. Egypt ranks second after India which scores 28% and with more than a 21% difference higher than the international figure. This suggests that their orientation is in line with the moderate current predominant globally. However, it is worth noting that the percentage of youth with leftist tendencies in Egypt is relatively high. This may not necessarily mean that they embrace socialism or Marxist thought, but rather adopt more radical attitudes in opposition to current conditions and use these positions to fuel their criticism.

Belief in the Values of Democracy


Yes to Democracy

Eighty four percent of the youth sample expressed strong support for the importance of living under a democratic rule. Most were males with university education. One of the paradoxes of international comparisons is that the democratic rule option among youth puts Egypt in eighth position at the world level (see Figure 5.12) with 8% higher than the international 76%. Thus, Egypt is ahead of developed countries with long records of democracy such as Japan, the USA, Britain, Russia and India. This may indicate a wish among young Egyptians for more democracy than presently available.

The survey shows that youth recognize the importance of people's choice of their leaders through free elections. Those who support it represent 90%, while 82% believe in the possibility of changing laws by referendum. Those who see that civil rights can protect freedoms and guard against oppression represent 73%. Younger and older respondents are close with regard these trends. The difference ranges between two to three percent and suggests that young people are expressing a general trend in society.

With regard international comparisons, the high percentage of youth among those who stress the importance of living in a democratic regime ranks Egypt eighth, with an eight percent lead over the international average of 76% among a number of countries with similar conditions to Egypt (Jordan, Vietnam, Argentina, Morocco and South Africa). Sweden is an

Figure 5.11: Youth's Political Trends by Country



Source: *Ibid*


exception among the group. This affirms our earlier conclusion that democracy is a higher priority for youth among peoples struggling for further democracy, while it does not figure high among the priorities of youth in countries with long records of democratic practices.

Democracy Not a Top Priority

However, and surprisingly, responses to the question on democracy as a top priority in the coming ten years indicate a remarkably low rating for Egypt (Figure 5.13). The percentage of youth who believe in the people's participation in government decision making as a top priority does not exceed 11%. It is higher among males with university education. Further, people's ability to make a difference in their societies is not seen as a top priority except by 11% of the youth sample, the majority of which were female. Freedom of expression was the lowest as a first priority in the exercise of democracy in Egypt in the next ten years, at only 3%. Responses were, rather, largely in favor of a higher level of economic development and combating price increases as a top priority over ten years.

These results also cast doubt on the current argument by Egyptian intellectuals that democratic reform is a priority demand. Youth appear to have visions of democracy but do not perceive it as a priority for their

Figure 5.12: Importance of Living in a Democratic System by Country



Source: *Ibid*

country in the future. To 72% of the sample, concern about the future is over economic improvement. This suggests that prospects for work opportunities and regular income amid growing unemployment are a more urgent preoccupation than political issues. There appears to be no association made between choice of political regimes and economic well-being.

NATIONALIST FEELINGS AND CONCOMITANT IDENTITIES Pride in their Nationality

Seventy-one percent of the sample affirms their sense of national belonging and identity, most of which are females. This may be because women are keener to preserve the common cultural heritage wherein national allegiance ranks top. Among them, females with university level education have the strongest sense of allegiance. The general view expressed in media talk shows is that the sense of allegiance is low among university students and this result appears to contradict that opinion. Again, 71.1% of the sample is proud of their Egyptian nationality – most are males with university level education. A comparison between young and older people in this respect shows that the percentage of people proud of their Egyptian

tian nationality is only slightly higher among older persons, with a 3% difference. A feeling of national belonging thus appears to reflect a common societal trend cutting across generations.

This puts Egypt fifth in the international comparison in youth pride in national belonging with a difference of 13% above the international 58%; Egypt ranks here among five states, namely Vietnam, South Africa, Turkey and India. In this respect, Egypt is ahead of developed countries which figure at the bottom of the list, namely the USA, Sweden, Britain and Japan. This perhaps indicates that the sense of national belonging among young people is not necessarily linked to levels of a country's progress and human welfare, although these may provide alternatives to allegiance and choice of identity. Belonging goes well beyond to reach deeply in the broader domains of family and civil bonds. It shows that the overwhelming national feelings among youth are governed by social, cultural and political considerations that need further research.

Youth's Sense of National Belonging

National belonging among youth in Egypt is expressed in the response of 85% of the sample who showed readiness to go to war in defense of their nation. Most are males with university level education. In this respect, Egypt ranks eighth at the international level scoring six percentage points higher than the international 79%. Egypt is thus ahead of developed countries such as Sweden, which appear at the bottom of the list.

Abidance by Egyptian laws is the most important condition for getting an Egyptian nationality in the opinion of 75% of the sample regardless of educational differences. It is followed by conventional considerations regarding the concept of citizenship such as following Egyptian customs and traditions (67%), kinship to Egyptians (63%) or birth in Egypt (57%). Most of these choices were made by persons with less than a university level education. The relationship between citizens and the state is therefore a mix of modern and conventional considerations of citizenship. There appears to be some confusion among youth in general and the less educated in particular regarding the meaning of citizenship.

Other Allegiances

While national belonging is the core of Egyptian youth's perception of identity, there are other concomitant identities. Belonging to the Arab nation is a basic identity to 65% of the sample, followed by local allegiance to the governorate where a person was born or lives at 60%. Recognition of other identities is relatively more common among females and persons with university level education. Global citizenship comes at the bottom of the list of concomitant identities. Those who see themselves as global citizens are about one third of the sample; Egypt is thus closer to the international average of 31%. Younger and older respondents have a very close match in response, except with regard world citizenship, to which youth appear more open and are ahead by 4%.

Egypt occupies the seventh position in regard to world citizenship, while other countries streamlined in globalization occupy lower positions (Sweden, the USA and Japan which ranks last). This may be attributed to the fact that a sense of identity at both the international and the local levels is subject to conventional factors, such as feelings of national belonging, traditional identities of a social, cultural and religious nature, and so forth. The issue of globalization needs further examination, especially since youth in most societies are the most open segments to the world and to integration in diverse globalized spaces.

FAMILY VALUES AND PATRIARCHAL LEGACY

The Importance of Family

The family is a main source of social capital, in the form of bonding, social networking, exchange, synergy and trust of others. Family weakness leads to an erosion of this social capital that extends to social activities in society. However, family links can also constrain social development, especially when family values dominate youth and transcend the private sphere to spill into the public domain. In this respect, the findings of the survey reveal data for Egypt that confirm the observation that many young people have beliefs and perceptions that emerge from the orbit of kinship and family structure. This leads to values that are handed down through generations and are dependent on a patriarchal system at their core.

The survey indicates that the family represents an important area of life for youth, with 98% supporting this view. Most respondents are females, with university level education, have jobs and are married; they also belong to the upper and middle classes, but there are no significant differences between urban and rural areas in this respect.

Egypt ranks third in the world next to Turkey and Indonesia with a difference of five points above the international rating of 93%. The difference between the highest percentage — Turkey at 98% and the lowest — China at 81% - does not exceed 17%. This suggests that the general trend among youth, both internationally and locally, is that family is the most important institution in life. No doubt, the high percentage of youth supporting the importance of family in developed countries which champion values of individuality and autonomy is one of the paradoxes that need further examination.

Young people's belief in the importance of family extends to the future. When asked about their rating of the importance of four basic aspects of life (family, work, technology and respect for authority) in the near future, 97% of the sample said paying greater attention to family is good, followed by attention to work at 92%, then technology at 79% and lastly respect for authority at 75%. The gender divide is small but is relatively higher among youth with university degrees, having jobs, living in urban areas and considering themselves below the middle class.

Traditional Attitudes

In a significant result on young persons' perception of themselves, 82% of the sample saw themselves as persons striving to keep the customs and traditions drawn from their religion and family ties. Most were females. Not less than 57% males with a university degree saw themselves as living up to what others expected of them. Family (and social) values thus obviously contribute to a self image that is conservative and which one frequently associates rather with a lower social and economic status.


Further, in the sample, 74% saw that a main objective was to live up to their parent's pride in them

(Figure 5.14). Most of the respondents were males from urban settings, with a university education but jobless. International comparisons show that Egypt ranks second in the world, next to Morocco, in youths' desire for parental pride, with a difference of 26% above the international figure of 48%. In this respect, countries with traditional legacies top the list that includes Morocco, Egypt, Jordan, Indonesia, South Africa and India. On the other hand, the bottom of the list is predominantly occupied by the West, with the exception of China. It includes Sweden, Japan, the USA and Britain. In these countries, youth's quest for pride goes beyond blessings by the family, even in China with its strong family heritage.

One of the family values relating to upbringing is the expressed need for a father and a mother within a family framework. Youth concurring with this view overwhelmingly represented 98% of the sample, underlying a belief in the importance of family in building human capital. It is also in line with a conservative attitude to child upbringing. Data indicate that 26% of the sample sees it as important that children should not be brought up as independent, where dependence appears to be a value of high priority in youth's perception of child upbringing. This is also in line with a tendency to highlight the value of obedience as something that children should learn very early in their lives. Those who support this view represent 70% of the sample. Most advocates were females with below university level education, unemployed and residents of rural areas, and in fact, the very conservative segments of the youth sample.

Issues of Gender

Some family values strengthen gender differences. Although the percentage of those who state that boys should be given priority over girls in university education is small, 58% of youth believe that men are better than women in work (Figure 5.15). Naturally enough, the percentage of supporters of this view is higher among males than females, though the difference is limited to 3 percent. Further, 87% of the sample said that in case of scarce employment opportunities, priority should be given to men who are, it appears, considered the principal breadwinners. In line with these findings, 66% of the sample believed that a woman's

Figure 5.13: Concern for Parent's Pride by Country

Source: *Ibid*

role as a housewife can give her the same satisfaction as work outside home. Most who support this view are females. Data also indicate that 70% of the sample support male supremacy over women as political leaders. All these results suggest that a male-dominated patriarchy is prevalent, at least in the view of many women.

As confirmation of prevalent patriarchal values, the ratio of male supporters of male superiority politically is four percent higher than females (68%). Further, the percentage of supporters of this view among older people is 74%, which is three percent higher than the advocates of the same view among youth, at 71%. The patriarchal bias against women among youth also cuts across the social values system in general, even among the educated. Visibly, education has not had an impact on the existing social perception of gender inequality. Paradoxically, there is a convergence of trends among young males and females in accepting gender discrimination. Young females, like older women, play a pivotal role in reproducing this perception.

Amazingly, international comparisons show that Egypt ranks *first* in the world in regard to gender differences in work with a difference of more than 41%


above the world percentage of 17%. Egypt thus leads the list of countries with a heavy patriarchal legacy, among which include Jordan, India, Morocco and Iran. On the other hand, the gender divide over work is small in a varied group of other countries including the USA, Sweden, Britain, China, Japan, Argentina and Poland. This strongly suggests that gender discrimination against women has specific inherited cultural and historical dimensions. This trend may change as a result of social and economic variables that reflect on family welfare. At present, the strength and influence of such values continue to impact the lives of youth in Egypt despite the waves of social change and modernization that have extended for over 50 years. It seems that conservative values, possibly based on religious precepts, still dominate among youth and indeed among most other social segments in Egypt.

THE CENTRALITY OF RELIGION

Concerning religion and its importance in life, the data show overwhelming religious sentiments among youth at 96% (Figure 5.16). Although there are no significant social differences among youth categories on this question, there are relatively stronger religious feelings among females, urban dwellers and the middle class. International comparisons rank Egypt first in the world in this respect with 38% percentage points above the international 58%. Egypt is among a group of Islamic countries with several religious orientations and which includes Indonesia, Jordan, Morocco, Iran and Turkey, but whose activities by Islamic movements during the past two decades has had a marked impact on deepening religious trends among youth. Countries where religious sentiments are at their lowest are Japan, China, Sweden, Vietnam and Russia.

There is also a strong belief in the divine presence in everyday life among Egyptian youth. Ninety percent of the respondents identified themselves as religious in this respect. The percentage increases significantly among females given that girls are now a major target of religious advocacy by Islamic movements on the one hand, and the fact that women play an effective role in preserving the values of religiosity on the other. Religiosity increases among persons with higher

Figure 5.14: Preference of Men to Women in Work by Country




Source

education, which suggests that currently, education has a fundamental role in spreading religious values. Approximately 82% of the sample stressed the importance of preserving customs and traditions rooted in religion and family as characteristics that apply to them completely. Despite the high percentage of females in this respect, the figures among groups of different ages and levels of education are close, implying that young people are generally primarily conservative. The religious influence in the lives of youth is complemented by a firm belief in fatalism. In this respect, 69% of the respondents said that they could not determine their fate because everything is pre-ordained and unavoidable. Only 7% professed that they determined their own fate. The remaining 25% adopted a neutral stand between fatalism and free choice. It is clear that fatalistic tendencies are higher among women and among the less educated at 7.9% of the sample, with a majority of females having a university level education and being residents of urban areas.

The survey revealed that only one fifth of the sample were keen to go to places of worship every day and a quarter of the sample went once a week, the balance going less frequently and ranging from once a

Figure 5.15: Importance of Religion in Life by Country



Source

month to only on special occasions. About 26% were not keen on the performance of rituals in the places of worship. It is clear that religious tendencies manifest themselves more in talk than in actual rituals and are given momentum by vocal advocates and the media. This phenomenon has a clear impact on activating the public domain as a moral channel at a time when the family and social institutions are perhaps getting weaker in performing this role.

Religious institutions have four major roles in the eyes of young people, chief among which are solving moral problems and meeting psychological needs at 67% of the sample and fulfilling spiritual needs at 64%. Helping with the family and community problems did not exceed 60% and 55%, respectively.

ATTITUDES TOWARDS OTHERS

Forty seven percent of young people see that their friends are important. The percentage is higher among males with higher education. This is consistent with the gender differences accepted by social norms which give males the right to form many friendships and the right to spend more leisure time with their friends.



Positive emotions towards the ‘other’ are also manifest in young people’s vision of the values that children should be encouraged to learn. Chief among these are tolerance and respect in the eyes of 71% of the sample. Here, Egypt ranks ninth by more than 5 points above the global percentage of 66% and is part of a group of countries which occupy an intermediate place, namely Jordan, China, Turkey and Argentina. It is worth noting that this trend increases among females and those with lower education. More than half the sample stressed the importance of children learning selflessness and altruism. These are all indicators of positive perceptions and attitudes towards the ‘other’.

However, 44% of the sample of young people saw a need to put restrictions on the number of foreigners allowed to come to Egypt, while 24% were for preventing entry. Those who saw the presence of foreigners conditional on the availability of employment opportunities accounted for 28%. The proportion of young people who do not accept the presence of foreigners to work in Egypt is higher among males and those with a university education. This is understandable, given the high unemployment rate and fear of competition in the labor market of a considerable portion of males in this category. A huge number (97%) of the sample agreed that employers should give priority to Egyptians when there are employment opportunities.

Short-Term Trust


Young people’s trust in others is fragile. Fifty-seven

percent of the sample prefers a safe environment, adopting some of the values in support of customs and traditions. Twenty-eight percent of the sample has misgivings about dealing with foreigners who might try to take advantage of them. No more than 16% of the sample has any confidence in the ‘other’ – a tiny proportion – reflecting the erosion in the real level of social capital among young people. Thus, Egypt is ranked fifth with a difference of less than 7 points from the international rate of 23%. It comes at the bottom of the list of countries with similar conditions, such as Turkey, Brazil, Iran and Morocco. Sweden, China, Vietnam and Japan are, in contrast, close to the top (Figure 5.17).

However, it is clear that the proportion of confidence in the ‘other’ at the global level is also low, despite the global transformations and the openness of youth to most means of globalized communication that transcends geographical, religious and national borders. This openness is believed to help extend bridges of trust, but the massive flow of current communication can be accompanied by feelings of caution and distrust.

If young people’s trust in others is fragile to this extent, then who do they think would deserve their trust? And what are the limits of trust in their lives? Data indicate that 95% of the sample has total trust in the family (Figure 5.18). The data also indicate that confidence in charities and humanitarian organizations comes in second place after the family at a rate

Figure 5.16: Trust in Others by Country




Source: Ibid

of 45%. It is clear that young people’s degree of confidence is associated with a variety of religious and spiritual considerations when it comes to helping others.

Trust also depends on a direct social relation. Forty four percent of the sample of young people trusts those they know personally such as friends and acquaintances.

Figure 5.17: Circles of Trust among Youth



Source: Ibid

This is followed by trust in neighbors at a rate of 43%. It then gradually decreases regarding most of the institutions and various bodies. The rate of confidence is at its lowest in the case of persons of other religions, persons one is seeing for the first time, and those with different nationalities. Once more, considerations related to traditional kinship and family and to direct personal relationships appear paramount. In this respect, there is a convergence between males and females, young and older peoples, and between various educational levels.


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Chapter Six



Poverty presents a major hurdle to sustainable development and to economic growth. It represents a threat to security, as well as to political and social stability, since it provides a fertile ground for fanaticism and extreme opposition to the state itself. Over the last two decades there has been widespread acceptance of the view that poverty is more than a lack of material resources; material resources are necessary but not sufficient to escape poverty. In the words of Amartya Sen 'income is only a means to reduce poverty and not the end of it.'

Poverty is known for being a state of deprivation from a decent life that a person or a society hopes to enjoy. Poverty does not only mean lacking what is necessary for the material welfare of a person; it also means deprivation from basic opportunities and choices such as living a long healthy and creative life, with a decent income, enjoying freedom, dignity, self-respect and respect of others. It is clear that income is but one of the choices that people want to enjoy.

Youth poverty differs from adult poverty in that it can have different causes and effects. Two main sets of causes can be identified: First, life-course events (e.g. leaving school, starting work, getting married, having children) play a significant role in shaping vulnerability to poverty. These ‘life events’ are more likely to occur during the 18-29 age interval. Second, intergenerational transmission experienced by youth is often linked to the poverty status of their households and childhood deprivation, and can in turn affect their well-being and the well-being of their children. The impact of youth poverty on long term human capital accumulation is well recognized because youth capacity for learning is greater than for older ages. Thus, youth poverty represents missed opportunities to acquire skills in school or on the job, or good health habits, and these problems are difficult to remedy.

CHARACTERISTICS OF POOR YOUTH

How serious are socio-economic disparities between the rich and poor? And how are young people impacted by their differentiated socio-economic background? This section provides a profile of poor youth in order to understand the quality of their life and the levels of deprivation they experience. Section 2 reports on the perception of poor youth and their aspirations and the third and last section makes policy relevant recommendations.

The analysis in this section is based on four data sources: The first is the Household Income and Expenditure Survey (HIECS) of 2008, the second is the representative sample Survey of Young People in Egypt (SYPE) of 2009, the third is the Demographic and Health Survey (DHS) of 2008, and the fourth is the set of Human Development Indicators, collected by the Institute of National Planning (INP) for this

Table 6.1: Poverty Rates by Region and Age

| Region | Poverty Rate | | Percent of individuals aged 18-29 |
|--------------|-------------------|-----------------|-----------------------------------|
| | Individuals 18-29 | All Individuals | |
| Metropolitan | 8.2 | 6.9 | 23.3 |
| Lower Urban | 8.8 | 7.3 | 22.4 |
| Lower Rural | 19.3 | 16.7 | 23.4 |
| Upper Urban | 22.7 | 21.3 | 23.5 |
| Upper Rural | 44.3 | 43.7 | 23.4 |
| Egypt | 23.2 | 21.6 | 23.3 |


Source: HIECS

EHDR (see Chapter 2 and Annex Tables). The first three sources provide age specific results for youth in the 18 to 29 age interval.

There are a number of different ways in which strong social stratification discriminates against poor youth, the most important of which are education and work conditions as detailed below. Two other striking areas of exclusion for poor youth can be observed with respect to overcrowded living arrangements and the ownership of various assets.² In terms of asset ownership, SYPE data exposes a huge differential that exists with regards ownership of cellular phones (mobiles) and computers. With regards ownership of a mobile, only 8% in the lowest quintile own a cell phone as opposed to 31% for the highest wealth quintile. As to ownership of a computer, for males aged 22-29, for example, the lowest two quintiles (poorest 40%) account for less than 1% of computer ownership, and highest quintile (richest 20%) accounts for 60%.

THE VARIOUS DIMENSIONS OF INCOME POVERTY

Analysis of the HIECS data set for youth in the age bracket 18 to 29 confirms a similar pattern to the results of both the DHS and HIECS in relation to the study “Child Poverty and Disparities in Egypt” to the 2010 UNICEF study which shows that more than 20% of children experience a number of deprivations.³ HIECS shows that 5.3% of children aged 6-17 years were employed in 2008/2009. Childhood poverty ranges from a low of 6.6% in the metropolitan region to 41.4% in rural Upper Egypt; when both parents do not work, poverty risks are twice the risk of employed parents.

Figure 6.1 Income Poverty Rate by Age, 2008-09

Source: Authors' calculations using HEICS, 2008

As shown in Table 6.1, 21.6% of all Egyptians are poor. Similar to previous poverty measures in 2000 and 2005 (World Bank 2002 and 2007), the results show large regional disparities with Rural Upper Egypt being the most deprived (43.7% of its residents are income poor) and Metropolitan region the least. The percentage of poor youth is always slightly higher than the average rate, higher by 1.5 percentage points. This observation holds for all regions in Egypt.

Youth are more likely to experience poverty than older age groups and 'younger young' are at substantially higher risk of poverty than the 'older young'. At the national level, 23% of children under age 15 years were in poverty in 2008-09. Poverty rates peak dramatically for teenagers between 15 to 17 years, rising to almost 29% and almost 27% for young adults between 18 and 20 years. The younger working-age adults between 27 and 29 years (17%) have the lowest incidence of poverty. Starting from age 27 years and above, the poverty rate is always below the national average. This is partly driven by changes in occupational status among young people (who are less likely to be studying or unemployed at later ages), but also by a reduced risk of poverty within groups: For example, those with a job are less likely to be poor in their late twenties than in their teens or early twenties. However, this is offset by the fact that at later ages, more of them have had children. The national pattern persists in urban and rural areas (see Figure 6.1).

The risk of poverty is particularly high among households with three or more youth members. Our calculations of poverty are based on the total consumption of

Table 6.2: Poverty Rates within Households of 5/6 members, by Number of Young Adults

| | Young Adults of Age 15-17 | Young Adults of Age 18-23 | Young Adults of Age 24-29 |
|----|------------------------------|------------------------------|------------------------------|
| 0 | 17.1 | 15.7 | 16.9 |
| 1 | 20.0 | 19.8 | 20.8 |
| 2 | 22.0 | 22.3 | 19.4 |
| 3+ | 22.3 | 25.5 | 29.2 |

Source: Authors' calculations using HEICS, 2008


all household members, (which is based on the number and ages of household members). Because of this, living arrangements affect a person's risk of poverty. In general, if a person lives with other adults who have jobs, this increases the household's income relative to its needs, and the risk of poverty decreases. In contrast, living with children or with young adults who do not have jobs tends to decrease the household's income relative to its needs and to increase the risk of poverty. Because young adults' incomes are on average low compared with those of their parents, living in the family of origin tends to protect young adults from poverty, and (other things being equal) we may expect the risk of poverty to be higher in households with younger adult's members. For instance, within households of 5 or 6 children, 22% of those have three or more persons of age 15-17 were poor in 2008-09, compared to only 17% of those without young persons of age 15-17.

THE INTERGENERATIONAL TRANSMISSION OF POVERTY

"My grandparents are responsible. They never sent their children (here the parents of the subjects) to school, this led to further poor offspring", said participant in youth focus group discussion.

Youth from poor households suffer from high and persistent capability deprivation especially during childhood – poor nutrition, untreated illness, lack of access to education –limits human development in ways that are often irreversible. Unhealthy, poorly educated children can grow into young people with more limited capacity for learning and working. The extent to which parent's poverty is transmitted to their children is affected by parents' investment in children – in terms of education and training, health

Figure 6.2: Prevalence of Deprivations among Youth (18-29 Years)



Source: *Ibid*

and nutrition, and general care. When a young person is forced to leave education before achieving a secondary, tertiary or vocational qualification, he is poorly paid, has insecure work; low and declining assets; minimal access to social protection and basic services and hence has no chance to break out of the vicious circle of poverty. The UNICEF report on child poverty in Egypt (2010 forthcoming) indicates that almost half the children (47%) in income poor households experience at least one severe deprivation out of seven dimensions (health, education, shelter, nutrition, water, sanitation and information) compared to 14% of non-poor children. And differences in deprivations experienced between the poor and non poor measured in terms of income is wider when we consider children suffering from at least two severe deprivations (absolute poverty). The percentage of children experiencing at least two or more deprivations is 10% for the income poor and only one percent for the non income poor”.

Figure 6.2 shows the percent of Egyptian youth of age 18-29 years who suffer from different severe deprivations of basic human needs. It shows that education deprivation is the prevalent and severe among youth aged 18-29 years in Egypt with 17% of youth accounting for over 3 million who have never been to school or who did not complete their primary education.

Education deprivation is followed by healthcare deprivation, where 15% of ever married young females who gave birth in the preceding five years (768 thousand) suffer from lack of either antenatal care or a Tetanus

Table 6.3: Youth Poverty as Multiple Deprivations

The Incidence of Multiple Deprivations Among Youth

| | |
|--|-------|
| Only one (any) deprivation (7 deprivation) | 23.6% |
| Two of any deprivations | 7.1% |
| Three of any deprivations | 2.0% |
| Four of any deprivations | 0.3% |
| Five of any deprivations | 0.1% |
| Six of any deprivations | 0 |
| Seven of any deprivations | 0 |

Source: *DHS*

shot during their last pregnancy. On the other hand, the percentage of water and sanitation deprivation are small, indicating that almost all youth have access to an improved⁵ source of drinking water and sanitation facility. It should be noted that both education and healthcare deprivations are, as expected, highly correlated to income poverty.

The incidence of multiple deprivations becomes less and less prevalent among youth. Figure 6.2 shows the proportion of youth experiencing one or more deprivations (‘severe deprivation’) as well as the proportion suffering two or more deprivations (‘absolute poverty’). Data shows that almost one out of three youth, (33.1% representing 5.9 million youth), experienced one or more deprivations (‘severe deprivation’). One youth out of four (23.6% or 4223 thousand youth) suffer from only one severe deprivation. These percentages decrease to less than one percent for youth who suffer from four or more types of severe deprivations (See Table 6.3).

A typical scenario of intergeneration transmission can be described as follows: Start with a household whose head is illiterate and with no productive assets, and trace the path through his/her children. The children are very likely to be malnourished, more a consequence of the ignorance of the parents than the unavailability of proper food and the poor sanitary conditions in which they live. These children therefore become more prone to diseases, which further diminishes their physical capabilities. They are not enrolled in schools. Even if they join schools, they will soon drop out to join the labor market, due to the constrained economic conditions of their households. Under these circumstances, many of them

Box 6.1: Poor Youth have Irregular Work

Most participants in youth focus group discussions complained of the irregularity of their work, being mostly seasonal. The youth reported that they are forced to accept whatever jobs are available, in most cases seasonal and irregular, at the same time low in wages, because of widespread unemployment. The youth, in this way, cannot organize their lives, as their situation is vulnerable and subject to all sorts of external changes, whether political, economic, and/or global.

All youth in the sample have irregular jobs. It is interesting to note that it is rural youth more than urban youth that feel the social pressure of this situation. One rural youth said that he tried driving a carriage but he was imprisoned because he violated a traffic law. He was exposed to all sorts of humiliation—insults, beating, and he was even handcuffed. He tried working as a cleaner. When it was known that he was educated, he was fired. Another young man reported that he has a job carrying goods. He wears a “galabeya”. This outfit seems to be stigmatized—in fact it is the stereotype of deviance, because every now and then, policemen arrest him and he is put in jail.

Source: Heba el Laithy, based on youth focus groups for study Living Standards in Egypt (2007) conducted for Environmental Quality International.

Table 6.4: Percent of Youth Experiencing Different Forms of Deprivation (by Wealth Quintile)

| Wealth Index Quintiles | Crowdedness | Flooring material | Sanitation | Water | Information | Education | Health | Income poverty rate |
|------------------------|-------------|-------------------|------------|-------|-------------|-----------|--------|---------------------|
| Total | 1.2 | 10.9 | 3.7 | 2.6 | 2.2 | 17.2 | 15.2 | 23.2 |
| Quintile 1 (poorest) | 4.8 | 43.2 | 7.7 | 7.0 | 11.1 | 40.2 | 22.7 | 46.1 |
| Quintile 2 | 1.0 | 12.7 | 5.1 | 3.2 | 0.5 | 24.5 | 16.6 | 35.1 |
| Quintile 3 | 0.3 | 2.0 | 4.3 | 1.8 | 0.3 | 13.7 | 14.7 | 24.6 |
| Quintile 4 | 0.1 | 0.2 | 1.4 | 0.6 | 0.0 | 7.3 | 10.1 | 9.3 |
| Quintile 5 (richest) | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.5 | 0.9 | 0.0 | 1.9 | 13.4 | 2.6 |

Source: Authors calculations using Egypt Demographic and Health Survey, 2008 and HEICS, 2008/09

would be virtually illiterate, and in the absence of adequate vocational training facilities, these children enter adolescence with very poor skills and capabilities. The cycle is complete when the spouse is of the same characteristics, and poverty is thus perpetuated across the different generations. Given such a scenario, it is clear that education is a very powerful, though not the only, instrument in enabling individuals to break the cycle of poverty.


THE LINK BETWEEN WEALTH AND YOUTH DEPRIVATION

Youth deprivation is obviously linked to child deprivation. Children living in rooms with more than five people per room account for 14.4% of all children. Overcrowding is seen to continue for youth 18 years and above as per SYPE results. It is also clear that income or wealth indicators of poverty are highly correlated with shelter deprivation. It is estimated that 17% of children under five years old (1.5 million children) are severely food deprived according to the

WHO definition. The incidence of food deprivation is highest in rural Upper Egypt as per DHS 2008, while the proportion of children between 7 and 18 who have never been to school is 3.2% at the national level (490,000 children). The regional disparities in lack of school attendance range from 1.4% in urban governorates to 6.7% in rural Upper Egypt. Moreover, information deprivation among children more than two years of age is 2.4%, or 551,000 children, probably the same children. These children lack access to television, radio, telephone or newspapers. Many of these deprivations are carried over from childhood to adolescence to youth.

Data presented in Table 6.4 shows that the wealth status of households represented by the assets approach has a substantial effect on youth deprivation. In fact, the HIECES results indicate that the wealth index is highly correlated with *income poverty*. Almost half of youth in the first quintile are income poor, and prevalence of poverty decreases as the wealth index

Figure 6.3: Percentage who Attended Preschool (by Wealth Quintile)



Source: SYPE 2009

increases to reach only 2.6% among youth in the richest quintile.


The risk of experiencing *crowdedness* deprivation varies enormously between the quintiles of the wealth index. Almost 5% of youth in the poorest quintile suffer from crowdedness deprivation, compared to less than one percent among non-poor youth.

Youth with the least wealth are most likely to experience deprivations. Household wealth represented by the assets approach is a strong explanatory factor for *education* deprivation. Youth with the least wealth are most likely to experience deprivation. While 40% of youth in the poorest quintile are severely educationally deprived, less than two percent of youth in the richest quintile suffer from severe educational deprivation.

Female youth living in wealthiest households are less likely to be *health* deprived than those living in poor households. The percentage of ever married female youth living in poor households who suffer from severe health deprivation reached almost 23%, while this percentage decreased to 10% and 13% among ever married female youth in the fourth and the fifth richest quintiles respectively.

The percentage of youth who suffer from *floor* deprivation ranges from 43.2% in the poorest quintile to 0.2% among youth in the fourth quintile and to zero among the richest quintile.

Figure 6.4: Distribution of Level of Education (by Wealth Quintile)



The wealth status of households has significant effect on severe *sanitation* deprivation with almost 8% of youth in the poorest quintile, down to less than one percent (0.5%) among youth in the richest quintile.

Disparity patterns for *water* deprivation are the same as those for sanitation. Youth in the highest two wealth quintiles suffer from almost no water deprivation and at the rate of 3.2% for the second poorest quintile and 7% of youth living in the poorest wealth quintile.


Youth living in poor households are more likely to be *information* deprived, with 11%, amongst the poorest as compared to less than one percent among non-poor youth.

EDUCATION

Another striking result is from the SYPE dataset which shows that poor youth aged 18-29 have been the most disadvantaged in terms of access to preschool, as seen Figure 6.3. Whereas more than 70% of Egypt's youth in the highest quintile have attended kindergarten, the percentage falls sharply along the wealth group where it reaches only 11% for the lowest quintile. This bears witness to the uneven access to equal opportunity since the correlation is very high between preschool attendance and better scores throughout the years of compulsory education.

For the age group 18-29, there are large differentials in educational enrollment and educational achievement. SYPE results show stark results whereby 39%

Figure 6.5a Low Achievers - Makbool




Source: SYPE 2009

of youth in the lowest quintile (poorest 20%) are illiterate, only a few make it to the general school certificate, and less into University (Figure 6.4). The phenomenon of illiteracy is largely rural, with 76% of all illiterate youth plus 70% of those who can only read and write residing in rural Egypt.

Youth in the richest quintile are, in contrast, achieving very high levels of education with as much as 27% holding the secondary school certificates and another 43% holding university degrees. In fact, the differential between the five wealth quintiles according to levels of education is the most striking of all wealth differentials. Historically, this differential also reflects the most stubborn characteristic of Egypt's poverty phenomenon: illiteracy

What is especially worrying is the implication for social mobility, which is impeded by the obstacle of poor quality of public education and the need for out-of-pocket payments for private tuition. The transition from school to post-secondary and university education reflects the unequal distribution of access to quality learning in Egypt. As shown in Figure 6.4, if you are poor (lowest quintile), the likelihood of having a post-secondary or university degree is minimal, in contrast to that of the top two quintiles who account for 43% and 21%, respectively, of total youth with a post-secondary or university degree.

Figure 6.5b High Achievers - Excellence



Turning from educational level to educational achievement as measured by grades, the second set of differentials between rich and poor becomes obvious. What the data exposes is the double jeopardy whereby only a declining fraction of poor youth has access to the different levels of education, and their disadvantage is compounded by those poor who access the education system also getting the poorer scores.

As depicted in Figure 6.5a, the lowest wealth quintile (the poorest 20% of the population) accounts for anywhere between 27% and 50% of poor achievers having a grade of *makbool* (a D grade). In contrast, youth from the highest wealth quintile (the top 20% of the wealth scale) are likely to achieve the best grades across different schooling levels. For example, as can be seen in Figure 6.5b, 49% of the richest quintile accounts for 49% achieved a grade of excellent (an A grade), in contrast to only 14% of the poorest quintile. What this in turn leads to is that the educational outcomes which are highly differentiated by income class are translated to equally differentiated opportunities at work and throughout the life span of Egypt's youth.

Low education is a key factor to transmitting poverty across generations. Evidence from all poverty studies in Egypt showed that education is the strongest

Box 6.2: Work and Education are Closely Correlated

One young man talked about his own experience, when he had to drop out from school, because he was also working and his grades were therefore low. Given the opportunity, he would have liked to continue his education. Education requires high grades. Those that earn them are the ones living in comfortable conditions that allow them to study and concentrate on their lessons. Another young man expressed his regrets as to every minute he spent in school, his anger towards all his teachers, as well as his father who used to push him to study. He studied and worked hard, but what did he get at the end? Nothing. He declared that he was willing to accept any job. When asked if he was going to send his children to school, he answered in the positive, hoping for good quality education that can be useful to them.

Source: Heba el Laithy, based on youth focus groups for the study 'Living Standards in Egypt' (2007) conducted for Environmental Quality International.

correlate of poverty, insofar as it determines the command of individuals over income earning opportunities through access to employment. Education was typically found to have a high explanatory power on observed patterns of poverty. The correlation between education and welfare has important implications for policy, particularly in terms of the distributional impact. Poor youth –as will be shown below– have low educational attainments and their low educational levels are not enough to escape the poverty trap, transmitting poverty across generations. Illiterate youth of both sexes, (see Box 6.3) emphasized the importance of education. They saw illiteracy as a prime cause of poverty.

Poor youth, especially girls, have lower likelihood to join schools. Net enrollment rate reached 29.7% for non poor and 13.9% for poor youth aged 18-24 years. Enrollment rate dropped sharply at tertiary education age. Enrollment rate for non poor is about double that of the poor. Further, the gap between poor and non poor was wider among girls compared to boys, but poverty gap was wider than the gender gap. At the age of 20 years, 11.7% of poor females and 13.6% of poor males were enrolled in education, compared to 31% of females and 36.7% of males in non-poor households. There was also a large gap in school enrolment between urban and rural areas, rural poor being the most disadvantaged.

Unemployment rate for poor youth is lower than the non poor, at any age. Poor young people cannot afford to stay unemployed. Thus, the incidence of unemployment may be low, although youth are still in poverty. As indicated by Figure 6.6, unemployment

Table 6.5: Youth Unemployment Rate by Education Level and Poverty Status, 2008-09

| | Secondary | Above Secondary | University or Higher Education |
|-----------|-----------|-----------------|--------------------------------|
| Poor | 16.1 | 28.7 | 29.4 |
| Non-Poor | 14.3 | 21.3 | 25.3 |
| All Youth | 14.7 | 22.3 | 25.6 |

Source: Authors calculations using HEICS, 2008-09.


Table 6.6: Distribution of Employed Youth by Poverty Status

| | Permanent | Temporary | Seasonal | Casual |
|----------|-----------|-----------|----------|--------|
| Poor | 61.9 | 7.2 | 1.1 | 29.8 |
| Non-poor | 76.4 | 10.1 | 0.6 | 12.9 |


Source: Authors calculations using HIECS, 2008-09.

rate increases with age, peaks at age of 18 and 19 and declines afterwards. This is true for both poor and non poor youth, yet unemployment rate for the poor is always lower than the non poor.

Unemployment rates continue to be high for secondary and university graduates, especially for the poor. As presented in Table 6.5, unemployment was more pronounced among the poor, where 29% of poor educated persons of age 18-29 were unemployed and one out of four educated non poor was unemployed. It seems that even if a poor person is able to break the vicious circle of education and poverty, he/she still cannot compete in the job market as a result of low quality education, labor market mismatch, or because of a lack of connections in identifying job opportunities.

Figure 6.6: Unemployment Rate by Age, 2008-09


Source: Authors calculations using HIECS, 2008-09.

Figure 6.7: Percentage of Permanent Employment by Age, 2008-09

Source: Authors calculations using HIECS, 2008-09.

Table 6.7: Distribution of Youth in Labor Force by Employment Categories, 2008-09

| | Wage Worker | Employer | Self Employed | Unpaid Workers | Unemployed |
|----------|-------------|----------|---------------|----------------|------------|
| Poor | 56.6 | 2.1 | 7.1 | 24.7 | 9.5 |
| Non-Poor | 54.1 | 3.8 | 10.9 | 19.1 | 12.1 |

Figure 6.8: Unpaid Workers' Share by Age and Poverty Status, 2008-09

Source: Authors calculations using HEICS, 2008-09.

Youth employment may be considered informal if the job is unpaid or if the job includes no benefits such as participation in the country's social security system. High rates of informality are a signal that youth are finding less permanent and low-quality jobs.

Underemployment is more prevalent among employed youth, with the poor over-represented among groups with seasonal or casual occupations. Underemployment is defined as working in temporary, seasonal or casual work, for lower wages. Overall, 84% of employed individuals had permanent work, 10.8% had casual work, 4.5% have temporary work, and less than one percent had seasonal work. Among employed youth, 72% have permanent work, 9.2% have temporary work, 0.8% have seasonal work and 18% have casual work. More than one third of poor employed youth have no permanent jobs com-

pared to less than a quarter of the non poor. Individuals with permanent jobs are less represented among the poor compared to non poor (by 14 percentage points), while casual workers are more represented in the poor group (by 17 percentage points). The prevalence of permanent employment increases with age for the non poor, while there is no age specific pattern for the poor.

For both poor and non poor, the share of unpaid workers decreases with age and the gap becomes wider. Older youth seek formal employment as wage workers or establish their own business, and the non poor are more likely to succeed as they have more skills, more assets and more connections. The incidence of wage employment is 56.6% for the poor versus 54.1% for non poor (Table 6.7). Unpaid workers are more common among the poor than the non poor, with the shares in total employment at 24.7 and 19% for the poor and non poor, respectively. This may be due to the fact that rural residents are engaged primarily in agriculture and poverty is more prevalent in rural areas (see Figure 6.8).

A PROFILE OF POOR RURAL YOUTH

According to Egypt's geography, it is now well established that the poor are concentrated in rural areas and particularly those in Upper Egypt. Egypt's poverty map also provides ample evidence for high levels of discrimination across rural areas themselves. The



1000 poorest villages (out of Egypt's total number of 4,700 villages) account for as much as 54% of the total number of rural poor in Egypt. This is largely a result of the unequal distribution of public goods including physical infrastructure (water, sanitation and roads) as well as public services, namely education and health facilities.

According to SYPE, whereas rural youth account for 59% of Egypt's total youth, they account for 85% of Egypt's poor youth. What is obvious, therefore, is that being poor is very much a characteristic of residing in rural Egypt and thus having less access to public goods and services. Lack of access to schooling in turn becomes a major determinant of low quality work opportunities throughout life and thus the poverty cycle reproduces itself.


Since 1994, Egypt's Human Development Reports and the growing number of indicators of well-being have consistently shown the persistent level of deprivation of rural communities. Youth living in rural areas are shown to be deprived in terms of both physical infrastructure facilities as well as education access and outcomes. Moreover, the quantity and diversity of job opportunities is far more restricted in rural Egypt and can explain the strong tendency for rural-urban migration and the very fast expansion of informal *ashwaiyat*, which offer intermediate earnings and living conditions between rural and urban regions.

It must be noted, however, that there are a number of characteristics of well-being that are not accounted for in the typical measures of deprivation and which are in favor of residents of rural Egypt. The positive and quantified variables in the countryside include less pollution, proximity to work (hence less cost of transport and time consumption for travel), more prevalent home ownership (lower cost of land), more security, less crowding and house congestion, and greater physical exercise for both males and females.

THE PROFILE OF YOUTH IN ASHWAIYAT

It is estimated that at least 15 million Egyptians reside in informal settlements, both urban and rural. Informal areas in Egypt are very young in age but are the fastest growing choice of residence, exceeding that of newly built towns. Contrary to popular thought, these informal areas which started to multiply in the 1970s are not necessarily slums, nor are they necessarily unstructured and unorganized. More often than not they eventually become cohesive entities that share strong social networks and cultural ties which are the basis of rule enforcement.

The phenomenon of growing informal areas is mostly related to the shift away from an agricultural-based economy which has pulled people away from their rural homes and towards the cities where most jobs are being created in industry and services. The unplanned and somewhat random construction of these informal urban communities (*ashwaiyat*) cre-

Figure 6.9: Key Fears for the Future

Source: *Dreams of Egyptians Survey, 2009 – Question 7.*

ates problems of accessibility, narrow streets, high density, and insufficient infrastructure. Other negative attributes include the poor coverage of physical infrastructure and especially sanitation, the poor quality of roads, the unsafe modes of public transportation, and the poorly ventilated dwellings (see Chapter 15). Perhaps the most serious problem that is faced by informal areas in urban Egypt is the stigmatization of their youth residents. The failure to protect young people from drugs and hustling has caused these places to attract more illegal activity than other, better-protected districts. This contributes further to the marginalization of these areas and their residents. Moreover, there is a 50% greater chance of drug use amongst young residents in *ashwaiyat* versus the average in Egypt

Those that live in these informal areas – young and old – must not be assumed as poor, as the profile of these areas includes a vast array of people from many socio-economic backgrounds. By examining the outcomes of the SYPE survey, for youth living in *ashwaiyat*, it is surprising to note that only 10% of the residents belong to the lowest wealth quintile and another 12% to the second lowest quintile. To the contrary, as much as 58% of residents belong to the fourth and fifth quintiles. Another characteristic of youth in urban *ashwaiyat* is that their educational outcomes are far better than the average for Egypt. Whereas the youth residents of urban *ashwaiyat* account for 9.4% of the total youth sample, they are relatively well-represented amongst post-secondary and University graduates (12% and 13%, respectively) and only account for 6% of total illiterate youth. This confirms that youth in *ashwaiyat* do not suffer from

the typical forms of deprivation of the poor. In fact, the prevalence of illiteracy, which stands at 16.7% of the total sample of youth, is mostly accounted for by rural Upper Egypt youth.

Overall, the representation of youth from *ashwaiyat* in the total sample is very close to their weight in the sample for all other characteristics, such as job quality and ownership of assets (mobile phone, room, and bed). On the social front, married youth in *ashwaiyat* have a 40% higher chance of having a nuclear family living arrangement than the average for all youth in Egypt.

According to the typical variables used to measure poverty, it would seem that the quality of life of youth residing in Egypt's *ashwaiyat* areas are not as bad as assumed by many. However, recent surveys of these slum areas show that one must be careful and distinguish between those that are geographically adjacent to the better-off urban centers and those that are remote – the difference being in better work opportunities in the former and hence better living conditions.

DREAMS AND ASPIRATIONS OF YOUTH FROM DISADVANTAGED FAMILIES

The source of data here is a representative sample survey, *Dreams of Egyptians*, conducted jointly by IDSC and the Center for Sociological and Criminological Research (2009). The sample size is 3000 individuals (each representing a household) aged 18 and above, of which youth were 1,776 in the age group 18-29. There are 68 questions, most of which are multiple choice.

In order to gauge the difference in attitudes and outlook between poor and non-poor youth, the sample was divided into poor and non-poor according to the response to the following question: To which class do you consider you belong to? The choice answers were: Rich, middle class, lower middle class, poor, and destitute. The two bottom groups were assumed to constitute the poor, as opposed to the first three which were assumed to represent the non-poor. The first interesting observation on our sample of youth is that only 10% of the total sample consider themselves poor (poor plus destitute in the sample), which

Box 6.3: Causes of Poverty As Perceived by the Poor

- A young illiterate working rural woman said that poverty is the cause of poverty, pointing to the vicious circle of poverty that most poor people cannot break
- Urban men, both educated and illiterate, reported a multi-causal view of poverty. They likewise believed that these causes interact to aggravate the feeling of deprivation. Income is affected by the economic recession, because rising prices affect the market, which in turn, with stagnated or decreased income, leads to more recession, and employers have to dismiss some employees. A blacksmith reported that sometimes he has to borrow money to pay his employees' wages. These men believed that the poor are more affected by increases in prices than are the rich.
- The youth, both urban and rural, explained poverty on the basis of the failure of state policies to protect low income groups in the face of the trend towards privatizing the economy. One illiterate young man working in a quarry said that the big businessmen monopolize the market in different activities. He was working in this quarry, but this big businessman bought it, monopolized it, and fired the employees that had been working earlier. He tried to find a job with the new owner, but failed, because quarrying is no longer the same. It now uses advanced machinery and has no place for illiterates like him, especially as he has no *wasta*, or patronage.
- Perpetuation of poverty was also apparent in the responses. Some subjects reported that their grandparents are responsible. They never sent their children (here the parents of the subjects) to school, this led to further poor offspring.
- It is apparent that the unemployed lay a high value on employment. Coincidentally, the illiterate youth of both sexes emphasize the importance of education. They consider illiteracy as the prime cause of poverty. Those among them that are working believed that they could have improved their status and that of their families if they had had better education, which would have enabled them to have better jobs. Their current jobs are rather modest because of their low level of education, or rather its total absence. In both cases, poverty is blamed on the missing attribute for each group, whether education or employment.
- The poor find predictions of tomorrow cannot be subject to rules, jobs are uncertain and income is very irregular. This uncertainty about the future seems an integral aspect of the experience of poverty in Egypt. It brings an intolerable sense of insecurity and vulnerability to lives of the poor. They feel vulnerable to trivial and accidental incidents.
- Insecurity is related to lack of health security as indicated by the poor when expressing their fears about tomorrow. The first fear they describe is being sick and unable to afford treatment. All interviewees of focus groups considered health as a major asset whose absence necessarily leads to poverty. A young man said his father was sick and confined to his home, while the mother died. Who is there to help? He had to drop out from school to provide income for his household.


Source: Heba el Laithy, based on youth focus groups for the "Study Living Standards in Egypt" (2007) conducted for Environmental Quality International.

is considerably below Egypt's recognized lower poverty line which stands at 20% of the population. With regards ownership, none of those qualifying as poor own air conditioning, a credit card, a deep freezer or dishwasher in their home, and only 2.6% have a fully automatic washing machine as opposed to 32.4% of the non-poor.

The results showed no significance between the attitudes of poor and non-poor with regards the importance given to being rich at close to 18% for both groups, whereas finding a job or being actively occupied with work shows a much larger importance at

36% for the poor and 25% for the non-poor. More than 70% of poor and non-poor youth are optimistic about the future. Of those who were pessimistic, the reason was mostly related to worsening general conditions which are perceived as deteriorating, including employment prospects. Amongst the key fears for the future, half of the poor and 45% of the non-poor feared inflation (the most feared), followed by sickness, unemployment and poverty (see Figure 6.9).

What the results show is that whether poor or non-poor, the ranking of worries about the future are similar with regards the price level (inflation), health

Figure 6.10: What Gives Confidence about the Future

Source: *Dreams of Egyptians Survey, 2009 – Question 8.*


and unemployment, but they differ on poverty, where the poor view the prospect of falling into poverty with much more apprehension. This shows great awareness among youth in Egypt of economic circumstances at the national level having deteriorated for their particular generation, as compared to that of their parents and especially with regards the availability of good jobs (see Box 6.3).

With regards to what factors could provide confidence in the future, five out of ten optional factors seem to matter for youth. The most important one was when the general conditions of the country will improve (42% for the poor and 41% for the non-poor). The second most important variable to boost confidence in the future was finding a good job (21% for the poor and 28% for the non-poor), the third was when justice prevails in the country (20% and 22% for poor and non-poor, respectively), the fourth was when each one gets his/her opportunity (18% and 17% for poor and non-poor, respectively) and the fifth was when one finds good health services (17% and 15% for poor and non-poor, respectively). See figure 6.10.

Opportunity

Those less important variables, for the both the rich and non-rich, included completing an education, getting an education, and finding housing. This shows great awareness among youth in Egypt of circumstances at the national level having deteriorated for their particular generation, as compared to that of their parents with regards economic conditions and especially the availability of good jobs.

With regards dreams and aspirations of youth, the study shows that Egyptian youth long for security of income, health and a good job. Poor and non-poor

Figure 6.11: Who Will Fulfill Your Dreams?

Source: *Dreams of Egyptians Survey, 2009 – Question 10*

are very close on all except the protection from poverty, where the non-poor response is at 49% versus the poor at 57%. As to who will fulfill the dreams of Egyptian youth (Figure 6.11, question 10 of the survey), the fatalism of youth shows in their overwhelming response is God, followed by themselves and last and least by family. It is interesting to note that the dependence on the state now accounts for only 2% of the response of the non-poor and 0% for the poor.

With regards time preference, youth would like to be spending more time on worship (58% of the poor and 62% of the non-poor). Second in importance is spending time with family, visiting the extended family (at 32-33% of both the poor and non-poor), and having more leisure time with nuclear family (24% of the poor and 28% of the non-poor). The glaring contrast between poor and non-poor youth appears in the selection by the poor of more time to rest at 32%, which ranks it equal to the second most important thing, in contrast to the non-poor at 13%. It thus seems that the poor are seriously missing out on physical rest.

In terms of preference for nuclear as opposed to extended families as a model for Egypt, the preference for an extended family was about double that (63%) of nuclear (31%) for the youth sample as a whole, and the difference between poor and non-poor was small. The same is true with regards happiness, which appears prominently as the choice of poor and non-poor in relation to hopes for ones family. This is followed by hope for solidarity (being one hand). With respect to children, as many as 95% or more of both poor and non-poor would like their children to obtain a university or post-university degree, while 73% of the poor hope their children will get positions



in the government or public sector (63% of the non-poor).

COPING MECHANISMS OF THE YOUNG AND POOR


Analysis of the habits and response of poor youth shows that they are resourceful and take advantage of both traditional mechanisms of social solidarity as well as innovative ways of coping with poverty. With regards tapping social networks, young people are likely to continue living with their parents and even form families within the extended family system. This is related to the fact that parents in Egyptian society are very likely to support their children beyond the age of maturity, as has been evidenced in the literature. The culture in Egypt is supportive of a system whereby parents are willing to share their income and savings with their children during the entire cycle of education, as well as in preparation for marriage, for both boys and girls. Social protection is therefore predominantly received by youth from the family rather than the state, since there are no unemployment benefits and youth are not likely to have accumulated savings or assets.

SYPE results show no significant difference across wealth quintiles for age of first marriage. The results show that for women 18-21 years, the median age ranges from 17 for the poorest to 18 for the richest, and for women 22-29 years, the median age ranges from 18 for the poorest to 21 for the richest.

Another characteristic which is similar across youth quintiles in SYPE is the intent to travel to another country to live, work or study. The range moves from a low of 13% for the second quintile to a high of 19% for the fourth quintile. In terms of emigration as a coping mechanisms, the young and poor in Egypt (aged 18-29) are shown to have equal or almost equal access to travel and migration in search of job opportunities in Egypt and abroad. For those who travel to the Arab countries or abroad, their job opportunities are mostly in the farming and construction sectors as unskilled labor. These opportunities have been the main source of savings in the form of remittances which are subsequently used to engage in projects as young entrepreneurs.

Moreover, SYPE results show similar entrepreneurial behavior with regards youth ownership of business, which ranges from a low of 5% for the poorest quintile to 10% for the richest (see Figure 6.12). As to “trying to establish a new business,” the range moves to a low of 12% for the poorest to a high of 20% for the fourth quintile.

What is really missing in the context of coping with poverty is for youth to be provided by the government with a sufficient package of incentives to help themselves. At present, social and economic schemes to help youth help themselves are limited to micro-credit by the Social Fund for Development (SFD): The

Figure 6.12: Coping Mechanisms by Wealth Quintile

Source: SYPE 2009

absence of market information on what are potential niches within each community and in the broader Egyptian market for both goods and services is due to the limitations of existing promotional programs and extension services.

A best case scenario that combines equity considerations together with incentives for business projects is for the state to develop a national scheme whereby youth are given access to non-agricultural land which is serviced and becomes a key asset for this future generation, both to relieve the land constraints that exist in the production sector, as well as to be used as collateral by youth in approaching banks or potential project partners. This national scheme would parallel that of land distribution schemes of the past in the sense that the minimum plot size of “Project Land” (PL) to be distributed would be equivalent in value as an income earning asset as the minimum parcel of agricultural land distributed to youth at five feddans.

Three strong recommendations are presented with regards the three groups of Egypt’s poor youth – the rural poor, the poor in slum areas, and the urban poor. With regards rural Egypt, Egypt needs to halt, if not reverse, the process of domestic migration towards informal settlements and slum areas. The current initiative of the 1000 Villages is the best potential avenue to provide an attractive environment within the poorest existing rural areas, such as to turn them into potential poles of attraction. Beyond the current plans for better servicing these 1000 Villages with physical infrastructure, health and education

services, these Villages should integrate schemes for employment-generation that are tailor-made to include both activities catering for local communities and those for marketing outside the villages. In the informal settlement areas, slum upgrading is again only one of the answers - beyond that, physical locations where youth can set up their own viable enterprises/projects should be introduced. With regards specific PLs for both groups in the rural and informal settlement areas, multi-story structures with appropriate sized workshops have been the most successful from international experience and are especially suited to Egypt’s geography given the shortage of available serviced land. The nature of these projects would focus on the needs of these communities as well as take advantage of their proximity to formal cities and urban areas. The support that can be given to the poor in urban communities is mostly in the form of vocational training and second-chance education so as to improve their likelihood of finding decent jobs.

CONCLUSIONS

Egypt’s poor – generation after generation – have been marginalized and deprived of those rights which have been shown to break the cycle of poverty. In fact, Egypt is way behind other middle income countries, let alone emerging economies, in raising basic standards of health, nutrition and education of the most vulnerable members of its population, namely children and youth. Only a determined package of public policy interventions can really shift the low morale and grim outlook of Egypt’s youth.

There are eight policy relevant conclusions from our analysis of youth poverty that deserve attention:

1. Handicapped children make handicapped youth. Children of the poor are most likely to display all of the symptoms of poverty. Youth in poverty are victims of their childhood and only a fraction are escaping poverty. Breaking out of the cycle of poverty is difficult and will need a battery of economic, social and cultural interventions. The need is for interventions that integrate and create synergies between those that are targeted at children and those targeted at youth.
2. Targeting rural Upper Egypt is sound on both eco-

Box 6.4: Activities to Promote Regular Migration and Positive Alternatives

Building upon noteworthy Egypt-Italy collaboration in the field of migration – in particular, aiming to address Egyptian unaccompanied minors' irregular migration to Italy – the Egyptian Minister of Family and Population and the Italian Ambassador to Egypt signed a landmark agreement on 22 December 2009, kick-starting a 3-year development programme (funded by the Italian Ministry of Labour and Social Policies for a total of 2 million Euro) which will create new education and training opportunities for Egyptian youth to enhance their employment prospects in Egypt and abroad. Both parties to the agreement have stated that they look forward to cooperating closely with the International Organization for Migration, which has been appointed joint implementing agent alongside the National Council for Childhood and Motherhood (NCCM). Leading to this, IOM and the NCCM designed and delivered a pilot information campaign to promote safe migration and positive alternatives in the governorate of Fayoum – a well-known area of high migration-pressure – in late 2009. Activities were varied. For example, on the 8th and 9th of December, IOM and the NCCM held a successful advocacy and planning workshop in the village of Tatoun (building the capacity of 38 community and religious leaders to promulgate the campaign's central message). Art seminars and football matches were also organized to directly engage vulnerable Egyptian youth and their families. A celebrity testimonial – notably put forth by prominent Egyptian actor Amr Waked – played a key role in enhancing the campaign's appeal amongst target beneficiaries. Further information on the information campaign is available online (<http://www.egypt.iom.int/UAMCampaign.htm>).


Over the coming 18 months, under the abovementioned agreement and complementary to pilot phase activities, IOM and the NCCM will seek to create market-oriented education and training opportunities for vulnerable Egyptian youth to enhance their employability in Egypt and Italy, through the upgrade and operation of two technical-vocational training centres in the Fayoum Governorate. Subsequently, comprehensive training will be conducted for centre staff (selected in accordance with pre-determined criteria) and curricula will be developed – with due consideration to labour market demand in Egypt and key destination countries. The centre will also offer Italian language courses and provide information on legal pathways for employment and residence in Italy. To this end, participation of the Egyptian diaspora (through virtual or temporary return) will be actively encouraged. Alongside this core project component, IOM and the NCCM may identify and implement other priority activities to promote socio-economic development in Egypt, complementing and profiting from synergies with the centre. *Source: International Organization for Migration, Egypt; prepared for EHDR 2010*

conomic and social grounds. Egypt's poverty map as well as all other exercises monitoring human development has confirmed that the poorest communities and the most deserving are concentrated in three or four governorates in Upper Egypt. Targeting instruments such as CCTs are effective instruments and should include such programs as nutritional supplements at school, education and training/re-training. These reduce leakages to the non-poor while ensuring that it is the children and youth who are afforded the opportunity to break out of the poverty cycle.

3. Informal areas and slum conditions breed informal and risky behavior. The absence of minimum standards of regulation and safety in informal settlements provides the breeding ground for drugs and other forms of crime. Youth in these settlements are not

as much in need of poverty-focused support as they are of conditions and opportunities to engage in civic participation and identify with the welfare of their community.

4. Education is the most obstinate divide that discriminates across society between the haves and the have-nots. The only way for Egypt to regain its social strength in terms of merit-based mobility from rags to riches according to education outcomes is for the entire system of basic and vocational training to be overhauled. The strategy of the Ministry of Education has been applauded for its comprehensive and integrated reform agenda which is in process but needs more resources. On the other hand, the policies and programs to eradicate illiteracy are falling short. Moreover, the process whereby the leakage



from the basic education system continues at its current deplorable levels must be remedied, preferably via the targeting of rural poor who have been shown to have the highest rates of attrition from the school system.

5. The national scheme for “Project Land” (PL) would be adjusted along the same lines as Egypt’s national vision for growth and diversification, both across region and across sectors. The scheme would thus distribute PL parcels in new regions such as along the coastline for youth who are willing to settle and engage in relevant projects in tourism, eco-friendly agriculture, renewable energy and other viable sectors. PL lands would be distributed to youth in Upper Egypt along the desert corridor adjacent to the Nile Valley (Zaheer Sahrawi) to engage in housing projects, as well as SMEs that cater for goods and services for the urbanizing communities of Egypt’s southern region. ICT services will continue to be one of the high growth activities with potential that can materialize with sufficient government and big business support.

6. Young people still dream of a university education followed by a government job, not only for themselves but also for their children. The state must now bank on its youth and provide an enabling environment for high rates of return to education and skills in the private sector. The private sector must also reform and formalize work contracts and social security contributions so as to improve work conditions and offer

decent jobs with minimum wages and acceptable maximum hours of work.

7. Migration has been the most effective equalizer. Poor youth have had an equal opportunity to temporary jobs abroad as have the rich and highly educated. Remittance savings have been the most important source of private investment in rural as much as in urban Egypt from lower as much as from higher skilled occupations for the past 30 years. It is high time that the government institutionalize the instruments and mechanisms of support to channel migrant savings into productive investment. The SFD still has enormous scope to expand its credit and non-financial services to reach small savers and investors, especially in the countryside.

8. Access to physical assets and credit for youth entrepreneurship is the answer to the absence of decent jobs. Egypt ranks 11th overall out of 43 countries in the Global Entrepreneurship Monitor (GEM) Survey, with 20.2% of the working age population (18-64) involved in entrepreneurial activity. For all countries in the GEM Survey, the 25-34 age group had the highest early-stage entrepreneurial activity, but the group with the next highest rate in Egypt was the 18-24 years old, which is not common of all other countries. Egypt’s youth thus give the country a strong entrepreneurial advantage. Refer to Chapter 10 for more details on GEM results.


Endnotes

- 1 Thanks are due to Dina Armanious who co-authored the Background Paper for EHDR 2010 on *Poverty and Youth* with Heba el Laithy. Thanks are also due to Defne Abbas for preparing several figures and verifying data.
- 2 SYPE results also show that poor youth have a poor quality of diet, even if not very different from that of higher wealth quintiles. The percentage of poor youth (lowest quintile) who have not consumed fish, chicken, meat, fruits or eggs during the week previous to the SYPE survey are 47%, 36%, 29%, 24% and 20%, respectively.
- 3 See 2010 UNICEF and CEFERS *Child Poverty and Disparities in Egypt*. The age group for children is defined as under 18 years old. The study followed the Bristol University methodology, whereby a multidimensional measure of poverty is based on the subset of seven indicators including shelter, food, education, health, information, water and sanitation
- 4 It should be noted that the quality of these services is poor.
- 5 The severe deprivation indicator is the proportion of children under five years of age whose height and weight are below three standard deviations of the WHO's median Child Growth Standards reference population adopted in 2006
- 6 See Chapter 2, section 3
- 7 SYPE, 2009
- 8 See Chapter 15
- 9 Dream of Egyptians Survey, Question 44
- 10 Dreams of Egyptians Survey, Question 68
- 11 Questions of Dreams of Egyptians survey is of a multiple choice nature
- 12 40% of the poor and 33% of the non-poor in the sample have children

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Chapter Seven



In Egypt there have undoubtedly been improvements in gender parity over the past decade, especially in education. According to the comprehensive 2010 Survey of Young People in Egypt (SYPE), currently, more than half of university enrolment is by women, and 74% of female respondents have completed basic education or above (see Chapters 3 and 4). Nevertheless, the same survey reports that 13% of females and 3% of males interviewed, aged 10-29, have never been to school. These figures are consistent with results of the 2006 national census. There is need, then, for a more extensive effort in extending educational services, in particular at the primary stages for poor and often rural young women who suffer most from illiteracy.

On a second front, Egypt has one of the lowest female labor participation rates in the world¹ and ranks 120 out of 128 countries in terms of gender gap.² There is little partaking in public or political life. Less than 1% of young women surveyed in SYPE participate in volunteer work and only 11% of young women voted in a previous election.³ This confirms reports on youth exclusion and marginalization.⁴ It also suggests that cultural barriers play a part in the segregation of women from public life.

Boys and girls are socialized to take on different roles in Egypt. Girls are required to be submissive, considerate and ready to serve the needs of the family, while boys are socialized to interact in the public arena. SYPE reports that the median number of hours spent by women aged 22-29 on housework is 3 hours per day (compared to thirty minutes by their male counterparts). Further, 40% of females aged 18-24 in its sample are married and 81% are married⁵ by the time they reach the age of 29. Among 2496 married females surveyed and aged 15-29, all but one had at least one child. Young women therefore face a number of obstacles to activities in the public sphere. First and foremost is the social pressure towards marriage, at which time family formation and childbearing take precedence over the relative independence provided through employment and income generation. Other common cultural factors suggest a desire to limit women's sexuality. While reduction in incidence of female genital cutting of young women has been recorded in a number of national and representative surveys, this practice remains widespread in Egypt.⁶

The management of this type of social upbringing generally takes place on the level of the household or educational and religious institutions, reinforced by peers, and is governed by the expectations of the community at large.

Outside of marriage, the public sphere is difficult to access for many young women. A large fraction of women never achieve employment, even if this is desired, as an outcome of cultural as well as labor market barriers. (see below). For example, the growing incidence of sexual harassment in public places in Egypt, and in particular in urban areas where poten-

tial employment is on offer, acts as a disincentive to participation in activities that might require public exposure such as travel on public transport, (see Box 7.5). For those in rural areas, cultural restrictions on travel, or indeed on jobs outside the home or on education are widespread. Indeed, these obstacles are highly correlated with poverty, especially rural poverty and in Upper Egypt in particular.⁷

In short, if educated, young women have a short window between school completion, marriage and motherhood while for the uneducated, the window is virtually non-existent. Recourse to marriage is the sanctioned outlet for most young women. It may not be the path to greater autonomy or self-determination, but it does provide a degree of inclusion and social status. For these reasons, the institution of marriage in Egypt is worth reviewing.

MARRIAGE THE OFFICIAL WAY

For a Muslim in Egypt, marriage — although governed by a civil contract involving both the young couple and their families — is most frequently accompanied by a short religious service.⁸ Although arranged marriages are frequent, the bride and her guardian must both agree on the marriage. Should either the guardian or the girl disagree on the marriage, it may not legally take place, although young women sometimes question a guardian's judgment. The marriage must officially take place in the presence of witnesses, after which it may be consummated. Divorce is generally seen as a male prerogative, although the right to initiate divorce can be added to the marriage contract to allow women to instigate proceedings. However, this option is infrequently taken up since it is considered a slur on the honorable intentions of the groom. There are other religiously and legally sanctioned provisions to initiate and obtain a divorce by a woman, such as the newly instituted practice of *khul*, but these are complex and costly and used mainly by the upper income bracket.

For Egypt's Christians, marriage is both a civil and religious contract. Matrimony is believed to be a gift from God, with procreation and family formation as a major goal, and therefore divorce is rare and available from the Church only under very specific cir-

cumstances. Both Islam and Christianity address the question of a 'proper' role for sexuality and regulate sexual activity or assign normative values to certain sexually charged actions or thoughts. Extramarital sexual activity or adultery is strictly forbidden by Islamic and Coptic law. Anecdotal evidence suggests that penalties are usually much more severe on women if sexual codes are broken, in some rare instances leading to 'honor' killings.

However, sex is considered a pleasurable, even spiritual activity, and a duty in Islam. At least one hadith explicitly states that for a married couple to have sex is a good deed rewarded by God. Another hadith suggests that a man should not leave the proverbial bed until the woman is satisfied. All shari'a laws regulating sexual conduct apply to both men and women equally, apart from those concerning menstruation.

In practice, values and attitudes to marriage tip the balance in favor of men. SYPE reports that in the large sample questioned, three quarters of young women and 86% of young men agreed that a married woman should obtain her husband's permission for most things. Further, more than 70% of the young men and 40% of young women agreed that a girl must obey her brother, even if he is younger than she is. The gender dynamics, whether within the family or in marriage, place young women in a subordinate decision-making position, exacerbated by the family and male guardianship bias inherent in the initial betrothal process and the provision that, under certain conditions, a husband may take on other wives.

The Family Courts in Egypt were established under Law 10/2004 as the first specialized courts to deal with disputes among family members, and settle legal controversy over divorce, custody and alimony payments. The courts' major aims are to accelerate legal procedures and processes and to enable all family members to deal with their problems in a safe, neutral and helpful environment. The courts, presided over by a panel of three judges, employ a sociologist and psychologist, who act as mediators and counselors. The Ministry of Justice is currently pilot testing legal aid offices in the Family Courts to strengthen the capacity of dispute settlement.

However, in a study conducted by the National Council for Women Ombudsmen's Office the following obstacles and challenges were addressed by the stakeholders and the participants:

- Family Court Houses are often in unreachable locations which makes it hard for mothers and children to access them; they are also unevenly distributed across the country and some are very poorly equipped;
- Court workers such as psychologists and social workers are seen as incompetent or not well-trained; for this reason, they may misconstrue evidence and impact on the judge's rulings. Poor women are particularly vulnerable in this respect, since they often lack the skills to present their case clearly;
- The frequent inclusion of religious bodies inside the court house is not favored by the judicial system; however, it exists and religious opinion is often conservative and traditional with regard to women. This may be due to the general constitutional stipulation that "Islam is the religion of State and principles of Shari'a are the main source of legislation," so that courts quite often rule based on Shari'a.
- The settlement offices attached to the courts often do not keep families out of the courts but act as a primary procedure to go through to eventually get into court and their numbers are often insufficient. Lawyers, for reasons of payment, intentionally bypass these offices and advise their clients to go to court instead of trying to settle. Poor women frequently are unable to cover the costs, given that they mostly have no independent source of income of their own.

MARRIAGE THE UNOFFICIAL WAY⁹

Given the heightened sexuality of youth, marriage sometimes takes the form of informal or *urfi* (customary) union which provides little of the social advantages of a formal marriage. Recourse to *urfi* unregistered but religiously acceptable union is, in urban areas, often prompted by the long period of 'waithood' between youth, and the social inclusion of adulthood.

There is no doubt that customary or *urfi* marriage has become an increasingly widespread phenomenon in

Egypt. *Urfi* marriage may be seen as one way to avoid the increasing cost of legal marriage and to permissibly circumvent restrictions on premarital sex at a time when marriage occurs much later in the life cycle as a result of numerous social and economic barriers. Its appeal is therefore at its greatest among young people whose sexuality is at a high peak, while the legitimate means through which to express this is mostly barred.

Modern jurisprudence has defined *urfi* or customary marriage as a term used to mean that the marriage contract — whether personally or privately documented or not — is not officially documented and registered.

Urfi marriage is of two kinds: The first is a customary marriage contract containing all the basic elements of a fully constructed marriage, meeting all legal conditions and factors but only lacking the official documentation of the marriage. This type of contract does not safeguard a woman's rights. The second is merely a piece of paper written between a young man and a young woman without the presence of any witnesses and is not documented. This cannot be considered a fully constructed marriage. Different variations of this form of marriage have appeared such as the 'cassette marriage' or the 'tattoo marriage,' both of which are informal *urfi* arrangements.

However, the legal implications of *urfi* marriage are that:

- The wife cannot demand her legal rights if the husband denies the marriage relationship. She cannot have access to alimony or obtain the rights of her children from this marriage;
- The wife cannot inherit her husband or her children cannot inherit their father in case of his death;
- In some cases, especially in a 'secret' marriage, the husband can deny paternity if there is no proof of marriage;
- The wife cannot obtain her right to her husband's pension if he is an employee with a fixed income;
- The husband will lose one of the most important marital rights which is guardianship or *quwama*.

Productive and fulfilling public participation beyond marriage is an important marker in the transi-

tion to full citizenship. However, evidence indicates that young people in Egypt are socially disengaged. According to the SYPE report, participation by young people in youth centers, political parties, unions and associations is at a low 5%, with only 3% of women showing any group membership compared to an equally low 6% for young men.¹⁰ This argues strongly for marginalization and lack of social inclusion.

OBSTACLES IN THE PUBLIC DOMAIN

If girls and young women are to become increasingly more active in the community, then an adjustment to their currently sanctioned role is required, particularly in the public sphere, where their absence is felt most acutely.¹¹

Based on UNIFEM report findings, gender discrimination is a worldwide problem and not related to developing or underdeveloped countries only. There are vast gaps between national and international commitments and realities for women globally, especially in the area of governance and politics.¹² Some examples include the following:

- Women are still outnumbered 4 to 1 on average in governments worldwide, but as of January 2008, only 6.5% of ministerial positions were held by women in Egypt according to a report by the Inter-Parliamentary Union;¹³
- In Egypt, women members of Parliament were 1.9% in the last election compared to 24.7% in Afghanistan, 25.5% in Iraq, 18.1% in Sudan, 19% in Tunisia, and a high of 47% in Sweden;
- For 18 of the 22 countries that boast 30% or more women in national assemblies, quotas were applied in some form. Egypt has also recently adopted a quota system (Box 7.1);
- Globally, women represent only about 19% of trade union members. In Egypt, evidence suggests that the figure is 7%.

An enabling environment for democratic participation in Egypt is limited by polling belligerence, faulty electoral lists, and limited access to resources for election campaigning. This discourages women — and indeed, many men — from taking part in what is perceived to be a flawed and potentially rough activity. Conservative social frameworks also dis-

Box 7.1: Progress on the Political Front?

In 2009 the Egyptian Cabinet adopted a bill amending People's Assembly Law 38/1972, providing a quota of 64 seats for women in the national legislature. The amendment introduced 32 new constituencies in which nominations will be eligible for women only. The government bill allocates two seats for women in each governorate, where two female candidates (one each to represent workers or farmers) will be elected in each constituency. This amendment is also in line with Article 62 of the Egyptian Constitution, amended in 2007 to give legislators flexibility to adopt an electoral system that guarantees a minimum representation for women in parliament. The quota in Egypt will be around 11%.

In 2006 the percentage of women in Egypt's trade unions on the level of the Executive Committee reached 7% with 104 elected women members out of 18,292. At a higher level of the National Trade Union, 32 elected women members won their seats out of 481, compared to the previous session where there were only 10 elected seats out of 478.

Source: Ministry of Manpower and Immigration, 2006

courage women's participation in what is seen as a male domain and deprives women of needed family support to be able to combine public ambition with domestic roles. Decision-making positions such as state governor, head of a syndicate, or president of a university are largely seen as strictly male territory, although some progress has been made in appointing women to supporting roles, such as university deanships and university vice presidencies.

Further, in 2003, the first woman in Egypt was elected as judge to the Supreme Constitutional Court, a precedent that paved the way for the appointment of 30 other Egyptian women judges to date. Women as lawyers constitute about one sixth of all graduates from law faculties. Membership of political parties range from around 13% in the government's National Democratic Party to 9% in the opposition Wafd Party. The main issue here is not only low representation, but age: It is the older and more experienced women who aspire to a parliament seat, with high levels of non-participation among the younger generation. This can be called an intergenerational gap, and it affects both genders.

Enhancing women's participation in public life is an essential part and parcel of gender reform. Based on the 2005 elections, women's representation in the Lower House of Parliament was less than 2%, an insignificant figure. Similarly, in the municipal elections of 2002, women's representation in local popular councils was at a low 2%, but by 2007, there was an increase to almost 6%, which is still low but an

improvement. The percentage of women in public office increased from 7% in 1988 to 23.5% in 2005, perhaps reflecting the fact that these women were appointed rather than elected. To date, women in Egypt represent almost 38% of electoral lists and the figure reaches almost 41% in some governorates, according to data from the Ministry of Interior for 2007-2008. There has been a noticeable increase in the participation of women in the political process as voters. As of 2008, Egyptian women constituted 40% of the electorate as opposed to only 18% percent in 1986. This represents real progress, and the newly introduced quota system guaranteeing representation in Parliament by women is likely to promote further participation in the public political sphere by women (see Box 7.1).

If participation in political life is taken as an entry point to greater empowerment, then a first step would be to reduce the gap between public and private spheres by promoting registration to vote, increasing the range of electable women and enabling them to enter a career in politics. This may first require affirmative action, such as the currently endorsed quota system. It would also require explicitly encouraging young women to stand for election, possibly through a system of incentives to join political parties. Contact with experienced women politicians would help young women to overcome their reservations and introduce them to the skills required to be candidates for positions of responsibility. The focus might also be on women who are candidates in local elections, as the holding of elected office at local level is often

the starting point for a successful political career at national level.

The importance of networks cannot be underestimated, not only for women who are already in public life but also for those who do not hold a representative mandate. Networks and alliances of women, amongst themselves, with political leaders, and between youth organizations and the authorities at national, regional and local level are a pre-requisite for the creation of political caucuses, lobbies, and interest-group representation, leading to increased voice and influence.

However, skills such as learning how to present one's ideas in public and to gain a hearing, on how to listen to others and learn with them, on how to participate, exercise one's rights, obtain and share information, express one's opinions, take decisions, debate, communicate, and manage conflicts, are needed by both young women and men to create a space for themselves in the public sphere.

Administrative structures are usually typified by a male setting operating in a formal way and using the language of power. Addressing this obstacle would require the adoption of styles in male-dominated form that are more welcoming to women. Equality is an integral part of the social contract as expressed in Egypt's Constitution. This right, if reaffirmed, could be helped by the formal creation of vocal 'equality' bodies or units within government departments, ministries, political parties, and parliaments. Women's participation is often confined to the less visible fields and their relegation to lower skilled subordinate positions needs to be addressed. A closer look at the budgets allocated to equality issues would provide a more accurate assessment of commitment to upgrading their participation.

Finally, education for girls must be such that it translates into social achievement. Education for equitable citizenship, if incorporated into school curricula, could stimulate an interest in public life, familiarize girls with public and political decision-making and promote democratic participation in terms of gender partnership. For this to materialize, teaching resources and gender-friendly instruments need to become available to create a culture of egalitarian-

ism and parity. Lessons learnt in school life could have impact through increased participation in voluntary activities inside or outside the classroom, in the community, or in voluntary associations, such as NGOs and youth organizations. In this respect, Egypt has created very few public youth clubs for girls (see Chapter 18).

YOUNG WOMEN IN THE WORKPLACE


As shown in Chapter 11, one of the most striking features of Egypt's labor force is the very poor representation of women. Whereas women have fast caught up in education at all levels in the period 1980 to the present, the closing of this education gender divide was not accompanied by a parallel improvement in the representation of women at all ages in the labor force. Moreover, the data provides evidence that the absence of women in the labor force cannot be explained by marriage alone or by preference for not working. The evidence for unequal opportunities in the labor market can be found by analyzing employment data for young women as compared to young men according to age and according to educational status.

As shown from a series of data sources in Chapter 11, unemployment rates are very similar for both females and males until age 19 at which secondary school graduates are seeking employment. By age 21, however, the unemployment rate for women rises up to twice the rate for men of the same age. This is evidence that the problem is not due simply to marriage but more to the culture of family and employer. In fact, a significant number of young women marry after the age of 21.

Analyzing employment trends according to sex reveals very different paths into the labor market for young men and young women. As shown in Figure 7.1, the vast majority of young men end up in some type of employment by age 29, with employment rates in the vicinity of 92% at that age. For women, the maximum employment rate of 15% is reached at 24 and then it stops rising, as women increasingly transition into marriage. Maximum participation rates for women are as high as 23%, also reached at age 24.


This suggests that while most unemployed men

Figure 7.1: Participation and Employment Rates by Age and Sex, Ages 15-29, 2009




Source: SYPE 2009

Figure 7.2: Trends in Female Labor Force Participation by Educational Attainment*



* Females aged 15-29 Source: ELMS 1998, ELMPS 2006, SYPE 2009

Figure 7.3: Trends in Proportion of Employed Females Working in Government by Educational Attainment*



* Females aged 15-29 Source: ELMS 1998, ELMPS 2006, SYPE 2009

eventually find jobs, a large fraction of unemployed women never actually become employed, but simply move from unemployment to economic inactivity. A comparison of the participation and employment curves for women in Figure 7.1 suggests that almost half of economically active women between the ages of 21 and 27 are actually searching for work rather than working. Other life course events like marriage

take them out of the job market altogether.

The most dramatic impact of the decline of employment opportunities in the public sector on youth employment is undoubtedly its effect on young women's rate of participation in economic activity. As shown in Figure 7.2, the participation rate of young women used to increase significantly once secondary education was achieved, and it continued rising from that point on. But as the figure shows clearly, the rates of participation among educated young women have been falling sharply since 1998. For example, young women with technical high school education had rates of participation of 51% in 1998. These rates have fallen steadily to 18 % in 2009. Similar, albeit less steep, declines in participation are observed for more educated women. Thus the one factor that has strongly driven increases in female labor force participation in Egypt, namely education, is getting weaker at a time when more young women are achieving these education levels.

A comparison of Figure 7.2 with Figure 7.3, which shows the percentage of employed women working for the government over time by educational attainment, provides a straightforward explanation for these declining participation rates. Essentially as the chances of getting government jobs declined for educated women, their participation rates also declined. Further investigation reveals that the majority of young women who worked in government in 1998 had permanent appointments whereas by 2009 the vast majority only had temporary employment contracts, providing less incentive to participate.

Why are these educated young women dropping out of the labor force altogether rather than seeking employment in the informal economy like their male counterparts? A number of possible explanations can be advanced for these stark gender differences in response to a drop in public sector employment. First, employment in the government is much more egalitarian along gender lines than employment in the private sector. While women can expect to be treated similarly to men with similar qualifications and experience in the government, they suffer from a large gender gap in wages and opportunities for advance-

Box 7.2: The Figures behind Employment

- 56% of the female respondents within the age group of 22-29 said that their wages were low;
- 38.5% of the female respondents within the age group of 22-29 said that they suffered from long working hours.
- 19% of the female respondents within the age group of 22-29 said that they suffered from harsh treatment at work.

Source: SYPE 2010

Box 7.3: Work-Related Discrimination

Despite the continuous and fruitful cooperation between the Ombudsman's Office of the National Council for Women and the different government and non-government bodies, there still exist recurrent complaints that concern work-related issues. For example, especially the inability to enjoy transfers or secondments has negative implications on the stability of the family and the performance of women in their jobs. Refusing requests to be transferred or seconded deprives many women from keeping their jobs especially if they get married and have to move to other governorates with their husbands. Young women are obliged to leave work if their requests for transfers or secondments are refused.

Women also face explicit forms of discrimination. A collective complaint was received from the employees in Broadcast Engineering of Channel Eight stating that women received monthly benefits far less than that received by their male colleagues despite the fact that they performed exactly the same type of work with the same level of effort. Moreover, there was discrimination against women in granting the incentive allowance.

Another complainant faced a case of discrimination when she was transferred from her job as a manager of the Department of Quarries by order of the governor who considered this a man's job, unsuitable for women, totally disregarding her academic specialization and her desire to continue her career in this field.


Unmarried women lawyers also face other forms of discrimination. The regulations of the Lawyers Syndicate do not grant the parents of an unmarried women lawyer the right to her syndicate pension in case of her death as they are not her dependents, whereas this pension is paid in case of male lawyers. Moreover, women lawyers are not allowed to combine the syndicate pension with the pension of one of their parents despite the fact that all syndicates allow combining both syndicate pension with other pensions to males. *Source: Ombudsmen The National Council For Women Newsletter (2009)*

Box 7.4: Incidence of Sexual Harassment in Egypt


Among the questions addressed to young people aged 10 to 24 by the Survey of Young People in Egypt, a special section was focused on questions related to sexual harassment:

- 50% of the female respondents had been subjected to some form of sexual harassment;
- 98.9% of the female respondents said that they had been subjected to verbal harassment;
 - 4.57% of the female respondents said that they had been touched or forced to touch others in sensitive areas;
 - 97.9% of the female respondents said that they were harassed by a stranger;
 - 43.2% of the female respondents said that they were subjected to harassment in public transportation;
- 10% of the female respondents said that they were subjected to harassment in a dark street;
- Almost 55% of the female respondents had not told anyone about being harassed, while 45% told someone;
- One of those who told 'someone' never reported to the police;
- 8.7% of female respondents within the age group of 22-29 said that they had encountered harassment from their bosses or colleagues at work;
- 6.6% of the female respondents within the age group of 22-29 said that they had encountered harassment from customers;
- 4% of the female respondents in the age group 22-29 said that they had encountered harassment when going and coming back from work. *Source: SYPE 2010*

Box 7.5: Young Women and Girls Call For Action¹⁸



- Well being of women and girls
- Equal access to health care, quality education at all levels, to community, sports and local activities
- Equal access to justice and public safety
- Equal access to participation and decision making of women in social decisions
- Skills and opportunities for women and girls to organize and use their collective power to advocate for justice, fairness and equity on behalf of themselves and others.
- Make their own choices with regard to traditional beliefs and cultural practices
- Share power equally and change opportunity structure
- Negotiate gender relations
- Develop a common understanding on vision and approaches (between women-men) to change societal attitudes
- Provide choices for young women
- Create a social mechanism and a popular discourse
- Proactive/preventive measures to eliminate all forms of violence against women and girls
- Equal access to women in career and vocational guidance, employment, equal remuneration, occupational health and safety, social security
- Equal access to participation and decision making in economic decisions
- Self employment /entrepreneurship
- Ability to generate income
- Access to resources
- Access and use credit.
- Access to information
- Own and control assets
- Provide choices for young women
- Realize greater choices in jobs and occupations and demand access to essential services for themselves, their families and their communities
- Supportive family policies for working mothers
- Quality and affordable childcare
- Creative incentives to the private sector for gender equity policies.



- Equal access to participation and decision making
- Equal opportunities
- Develop a civic education curricula that starts from the early years in the school
- Build trust
- Temporary affirmative action
- Encourage young women to participate
- Promote women in political parties
- Be attentive to young women's needs
- Ensure that educational achievements for girls are translated into social achievement
- Ensure allocation of resources for capacity development
- Engage as equal citizens
- Foster active participation
- Create a strong voice
- Bridge the intergenerational gap
- Conduct budget analysis for political parties to assess their commitment to equality and women's issues

ment in the private sector.¹⁴ Secondly, while women can expect to have lifetime careers in the public sector, women employed in the private sector tend to quit such employment at marriage, giving them a relatively short employment horizon. Finally, high levels of occupational segregation in the Egyptian labor market essentially mean that women face large barriers to entry to both wage and self-employment even in the informal economy.¹⁵

VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN

Very little research is available on this sensitive issue and little is known on the prevalence of beatings or marital rape, beyond anecdotal evidence. It is clear that in some traditional families these are condoned as part of a husband's rights over his spouse. In this respect, violence in the home might be called a cultural issue. Cases of serious injury are reported to the police, if at all, but rarely is a man prosecuted for this behavior, the preferred mode being some form of reconciliation. Shelters for battered women exist in the NGO movement, but these are few and far between, and their presence is not widely known. With regard to the violence of female genital mutilation, SYPE reports that four in five girls still undergo genital cutting in Egypt, although this is more evident among older cohorts, suggesting that recent legislation by the state and in amendments to Child Law (2008) have borne fruit.¹⁶ These impose punishments and fines on those medical or non-medical persons who apply this practice.

Cases of public rape are now being reported in the Egyptian press. To avoid the 'shame' and circumvent public embarrassment, victims were, until recent reform, often married to their rapist, thereby 'legalizing' the offence. Rape in Egypt is now considered a serious criminal offence subject to the Penal Code. Lesser offences such as the widespread public occurrences of harassment, have also led to demands for a stricter application of Article 306 of the Penal Code (see below). This is after a number of reported incidents created public outrage, particularly when repeated molestations of girls by gangs of young men occurred on busy streets and in front of numerous witnesses. These acts are a new phenomenon to Egypt, and are often ascribed to a breakdown in traditional

values (see Chapter 13).

LEGISLATING AGAINST SEXUAL OFFENSES¹⁷

Sexual harassment is a phenomenon common enough to cause young women to fear for their safety. Although it must be addressed in its broader context, in the absence of social means to control to this form of behavior, the response has been a recourse to strict legislation and a criminalization of the act. In Chapter Four of the Penal Code, all forms of sexual harassment are addressed, either in the form of criminalizing intercourse with a female without her consent in Article 267 of the Penal Code; or sexual assault in Articles 267 and 269; or insulting and lewd behavior, whether verbal or nonverbal, which offends a woman's modesty in public in Article 306; or inciting debauchery in Article 269, or obscene acts and indecent exposure that offend modesty in Article 278, or anyone who commits an indecent act with a woman, even in private in Article 279 of the Penal Code.

With regard to public offences against modesty, Article 306 of the penal code appended to Law 617/1953 and amended by Law 169/1981 and Law 93/1995 states that: Everyone who molests a female, whether verbally or nonverbally, in a way that offends her modesty in a public road or in a much-frequented place is to be punished by a term of imprisonment and a fine or with either of these two punishments. Molestation does not necessarily have to be committed openly. The crime is established even if the offending words are whispered as long as they have been uttered in a public street or much-frequented location.

There has to be an act of "molestation" that can be broadly defined, such as obstructing her path, and pursuing her in public. It also includes committing verbal or nonverbal acts in a café. Molestation includes all of the above whatever the means used by the perpetrator to commit his crime such as touching, telephone calls, love letters, sms's, mobile phones, e-mails and other means.

Some courts have taken the view that the crime is not established unless the offender's action offends the modesty of a particular female. The objective criterion, on the other hand, means that the act committed



by the perpetrator should be offensive to any female even if it is committed against a female of the type whose modesty may not be offended by such an act such as a prostitute. This can be a crime in itself or can be a multiple crime perpetrated with other crimes such as words with intent to incite prostitution (Article 1 of Law 10/1961), or an act that offends modesty that can be considered an act of obscenity or indecent exposure (Article 278 of the Penal Code).

The problem of harassment does not necessarily lie in further criminalizing such behavior through new legislative intervention or even stricter penalties. It appears enough that the perpetrator will be stigmatized and punished by criminal law as a deterrent to committing sexual harassment again. However, an effective socialization process to discourage such behavior is more difficult to apply than the firm and strict application of existing legal provisions.

A DREAM FOR GENDER EQUALITY FOR EGYPT'S YOUTH

There are numerous laws protecting and promoting equality between men and women but actual implementation still limits or contradicts this right, even though it may be granted constitutionally. This is especially true in Egypt with regard the personal status law that organizes family relations during marriage, divorce and the related economic implications, and custody of children.

Any limitations placed on women in the private sphere will undoubtedly affect their ability to fully participate in the public sphere as well. Despite the great effort exerted in Egypt both by government and by national women's organizations, more is needed to resolve areas of contradiction between shari'a, custom, legislation and reality. The religious and patriarchal culture and social environment in Egypt is sometimes used to justify discrimination against women and legal protection for women is not enforced by government officials, preventing women from experiencing equal treatment and equal opportunities under the law. Thus, the actual observance of existing laws by all stakeholders is also necessary. In particular, violence against women, whether occurring in the home, at the work place, or in the public sphere is a serious concern. There is a need for a 'Violence against Women Act' with a strong mechanism for enforcement and monitoring.

The prevailing cultural norms affect the execution of the law at the local level, leading to discriminatory practices, particularly in rural areas and among young women, whose lack of awareness concerning their legal rights is a real concern. This is especially true with regard lack of proper guarantees to ensure the legitimate transfer of property and inheritance rights, and the facilitation of personal legal procedures, including divorce or registration to obtain an identity card or to vote. Traditional and conservative social frameworks discourage women's participation

in the public and political spheres, and impede the provision of needed family support to allow women to combine work with their domestic roles. Poor representation of women in political parties hinders women from playing a public role other than that provided through benevolence or NGO channels.

THE WAY FORWARD

An 'agency approach' is needed to enhance young women's status as agents of development, as partners, and movers and shapers of change to benefit society at large. At the individual level, agency is an assessment of what young women can do in line with their conception of what is good for them in respect to their well being. Women might be disempowered in the work force, unable to reach a decision making position, unable to move around in the community freely, yet they might be able to decide on children's level of education, able to make health decisions on

behalf of themselves and other family members. The domains in which individuals can and cannot exert agency are important issues to grasp, study and present solutions for.¹⁹

The aim would be to translate 'women's issues' into a matter of 'public interest' such that it promotes the appropriate affirmative administrative as well as socio-economic public policies and ensures gender sensitive services and public spending. Efforts to guarantee greater political participation, engage women in voice-based (demand) to choice-based (supply) to improve accountability of public service providers, will benefit society at large, as will assuring public safety and security for women and girls. A monitoring, evaluation and accountability framework for gender equality policies, procedures, processes would need to be developed.


Endnotes

- 1 Barsoum et al., 2009
- 2 Housemann et al., 2008
- 3 SYPE Preliminary Report, February 2010
- 4 Assaad and Barsoum, 2009
- 5 SYPE 2010
- 6 Data from the 2010 preliminary results of SYPE indicates that among girls aged 10-14 the prevalence rate is 66% down from 82% of females aged 10-29
- 7 See Chapter 11
- 8 A family status law applies to all Egyptians, covering marriage amongst other issues. While considered part of the "civil" code of law, it still has religious elements, referring to the Shari'a as a basis for Muslims, and to the corresponding religious principles or regulations for each of the non-Muslim communities
- 9 Material provided by Maya Morsy in her background paper to this chapter of the EHDR 2010
- 10 SYPE Preliminary Report, February 2010
- 11 The World Bank (2007). "Development and the Next Generation". World Development Report 2007. Washington D.C. .page 15
- 12 The listing and its figures are taken from UNIFEM. "Progress of the World's Women 2008/2009. Who Answers to Women?" Gender and Accountability. 2009
- 13 International Herald Tribune, 13 February, 2010
- 14 Ragui Assaad and Melanie Arntz (2005). "Constrained Geographical Mobility and Gendered Labor Market Outcomes under Structural Adjustment: Evidence from Egypt. World Development 33(3): 431-454.
- 15 Ragui Assaad and Fatma El-Hamidi (2009) "Women in the Egyptian Labor Market: An Analysis of Developments, 1988-2006. In The Egyptian Labor Market Revisited. Ragui Assaad (ed.). Cairo: American University in Cairo Press, pp. 219-257
- 16 SYPE (2010) reports that prevalence among girls aged 10-14 is 66%, while that for females aged 10-29 is 93%
- 17 This section is based on notes from Maged El Shirbini, provided as background material for the EHDR 2010
- 18 Adapted from the National Women's Strategy 2007-2016. Government of Ireland Department of Justice, Equality and Law Reform under the direction of an Inter-Departmental Committee. 2007, and the Development and the next Generation . World Development Report . World Bank . 2007, and United Nations Fund For Women. Progress of the World's Women 2008/2009. Who Answers to Women? Gender and Accountability. New York. 2008
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Chapter Eight



Research cited elsewhere in this report indicates young citizens in Egypt are those least likely to engage in any kind of formal political behavior. Their high level of indifference to civic affairs in general raises the question as to why this should be, and whether youth have developed channels for alternative means of engagement in public life. For the purposes of this chapter, two studies were undertaken, the first to gauge perceptions and attitudes to political participation of young Egyptians, and the second to determine the extent of success of so called ‘electronic democracy’ since youth in Egypt constitute the largest number of current Internet users. In either case, an informal approach was used. The authors recognize that their results cannot be interpreted as scientific since they are not the outcome of the rigorous methods of standard research practice. Nevertheless, while generalizations cannot be made, results provide a valuable glimpse into the thinking of a segment of young Egyptians at university level or with access to the Internet.¹

THE CONCERNS OF YOUTH: AN INFORMAL EXPLORATION²

At the lowest level is indifference to public affairs; at the second level, there is engagement in the mechanisms and processes of participation; and at the peak is seeking leadership and governance. The three levels feed into each other and are not disconnected. Nevertheless, this classification helps to assess the overall level of participation in society and among a given segment or group, for the purposes of analysis and study.

For the purposes of this chapter, discussions and interviews were conducted with over 400 young university students. These encounters were closer to conversations and were informal in nature, the purpose being to put young people at their ease in order to identify their true concerns. Eventually, this allowed the interviewer to locate their attitudes to political and public affairs within their range of interests.

Because of the emphasis placed on lack of formality, the size and specifications of the sample were not determined by the methods of standard academic practice. These did not take religious affiliation into account, nor did they divide among rural and urban, educated and uneducated, the poor and rich. In short, exchanges were not conducted in accordance with field research procedures, and cannot be cited for generalization or comparative purposes.

Nevertheless, the interviews are a rich and direct source to spontaneous and personal responses since the methodology guaranteed the element of trust and openness without embarrassment. Respondents were required to give only one response to the following two questions: 'What is the most important thing to young people?', and 'what do young people need most today?' The questions were asked of different groups of young people who, in turn, were asked to address the same questions to their friends and acquaintances but without prior preparation or special arrangements for the interview. The groups extended from freshman to graduation class university students or to those recently graduated.

In response to the first question on priorities of importance, the main responses from young men were 'sexual curiosity,' 'cell phones' and 'football' (72%) Young women said "personal safety", "graduation" and "marriage"(89%) To the second question on needs, the answers showed that young men were looking for role models or 'good examples' (62%) while girls wanted 'insurance and protection' (73%). At this stage, no mention was made on the role of politics in their lives.

Most young people do not care about politics. Our education - at all stages -does not leave us any chance to pay attention to anything else. After graduation, we are preoccupied with job seeking and then with starting a family.

Young male respondent


A Preoccupation with Sex

In answer to their main preoccupation, it is no surprise that the answer is 'sex' including its psychological aspect and related physical needs. Precedence is given to sex over almost everything else. There were numerous expressions of this concern, given that the social taboo over sexual matters pushes young people to explore the world of sexual relations by themselves and by trial and error at a time when they face rapid psychological and physical changes in the absence of information or guidance.

Most young men respond to this drive by seeking to participate in online 'chat' sites in general, and Facebook in particular, to form friendships, especially with girls. Among themselves, young men brag of the number of girls they know through this virtual medium. Sex- related topics dominate their talk as they review the hottest movies, and exchange information and jokes with sexual connotations. They also argue whether a certain behavior is *haram* or *halal* (religiously permissible or not).

Frowning, shouting, obscene talk and vulgar words are believed by some young men to be 'manly' and command the respect of others. Others join gangs, taking strength in their numbers.

Young female student

Figure 8.1: Youth Concerns (Males)

Source: Ali el Sawy, Background Paper to the EHDR 2010


Personal Appearance as Indicative of Status

Appearance and gadgetry are important reflections of personal status. The veil in its many manifestations is one example. Type of mobile telephone, that is, cell phone brand or model is seen as an indicator of the status and personality of the young holder. Numerous young people evaluate a person on the basis of his/her car model and his/her computer brand so that a young person may accept to be penniless, but insist on having a recent model. A sophisticated brand gives the impression that the holder is well off. This in turn boosts confidence among peers.

An Interest in Sports, Recreation and Travel

An important preoccupation for young men is with soccer, news about football clubs and players' movement from one club to another, and analysis of games. Not only does interest revolve round watching soccer matches, but it also focuses on sports issues such as sports club elections, players' fees and cost, as well as miscellaneous items on newspaper sports pages in general.

For young women, and often for men too, there is an interest in latest news about artists, singers, movies, songs, and in downloading the latest of such features on computers or mobile phones. Talk about a new film, for example, may continue for several hours. The person who had seen it would narrate it to others with all the details about what a star actor or singer was wearing and his/her hairstyle — which soon becomes a fashion statement.

Figure 8.2: Youth Concerns (Females)

Source: Ali el Sawy, Background Paper to the EHDR 2010

Other interviewees had more practical interests, distributed as follows: 'completion' of study (11%), getting work or a visa to travel (10%), and political participation (7%).

For Girls, Safety Comes First

It is remarkable that girls attach such great importance to safety considerations. By safety, they appear to mean worry about their own safety and about safety-related matters. These include harassment and assault in the street, violation of their private space in shopping areas, and even kidnapping. Many comments referred either to incidents that had happened to people they knew, had read about or that they themselves faced or could potentially face.

People are merciless. They don't leave you alone whether you're wearing a veil or covered from head to toe, even if you are out with your mother or family. Today the most important thing for a girl is to protect herself from the moment she sets foot outside her home till she's back.

A female respondent

Graduation as Highly Desirable

Some young students say "Play all the year round, and capture whatever you can of the syllabus in the last month." This attitude is less common among girls. Young women generally felt that education armed them with a weapon in life, namely in the certificates or degrees they obtained. Holding a degree could allow the choice of a better partner in life and also allow them to become financially independent. A frequent remark was that a girl without education had

Box 8.1: What Dreams Are Made Of

A study by the Cabinet Information and Decision Support Center (2009) entitled 'What Do Egyptians Dream Of?' shows how young people (under 35 years) responded to questions on their needs as follows:

Figure 8.3: Dreams of Youth (Under age 35)




Figure 8.4: On Whom Do You Depend to Make Dreams Come True?





Figure 8.5 What Do You Wish for Yourself and Your Family?



Source: Cabinet Information and Decision Support Center (2009)

nothing but her looks to count on. Most girls were therefore very concerned with doing well academically and passing their exams without problems.


Getting Married

Matrimony was often cited as a concern, with security and stability seen to be the most important objectives in marriage. A concern about marriage is not groundless, given the pressures that drive young people to aspire to this socially sanctioned condition where sex is permissible. However, it poses a problem for both young men and women students, given

their transitional economic, social and psychological circumstances. These place a limit on the necessary and appropriate setting for marriage, economic independence, starting a family and achieving a degree of 'adult' social status. One comment is by a girl who said "perhaps a way out is through marriage to an important or established person as a substitute for other means of getting one's rights in society."

Passion and love are among the strongest elements that dominate our lives. But the concept of love varies from one young man to another. There

Figure 8.6: What is the Post You Dream of Occupying?



Source: Cabinet Information and Decision Support Center (2009)

are young men who look for a touch of the hand or a kiss while others see it as attracting the largest number of girls possible. There are also young men who see love as a pastime. A common factor is the desire to be in love.

Comment by a young man

Politics: Isolation or Polarization

In politics, and according to responses, young people may be divided into several categories. The largest categories are either pushed to exclusion or attracted by polarization, while the (fewer) moderates fall between these two responses.

Some religious fundamentalists polarize young people by raising the slogan: "We are all equal and we all face the same problems arising from the practices of the present regime." Muslim Brotherhood members attract youth by the services they offer, particularly to expatriate students, such as providing books and other curricula-related material and by organizing religious functions and exhibitions on religious occasions. They also make a point of expressing public moral support to youth, such as congratulating them on certain occasions and attracting them under the slogan "Through God I love you". This gives youth a feeling of psychological security.

On the other hand, political parties also attempt to polarize. Reference to parties basically means to the official National Democratic Party (NDP). This uses a strategy similar to that of the Muslim Brotherhood in delivering services and organizing outings, offering grants for the study of languages, computers and the ICDL license, as well as sponsoring sports events. However, NDP services are provided within the context of propagating the party, its leadership and achievements, and it discourages critical thinking, unlike the Muslim Brotherhood, which encourages political criticism.

The moderate category represents a minority of young people who avoid seclusion or polarization and participate effectively in society, often turning to civil society activities and the Internet.

The reason for non-participating is the absence of a role for the family or the school in political upbringing. The role of the family is reduced to making a living and of the school to giving a certificate. The value of concern with collective welfare, public affairs and sense of responsibility ranks last among the concerns of the family, and - naturally enough - of the youth too, while priority is given to economic values.

Cabinet Information and Decision Support Center (2009)

The general implication is that young peoples' preoccupations are more closely associated to qualms than to political aspirations. By a large majority, they see political activities as useless and incapable of making a difference to their more immediate problems or addressing their real concerns.³ A question in a recent survey conducted by the Cabinet Information and Decision Support Center reveals young people's aspirations as shown in figure 8.6

Political comments had a clear significance. One of the young women said: "I would not mind participating and voting in the elections if there was a truly free choice and no electoral bribery. But how can I guarantee my safety (at the polling booths...) and my return home in dignity after engaging in that hassle?" A young man said, "My family is always telling me to

Box 8.2: Y-PEER (Youth Peer Education Network)

Y-PEER Egypt was established in 2005 with the support of the United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA). Y-PEER is led by young people and is a live illustration of youth-adult partnership where initiatives are taken by young people and supported by adults. The network is established in over 45 countries worldwide.

The philosophy of Y-PEER Egypt is built on providing NGO's with their own cadre of trainers. Y-PEER builds the capacity of its member NGO's through trainings of trainers who then conduct trainings of peer educators locally and through theatre based peer education trainings on a myriad of topics. By creating a network, constituting of NGO's, Governmental and Academic Institutions, it also provides a platform for sharing experience between its members and links the members with potential partners. The network is coordinated by a group of young people who undergo extensive training on Y-PEER methodology at Regional and Global levels. They are responsible for planning, implementing and monitoring the activities of the network. UNFPA provides ongoing technical and financial support to the network and the planned activities.

Y-PEER also provides its members with a comprehensive toolkit including training manuals and programmatic toolkits in peer education. Examples include theater based peer education training; Youth Friendly Services; Youth Adult Partnership and combating HIV among most at risk populations. One of the unique tools is the Standards in Peer Education Programming. Y-PEER has always been keen on maintaining the quality of its tools and trainings and has established partnerships with venerable universities and institutes. Through these partnerships, standards of peer education programming have been developed to be a guide to institutes working in peer education in different aspects of the program and to set a quality standard. YPEER and UNFPA Egypt are working to initiate a process of institutionalizing these standards in national peer education program in Egypt.

The network in Egypt currently consists of 40 NGOs in 16 governorates.

Examples of the work done by Y-PEER Egypt include:

- More than 100 trainers of peer educators trained, 3000 peer educators and 80 theater based peer education trainees.
- Working with celebrities and journalists, including Ms. Howayda Abou Heif and Mr. Khaled Abol Naga, to promote health messages.
- Establishment of a Youth Advisory Panel with UNFPA and UNICEF.
- Working with Universities to establish an educational campaign on SRH and population issues.
- Working with the NCCM in its adolescent's health project.
- Translation of MTV's stayingalive.org-website in Arabic to provide information on SRH and HIV/AIDS to young people.

For more information, visit www.ypeeregypt.com Source: UNFPA, Egypt

engage in anything but politics. Keep away from politics to live in peace... “A third young person said “The school taught us that the right policy is to fear Allah, abide by religion and keep away from the political parties’ hypocrisy and the government’s lies”. A fourth said, “One may approach a political party only if there is an opportunity to work, and that’s it.” Another girl said “At home there are lectures, at university more lectures, and in politics, again more lectures. Words, words, words! It’s mind-numbing and futile.” Other comments are similar to those expressed in youth blogs and the Internet in general (see elsewhere in this Chapter).

Why Non-Participation?

The family must be like a mesh, not a hierarchical structure. The dominant language in the family should be the language of dialogue, not loud voices. There is need for stepping up media campaigns designed to alert families to cultivate honest dialogue and reject the culture of hostility to their children’s values.

Comment by a young man.

The significant lack of participation in public affairs — evidenced in interviewee responses — may be attributed to several factors:⁴

- Cultural and social factors include family values that do not cultivate a desire to unity. Families

in Egypt generally advocate individual rather than collective dealings with the community. The absence of a culture of voluntary cooperation among youth and the growing phenomenon of “me first” is therefore not surprising.

- Young people have a preconceived ideal model of society but when actually involved in real life, the day-to-day horse-trading, bickering and corruption indicates that real politics are far from ideal. This leads to alienation and withdrawal, and in extreme cases, to a desire to escape or to migrate.
- Youth do not feel that the state extends any services to them. They perceive that the quality of their education is poor, their employment opportunities modest to non-existent, and the standard of living they can look forward to unexceptional. This reduces attachment to the state and its regime.
- Youth fear that the only means for social mobility is bribery, favoritism and bypassing the law. This breeds a feeling of hopelessness and some seek refuge in drugs, sex, crime or violence.
- Economic factors manifest themselves in the state’s weakened employment role and increasing reliance on the private sector. Respondents said that economic problems are not resolved through seminars and awareness campaigns but through a significant role for government on the ground, that is, by providing a decent education, the conditions necessary for suitable employment and salaries, by combating nepotism and ensuring equal opportunities.
- Political factors, especially the lack of channels of communication between young people and the ruling and intellectual elite are a factor that creates paralysis and an inability to act through (missing) legitimate channels.

Society seems schizophrenic. Despite citizens’ rejection and distrust of the government, they do not move except through the government. Within this relationship there is a missing link, namely the lack of trust, because the government gives us ‘hypnotics’ to have its way and do whatever it wants.

Comment by a young man

Why Join Religious Groups?

Anecdotal evidence indicates that the involvement of young people in religious movements (Muslim or Christian), both formal and informal, is the most significant phenomenon in contemporary political affairs. These movements differ, have varying backgrounds and references, adopt diverse approaches with assorted objectives, but nevertheless manage to attract young people for many reasons, chief among which are:

Disillusionment with Formal Politics

Young people in the sample appear to see no connection between the content of the leadership’s political discourse and what they expect of the leadership. In this respect, there is a failure of the Egyptian political discourse to convince young people of its tenets, thereby leading to a loss of credibility. There is also the perceived weakness of the state’s developmental role, the limitations of state and party institutions, in particular with regard their role in political education and real representation. On the other hand, religious movements are seen to be striving to represent the people and defend their interests. It is this sensitivity to the grassroots that gives precedence to a religious subset allegiance over a national allegiance.

Why do officials extensively use ‘my’ and ‘mine’ consciously or unconsciously and repeatedly say ‘my ministry/department/party did so and so’? Why don’t they say ‘Egypt achieved this or that’?

Comment by a young woman

Loss of credibility of the electoral process and distrust of political maneuvering together raise the attraction of religion. Most young people who were questioned believe there is no corruption within religious organizations and that they uphold the principles of justice and equality in contrast to state institutions. Further, the state, in marginalizing and containing the role of traditional religious institutions such as Al Azhar, and in dissolving the private religious endowments (wakf) mechanism, has cast doubt among many young people on the impartiality of Al-Azhar scholars and their way of thinking.

Box 8.3: Joining Political Parties Requires an Enabling Environment

What conditions are necessary to energize young people and provide the incentive for more participation in political life?

Some basic questions expressed by youth indicate their areas of concern:

- Is there encouragement or welcome as they enter the party headquarters or will they face the same suspicious treatment they get from bureaucratic government bodies?
- Is there credible information on the party and its principles, ideas, membership, the rights and duties of a member and the party Plan of Action, or just the usual posters of the party leader and his activities?
- Do any party officials discuss a youth's aspirations and orientations in public work and party activity before asking him/her to fill in the membership application?
- Is there a real institutional network of contacts between the party and its branches and bodies? Is there a directory identifying party units, committees, leaders and the addresses of its offices and branches?
- Can a young person turn to the Internet to get enough information about the parties and their activities, statutes and objectives in order to make an informed decision? This is provided by some of the banned groups or figures.
- Is there dialogue or exchange between party leaders and youth, or are the audience and speakers at meetings senior members only?
- Can youth hear a real discussion about the needs and capacities of the district or village where they live and where the party is located? Or are they simply exposed to debates, rumors and insinuations about the corridors of power?
- Should young newcomers be subject to a well-established hierarchy where 'His Excellency' or other obsolete grand titles accord a senior member VIP treatment?
- Is an entrenched pecking order within a party an enabling environment for the dynamic participation of a young graduate seeking respect and voice within a democratic association? *Source: Ali el Sawy, Background Paper to the EHDR 2010*

Economic Reasons

Many respondents said that growing unemployment has led to insecurity over the future. It leaves them with time on their hands, little to do and much frustration. The vacuum is often filled either by leisure activities or religious duties. Unemployment also affects allegiance to the state which is perceived as a root cause of the lack of work. This, potentially, could intensify the rebellion against what is perceived as a dysfunctional system of governance, expressed either through violence against that reality or by withdrawal into a 'purer' spiritual sphere.

Social and Cultural Factors


The problem with the official mosque sermons is that they are seasonal and that preachers wait for any religious occasion to review its history... But people need to do what is right in their daily lives... As for the unofficial mosques in which ordinary people preach, they are often not convincing or effective. The sermons and discourse of the Muslim Brotherhood have an effective approach.

Comment by a young man

A World Values Survey appears to indicate that religious values rank first for Egyptian youth (see Chapter 5). Added to this dimension is the fact that religious movements address phenomena such as inequality, class distinction, rampant corruption and the regression of education as key parameters of social dysfunction. Rapid urbanization, the growth of unstable family ties as an outcome of social change and the widening gap between youths' values and vision and what they see around them are given as reasons for the attraction to faith-bound behavior as a form of psychological reassurance.

As we grew up, we found everybody around us talking about the failure of the state and of society. At home, insults of the government, and at school, denial of what the state promises. We are surrounded by the non-stop cursing of officials and everything — but there is no hope except in getting out of this frustrating environment.

Comment by young woman

Figure 8.7: Internet Users in Egypt

Source: *The Global Information Technology Report 2008-2009: Mobility in the Networked World*. World Economic Forum; March 2009.

Absence of Youth-Friendly Political Parties

Egypt has a multi-party system, but in reality, it is the government-affiliated National Democratic Party (NDP) that exerts the most influence. Under present conditions, it would be expected that the NDP should lead the process of modernization and revitalization of party life. Successful political parties constantly develop and adapt to change. However, the NDP, like other parties, leaves little room for participation by young people. Nevertheless, the most contested areas on the NDP agenda are three issues which reflect, in general, awareness by the party leadership of the seriousness of the present apathy among youth. First is the need to reform the institutional structure of the NDP, followed by a need to correct the poor image of party leaders and cadres in the eyes of the ordinary citizen, and finally, it is lack of real political participation in Egypt in general and no 'party culture' among the public and the voters.

However, more important is how reform will take place, especially in respect to inducing youth to participate in political activity. The biggest challenges facing reform visions and position papers are not their thinking so much as the modest tools available to bring them to fruition. The same applies to political parties as the legitimate institution for participation.

Participation outside State Institutions

Currently, anecdotal evidence indicates that the election of civil society organizations (clubs, unions) sometimes achieve breakthroughs in the voting par-

ticipation rate and the transfer of power, in contrast to a dramatic decline in voting participation rates in political elections, (presidential elections and referenda, parliament, local elections). However, there appears to be a rise in the participation indicators outside the official institutions of power and governance. This is seen not only in non-political elections but also through involvement in public affairs by peaceful means to bring about a change, including in the political behavior of individuals in attempts to influence the decision-making processes and government policies.

The expression 'neo-ikhwanism' is used by some young people to refer to the Muslim Brotherhood youth in their modern new look, especially at university. Instead of wearing a short gown and a long beard they wear jeans, casual clothes, and a short beard, if any. Their tone of voice is moderate like that of popular young preacher Amr Khalid, and they use English words such as 'already' or 'whatever'... Young women dress in regular clothing and a long scarf worn in a distinctive way. Though girls and boys still do not mix, there is a change in the relationship between them. Girls have proved their presence clearly.

A female university student

THE INTERNET AND POLITICAL INVOLVEMENT

Participation of Youth via the Internet

Some forms of youth participation have no less political significance or impact than participation in official events. Chief among these is the Internet.

International statistics and reports indicate that youth are the biggest category using the Internet as a source of information because it is one of the cheapest and fastest tools at hand. Online activists and bloggers, as well as participators in 'Facebook' and 'YouTube' are now behind political action in many parts of the world, and it appears that the extent of success of so called 'electronic democracy' now rests largely on young people. But success in this respect is always linked to a government's practices through its laws and legislation — and these are often inadequately developed in many countries, including Egypt.

Nevertheless, the Internet – under a variety of regimes, including Egypt - has significantly contributed to expanding the scope of freedom of personal and individual expression and to breaking official organizations' monopoly of channels of communication.

The Internet in Egypt

The number of Internet users in Egypt is estimated at about 13 million to date, according to available 2009 statistics. That is, almost two out of eight citizens go to the Internet for information, business and personal usage. This is an increase of almost threefold compared to 2005 – and for many, 'logging in' has become a daily practice. It means, for example, that the number of daily Internet users in Egypt is much higher than that of newspaper readers.

These figures are expected to rise to cover more than 50% of Egypt's population in the coming ten years. This suggests that the State must face the technical and legal implications of this new revolution in citizen self-expression – and do so in a timely manner.⁵

YOUTH INTERNET POLITICAL PARTICIPATION: THE RISKS IN ANALYSIS

There are a number of factors that can color any analysis of youthful Internet political participation. For this reason, one must tread with caution when analyzing the results of any given study. First, the virtual information world can give a picture of reality that may be different from the facts on the ground or challenge time-honored precepts. Second, constant technological and legal developments may allow official censorship of certain types of content. Third, Internet users must be educated, by necessity, and as such are by no means fully representative of the population at large, let alone of all young people.

Thus, while the Internet may be an important tool for measuring political, social and economic trends, the picture it presents of young people's views or activities is partial and limited, and must be considered as such. Given these provisos, the importance of the Internet lies in the fact that it is the only online means available for measuring youth's political participation. In Egypt, it has become a tool with huge weight in calling for any

activity, as the events on 6th April 2006 demonstrate. At that time calls for specific civic action were made almost exclusively online, with tremendous impact, drawing maximum attention, a response by civil society never faced before by the State.

A number of questions need to be addressed in this respect. For example, are there differences between the conventional and the virtual worlds in youths' political allegiances? What political behavior on the Internet is revealed by youth regarding faith issues or affiliations? Does the State help activate youth political participation via the Internet? Should the State have a greater or lesser presence in directing youths' points of national or political reference as expressed on the Internet? Answers to these questions are likely to indicate to what extent Egypt's youth are enabled to operate in a virtual environment. A background study for this report attempts to answer these questions.⁶ But first, we look at other studies in place.

Does Government Promote Internet Use?

A number of studies have been conducted by State agencies in Egypt, notably by the Information and Decision Support Center (IDSC) attached to the Cabinet, the Ministry of Information and Technology, the Central Agency for Public Mobilization and Statistics (CAPMAS) and the National Center for Social and Criminology Research (NCSCR). In a report published by the IDSC, a section titled 'Internet Mania' deals with the relation between youth and Internet. Results were as follows:⁷

- More than 80% of Internet Café clients in Egypt were young people. This is attributed to unemployment and leisure, on the one hand, and the familiarity of this age group with information technology, on the other;
- Sixty percent of the youth surveyed spent their time chatting, 20% browsing pornography sites, 12% conducting business or scientific work and 8% visiting political sites;
- The report also examines new Internet jargon that is largely drawn from technology and uses abbreviations extensively, as well as Latin letters. The report suggests that this may affect standard Arabic or even English language usage.

A statistical survey on ICT among youth conducted by CAPMAS at the end of 2008 provides a more general picture:⁸

- The number of computer users among youth was over six million, of which 57% were male and 43% female;
- 2.4 million young persons used the Internet, of which 61% were male and 39% female;
- Internet use for academic purposes by youth was at about one fourth of total youth users (1.398 million), of which 55.4% were male compared to 44.6% female;
- The number of Internet users having a university degree was at a low 356,000, of whom 61% were male and 39% were female;
- Young Internet users who were employed numbered 443,000, of whom 75.25% were male;
- Young people who have mobile phones was close to the number using computers, at 5.656 million, of whom 69% were male and 31% female.

Additionally, the Ministry of Communication and Information has issued a guidebook for parents, entitled 'Parents' Working Group for Safe Cyber Use'. The two-page pamphlet explains methods for 'safe' use of the Internet by sons and daughters, and it is an expression of the apprehension of State bodies on the power of the Internet.⁹ It illustrates the caution with which the Government of Egypt approaches issues of freedom of speech.

A Study Tailored for this Report

A 2009 informal Internet study was conducted for this report. It relied on the measurement of a number of indicators relating to youth's political participation in the virtual world by analyzing the content of 195 sites representing youth segments to-date on the Worldwide Web. These consist of blogs, group electronic magazines and personal pages on Facebook.¹⁰

Categories included independents, persons with party affiliations and different political groups. The study also depended on a number of indicators that have been verified by different content analysis methods and also on information approaches. These measure the frequency of specific words in texts on websites and the popularity of a site through number of

links, as well as a determination of how sites impact on youth political participation and an assessment of how far youth interact with the sites. Several significant details emerge from the study, from which the following selection is based:

Degree of Allegiance

An indicator for the title of each site was used to provide knowledge on the degree of commitment to allegiance to Egypt (the homeland) in its various forms, or to a political party or group. The surveyed sample of 195 sites showed middling interest in allegiance to the homeland, while party or political allegiance came out on top. In other words, each of 35 sites scored three points for national allegiance, as commitment was evidenced in their names. One hundred and five scored two points because the title expressed the viewpoint of a specific party or political or religious group. The remaining 52 sites got one point and represent about one quarter of the selected sample.

Responsibility and Transparency


A. Sites' Responsibility and Distribution per Editors' Gender

Distribution of males and females was explored, both ideologically as well as for administrative responsibility, for postings on the site. It was observed that gender distribution in the sample demonstrated a bias against females, with the exception of about 5% of the sites. There may be cultural or other reasons why young Egyptian women are not inclined to take on a leadership role or to use the Internet as a means of expressing their opinion, compared to males. Nonetheless, there were some examples of young Egyptian women whose writings often put them in confrontation with different political trends and State policies. In addition, the nature of some cyber magazines expresses women's views, notably *Blog Bent Masreyah* (The Blog of an Egyptian Girl), *Wahda Masreyah* (An Egyptian Woman) and *Masreyah Giddan* (A Very Egyptian Woman).

B. Degree of Transparency

Most young people were extremely reserved when it came to putting their names and personal details explicitly on the Internet. This is perhaps out of fear of legal accountability, or because what is said may

Figure 8.8: Allegiance on the Site



Source: Zain Abdel Hady, 2009

Table 8.1: Allegiance on the Site

| % | No. of Sites | Item | Category |
|--------|--------------|--|----------|
| 17.90% | 35 | Title expressing allegiance to nation as a whole | A |
| 55.40% | 108 | Title expressing allegiance to specific party or political trend | B |
| 26.70% | 52 | Unspecific title | C |


Source: Ibid

Table 8.2: Gender Distribution in Websites

| % | Score | No. of sites | Item | Category |
|--------|-------|--------------|-----------------------------|----------|
| 5.10% | 3 | 10 | Fair gender distribution | A |
| 57.40% | 2 | 112 | No fair gender distribution | B |
| 37.40% | 1 | 73 | Site does not include names | C |


Source: Ibid

Figure 8.9: Degree of Responsibility for Site



Source: Ibid

Figure 8.10: Degree of Transparency



Source: Ibid

run counter to State policies and practices. There have been cases in Egypt when young bloggers have faced prosecution and imprisonment for their views. Another possibility is that the sites are backed by particular interest groups that wish to remain anonymous. Sites that mention the person or group responsible for them or provide any full details did not exceed 2.6% of the sample, while 60% of the sample sites gave names but did not designate the task of each person mentioned. However, 37% of the sites were entirely without names or provided initials only. Besides, there is no verification that names mentioned are those of the persons in actual fact responsible for the sites.

C. Degree of Risk

The date of construction of a site reflects the interest in professing views. There were no regulations governing the treatment of the Internet up until 2003 when Egypt recognized the principles stated in the Information and Internet Community in Geneva. This appears to have coincided with a growing interest in constructing personal websites and creating elec-

tronic magazines as well as with the mushrooming of blogs, first launched largely by international and Arab companies, prompted by economic and technological considerations. Nevertheless, they helped raise interest in self expression and writing, and from there to political participation via the Internet.

D. Language of Political Discourse on Websites

No doubt, the use of the Egyptian Arabic colloquial dialect on websites is a characteristic of Internet use in Egypt. Many electronic magazines, personal websites, forums and Facebook pages have become the arena for breaking colloquial/classical language barriers. Young people are shedding off national, party or even the independent press language criteria, namely the language and grammar of the educated elite — constraints which are believed to hinder or complicate the communication of political concepts and contents for the rest of the community.

The analysis indicates that there is a growing choice of colloquial Arabic (specifically the Cairene dialect)

Table 8.3: Degree of Transparency in Mentioning Names of Site Editors

| % | No. of sites | Scores | Item | Category |
|--------|--------------|--------|---|----------|
| 2.60% | 5 | 3 | Editors' names mentioned, and their tasks specified | A |
| 60% | 117 | 2 | Editors' names mentioned, but their tasks not specified | B |
| 37.40% | 73 | 1 | Names not mentioned in full or initials. | C |

Source: Zain Abdel Hady, 2009

Table 8.4: Date of Appearance in Youth Internet Sites

| % | No. of sites | Item | Category |
|--------|--------------|--|----------|
| 12.30% | 24 | From the appearance of Internet in Egypt till 2005 | A |
| 71.80% | 140 | From 2005 to 2008 | B |
| 15.90% | 31 | After 2008 | C |

Source: *Ibid*

Table 8.5: Language Used on Youth Websites

| % | No. of sites | Item | Category |
|--------|--------------|------------------------------|----------|
| 53.80% | 105 | Use classical and colloquial | A |
| 26.10% | 51 | Use colloquial only | B |
| 20% | 39 | Use classical only | C |

Source: *Ibid*

Table 8.6: Interaction on Youth Sites


| % | No. of Sites | Item | Category |
|--------|--------------|--------------------------------------|----------|
| 85.10% | 166 | Comments, names/emails are available | A |
| 11.30% | 22 | Only comments available | B |
| 3.60% | 7 | No comments available | C |

Source: *Ibid*

for discourse, and it confirms that there have been gains in wider readership by youth. About 79% of the sample sites range between exclusive use of colloquial Arabic or use a mix of both the colloquial and the classical language. This development deserves further study in view of its potential implications, including the ease and acceptability of the State's formal language in political discourse.

E. Interaction with Browsing Community

It is possible to both give and receive views and comments on websites. This is a democratic feature that may not be found in other means of written communication. Measuring this feature can indicate the growth of democratic practices and interaction among youth. More than 95% of the sample made available their comments and emails to invite continued feedback and discussion on all the many subjects and issues raised. However, it is possible that some sites censor comments that challenge their political persuasion, or that run counter to prevailing morals.

Figure 8.11: Degree of Risk from Introduction to Internet


Source: *Ibid*

This aspect requires further assessment and could be examined in a separate study.

F. Figures Hosted by Websites


Electronic magazines and other sites often host guests representing different political currents such as members of the Muslim Brotherhood, Christians, independents, radicals or even conservative rightists. The more varied the guests hosted by a site, the more indicative this is of a liberal approach. The fact that many youth sites do not host leading writers or intellectuals may be interpreted as a lack of belief in these figures' ideologies or possibly a difficulty in persuading these more conventional figures to participate in

Figure 8.12: Language of Political Discourse




Source: Zain Abdel Hady, 2009

Figure 8.13: Interaction with Browsing Community




Source: Ibid

Figure 8.14: Figures Hosted by Site



Source: Ibid

Figure 8.15: Popularity of Website



Source: Ibid

Table 8.7: Guests Hosted by Sites

| % | No. of Sites | Item | Category |
|--------|--------------|---------------------------|----------|
| 3.10% | 6 | Diverse guests | A |
| 30.30% | 59 | Fig. with one orientation | B |
| 66.70% | 130 | No Figures hosted | C |

Source: Ibid

Table 8.8: Number of Visitors to Youth Sites

| % | No. of sites | Scores | Category |
|--------|--------------|--------|----------|
| 31.80% | 61 | 3 | A |
| 8.20% | 16 | 2 | B |
| 60% | 118 | 1 | C |

Source: Ibid

this new medium.

G. Popularity of Site or Page

The number of visitors to a site is an extremely important quantitative indicator of the popularity of a website or page, and consequently how far it can impact those who browse it, especially if the site has a visitors' counter. Despite the difficulty of depending on this indicator — since site owners can falsify registration numbers to promote their sites or pages — a daily observation of a site and the amount of daily comments on it can give some indication of the real number of visitors.

H. Political Views of Some Religious Groups

There are no views specific to youth belonging to religious groups, be them the Muslim Brotherhood or Coptic organizations. However, it is generally observed that Muslim Brotherhood youth dedicate their discourse to what is religiously permissible. In this view, the Internet is corrupting, the government is not worthy of leading the State and the Islamic law

(shari'a) must prevail.

Most Coptic Internet sites speak about the isolation of Coptic youth inside the Egyptian community. The Al-Aqbat al-Mutahidoon (United Copts) website makes this observation on one of its pages ...“(Our)... gatherings are small, and they are rejected.” Coptic youth websites are also mostly preoccupied with discrimination said to be practiced against them. However there are also sites expressing more moderate views.

I. Views on State-related Issues

An analysis of a number of expressions related to some State-related issues was conducted. The measurement of frequently used terminology on sites confirms that certain issues are of special interest to youth, while others elicit no interest or are expressed inaccurately. It was observed, for example, that most spoke about State corruption as a foregone conclusion. It appears that the State has, to date, not had the political will to counter this perception. Government has a very poor presence on the Internet, and its pres-

ence is not interactive. This is an issue that requires review and serious improvement if the State wishes to engage in democratic dialogue.

Addressing Specific Political Issues

Decentralization

A large number of youth align themselves with decentralization. Sixteen sites voted for State decentralization, one objected, four sites appeared neutral, while four others ridiculed the question of decentralization, maintaining that conditions would not change whether the State is centralized or decentralized. These views appear to represent individual opinions and it was not possible to confirm that they were representative of any one group. The issue needs further study.

Overall, views on decentralization could be grouped under the following topics:

- There was much discussion of decentralization from a pan-Arab national perspective. This stressed the need for the independence of the ruling authority without any patronage from abroad, as in the case of the Hamas government in Gaza. Some ideas revolved around reviving Arab and Islamic nationalism, that is, an Arab–Iranian alliance;
- Many of the electronic forums, groups and online magazines presented discussions that were full of frustration, sarcasm and resentment against the government, centralized authority and the one party rule in Egypt. They also saw no hope of change;
- Numerous views dealt with economic monopoly in Egypt and the support given to businessmen of one political party. In some cases, names of businessmen were cited as monopolizing specific industries. Their concentration in one specific party suggested the idea of party corruption and the centralization of such corruption;
- Several sites called on the State to remove its grip on the media and stressed the importance of media independence;
- Some sites also requested autonomy for local administrative bodies and the decentralization of decision making at that level;
- There were some suggestions to move some min-

istries to Alexandria in view of its historical and cultural heritage.

Authorities and People's Councils

- Many youth sites expressed the belief that the executive authority was primarily and exclusively responsible for ruling in Egypt. They questioned the role of the legislative and judicial authorities since their independence and effectiveness are seen to have receded significantly. The need for reform is clearly expressed on many sites.
- It appears that the relationship between the people's councils and youth is almost totally severed. There are no specific mechanisms to insure youth participation in them. Participation is generally tied to belonging to the National Democratic Party.

Political Parties

- There was a high percentage of opponents to the ruling National Democratic Party (NDP) and its orientation among youth. The number of its supporters was less than the number of its opponents. Opponents based their opinions on perceptions of corruption and centralization and on disagreements with NDP's political vision;
- Those that were neutral on the NDP nevertheless had questions about its national strategy. Questions were raised, for example, on what could be expected from the next National Democratic Party following elections. There were also questions on the policies that the NDP should adopt with the emergence of youth with a socialist and secular orientation, and towards supporters of strikes;
- The political discourse among youth also included calls for the creation of new parties, which implies a lack of trust in existing parties and their programs.

Religious Groups

- Religious parties are banned from politics in Egypt. The idea of legalizing religious parties is therefore raised with the aim of enabling certain groups — even if they include followers of different religions — to strengthen their presence. This idea is expressed in some youth contribu-

tions. However, in other messages, a warning is given. One young person said “you do not know what it means for Egypt to become an Islamic State and the Islamic law to be applied. Most Egyptians do not know that. Believe me if matters were to remain as they are at present, Egypt will be heading to an Islamic State, to more darkness and more backwardness than it is witnessing at present.”

- Youth consciousness of religious diversity in Egypt is also observed. One of the youth messages says “when we apply Islamic law in a country where there are 13 million Christians, will God be satisfied with this? I do not believe that the application of the law of a certain religion on individuals who do not follow it is any form of justice. Imagine it happening the other way around, and matters will be clearer...”

Elections

- There was general agreement that political participation by youth in elections was weak, useless, or non-existent as a result of electoral rigging and lack of candidates’ care for citizen’s and young people’s real needs;
- Many sites also stressed the need for a multi-party system that allows equal opportunities and prevents the domination by one party;
- Some youth also expressed the desire for an easing of the security grip on the elections, the presence of international observers, and a more organized elections process.

PROPOSALS FOR REFORM

A large number of Internet proposals — presented by youth as solutions to the problems facing them or the State — were reviewed. The focus was on practical proposals, since many suggestions have been necessarily excluded as unrealistic, individualistic, lacking an underlying vision, lacking a social resolution, or because they were irrelevant to issues related to Egypt.

Proposals on the Internet included the following:

- Guaranteeing different forms of democracy in education and restoring class and university elections;

- Promoting a multi-party system, and paying attention to women, equality and religious tolerance in all State-owned media;
- Raising the presence of the State and its organizations on the Internet and intensifying it, as well as dealing with the Internet as a strong media influence, not simply as a means of freedom of expression;
- Presenting State excerpts of success stories on YouTube rather than taking a defensive role against charges leveled against it;
- Highlighting the State’s moral and material achievements and investments regularly on State-owned websites, establishing realistic achievement indicators, focusing on how far the government is fighting institutional corruption and publishing related news;
- Strengthening the role of legislative and judicial institutions and diminishing the executive authority as responsible for laws and regulations;
- According State attention to the proper implementation of the law and applying it to officials even before applying it to citizens, as well as transparently publishing related news in the press;
- Disseminating religious, political and sex education on State-owned websites and assessing the impact on youth segments;
- Boosting the State role in training youth on the effective use of the Internet and its economic benefits to open up job opportunities;
- Providing job opportunities for youth in the media and giving them an opportunity to present programs that meet their dreams and aspirations and boost democratic practices;
- Featuring examples of youth excellence as role models, as well giving them responsible positions in institutions to lend credibility to the State’s concern with youth;
- Arranging visits by youth and their leadership to civilization sites, historic institutions and model communities to build up national allegiance and loyalty;
- Promoting Egypt and its civilizations on every Internet site owned, supervised or affiliated to non-governmental organizations and the private

Box 8.4: President Mubarak on Youth

What Is Needed For Young People?

- Make way for them.
- Remove the obstacles from their path.
- Lift guardianship on their thought and movement.
- Do not underestimate their abilities and potential capacity to play pioneering and effective roles.

What Is Needed From Young People?

- Do not wait for an invitation from anyone to enter the arena of national action.
- Take initiative to shoulder responsibility.
- Prepare for success.

Source: Speech to university youth, Alexandria, August 27, 2002.

sector, to support national duty and obligation;

- Turning villages into small towns and paying attention to their utilities and service institutions to prevent migration to cities or abroad.

The current interest of a large segment of youth on the Internet makes it imperative for the State to set up an authority or body in charge of supporting and promoting Egyptian Internet sites. The aim of this body would be to provide support and training for youth sites, surveys of sites, analysis of their political discourse, and respond to these and boost State presence on the Internet. Its aims would include identifying standards and components for setting up websites by ministries and other institutions. It is suggested that this would be a body independent from established State-related organizations so as to ensure its autonomy.

The Internet also renders it imperative to reconstruct the information, communication and political content of State websites in a manner that corrects erroneous concepts, how the State manages its actions and its political position on major issues. State institution websites should cover achievements for the benefit of citizens by setting up a list of indicators on developments and tasks accomplished. This would introduce transparency and counter malicious propaganda.

State support could be given to the creation of NGOs concerned with promoting better use of the Internet and to preventing its social abuse; organized training courses by the State, NGOs or private organizations on designing and constructing websites in Arabic and English could raise standards and raise Egypt's image, on the one hand, and give the feeling that all actors back these activities, on the other hand.

Youth role models play an important part in channeling the energies and goals of youth communities and demonstrate that success is possible. Use of this mechanism should be frequent. Trends can be identified through independent studies of opinion and analysis of political activity among groups, particularly those Coptic youth who feel marginalized, to address the issues of interest to them and inform suitable solutions. The phenomenon of isolation in the face of active Islamic groups — as expressed in websites — requires serious and urgent study.

Awareness-raising for tolerance and open-mindedness to and by men of religion through modern discourse and Internet sites appears a prerequisite to national unity.

WHAT DOES THE FUTURE OFFER?

There are three schools of thought in this respect. The first endeavors to raise awareness and believes that the premises should precede results. In other words, young people should start to participate first. This school is seen as conventional and conservative. The second school seeks to re-construct young people's thoughts, and direct them towards ideological/religious orientations or towards political pragmatism. This can imply rational pragmatic political content, such as a focus on the needs of the era of globalization. It can also mean — through religious channels — to provide the opportunity to do things with wide community impact (advocacy, reform, justice, setting an example).

The third school can be considered reformist. For example, it calls for reforming school education, improving the quality of school performance, enhancing teacher skills and overseeing teachers. It

appears that this tendency is gaining more ground among the wealthy and influential elite. However, the conservative and patriarchal school of thought remains predominant, followed by that of a 'revolutionary' ideology.

However, fundamental questions in the formulation of youth policies remain. These raise the following questions:

- 1. Is the State primarily responsible for mainstreaming and achieving harmony between the programs of governmental and private institutions, both public and private, in the area of youth empowerment? It is here that a number of practical questions arise:
- 2. Are we talking about State services or policies for young people? It is important to have a national policy for youth developed in a consultative manner and with clear, announced and stable objectives and methods of assessment. Whether accomplished via a coordinating Ministry for Youth, a National Council or State institutions in partnership with civil society, this need is apparent.
- 3. There is no doubt that a central issue in youth policy is employment. It involves expansion in job creation, rehabilitation activities and training for work, equal employment opportunities, attention to developing the innovativeness and linkages of small business owners, environment preservation, and reaching the excluded by empowering them with voice.
- 4. Is the generation factor marginal, with no substantial impact on the behavior of individuals, so much so that there is no need to talk about the specificity of young people? It appears better to trusting young people's choice, leaving them to determine priorities, convincing them that experience comes with practice and patience. It is necessary to give youth a chance to experiment and learn from mistakes.
- 5. The key question is, "What do young people want for themselves?" This requires communication with young people by direct means to identify their priorities, assess their abilities and develop their skills. There is a deficiency of the information necessary to determine their realities, identify target segments and plan for the development of capabilities. Here, research departments of appropriate ministries could step in to set up databases. A youth research unit at the National Center for Social and Criminological Research is also needed. Field research and sounding out young people's views through public opinion surveys, such as those carried out by the Cabinet-related IDSC, are also of immense value.

Endnotes


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Chapter Nine

THE ROLE OF YOUTH IN ACHIEVING GOOD GOVERNANCE



This chapter investigates the status and role of Egyptian youth in achieving good governance in Egypt with a specific focus on their role in ensuring a better performing government apparatus that is more efficient, effective and responsive. There are many reasons why it is essential to enhance youth participation in achieving good governance, perhaps the three most important of which are the following:

- When youth participate early on in policy making and in the decision making process, this prepares the next generation of leaders to take on responsibility for running state affairs;
- Participation allows the opportunity for this large fraction of society to express its particular needs and expectations and make sure that these are well represented in the body politic;
- By partnering with youth rather than excluding them, society capitalizes on their resources and capabilities, adding a new perspective to how problems are perceived, thereby contributing to better quality outcomes in the long run.

Good governance entails interlinkages and partnerships between the three main actors in any society: civil society organizations, the private sector, and government. In each of these there is a role for youth to play and this can take a number of forms. As young people become involved in their communities, through volunteerism for example, they benefit the surrounding social environment as well as profit both personally and professionally, building trust and confidence in their own capacities to impact on development. The private sector offers opportunities to hone skills, demonstrate innovative approaches, and achieve financial independence.

But it is government that must play a leading role in providing an enabling environment for the social gains of youth inclusion to take place. In this respect, the perspective of 'responsive governance' is useful as a tool for reform of government performance and in envisaging an active role for youth in reform.¹

From this perspective, there are three main vehicles for reform:

- First, internal improvement of government rules, procedures and operations, where youth can play a more significant role through, for example, implementing a competency based human resource management system, implementing pay for performance and investing more heavily in the training of the available human capabilities;
- Second, by enhancing the role of the private sector and enabling the private sector to compete with government in providing goods and services to citizens, and by forcing the government to meet competition, the quality of goods and services will be improved. Here youth can play a role through working in the private sector and managing private sector organizations that act as competitors to government and drivers of quality improvement;
- Third, civil society organizations and the media can push for the government sector reform by holding it accountable, and here, youth can definitely help in monitoring government performance through traditional and non-traditional media channels.

STATUS QUO IN RELATION TO THE GOVERNMENT SECTOR

Youth Currently Represented in the Egyptian Civil Service

Youth, as defined by the EHDR 2010 as 18-29 years of age, is practically non-existent in any top level managerial position in the Egyptian government, whether First Undersecretary, Undersecretary or General Manager, nor in central or local Government, the service authorities or public economic authorities (See Table 9.1). Distribution of government employees in the higher level jobs does not include anybody below the age of thirty-five. The average age of the Egyptian government employee falls within the age bracket 41-45 years.²

Other data from the Central Agency for Organization and Administration show that the total percentage of youth in the Egyptian bureaucracy (age group 20-35) amounts to approximately 18.15%, among which 51.3% are males and 48.7% are females (See Table 9.2).

Although approximately 18.5% of government employees are in the age group 20-35, the majority tend to be in the uppermost echelon of this age category, with nearly 64.3% of them falling in the age bracket 31-35 years of age (See Figure 9.1).

It is noteworthy that for the majority of the youth aged 20-35 who are employed in the government bureaucracy, 77% are working in local administration agencies, 8% in the economic agencies and 7% in the administrative agency (See Table 9.3 and Figure 9.2).

The total number of youth in the government sector amounted to 567,468 individuals on the first of January, 2009. The education sector holds the largest share of youth in the government sector, amounting to 303,325 employees and representing 53.5% of the total number of youth employed. The health sector represents the second largest share, reaching 30.1% of total youth employed (See Table 9.4)

The number of youth in the economic authorities totaled 48,512 on the first of January, 2009. The Transport, Communications and Civil Aviation sector

Table 9.1: Number of Employees in the Egyptian Government Higher Echelons and Age Distribution per Grade in 01/01/08

| Government Grade/ Age Group | 35-40 | 40-45 | 45-50 | 50-55 | 55-60 | 60-65 | Unknown Birth Date | Total Grade |
|--|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|--------------------|-------------|
| <u>Central Government</u> | | | | | | | | |
| First Under Secretary | 2 | 5 | 32 | 132 | 25 | 0 | 10 | 206 |
| Under Secretary | 3 | 29 | 173 | 688 | 87 | 1 | 18 | 999 |
| General Manager | 46 | 332 | 1203 | 1713 | 121 | 3 | 59 | 3477 |
| Subtotal (1) | 51 | 366 | 1408 | 2533 | 233 | 4 | 87 | 4682 |
| <u>Local Government</u> | | | | | | | | |
| First Under Secretary | | | | | | | | |
| Under Secretary | 0 | 1 | 3 | 9 | 1 | 0 | 7 | 21 |
| General Manager | 3 | 26 | 137 | 353 | 26 | 0 | 7 | 552 |
| Subtotal (2) | 3 | 27 | 140 | 362 | 27 | 0 | 7 | 566 |
| <u>Service Authorities</u> | | | | | | | | |
| First Under Secretary | 1 | 6 | 8 | 42 | 10 | 0 | 7 | 74 |
| Under Secretary | 1 | 3 | 57 | 147 | 7 | 1 | 4 | 220 |
| General Manager | 28 | 112 | 360 | 569 | 84 | 2 | 26 | 1181 |
| Subtotal (3) | 30 | 121 | 425 | 758 | 101 | 3 | 37 | 1475 |
| <u>Public Economic Authorities</u> | | | | | | | | |
| First Under Secretary | 2 | 5 | 13 | 57 | 6 | 0 | 3 | 86 |
| Under Secretary | 2 | 12 | 95 | 278 | 26 | 0 | 3 | 416 |
| General Manager | 14 | 135 | 438 | 545 | 17 | 0 | 4 | 1153 |
| Subtotal (4) | 18 | 152 | 546 | 880 | 49 | 0 | 10 | 1655 |
| <u>Grand Total</u> | 102 | 666 | 2519 | 4533 | 410 | 7 | 141 | 8378 |
| (nos. for all grades=Subtotals (1)+(2)+(3)+(4)) | | | | | | | | |
| Grand Total (no.by grade) | 5 | 17 | 53 | 231 | 41 | 0 | 20 | 367 |
| First Under Secretary | 6 | 45 | 328 | 1122 | 121 | 2 | 32 | 1656 |
| Under Secretary | 91 | 605 | 1038 | 3180 | 248 | 5 | 96 | 5263 |
| General Manager | | | | | | | | |
| <u>Percent concentration to total of each grade:</u> | | | | | | | | |
| First Under Secretary | 1.36 | 4.63 | 14.44 | 62.94 | 11.17 | 0 | 5.45 | |
| Under Secretary | 1.63 | 2.72 | 19.81 | 67.75 | 7.31 | 0.12 | 1.93 | |
| General Manager | 1.73 | 11.50 | 19.72 | 60.42 | 4.71 | 0.09 | 1.82 | |
| Percent to total age groups | 1.22 | 7.95 | 30.07 | 54.11 | 4.89 | 0.08 | 1.68 | |

Source: CAO 2008 as quoted in Doha Abdel Hamid and Laila El Baradei (2009), "How to Reform the Pay System of Egyptian Government Employees", ECES, Working Paper Series # 155, forthcoming, p.16.

represents the largest share of youth in the economic authorities, making up 64.2% of the total number of young employees. Meanwhile, the health and religious services and labor force sector represents the second largest share and amounts to 18.2% of the total employed youth (See Table 9.5 and Figure 9.3)

Meanwhile, if we consider the distribution of youth employed in the government sector according to financial grades, including both those employed according to public and special cadres, the data points out that the majority of youth in the government sector belong to the third grade, amounting to 361,415 employees and making up 59.7% of the total

number of youth employed. The General Manager grade represents the smallest share of youth in the government sector and has a total of 2,187 employees, making up 0.2% of total youth employed (See Table 9.6 and Figure 9.4).


If we focus on the distribution of youth employed according to the special cadres, we find that the majority of youth are working as Teaching Assistants (81.9%) with a total number of 8,369. Next follows the position of Assistant Teacher in the second rank, making up 10.3% of the total number of youth employed according to special cadres (See Table 9.7 and Figure 9.5).

Table 9.2: Distribution of Youth by Age Category and Gender in the Egyptian Bureaucracy (Data From a sample of 557 units out of a total of 671 units)

| Age/Gender | Male | Female | Total | Percentage |
|------------------------------------|-----------|-----------|----------|------------|
| From 20 - 25 years | 14,033 | 25,389 | 39,422 | 1.16% |
| From 26- 30 years | 83,475 | 96,953 | 180,428 | 5.32% |
| From 31-35 years | 218,496 | 177,634 | 396,130 | 11.67% |
| Total Youth Group from 20-35 years | 316,004 | 299,976 | 615,980 | 18.15% |
| Total No. of Employees | 2,159,550 | 1,234,740 | 3,394,29 | 100% |
| % Youth to Total | 14.60% | 24.29% | 18.15% | |

Source: CAO, Central Information Department, 2009

Figure 9.1: Distribution of Youth by Age Category and Gender in the Egyptian Bureaucracy



Source: CAO, Central Information Department, 2009

Figures for new government appointments over the past years (Table 9.8) show that the greatest number of appointments took place in 2002, reaching a total of 120,839 new employees (Figure 9.6). These are all tenured appointments.

Meanwhile, data derived from the Ministry of Finance records showing various government expenditures on youth related activities indicate an increasing spending trend over the past decade. Table 9.9 shows funds allocated to youth according to the budget expenditures side. Figure 9.7 compares between year 2005/2006 and year 2009/2010 and shows the relative increase in expenditures during that five year period. Figure 9.8 shows that the funds allocated to the wages and labor compensation for youth represented the biggest share at 56% of the total youth related expenditures.

Overall, youth in the government sector do not get enough opportunity in leading or implementing reform since they are concentrated mostly in the lower echelons of the hierarchy. Despite government expenditures on youth related activities and initiatives, much remains to be done and the supply does not yet meet the demand by youth for better services.

Table 9.3: Distribution of Youth Age Bracket 20-35 in the Egyptian Governmental Sector on January 1st 2009

| Governmental Sector | Number of Youth |
|-----------------------|-----------------|
| Administrative Agency | 44,305 |
| Local Administration | 472,655 |
| Service Agencies | 50,508 |
| Economic Agencies | 48,512 |
| Total | 615,980 |

Does The Civil Service Provide Opportunities for Youth Promotion and Training?

- The *training* budget is very low. The average training budget available per capita in the Egyptian government service amounts to approximately LE 10 per year.³
- *Performance appraisal* is ineffective: The problem in many government organizations is that almost all get a grade of excellent in their appraisal. Superiors' justification for the overrating of their subordinates' performance and for the exaggerated grades is that Egyptian government employees are underpaid and they should not be deprived of any chance for an increase in pay.
- *Promotion* is based on seniority: According to law 47/1978, promotion in the civil service is mostly based on seniority (Law 47/1978, Chapter 4) with the exception of leadership positions where law 5/1991 applies and allows room for the promotion of the most qualified and the higher performer. However, in reality, even when deciding on the promotion of leaders in the government sector, the seniority criterion dominates.

Table 9.4: Number of Youth in the Government Sector According to the Budgets of the Administrative Agency, Local Administration and Service Agencies

Youth up to Age 35 on the 1st of January 2009

| Sector | Numbers | % |
|---|---------|------|
| General Public Services Sector | 30,755 | 5.4 |
| Defense, Security and Justice Sectors | 83 | 0.0 |
| Public Order and Public Safety Affairs Sector | 4,582 | 0.8 |
| Economic Affairs Sector | 24,344 | 4.3 |
| Environmental Protection Sector | 1,074 | 0.2 |
| Housing and Community Utilities Sector | 4,220 | 0.7 |
| Health Sector | 170,757 | 30.1 |
| Youth, Culture and Religious Affairs Sector | 22,035 | 3.9 |
| Education Sector | 303,325 | 53.5 |
| Social Protection Sector | 6,293 | 1.1 |
| Total | 567,468 | 100 |

Source: CAO, Central Information Department, 2009

Table 9.6: Number of Youth in the Government Sector Distributed according to the Financial Grades (Including Public Cadres and Special Regulation)

Until Age 35 year on the 1st of January 2009

| Grade | Numbers | % |
|-----------------|---------|--------|
| General Manager | 946 | 0.2 |
| G-1 | 2,187 | 0.4 |
| G-2 | 23,795 | 3.9 |
| G-3 | 361,415 | 59.7 |
| G-4 | 154,044 | 25.4 |
| G-5 | 35,652 | 5.94.6 |
| G-6 | 27,725 | 100 |
| Total | 605,764 | |

Source: CAO, Central Information Department, 2009

The challenges in a transition to a merit-based system in employment face a number of obstacles, including cultural barriers visible in the widespread practices of nepotism and patronage. Lack of a strong government has also resulted in the over-ruling of merit-based appointments to appease interest groups during election times and for political gain.

Available Niches in the Government Sector for Competent Youth

A few niches are available in the government sector for competent youth, mainly represented in the technical offices of ministries, government agencies and authorities where highly qualified youth are employed

Table 9.5: Number of Youth in the Government Sector as stated in the budgets of The Economic Authorities

Until Age 35 year (1st January 2009)

| Sector | Numbers | % |
|---|---------|------|
| Agriculture and Irrigation Sector | 310 | 0.6 |
| Industry, Petroleum/Mineral Resources | 970 | 2.0 |
| Electricity and Energy Sector | 1,042 | 2.1 |
| Transport, Communication/Civil Aviation | 31,140 | 64.2 |
| Supply and Internal Trade Sector | 71 | 0.1 |
| Financial and Economic Sector | 77 | 0.2 |
| Housing, Construction/New Communities | 1,019 | 2.1 |
| Health/Religious Services/ Labor Force | 8,824 | 18.2 |
| Culture and Media Sector | 1,576 | 3.2 |
| Tourism Sector | 2 | 0.0 |
| Insurance and Social Affairs Sector | 3,481 | 7.2 |
| Total | 48,512 | 100 |

Source: CAO, Central Information Department, 2009

Table 9.7: Number of Youth in the Government Sector Distributed according to the Financial Grades (Special Regulation)


Until Age 35 year (1st January 2009)

| Grade | Numbers | % |
|--------------------------------------|---------|------|
| Consultant | 5 | 0.0 |
| Assistant Research Professor | 2 | 0.0 |
| Assistant Professor | 7 | 0.1 |
| Researcher (Teacher) | 19 | 0.2 |
| First Researcher /Research Professor | 2 | 0.0 |
| Assistant Researcher | 242 | 2.4 |
| Researcher /Teacher Researcher | 17 | 0.2 |
| Teacher | 39 | 0.4 |
| Assistant Teacher | 1,053 | 10.3 |
| Assistant Researcher | 201 | 2.0 |
| Artist Third/ Beginner under Test | 63 | 0.6 |
| Assist. Researcher /Teaching Assist. | 197 | 1.9 |
| Teaching Assistant | 8,369 | 81.9 |
| Total | 10,216 | 100 |

Source: CAO, Central Information Department, 2009


on a contractual basis and paid high salaries through international donors' support. These technical offices, which represent a parallel system to the traditional government bureaucracy, are usually responsible for providing policy advice and supporting the ministers or top level officials. Over the past two decades, technical offices have been established in the majority of Egyptian ministries. Since they are funded by donor agencies, they implement a different compensation scheme and do not abide by the civil employees' rules

Figure 9.2: Distribution of Youth Age Bracket 20-35 among the Different Types of Government Agencies in 2009




Source: CAO, Central Information Department, 2009

Figure 9.4: Distribution According to the Financial Grades (Public and Special Regulation)



Source: CAO, Central Information Department, 2009

Figure 9.3: Distribution of Youth in the Government Sectors According to the Economic Authorities



Source: CAO, Central Information Department, 2009.

and regulations. Technical offices represent niches in the Egyptian bureaucracy for a small number of youth, especially with high language and computer skills. An accurate number of youth employed in Egyptian technical offices has not been determined, though the average is to have about 20-30 employees in each ministry through this parallel system. A more transparent system in recruitment and hiring for technical offices needs to be developed and implemented.

POSITIVE YOUTH INITIATIVES FOR BETTER QUALITY GOVERNANCE

A number of selected positive initiatives by Egyptian youth seek more participation and better quality governance in their country despite the present obstacles and barriers. The selection of different initiatives is to demonstrate that youth can act as change agents and change is possible through different means and ways.

The Sixth of April Movement

The Sixth of April youth define themselves on their website as: “a group of Egyptian youth brought together for the love of Egypt and the desire for reform...the vast majority ... do not belong to any political trend ... we are convinced of our ability and our right to change.”⁴

Table 9.8: Number of Appointed Youth In the Government Sector during the Last Ten Years

| Until Age 35 on the 1st of January 2009 | No.s |
|---|---------|
| Grade | 112,019 |
| Youth appointed During 2004 | 120,839 |
| Youth appointed During 2002 | |
| Appointed Outstanding Graduates 2001/02 | 6,750 |
| Appointed Outstanding Graduates 2000 | 4,976 |
| Appointed Outstanding Graduates 1998/99 | 4,465 |
| Total | 249,049 |

Source: CAO, Central Information Department, 2009.

The Sixth of April Movement was started by a young woman and a colleague in 2008. This initiated a page on Facebook and called for a unified protest against the Egyptian government. Word spread through mobile messaging and blogs. In the town of El-Mehalla, textile workers demonstrated on the 6th of April, 2008 and were joined by other citizens from different walks and affiliations, leading to a significant confrontation with the police force. Three people were shot dead and several were injured.

On the same date in 2009, word spread around through Facebook and various blogs to organize a national ‘Anger Day’. Some sources estimate that

Figure 9.5: Number of Youths in the Government Sector, Distributed according to Financial Grades (Special Regulation)





Figure 9.6: Number of Appointed Youth in the Government Sector during the Last 10 Years



75,000 young Egyptians signed up to the Facebook site calling for the Day of Anger. Several lawful demands were made, including a minimum wage of LE 1200 a month, improved pension schemes, better health and education services, ending police repression, ending rigged elections and stopping the exportation of cheap natural gas to Israel. However, prior to the event taking place, two young girls who were distributing leaflets calling for the event were arrested, and on the scheduled day there was intensive police deployment on all streets of Cairo. As a result, the 2009 6th of April activities were relatively quiet with only dispersed citizen gatherings in a number of syndicates and public universities.

An important lesson can be drawn from the 6th of April Youth Movement. Although the movement was repressed by government, it caught the attention of the local and international media and drew attention to how ICT can be used, especially by youth, in organizing political opposition movements and exposing autocratic governments' 'unsatisfactory' performance.

The Shayfenkom Movement

The literal translation of *shayfenkom* in Arabic is "we can see you". This is another example of a grassroots political movement in Egypt that intensively uses the internet for coordination and organization of its activities. The main purpose of the movement is to monitor election processes by sending representatives to election committees and booths, and observing and documenting what is happening. The movement was active during the presidential elections of 2005. The general call by the Shayfenkom during this election was to become proactive and to report election violations by citizens to their website directly or through cell phones.⁵

The Wael Abbas Blog


This blog, created by a young man named Wael Abbas,⁶ is a place where Abbas critically records his thoughts and comments on diverse incidents taking place in Egypt, particularly those having to do with torture in police stations. He also posts photos and video clips in the belief that a picture speaks a thousand words. Abbas claims that his blog attracts approximately 30,000 visits each day. As a result of his video clips of police brutality in a rare incidence,

Table 9.9: Funds Allocated by the Government for Youth Related Activities Based on Ministry of Finance Estimations

| Figures in Thousand LE | 2005/2006 | 2006/2007 | 2007/2008 | 2008/2009 | 2009/2010 |
|--|-----------|-----------|-----------|-----------|-----------|
| Wages & Labor Compensations | 4370515 | 4933811 | 5504132 | 5965106 | 6979598 |
| Purchasing Goods & Services | 588099 | 982857 | 989860 | 1064591 | 1167046 |
| Interests | 17070 | 15935 | 19427 | 17714 | 11666 |
| Subsides, Grants | 426743 | 546344 | 698400 | 708500 | 721007 |
| Other Expenditures | 2173 | 197959 | 43520 | 73339 | 58434 |
| Purchasing None Financial Assets (Investments) | 1468800 | 2312600 | 3045500 | 2898900 | 3430400 |
| Total | 6873400 | 8989506 | 10300839 | 10728150 | 12368151 |

Source: Ministry of Finance, 2009

Figure 9.7: Funds Allocated for Youth 2005/06 and 2009/10




two police officers received a prison sentence. Initially, the government of Egypt did not pay much attention to the activities of youth blogs in Egypt on the assumption that they had little impact. Beginning in 2006, when the international media started reporting on Egyptian blogs, the situation changed. Since then, most blogs (including that by Wael Abbas) became the target of repetitive hacking by government authorities.

Blogging activities in Egypt have been described by the UK's *The Economist magazine* as having evolved dramatically over the past couple of years from being "a narcissistic parlor sport to a shaper of the political agenda." Bloggers continue posting news supported by photos and video clips concerning a number of issues sensitive to the Egyptian government, such as torture in police stations, harassment of women on the streets, and elections rigging.⁷

Alashank Ya Balady Association

AlshaneK Ya Balady translates to 'for you my country'.

Figure 9.8: Funds Allocated for Youth 2009/2010



The association is a success story on how Egyptian youth can effectively organize through NGOs and can have a positive impact on the development of their country. The mission is to empower marginalized youth and women economically and socially. What is significant is that it is an Egyptian NGO run totally by enthusiastic youth who believe in the need to be proactive and make a difference in their community's development.

Initially established as a student club at the American University in Cairo in 2002, with only two programs – one for illiteracy eradication and one for micro-credit – the association has now expanded and scaled up its operations. In 2003 and 2004, new branches were opened in Ain Shams University, Cairo University, the German and the French universities. Activities were expanded in all universities to six other programs: English classes, human development for children and teens, art expression for children and teens, vocational training, health awareness, and tutoring for teens. By 2005, the association was registered as a legal NGO with the Ministry of Social Solidarity. Currently, the NGO is still expanding its operations to other universities through a creative franchise system.



The founder and chairperson is one of four Arab youth winners of the King Abdullah II Award for Youth Innovation and Achievement, selected from over 500 applicants. Other awards won include the Social Entrepreneurship Award in Malaysia, the Social Entrepreneurship Award in London, the Synergos Arab World Social Innovator and the Youth Action Net Global Fellows Award in the United States.⁸

RECOMENDATIONS: ENHANCING YOUTH PARTICIPATION IN QUALITY GOVERNANCE

Government's Role

Implementation of Competency Based Human Resources Management involves identifying the skills, abilities, attitudes and personality traits that distinguish high performers from average performers and use these as the basis for performing the various human resources management functions, including recruitment, selection, training, development and compensation. For example, competency-based hiring is hiring to the public organizations based on the degree of fit between needed competencies for successfully performing a job and the availability of these competencies in employees applying. Competencies would no longer focus on educational degrees and certificates, but the important factor would be the skills possessed by the employee and how they may enable him/her to excel on the job.

This provides a good chance for exclusion of age as a basic selection criterion and provides greater oppor-

tunity for qualified youth to apply to any government position they may be fit for. On another note, the shift from the educational degree as a basis for hiring would eventually pressure educational institutions to give more weight to developing their students' needs and considering labor market requirements.⁹

Competency Based Human Resource Management (CBHRM) has been borrowed from the private sector and implemented in government organizations since the early 1990s. Examples for positive impact of CBHRM on overall organizational performance abound in the British civil service and in Korea, as examples of both a developed and a developing country. In Korea, starting the 1990s, the Korean government decided to shift from education-based selection methods to performance and skill-based selection methods. To operationalize such a system, selection will not only depend on standard testing methods, but will also include a new 'blind interview' system. In such a blind interview, a panel of interviewers composed of both government officials and academicians conduct the interview without being given any information about the interviewee; they are rather left to assess his/her performance based on the ability to deal with a discussion topic that requires a certain degree of creativity in its resolving.¹⁰

- *Implementation of Pay for Performance*, whereby a ratio of compensation, aside from basic pay, would be linked to employee's performance on the job and not only linked to seniority and number of years. This will provide hope to

youth and an incentive for them to try to improve performance.

- *Intensive Training and Capacity Building:* More investments should be allocated to training of youth in government organizations. They should be given preference when government decides on allocation of training opportunities. Currently, in many situations when there are valuable training opportunities, they may be allocated to top level managers who may not continue with their work in government except for a few years. A more logical alternative would be to invest in young people and build their capacities since they are the ones who are likely to remain for a longer period of time within the government bureaucracy — assuming the necessary precautions are taken to minimize potential brain drain after the training investment.
- *Development of Second Tier of Young Managers:* One possible mechanism to achieve short term results would be making the development of a second tier of government leaders obligatory in all central and local government organizations, whereby they have to identify and develop their young leaders and report on performance achieved.
- *Utilizing E-Government to Fight Corruption.* Much can be learnt from the Indian experience with e-government. In all the different applications of e-government, youth will have a major role to play since the younger generations are more capable of dealing with the new technology:¹¹
 - *E-Shame:* The Central Vigilance Commission responsible for fighting corruption started to post on its website a large amount of information about officials who have either been accused or prosecuted because of committing corrupt acts. *Newsweek* referred to this experiment as ‘e-shame’. Although it had its drawbacks in that it mentioned officials’ names even when they were just accused of corruption and sometimes before a verdict had been made, it led to increased public awareness about the need to control and fight corruption.
 - *Vijaywada Online Information Center*

(VOICE) is an example of the computerization of service centers for municipal services where building approvals and birth and death certificates are issued. Through opening kiosks in areas near citizens, and linking those kiosks to the back offices in the municipality through a wide area network, corruption has been reduced, and services have been provided more conveniently to citizens.

- *Changing the psychological contract:* The younger generations have different needs and expectations. They want a better resolution for work/life issues, flexi-time and telecommuting options, and they want more discretion, more decision making powers, and a chance for progressing in their career paths based on their competencies and performance. In order to be able to attract competent youth to work in the government sector, the Government of Egypt has to take into consideration the changes in the needs and expectations of the new generations. Recently, some of the youth expectations and needs have been considered by the government, with examples including the allowance of part-time work and the recent announcement of allowing some employees to work through telecommuting.¹²
- *Hiring of Cadres:* More transparency should be introduced to the recruitment and hiring process in technical offices. Youth who have the required competencies may thus have a chance to apply to the available jobs.

Youth’s Role

- *Whistle Blowing:* Youth should be encouraged to report on any corruption taking place in government organizations on the condition that they are given sufficient protection by the Egyptian government.
- *Using the Internet and ICT to Organize Actions:* Youth can cleverly use the internet and ICT to organize their monitoring of government performance. Some actions by active bloggers in Egypt are examples of proactive use of the internet to monitor government accountable.
- *Upgrading Skill:* Youth should work on upgrad-

ing their competencies and skills to meet the demands of the labor market and realize that the new trend of competency based human resource management requires a continuous updating of skills – Learning is a continuous process.

- *Working through the Private Sector:* Working in the private sector would provide competition to services provided by government, such

as health and educational services, and it would raise standards.

- *Engaging in Developmental Activities:* Youth can adopt a more developmental objective and engage more in volunteer work through non-governmental organizations partnering with government to achieve sustainable development.


Endnotes

- 1 For further elaboration on responsive governance as a tool for reform see World Bank, 2003
- 2 CAPMAS, 2009
- 3 Nahas S, 2006
- 4 <http://shabab6april.wordpress.com>
- 5 The Independent Website. "Fraud claims prompt demands for Egyptian election monitors". <http://license.icopyright.net/user/viewFreeUse.act?fuid> Accessed on 3 May 2009.
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Chapter Ten



Youth Entrepreneurship is a term which describes the involvement of Egypt's youth in pursuing business opportunities in the market place, whether through self-employment or by establishing a business which employs others. Entrepreneurship in that sense is a reflection and an expression of the capacity of the youth to take risk, to look for opportunities outside of the traditional channels, and to have the optimism and audacity to venture into a promising world. In that sense, entrepreneurship is not merely a function of laws, regulations, and procedures, but more importantly, of the existence of a risk appetite, and of the confidence that it is possible to achieve success based on merit, effort and business acumen.

The legal environment for business transactions — and therefore for entrepreneurship — has improved significantly in Egypt. Over the last few years, Egypt has seen a marked improvement in the legal and procedural environment for doing business. Starting in the second half of 2004 (with the appointment of a new government), a concerted effort was undertaken to improve the overall environment for doing business on a number of fronts, especially by the newly revamped General Authority for Investment and Free Zones (more commonly known as GAFI). The implemented reform aimed at creating a responsive and enabling business environment that tackled major investment impediments and streamlined procedures required to facilitate the market entry process.

PREVALENCE OF ENTREPRENEURSHIP AMONG YOUNG PEOPLE IN EGYPT¹

Nevertheless, entrepreneurship is not very common among young people in Egypt. According to SYPE, only 1% of youth between the ages of 15 and 29 are either employers or self-employed. Although the rate of engagement in independent activity among young women is significantly lower than among young men (0.3% as compared to 1.9%), the difference is almost entirely due to their different rates of participation in employment. Among employed youth, an equal proportion of young men and women are either employers or self-employed (3.6%). As expected, the proportion of entrepreneurs increases steadily with age, within the population at large and among the employed. The proportion of young men engaged in entrepreneurship increases from very low levels at ages 15-18, to over 4% when they are in their late twenties. The maximum proportion among young women is also reached in their late twenties, but is still less than 1% of all young women at those ages and about 5% of the employed.

The prevalence of independent workers in either the population or among the employed is highest in urban slum areas, followed by rural areas, and then by urban non-slum areas. It is clearly easier for one to set up one's own activity in informal settlements or villages than it is in a more planned and regulated urban environment. It is also notable that the prevalence of independent activity is highest in the middle

of the wealth distribution, with the middle household wealth quintile having the highest prevalence. However, this differs by gender. While the prevalence of independent activity is highest in the middle of the wealth distribution among males, it is highest in the lowest wealth quintile among females. While there is no strong relationship, participation in independent activity does seem to decline somewhat at higher levels of education.

Attitudes Towards Entrepreneurship

All young people were asked who they thought was responsible to provide them with employment opportunities. More than 80% said that it was the responsibility of the government or policymakers. Only 9% said "myself" and 3% said "my family". However, when asked if they had the choice between wage and salary employment and independent work, 53% said they would prefer independent work, with little variation in this proportion by sex, education, urban/rural residency, and household wealth quintile. When asked for the reason for their preference, 66% of those who said they preferred independent work mentioned the desire for more independence, and only 9% mentioned the absence of other employment opportunities. Of those who said they preferred wage or salary employment, 61% justified their choice by a desire for more stability and 26% mentioned the lower responsibility involved.

All youths were asked if they had thought about or attempted to undertake a project of their own. While 15% of all youths answered in the affirmative, only 19% of those who expressed a preference for independent work either thought about or attempted to start their own project, as compared to 10% of those who said they preferred wage or salary employment. Even more surprisingly, only 65% of those who are actually working in independent activity said they had thought about or attempted to undertake their own project. It is most likely that the rest acquired their project by taking over a family business. As expected, more young men (23%) than young women (8%) had thought of or attempted to undertake their own projects, but surprisingly, the proportion among them that actually succeeded in undertaking a project is only slightly higher for young men (7.8%) than it is

Box 10.1: Entities Involved in the Investment Process in Egypt

The current investment framework in Egypt — which reflects an investment facilitation approach — includes a number of players, each with specific roles and functions. The role of each entity is not confined to specific investment needs, except for a few which focus on specific investment sizes such as the Social Fund for Development (SFD), and the Small and Medium Enterprises (SME) Unit at the Ministry of Trade and Industry.

The key player in this setup is GAFI. As the sole entity responsible for investment, GAFI expanded its role in the direction of investment promotion and facilitation in addition to its traditional regulatory and supervisory roles. The new role stressed two main themes:

- First the procedures simplification program which resulted in cutting time, effort and cost of starting a business through its 'One-Stop-Shops'.
- Second, the investment facilitation concept where GAFI became the coordinator between the investor and other relevant government bodies. Complementing GAFI's role, the Industrial Development Authority (IDA) developed its role to be responsible for Egypt's industrial strategy and embarked on promoting industrial parks. As the sole owner of new industrial land, IDA developed a national industrial map that reflected its industrial policy and provided the basis for a land allocation process. IDA is responsible for coordinating with relevant entities to ensure offering investors industrial land with the proper infrastructure. But whereas GAFI and IDA deal with investors irrespective of their size, the Social Fund for Development deals primarily with SMEs.

The Industrial Modernization Center (IMC) assumes a different role in providing the required technical assistance to develop and upgrade existing industries that are in line with the government's national industrial policy. It provides financial support accompanied by technical help to maintain the required level of performance that would allow firms to compete in the global environment. The IMC provides financial support to the HR training carried out by new or existing industries for the sake of maintaining a proper workforce that is in shape and capable of taking the industry steps forward. Other entities that could be part of this investment setup are the Investment Offices in governorates all over Egypt, which should act as windows for micro, small and medium-size investments in places not covered by the authorities mentioned above. In reality, however, their role has been extremely limited and is in need in fact of serious strategic review.

Source: Ziad Bahaa el Din, Background Paper, EHDR 2010

for young women (7.1%). Actually, among employed young people, young women who thought about doing their own projects were twice as likely to undertake these projects as young men. This suggests that there are fewer barriers for young women to undertake independent projects than there are for them to obtain wage and salary employment. This interpretation is further buttressed by the fact that more women than men who implemented their own project said that their main motivation was their inability to find a paid job (41% for women versus 35% for men).

Like the actual prevalence of independent activity, which peaks at the third quintile, the proportion who thought about undertaking their own project first goes up with wealth, reaches a peak at the fourth wealth quintile and then declines. However, the gender pattern is much more similar now that it was in the

actual prevalence of independent activity. Similarly, the proportion of those actually realizing their plans and setting up a project peaks at the third wealth quintiles, but again with no gender differences. This suggests that the high rates of independent activity noted earlier for very poor young women is the result of the absence of other employment options rather than from a well-thought out strategy to set up entrepreneurial activity. It is highly likely that many of the poor young women observed in independent activity are simply engaged in marginal activities related to their traditional roles in raising poultry and livestock and selling their by-products.

The fact that young people's desire to start their own projects goes up with wealth is not surprising. The more surprising part is why it declines at the top of the wealth distribution. The most likely explanation

for that is that young people at the top of the wealth distribution probably have many more choices for lucrative wage and salary employment, making the risk and uncertainty involved with entrepreneurship less attractive. Those at the top of the wealth distribution who do become entrepreneurs probably do so by taking over a family business rather than starting up their own projects.

Very few young people who started their own projects received financing to do so from formal financial institutions or microcredit providers. Six percent said that they did not need any financing. Among those who needed financing, just under half used their own savings, a quarter used savings from family members and just over a fifth received loans from family and friends. Less than 4% mentioned receiving any financing from any sort of formal institution like a government agency, the Social Fund for Development, or an NGO.

The relative absence of formal sources of finance on the ground is not for lack of demand on the part of young entrepreneurs. The absence of financing was the most frequently mentioned obstacle faced by young entrepreneurs in managing their projects, with about a third of entrepreneurs listing it first. The second and third most frequently mentioned obstacles were the lack of marketing services and business information. It is worth noting that the respondents were asked to choose the most important two obstacles among a list of eleven, including the absence of business and skills training, counseling and advice, legal services, access to technology and product development support.

Besides having limited access to formal sources of finance, young entrepreneurs rarely get any kind of business development support from formal institutions. Only 20% of young entrepreneurs reported receiving assistance or knowledge transfers in the areas of project management and the development of the technical skills required by their project. Of those, two thirds received this assistance from NGOs and less than one fifth from government agencies. Hence, despite the important efforts that have been made in recent years to support small and microenterprises

Table 10.1: Egypt's Ranking in the Ease of Doing Business Report

| Indicator | Ranking ² | | | |
|------------------------------------|----------------------|------|------|------|
| | 2007 | 2008 | 2009 | 2010 |
| Overall Rank | 165 | 126 | 114 | 106 |
| Starting a business | 126 | 55 | 41 | 24 |
| Dealing with constructions permits | 169 | 163 | 165 | 156 |
| Employing workers | 114 | 108 | 107 | 120 |
| Registering Property | 141 | 101 | 85 | 87 |
| Getting credits | 159 | 115 | 84 | 71 |
| Protecting investors | 118 | 83 | 70 | 73 |
| Paying taxes | 144 | 150 | 144 | 140 |
| Trading across borders | 83 | 26 | 24 | 29 |
| Enforcing contracts | 157 | 145 | 151 | 148 |
| Closing a business | 120 | 125 | 128 | 132 |

Source: World Bank; Doing Business Report (various issues)


with credit provision and support for business development, this analysis indicates that few young entrepreneurs actually benefit from these programs. Of the 3% of young people with previous employment experience who managed to undertake their own projects, only 4% received any financing from formal institutions and fewer than a fifth received any other sort of business development support.

As it now stands, Egypt's ranking in terms of business climate has improved internationally. In the World Bank 'Doing Business Report 2010', Egypt ranked the 106th out of 183 countries, from a low of 165th in the 2007 report. As seen from Table 10.1, a dramatic improvement has taken place in the areas of starting a business, property registration, investor protection, and trading across borders. Egypt was the top reformer in the 2008 report, and succeeded in retaining its position among the ten top reformers in the following two reports.

KEY CONSTRAINTS AND IMPEDIMENTS

In spite of the improvements, there continues to be a number of key constraints in the overall investment environment. This is particularly true with respect to the smaller enterprises mostly favored by youth

The concept of fostering youth entrepreneurship is not well diffused in government strategies. The fact that youth engagement in the business environment is low was discussed in the Global Entrepreneurship Monitor Survey known as GEM³ where older age



groups (45-54 years) were found to have a higher level of involvement as established business owners, and the younger age groups a higher level of involvement in early stage entrepreneurial activity, particularly as nascent entrepreneurs. The high level of involvement in early stage entrepreneurial activity is still lower than the average for factor driven economies, where an average of just over 15% of the 25-34 age group were engaged and 11.6% of the 35-44 age group.

However, the big picture shows Egypt to be doing better than the majority of countries in the GEM Survey. In terms of overall ranking, Egypt places 11th out of 43 countries, with 20.2% of the working age population (18-64) involved in entrepreneurial activity. 13.1% of this figure is comprised of early-stage entrepreneurs (7.9% and 5.5% being nascent activity and new business owners, respectively), while the remaining 8% are established owners with businesses older than 42 months. For all countries in the GEM Survey, the 25-34 age group had the highest early-stage entrepreneurial activity (regardless of type of economy), but the group with the next highest rate in Egypt was the 18-24 years old, which is not common of all other countries.

Thus, Egypt's young population gives it a strong entrepreneurial advantage. Furthermore, 62% of early stage entrepreneurs in Egypt are between the ages of 18 and 35, whereas only 53% of the adult population is in that group. Finally, the fact that 81%

of Egyptian reported their motive for pursuing early stage entrepreneurial activity as 'opportunity' rather than 'necessity' makes the country appear more like a developed, rather than factor driven, economy.

A number of surveys have investigated the main bottlenecks in the investment environment. There is some consensus gradually appearing, albeit with various weights and different areas of emphasis. According to the findings of the 2006 survey conducted by the World Bank for assessing Egypt's investment climate (ICA report) the key impediments were: Macroeconomic instability, informal practices and illegal competition, corruption, regulatory policy uncertainty, tax rates, cost of financing, tax administration, lack of skilled and well educated workers, and labor regulations. Access to land, business licensing and permits, transportation, water, electricity and telecommunications came at a lower level of priority to the surveyed firms. This, however, differs from the point of view of investors as reported in a recent publication by GAFI's Board of Trustees entitled 'Towards an Equal Distribution of the Proceeds of Growth'. The latter came up with the following list of impediments; the absence of government support, high interest rates, the instability of inputs of production prices, access to finance, corruption, lack of skilled workers. A lower priority was given to each of scarcity of inputs of production, unsuccessful planning, high labor wages, lack of distribution channels and lack of demand.

Box 10.2: Canada's Second Chance Route: A Model to Emulate

The Centre for Entrepreneurship Education & Development (CEED) Second Chance Program assists youth in conflict with the law to become productive citizens by using entrepreneurship as a vehicle for learning. In the ten years since the program's inception, more than 100 young people have benefitted from the development of the skills and attributes necessary in becoming productive, engaged and contributing members of society. The program is unique in that it recognizes that youth in conflict with the law often possess misdirected entrepreneurial qualities. The strengths of the program lie in the incorporation of mentoring as part of the program's development strategy, the inclusion of social competency and life skills, and the emphasis placed on the value of experiential learning. Second Chance facilitators work with participants on an individual basis to guide them through a process of professional and personal growth, which has resulted in a program with annually low rates of recidivism among past participants.

The X Factor

The program's success relies on involving participants in the development of community projects, personal goal setting and skill building activities in the development of activities to positively contribute, and give back to their communities. Each youth is encouraged to use his or her skills and talents towards an improved, self-fulfilling lifestyle. Enrolling in the Program gives these young people a valuable 'second chance' to turn their lives around and work towards achieving their goals. All of the above activities are conducted using a business planning model. Ultimately, Second Chance teaches the 'business of life' – teaching participants how to run their lives as successful businesses. Graduates of the Program leave with strong leadership skills, life skills important to their personal development, and the entrepreneurial mindset vital to being successful and engaged members of society and in some cases, even small business owners. Many successful graduates enroll in post secondary programs, find employment and begin the process of increasing and building extensive skill sets to add to their resumes.

Program Metrics

In the summer of 2009, CEED commissioned a review of the Program by Dr. Stephen Schneider, Professor of Sociology and Criminology, Saint Mary's University in Halifax, Nova Scotia, Canada. This review highlighted the strengths and success of the Program, as well as several recommendations on how to better meet the needs of Program participants. The timing of this review was especially relevant given the recent expansion of the Program to additional provincial centers (the Program had previously operated from CEED's offices in Halifax, Nova Scotia).

The report identified several strengths, including the value of including the mentoring component as part of the Program's development strategy, CEED's work in developing networks of support for participants, the individualized nature of participant programming (the self-identification of goals, skill sets, and personal experiences along the progression of the program), the effectiveness of including the development of social competency and life skills development for youth at risk, and the diverse, holistic, and experiential nature of program delivery and the learning environment

As a result of the report, CEED will incorporate changes to the program, including:

- The continuous incorporation of research to keep Program content relevant
- Increasing the depth of participant assessments prior to starting the Program
- Further capitalizing on the success of the individualization of the Program
- Working to increase supports to participants when they successfully complete the Program
- Development of a formalized pool of mentors to increase the ease at which participants find their mentors
- Formalizing the structure of Program evaluation

For more information visit <http://www.ceed.ca> Source: Annette St. Onge, CEED

The fact that there is some discrepancy in the investors' response is normal and reflects various methodologies and samples as well as overall approach. The World Bank approach tends to direct its research

towards excessively quantifiable and measurable issues – mainly for the purpose of comparison with other countries – and accordingly emphasizes number of procedures, cost of conducting a formal trans-

action and the time associated therewith. This often misses the point of what the true impediments are, especially for small businesses, that is, why entrepreneurs are driven to invest and take risk, and why they end up succeeding or failing. For the picture to be completed more qualitative research is needed and in-depth analysis of specific examples. This was attempted by the GAFI Report which used as a case study a distressed industrial zone in the Upper Egypt governorate of Sohag (Kawthar District) it is considered as a classical example of an SMEs zone, where most of investors lack awareness of; dealing with financial institutions, investment information and the right planning for business continuity. The conclusions of the Report on this matter may not be more conclusive as those of the World Bank (at least by virtue of the limited sample), but the combination of large scale quantitative research with such tailored reports could lead to investing different dimensions of the problem.

In another survey conducted by Gallup on youth in different Arab countries⁴, youth considered starting a new business a real problem. About 70% of the surveyed sample pointed out to government bureaucracy as a real impediment, while only 30% considered it easy to carry out paperwork and permits necessary to start a business. Bureaucracy is a particular disincentive to young people starting a business and can put an unsustainable burden on their new businesses. On the other side, the GEM report, mentioned earlier, points to other investment impediments as follows; lack of financial support, inadequate government policies, lack of governmental programs that assist entrepreneurs, problems with education and training, lack of R&D transfer, weakness of commercial and professional service infrastructure, insufficient internal market openness, lack of accessibility of physical infrastructure, and social cultural norms.

Overall, obstacles that youth entrepreneurs face include the following impediments: Lack of awareness and the proper training required for starting up a business and maintaining it, as well as lack of government support and the absence of a focused attention to the needs of this category of entrepreneurs. The concept of youth entrepreneurs is not fully spread in

the Egyptian culture; the youth employment concept is still prevailing. Ways to communicate the importance of youth entrepreneurship that are supported by effective mechanisms still do not exist. The lack of guidance and opportunities provided by the government is another concern. Access to finance is an equally important issue, as is the absence of the required guarantees thus depriving potential businesses from entering the market, and there is a need for institutions that are willing to financially support youth entrepreneurs. That role is being played now by a small number of NGOs that facilitate the access to the finance process, but a more institutionalized framework is needed, whereby young entrepreneurs could get the necessary financial support to enter the business environment.

On another front, an ineffective competition law can close markets to new start-up businesses particularly young people who are outside local business networks. Informality continues to be a major concern; young entrepreneurs might operate under the umbrella of the informal economy evading taxes and other constraints, but they are unable to grow due to the lack of access to reasonable sources of finance and fear of regulation and taxation.

TOWARDS AN ENABLING ENVIROMENT

There is — on the whole — no specific treatment or special track accorded for young entrepreneurs to start a business in Egypt. Youth per say is not a factor in law or in practice that brings about any special privileges or benefits when it comes to starting a business. (It does, however, bring some benefits in other areas such as qualifying for ownership of land designated for reclamation or of subsidized housing). The law is perhaps the right approach. It is difficult to imagine specific benefits or advantages which could be accorded to young entrepreneurs which should not be available to all those seeking to start a business. Improving the overall environment for doing business and for self-employment is thus the best way to encourage and empower the youth to become entrepreneurs.

There continues, however, to be some scope for youth-sensitive measures which, albeit of a general



applicability, will likely benefit the young more significantly than other age groups. The following consider the first elements that are part of the overall business environment and are followed by a more specific discussion of youth sensitive measures.

Priorities for Reform

Most of the following recommendations for the overall improvement of the business environment have been proposed, discussed and seriously debated on various occasions and in numerous events and publications over the last few years. There is little novelty or innovation in this domain and the focus is broad with no specific emphasis on youth. However, pooling together the key elements should be the basis for consensus, in addition to providing some practical guidelines as to the application of the proposed measures. The hope is for a 'trickle-down' effect to impact on greater youthful entrepreneurship.

- 1. *Legislative Reform*: In this area, the most urgent and pressing need is to introduce new legislation to deal with bankruptcy and protection from creditors so as to reduce the risk attached to starting a business. This has long been considered an essential part of improving the business climate in Egypt because it would allow easier exit from the market, more efficient recycling of resources and productive capacities, and better protection for lending therefore easier access to finance.
- 2. *Institutional Reform*: Here the single most important element would be the formalization of real estate ownership in Egypt. This would permit real estate owners to sell, lease, exchange, and secure the ownership of their real estate assets. It would also permit mortgage lending and represent a major collateral asset. This is not a matter that can be achieved by law only; it requires major institutional building and a massive on-the-ground registration program.
- 3. *Access to Land*: This refers to the continuous need by investors, particularly smaller start-up businesses, to find suitable, affordable and serviced land. It is not the lack of land in Egypt that is the cause of trouble. It is the fact that such land needs to be (i) legally available, (ii) affordable to a start-up business, (iii) serviced with the required utilities such as water, power, roads and waste disposal, and (iv) relatively close to housing, markets and sources of inputs.
- 4. *Licensing of Activities*: Over the last few years, the establishment of companies was radically improved. However, the same did not occur with respect to the licensing of various activities, arguably many of which could be undertaken by youth. Overlapping jurisdictions, lack of clear rules and requirements, and the inability to change the mindset in line with the national vision have been the culprits.
- 5. *Access to Finance*: Again, introducing a new framework for resolving bankruptcies is prob-

ably the most needed measure to improve access to finance for start-up businesses. In addition widening the scope of credit scoring could have a significant effect. Allowing the establishment and licensing of specialized institutions that provide micro as well as small scale funding would also have a positive impact, especially for youth. Finally, the continuous growth of non-bank financial services – financial leasing, mortgage finance, and factoring – will benefit smaller companies and allow for easier funding.

- *6. Access to Information:* Here a nationally coordinated effort is required in order to ensure that enough information is made available for potential investors and entrepreneurs about all aspect of doing business; demographic information, market information, prices, changes in laws and regulations, availability of land, etc. Only this would permit a level playing field capable of drawing and encouraging new entrants to the market.
- *7. Improving the Competitive Environment:* This refers simply to the need to extend the interest of the authorities in charge of protecting the competitive environment and of the public at large to reduce barriers to entry, and eliminate restrictions and requirements that limit the capacity of new players to enter the market.

Empowering the Young

To specifically identify youth sensitive measures to improve the investment environment is not a straightforward matter. An easy option would be to recommend specific benefits and privileges to those within a certain age bracket (loans, guarantees, cheaper land, credit, better tax treatment, etc). But to fulfill such a formalistic requirement risks introducing unnecessary distortions, opportunities for corruption, and result in no specific gains. A better approach would be to adopt a ‘National Youth Entrepreneurship Strategy’ that embarks on a number of pillars and addresses all the required issues.

This ‘National Strategy’ would provide all incentives required for establishing a youth entrepreneurship community. Major issues that should be covered by the suggested strategy are as follows:

- A comprehensive awareness/PR campaigns to diffuse the concept of youth entrepreneurship, reduce the fear of failure and boost perception of the value of entrepreneurs to society, using case studies, identify heroes and champions from among young people and successful entrepreneurs, getting experienced business people to promote self-employment as a genuine career option for young people and creating prestigious awards to celebrate the success of entrepreneurs, make heroes of entrepreneurs. The campaign can capitalize on existing efforts by other institutions (i.e. ILO “Know About Business” Program);
- Establishing enterprises and support agencies that provide accessible ongoing technical advice and training on subjects such as marketing, taxation, sales, HR, accountancy, laws and regulations, project evaluation, dealing with credit institutions... etc;
- Provide incubator units where youth businesses can find accessible services, shared office space and mutual support from other new businesses;
- Vocational and skills training requirements;
- The ease of access to information;
- Access to credit and the creation of new channels of financing including the possibility of using financial leasing as a means of financing businesses;
- Supplying opportunities that could engage youth in the businesses Special incentives in terms of access to land and infrastructure;
- Building social networks and youth institutions and Chambers;
- Engaging small producers in the value chain of certain products.

THE MANY FACES OF OPPORTUNITY

Every new business is a goldmine opportunity for Egyptians; a new business means a new set of jobs created, more investments poured into the market, and higher possibilities for innovation and development that contribute to the overall economy. Small and Medium Enterprises (SMEs) provide the solution to many problems of the market economy, whose big enterprises are forced to adopt – for example – strict policies regarding spending and employment. In other words, big enterprises are less flexible and

immobile, and although contributing large amounts of both money and employment opportunities to the economy, they are still limited in terms of initiating new ideas, and thus new businesses.

SMEs, on the other hand, are mobile, flexible, and 'slim'. They are much more prone to change, more than receptive to growth, and can create clusters and partnerships at a much higher frequency than their bigger siblings. In Egypt, Small and Medium Enterprises are defined as companies with less than LE 5 Million in capital (with Small Enterprises ranging from 50, 000 to 500, 000), and having a less than 50 employees labor force.⁵ According to the 2008 Egypt Human Development Report, SMEs account for 75% of employment and around 80% of GDP in Egypt.⁶ Furthermore, these SMEs depend on youth as a major pool for employment, in addition to the fact that a significant amount of SMEs are founded by youth entrepreneurs as well.⁷

An 'in-between' option that has recently emerged is the choice of franchising as a business model that has much to offer in terms of developing SMEs, promoting entrepreneurship and creating employment.⁸ The greatest strength of franchising as an SME strategy is its proven success when compared to independent businesses. Most conservative statistics show that franchisees rate of success is higher than that of independently-owned small business. In Australia, franchising is 2.5 times more successful than other small businesses. According to the Joint Africa Institute (2004) the USA claims that 90% of its franchised units succeed whilst in South Africa the success is generally acknowledged at about 85% in franchised businesses over a 3 to 5 year period.

What makes franchising more successful than independent businesses is the transfer of know-how between the franchisor and franchisee. For instance, established franchisors usually have operating manuals that detail pre-opening, operation and marketing of a franchise. Franchisees also benefit from a complete business plan, training, the use of the system's trademark and signs, architectural design and advertising and marketing support. There are also instances where the franchisor can help the franchisee find funding sources.

It remains that, like any other business model, financial constraints to starting up a franchising business exist, and can be inhibitive in the light of a deficient micro-finance system. The same holds true for youth who face difficulty accessing formal channels of finance. Nevertheless, service based or home-based franchised businesses have proven to be more affordable and offer great flexibility as they can be run from an inexpensive office space or home. Cleaning services, in-home care services, personal security and alarm systems, personnel placement services, magazine publishing, trademarked product distribution, interior decorating, business planning, accounting and tax services are some examples of labor intensive low investment franchises.

Given the success record of small franchised businesses, public policy in Egypt should focus on creating the regulatory environment conducive for franchise practices, as well as raise awareness and provide the financial programs necessary for the creation and growth of such businesses, possibly through the formal banking system.

Box 10.3 Potential for Growth of Franchising in Egypt

In Egypt, there are notable efforts undertaken by the Egyptian Franchise Development Association (EFDA) to encourage and promote entrepreneurship through franchising. The awareness raising, training and consulting services offered by the EFDA on franchising issues to members and non-members alike are a distinct service offered by this NGO. Nevertheless, reaching out to small and medium enterprises (SMEs) that include franchises is one major challenging that the EFDA currently faces, as does the Government of Egypt (GOE).

So far, the bulk of franchising activity in Egypt has been in retail services followed by food franchises (48.9% and 22.53% respectively). There are now a limited number of franchise companies in hotel management, car rental, language education, health and fitness, electronics, and computer training.

The growth of home grown franchises is also encouraging. For example, Mohamed Mo'men opened his first fast food restaurant in 1988, which eventually was followed by the expansion of the Mo'men chain across Egypt. Today Mo'men has become a name in the market and has succeeded to franchise its chain in Jordan, Libya and Sudan, with plans to expand into the GCC market.

Table 10.2: Franchising Activity By Sector

| Sector | No. of Systems | % of Total |
|---------------------------------|----------------|------------|
| Automotive Products/Services | 5 | 1.37 |
| Building Office/Home Services | 1 | 0.27 |
| Business to Business Services | 1 | 0.27 |
| Car Sales | 2 | 0.55 |
| Education/Training | 12 | 3.30 |
| Entertainment/Leisure | 11 | 3.02 |
| Hair/Beauty | 6 | 1.65 |
| Petroleum Retailing | 9 | 2.47 |
| Printing/Photocopying Services | 2 | 0.55 |
| Real Estate Services | 1 | 0.27 |
| Retail | 178 | 48.90 |
| Hospitals | 2 | 0.55 |
| Medical/Pharmaceutical Services | 16 | 4.40 |
| Food | 82 | 22.53 |
| Others | 36 | 9.89 |
| Total | 364 | 100 |

Source: EFDA compilation from the Franchising Census Egypt 2004

That being said, it has become necessary to create an overall business environment where franchising can flourish. Existing obstacles include the still limited awareness about the concept of franchising and how it functions among public, private sector, professionals and academia. Another related problem is the limited information about viable market opportunities. As a first step towards an overall policy framework by the GOE the African Development Bank's significant contribution towards a franchising program, with a US\$40 million loan is to be managed through the Social Fund for Development (up to 70% of cost of capital setting up the business). The fund aims to encourage the establishment and expansion of primarily local franchising concepts, with money going to raising awareness about franchising and developing financial instruments in Egypt.

Figures on the distribution of franchising activity by age the shows that it is skewed to those above 35 years of age, while franchisors that are younger represent only 6.6% according to census figures for 2004. In this respect, it is probably financing that is the problem faced particularly by young entrepreneurs. Lack of collateral and sources of capital do pose an obstacle. Cash flow based lending presents a potential solution, so do government guarantees to encourage the banking sector to lend to small business.

Another serious impediment is the general limited creativity and marketing capacity of small and medium enterprises in

Box 10.3 continued...

Egypt. However, this is not solely an SME problem but it is manifested in poor R&D and educational outcomes. According to a GEM study (2008), Egypt ranks last among 31 countries on R&D and technology support provided to new and growing firms.

Further, while a study shows that the existence of institutions such as trademark protection and labor regulation can have a positive impact on franchising activity within a country, the enforcement of trademark protection is quite effective in Egypt, it is the long dispute resolution system that can act as a disincentive for franchising and entrepreneurial activity in general. It therefore becomes all the more necessary to develop the capacity of recently established economic dispute courts.

On a positive note, Egypt is now in the process of developing an overall policy and legislation regarding franchising. The purpose of the legislation should be to protect the right of franchisee, protect the economy from franchising monopolies, and ensure that rules and safeguards regarding franchising are effectively enforced. Franchise regulations would be most beneficial if they include a definition of franchising, a requirement for pre-sale disclosure and a stipulation that the franchisors and franchisees act in good faith towards each other in complying with the spirit and content of the contract.

Source: Heba Abu Shnief, Background Paper, EHDR 2010


Endnotes

1. Ragui Assaad, Background Notes to the EHDR 2010
2. Number of countries increased between 2007 and 2010 as follows: 175 country in 2007, 178 country in 2008, 181 in 2009 and 183 in 2010.
3. GEM is an international research initiative conducted by the Global Entrepreneurship Research Association (GERA), a consortium that includes each of London Business School and Babson college, that established an independent non-profit company. The GEM measures the level of entrepreneurial activity by assembling harmonized data from several participating countries on an annual basis.
4. Silatech in partnership with Gallup, June 2009.
5. *Business Today Magazine*, February 2009
6. EHDR, 2008.
7. Seif Abu Zeid, Background Notes on EHDR 2010
8. Section on franchising by Heba Abu Schnief, Background Notes on EHDR 2010

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Chapter Eleven



Among the five transitions that make up a young person's transition to adulthood — identified in Chapter Three — the transition from school to work is probably the one that has attracted the greatest degree of public concern. High youth unemployment does not only result in much anxiety for many Egyptian families, but is undoubtedly one of the major policy priorities of the Egyptian political system. Compounded by the youth bulge, the significant restructuring that occurred in the Egyptian economy in recent decades toward a more market-oriented system has greatly complicated young people's transition to the labor market. While the demographic pressures are beginning to subside, as the youth bulge moves to higher ages, the restructuring of the economy and the institutional transformation that must accompany it is still largely incomplete.

Government hiring of secondary school and university graduates has been severely curtailed in recent years, but the formal private sector has not sufficiently expanded its employment to absorb the large number of educated new entrants streaming onto the job market every year. More importantly, the education system continues to produce credentials that are good to qualify people for government employment rather than skills that are valued in a market economy. Faced with poor prospects of getting formal jobs in either the public or private sectors, young people are either forced to accept any jobs they can get in the informal economy or, as is increasingly the case for young women, to abandon the idea of participating in the labor market altogether.

These trends amount to a complex picture of labor market developments for young people that cannot be ascertained by a few simple indicators. For instance, the unemployment rate, which has captured a great deal of attention in policy circles and in the mass media in recent years, is, on its own, an inadequate measure of how well youth are faring in the labor market. Very high youth unemployment rates have been used to sound the alarm about the extent of the youth employment problem for some time, but now that there is evidence that these rates are falling, does this mean that the problem is being resolved?

The unemployment rate is a very partial measure of the health of the labor market that depends as much on the level of expectations about getting formal employment as it does about the rate at which such employment is being created. The unemployment rate can decline simply as a result of people giving up on the prospects of formal employment and either taking up any job in the informal economy, creating one's own job, or dropping out of the labor force altogether. This can happen without any real improvements in employment conditions in the economy. Thus, to ascertain what a decline in unemployment rates means, one has to examine a number of other labor market indicators including alternative definitions of unemployment, the labor force participation rate, and the newly introduced indicator called the "jobless rate", as well as information about the type of jobs young people are actually getting. In what follows, that is precisely

what is done to get a more complete picture of labor market development for young people in Egypt.

The discussion that follows relies on a number of data sources. Comparable surveys for 1998, 2006 and 2009 are used to trace changes in the situation of youth over a period of just over a decade.¹ These surveys use the same definitions and methodologies, making it safe to compare across them. In some analyses, data from the official Labor Force Survey, carried out by CAPMAS on a quarterly basis, are used. These data are somewhat more problematic to use because the micro-data are not available to researchers, making it difficult to carry out the special tabulations necessary to look at the situation of youth. The methodologies of CAPMAS surveys also changed at the end of 2006, making it complicated to reach reliable comparisons over time.

THE TRANSITION TO EMPLOYMENT

Youth unemployment is the dominant form of unemployment in Egypt. In 2006, well over 80% of the unemployed were under the age of 29 and 82% of the unemployed had never worked before. Unemployment is therefore essentially an indicator of labor market insertion problems experienced by young people as they negotiate their transition from school to work.² Because of different expectations about gender roles in Egyptian society and a highly gendered labor market structure, these transitions are highly differentiated by gender. While nearly all young men eventually transition into employment, less than a fifth of young women do, a figure that has unfortunately been declining with time as employment opportunities for women in the government dry up.

Youth unemployment in Egypt is high by any measure, but there are some indications that it had begun to decline, notwithstanding the recent financial crisis. The unemployment rate for youth 15-24 in Egypt in 2007 was 24.5%. This compares to world average of 11.9% in 2007 and an average of 23.8% for North Africa, the world region with the highest unemployment rates in the world.³ The following discussion of trends in the unemployment rate is based on two alternative definitions of unemployment, namely the *standard* and the *broad* definitions. Both definitions are



based on recommendations by the International Conference of Labor Statisticians that takes place under the auspices of the International Labor Organization.

- The standard definition of unemployment requires that a person not have worked a single hour during a reference week, be desiring to work, ready and available to start work within two weeks, and to have actively searched for work during some past reference period, typically the past month.
- In cases where labor markets are less structured or where searching for work appears futile, international recommendations allow for a broader definition that drops the active search criterion. Thus the broad definition of unemployment includes – within the ranks of the unemployed – individuals who are not working, are ready and available for work, but have not engaged in any search activity. That group is often referred to as the discouraged unemployed.
- Neither definition includes individuals who have worked an hour or more during the reference week, but who wish to work more hours. The latter are considered employed but are considered visibly underemployed.

The Egypt Labor Market Surveys (ELMS) of 1998 and 2006 and the Survey of Young People in Egypt (SYPE) of 2009 suggest that there was a significant decline in the youth unemployment rate from 1998 to 2006 and then relative stability from 2006 to

2009, if the standard definition is used. According to this measure, the unemployment rate for those 15 to 29 year olds has declined from 25.6% in 1998 to 16.9% in 2006 to 16.7% in 2009 (Table 11.1). However, the comparison of the estimates from the standard and broad definitions suggests that much of the decline in the standard unemployment rate is due to discouragement rather than an increase in employment rates.

In fact, broad unemployment *increased* from 2006 to 2009 at a time when standard unemployment declined slightly. A broad unemployment rate of 22.9% in 2009 suggests that 6.2% of the youth labor force was made up of discouraged workers who quit searching for work. This is up from less than 3% discouraged unemployment in both 1998 and 2006. The fact that broad unemployment declined from 1998 to 2006 suggests that there was some improvement in youth employment prospects during the period preceding the world financial crisis.


It has been well known for some time that unemployment rates are much higher among young women than young men. In fact, by either measures of unemployment, more than one in two economically active young women were unemployed rather than employed in 2009. Depending on the year, young women are between two and a half and four times as likely to be unemployed as are young men. To the extent that there was an improvement in the employ-

Table 11.1: Standard and Broad Youth Unemployment Rates by Selected Characteristics, 1998, 2006, 2009, ages 15-29

| | Standard | | | Broad | | |
|-------------------------------------|----------|------|------|-------|------|------|
| | 1998 | 2006 | 2009 | 1998 | 2006 | 2009 |
| All | 25.6 | 16.9 | 16.7 | 28.8 | 19.1 | 22.6 |
| By Sex | | | | | | |
| Males | 15.9 | 9.7 | 12.4 | 18.4 | 10.6 | 16.1 |
| Females | 51.9 | 36.7 | 32.0 | 55.7 | 40.8 | 42.8 |
| By Age Group | | | | | | |
| 15-19 | 26.3 | 14.6 | 16.7 | 31.2 | 18.4 | 23.3 |
| 20-24 | 33.6 | 22.9 | 20.6 | 36.9 | 25.6 | 28.0 |
| 25-29 | 16.5 | 12.8 | 12.9 | 18.0 | 13.6 | 16.7 |
| By Sex & Age Group | | | | | | |
| Males 15-19 | 17.9 | 10.2 | 16.4 | 21.4 | 12.2 | 21.4 |
| Females 15-19 | 54.7 | 27.0 | 19.0 | 61.0 | 34.7 | 33.3 |
| Males 20-24 | 19.9 | 14.3 | 15.0 | 22.7 | 15.3 | 19.7 |
| Females 20-24 | 61.6 | 42.6 | 38.2 | 64.6 | 47.4 | 50.1 |
| Males 25-29 | 10.7 | 5.9 | 7.5 | 12.0 | 6.3 | 9.3 |
| Females 25-29 | 35.3 | 34.4 | 30.2 | 37.3 | 36.0 | 38.3 |
| By Residency | | | | | | |
| Urban | 26.6 | 21.5 | 17.9 | 30.2 | 24.2 | 23.0 |
| Rural | 25.0 | 13.9 | 15.8 | 27.9 | 15.5 | 22.2 |
| By Household Wealth Quintile | | | | | | |
| Lowest | 17.5 | 9.5 | 12.5 | 22.4 | 11.7 | 19.8 |
| Second | 26.3 | 13.3 | 15.2 | 29.7 | 15.6 | 21.5 |
| Middle | 25.9 | 18.3 | 16.5 | 28.2 | 20.3 | 22.0 |
| Fourth | 28.9 | 21.6 | 20.4 | 31.8 | 23.9 | 25.9 |
| Highest | 29.5 | 24.8 | 18.6 | 32.2 | 26.6 | 23.6 |

Source: ELMS 1998, ELMPS 2006 and SYPE 2009.


Figure 11.1: Standard Unemployment Rates by Age & Sex, Ages 15-29, 2009



Source: SYPE 2009

ment outlook from 1998 to 2006, that improvement was much more pronounced for young men, who saw their unemployment rate (according to the broad definition) decline by 42% (from 18.4% to 10.6%), compared to a decline of only 26% for women (from 55.7% to 40.8%). Both men and women saw deterioration in their employment prospects from 2006 to 2009, a period that corresponds to the onset of the

Figure 11.2: Participation and Employment Rates by Age and Sex, Ages 15-29, 2009



Source: SYPE 2009


world financial crisis, but the relative deterioration was worse for men.

The unemployment data also indicate that unemployment for young people peaks at age 21 and then declines significantly thereafter (see Figure 11.1). Unemployment rates are fairly similar for males and females until about age 19, the age at which most sec-

Table 11.2: Youth Jobless Rates by Selected Characteristics, 1998, 2006, 2009, Ages 15-29

| | Jobless Rate | | |
|-------------------------------------|--------------|------|------|
| | 1998 | 2006 | 2009 |
| All | 58.6 | 52.7 | 60.1 |
| <u>By Sex</u> | | | |
| Males | 32.3 | 21.2 | 23.7 |
| Females | 85.5 | 81.4 | 87.5 |
| <u>By Age</u> | | | |
| 15-19 | 61.6 | 55.6 | 58.7 |
| 20-24 | 64.0 | 60.0 | 63.9 |
| 25-29 | 49.7 | 43.3 | 56.9 |
| <u>By Age and Sex</u> | | | |
| Males 15-19 | 31.7 | 23.9 | 28.5 |
| Females 15-19 | 89.5 | 82.1 | 88.4 |
| Males 20-24 | 44.1 | 32.6 | 30.4 |
| Females 20-24 | 85.7 | 83.1 | 88.3 |
| Males 25-29 | 18.2 | 9.0 | 13.2 |
| Females 25-29 | 81.6 | 79.1 | 86.3 |
| <u>By Residency</u> | | | |
| Urban | 57.0 | 53.3 | 56.2 |
| Rural | 59.6 | 52.3 | 62.3 |
| <u>By Household Wealth Quintile</u> | | | |
| Lowest | 59.1 | 47.9 | 64.7 |
| Second | 58.5 | 51.2 | 62.1 |
| Middle | 59.3 | 54.2 | 59.0 |
| Fourth | 58.9 | 56.3 | 58.1 |
| Highest | 56.7 | 55.0 | 54.2 |

Source: ELMS 1998, ELMPS 2006, SYPE 2009

Figure 11.3: Jobless Rates by Age and Sex, Ages 15-29, 2009

Source: SYPE 2009


secondary school graduates start looking for work. Rates shoot up for women at that age, reaching a peak at age 21, where they are twice as high as those of men of the same age. Both male and female unemployment rates decline after that age, but the decline for men is much more rapid.

These trends by sex reveal very different paths into

the labor market for young men and young women. As shown in Figure 11.2, the vast majority of young men end up in some type of employment by age 29, with employment rates in the vicinity of 92% at that age. For women, the maximum employment rate of 15% is reached at 24 and then it stops rising, as women increasingly transition into marriage. Maximum participation rates for women are as high as 23%, also reached at age 24. This suggests that while most unemployed men eventually find jobs, a large fraction of unemployed women never actually become employed, but simply move from unemployment to economic inactivity. A comparison of the participation and employment curves for women in Figure 11.2 suggests that almost half of economically active women between the ages of 21 and 27 are actually searching for work rather than working. Thus young women have a short window between school completion and marriage in which at least some of them are available for employment, and often unable to get it. This window closes when other life course events like marriage take them out of the job market altogether.


The jobless rate shows the consequences of low employment rates among the out-of-school population irrespective of the individual's desire to participate in the labor force. As such the jobless rate captures how much of the not-in-school population is either unemployed or inactive.⁴ As shown in Table 11.2, like the broad unemployment rate, the youth jobless rate declined from about 59% in 1998 to 53% in 2006 and then climbed back to just over 60% in 2009. While the jobless rate among young men exhibited the same U-shaped curve, the increase from 2006 to 2009 was much more limited than for young women. The male jobless rate declined by a third from 32% in 1998 to 21% in 2006, and then increased by only 3 percentage points to 24% in 2009. In contrast, female joblessness declined much more modestly in the 1998 to 2006 period from about 86% to 81%, and then rose during the crisis period to reach 87% in 2009, a level that exceeds where it was in 1998. As shown in Figure 11.3, joblessness for men, like unemployment reaches a peak at age 21 and then declines rapidly after that. Female joblessness peaks at age 20, but the subsequent decline is very gradual, with the jobless rate never going below 85%.

Figure 11.4: Standard Unemployment Rates by Educational Attainment and Sex, Ages 15-29, 1998, 2006, 2009



Source: ELMS 1998, ELMPS 2006, SYPE 2009

Figure 11.5: Jobless Rates by Educational Attainment and Sex, Ages 15-29, 1998, 2006, 2009



Source: ELMS 1998, ELMPS 2006, SYPE 2009

Unlike unemployment, which appears to increase with increasing levels of wealth, joblessness does not exhibit a clear relationship with household wealth. As shown in Table 11.2, the jobless rate does not exhibit a clear relationship with wealth in 1998, increases with wealth in 2006 and decreases with wealth in 2009. There is also stable rural-urban differential in joblessness

Besides being strongly differentiated along gender lines, the transition to employment is also differentiated along educational lines. Another well-known feature of open unemployment in Egypt is that it is a phenomenon that primarily affects educated youth.

As shown in Figure 11.4, unemployment rates are very low for less educated young men and women. At the secondary level, they jump up for both sexes, with the highest unemployment rates in 2009 being recorded for post-secondary institute graduates followed by university graduates for men and by technical secondary graduates for women. Unemployment rates for males at all education levels except university graduates fell significantly from 1998 to 2006 and then increased from 2006 to 2009. Surprisingly, male university graduates experienced a decline in unemployment from 2006 to 2009. Unemployment rates among all educated females actually fell from 2006 to 2009, but this is almost surely due to discouragement

rather than increased employment creation.

Why are unemployment rates so much higher for educated young people than they are for the less educated, who are presumably less skilled, and why is there such a sharp break at the secondary level? The answer lies in the type of jobs each group expects to get. Because of a history of being eligible for public sector employment, new entrants with secondary education and above expect to obtain formal jobs and are therefore willing to remain jobless while searching for such jobs. They are thus the ones captured among the ranks of the unemployed. The less educated have virtually no history of formal employment in Egypt and therefore little expectation of it. Less educated men transition relatively quickly into the informal economy right after or even before they drop out of school, whereas few less educated women seek paid employment in the first place. It is the prospect of finding formal employment that leads educated young people to join the ranks of the unemployed.

This insight can be used to advance an explanation for why unemployment rates among educated youth have been falling recently. With the prospects of public sector employment declining significantly in recent years and opportunities in the formal private sector remaining limited, the chances of obtaining formal employment declined significantly. The initial reaction to these developments on the part of educated young people was probably to search harder and longer, leading to rising unemployment rates. However, as it became clear that the government was no longer hiring and that formal private sector jobs are even harder to get, the main response on the part of educated men was to increasingly curtail their search and take up jobs in the informal economy. Educated women, on the other hand, responded to the drying up of opportunities in the public sector by increasingly withdrawing from or not entering the labor force altogether. Both of these responses would have the ultimate effect of reducing the unemployment rate for educated workers.

Examining the data on joblessness rates provides some support for this hypothesis. First male jobless rates, like unemployment rates, increase with educa-

tional attainment, but the difference between more educated and less educated workers is not as large. Note also that jobless rates declined for young males from 1998 to 2006 for all educational categories, but most noticeably for those with technical secondary and post-secondary education. This decline most probably reflects the realization on the part of young educated males that formal sector work is not forthcoming and that it is best to take up informal employment rather than remain jobless. The slowing economy resulting from the onset of the world financial crisis in 2008 led to an increase in male joblessness for all educational categories except university graduates, which is the same trend observed for unemployment.


In the case of females the patterns of joblessness differs significantly from the pattern of unemployment. Whereas unemployment increases significantly with education, joblessness declines with education, starting with the achievement of secondary education. Again, unlike unemployment rates for educated young women, which tended to decline from 1998 to 2009, jobless rates tended to increase, suggesting greater discouragement as more women opt not to participate.

To provide evidence in favor of the hypothesis that unemployment reflects in part young people's expectations for getting a formal job, the types of jobs that educated young people have been getting upon entry into the labor market over time are examined. To do that, first jobs are subdivided into five classes:

- (i) public sector jobs;
- (ii) formal private sector wage and salary work;
- (iii) informal but regular private sector wage and salary work;
- (iv) irregular private sector wage work, and
- (v) self-employment and unpaid family work.⁵


The distribution of educated new entrants by sex and by year of birth and type of first job is shown in Figure 11.6. The figures starts with those born in 1978 and who would therefore have entered the labor market around 2000, well after the major slowdown in government hiring had occurred. Despite this, a decline in the probability of public sector work can be clearly seen for both males and females. Almost one fifth of

Figure 11.6: Distribution of Educated New Entrants by Year of Birth and Type of First Job, 2006 (3-Year Moving Average)




Source: *ELMPS 2006*

Figure 11.7: Female Labor Force Participation Rates by Educational Attainment, 1998, 2006, 2009



Source: *ELMS 1998, ELMPS 2006, SYPE 2009*

Figure 11.8: Proportion of Employed Females 15-29 who work in the Government by Educational Attainment, 1998, 2006, and 2009.




males and more than a half of females born in 1978 could expect to get public sector work in their first job. These probabilities had declined to about 5% for males and under 25% for females for those born in 1986. Formal private sector employment did not serve as a substitute for the declining public sector during for these cohorts. In fact, formal private sector employment for male new entrants was also declining significantly. It remained fairly stable for female new entrants at about 10-15% of first jobs.

The only two categories of employment that are increasing in importance are private informal but regular wage work and self-employment or unpaid family work, both informal types of employment.

Private informal but regular wage work now constitutes about a third of all first jobs for both males and females. Another one third of males first enter into self-employment or unpaid family work, but only one fifth of female new entrants do so. Private irregular or casual wage work has been slightly on the increase for males, and is virtually non-existent as a form of employment for young females. In brief, as public sector opportunities dry up for young new entrants, their employment opportunities are increasingly found in the informal economy, where job quality is known to be much lower than in the formal sector.

The most dramatic impact of the decline of employment opportunities in the public sector on youth

Figure 11.9: Average Years of Schooling by Year of Birth and Sex, Four-Year Moving Average



Source: ELMPS 2006

employment is undoubtedly its effect on young women's rate of participation in economic activity. As shown in Figure 11.7, the participation rate of young women used to increase significantly once secondary education was achieved, and it continued rising from that point on. But as the figure shows clearly, the rates of participation among educated young women have been falling sharply since 1998. For example, young women with technical high school education had rates of participation of 51% in 1998. These rates have fallen steadily to 18% in 2009. Similar, albeit less steep, declines in participation are observed for more educated women. Thus the one factor that has strongly driven increases in female labor force participation in Egypt, namely education, is getting weaker at a time when more young women are achieving these education levels.

A comparison of Figure 11.7 with Figure 11.8, which shows the percentage of employed women working for the government over time by educational attainment, provides a straightforward explanation for these declining participation rates. Essentially as the chances of getting government jobs declined for educated women, their participation rates also declined. Further investigation reveals that the majority of young women who worked in government in 1998 had permanent appointments whereas by 2009 the vast majority only had temporary employment contracts, providing less incentive to participate.

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
these declining participation rates. Essentially as the chances of getting government jobs declined for educated women, their participation rates also declined. Further investigation reveals that the majority of young women who worked in government in 1998 had permanent appointments whereas by 2009 the vast majority only had temporary employment contracts, providing less incentive to participate.

Why are these educated young women dropping out of the labor force altogether rather than seeking employment in the informal economy like their male counterparts? A number of possible explanations can be advanced for these stark gender differences in response to a drop in public sector employment. First, employment in the government is much more egalitarian along gender lines than employment in the private sector. While women can expect to be treated similarly to men with similar qualifications and experience in the government, they suffer from a large gender gap in wages and opportunities for advancement in the private sector.⁶ Secondly, while women can expect to have lifetime careers in the public sector, women employed in the private sector tend to quit such employment at marriage, giving them a relatively short employment horizon. Finally, high levels of occupational segregation in the Egyptian labor market essentially mean that women face large barriers to entry to both wage and self-employment even in the informal economy.⁷

WHY IS EDUCATION NOT PAYING OFF FOR YOUNG PEOPLE ANY MORE?

There is no question that there have been significant gains in levels of educational attainment for young people in recent years. As shown in Figure 11.9, average years of schooling increased steadily in Egypt in recent years. Egyptians born in 1985 has on average over 10 years of education, as compared to only 4 years of education for those born in 1950. We can also notice a considerable narrowing of the gender gap as educational attainment increased, with the difference in the male and female means going from 3 years for those born in 1950 to one and a half years for those born in 1985.

Figure 11.10: Mean Job Quality by Education Attainment for Wage and Non-Wage Workers, 1998–2006



Source: Assaad, Roushdy and Rashed (2009)

Despite these significant achievements in educational attainment, there is growing concern among young people and their families that the returns they get for their education in the labor market are declining rapidly. The falling returns to education take many forms, including lower monetary returns in the form of earnings, lower likelihood of obtaining formal employment for a given level of education, and generally lower job quality. Some argue that falling returns are inevitable as more people acquire education and the supply of educated workers rises. Greater competition among these workers is bound to reduce the premium workers get for their education. This argument implicitly assumes that demand for education and skills grows more slowly than the supply of education, which is not necessarily the case in a growing globalizing economy. Other parts of the world have experienced significant increases in return to schooling as skill-intensive technical progress has raised demand for educated labor, notwithstanding the increase in the supply of educated labor. The question is why is such a dynamic not occurring in Egypt?

One obvious answer to this question is that it is not simply an issue of the quantity of education supplied and demanded, but of the type and quality of education. The demand for skills is probably increasing as rapidly in Egypt as it is elsewhere in the world in response to globalization and technological change, but the question is whether the Egyptian education system is supplying these skills to the labor market. For decades the majority of educated workers in Egypt were headed for employment in the public sector where what mattered to get a job was not one's skill

level but one's formal credentials. Responding to the signals they obtained from the labor market, parents strove to obtain these credentials for their children by investing in their ability to pass official exams and get degrees.⁸ The educational system in turn was shaped over many years by the same goal of maximizing the number of students it graduates at all levels, with little emphasis on what skills are actually learned and how useful these skills are to the private job market. Now that government employment has been curtailed, Egypt continues to be saddled by an educational system that produces large number of degrees with limited value in the private sector labor market.

Returns to education have not only declined in terms of monetary remuneration, but also in terms of the type and quality of job a young person is able to obtain. As seen in Figure 11.6, there has been a significant decline in the probability of obtaining either public or private formal employment for young people. The trend is even sharper for educated young people who were highly dependent on government employment in the past. Educated young people are now relegated to jobs in the informal economy, jobs they could have probably obtained with much lower levels of education. For women, the returns to education manifest themselves in their very ability to enter the paid labor market. Figure 11.7 shows that participation rates increase sharply once women complete secondary education. However, this pattern of increasing participation with education is being eroded as participation rates fall for educated women in response to declining opportunities in government. This implies that the declines in returns to education

Box 11.1: Egyptian Youth Migration: Patterns, Aspirations and Motivations

Although many Egyptian youths aspire to migrate, few actually succeed to do so. According to SYPE, 15% of Egyptian youth 18-29 aspire to go live or work abroad, but only 1.6% had managed to do so (It should be kept in mind that the survey covers young people currently living in Egypt at the time of the survey and thus only includes information on non-migrants and return migrants.) It is by now well established that migration from Egypt is mostly made up of temporary migration to other Arab countries, whereas the proportion of return youth migrants from European destination countries is almost negligible, perhaps because those who go there do not return.

Gender is the most important determining factor for both migration and migration aspirations. The proportion aspiring to migrate varies from 27% for men to 6% for women. Education appears to be another powerful motivator for migration for both young men and young women. The proportion aspiring to migrate increases steadily with education and ranges from 4.5% for those with no formal school certificates to 20.9% for those with university education. The difference across educational levels is more pronounced for women than for men, ranging from 1% for those without certificates to 12.5% for those with university education. Younger youths tend to have somewhat higher migration aspirations than older youths. Urban slum residents have higher migration aspirations than either rural or urban non-slum residents, but the differences are not large. Finally, there is no systematic variation in migration aspirations by household wealth for young men, though they do increase steadily with wealth for young women.

Like migration aspirations, actual migration rates also vary strongly by gender, with 2.5% of men 18-29 having migrated and returned but only 0.9% of women. Like migration aspirations, actual migration rates increase significantly with education. University-educated young men are nearly 3.5 times as likely to migrate as men with no school certificate, and university educated women are more than 8 times as likely to migrate than their counterparts with no school certificate. However, in contrast to migration aspirations, the ability to migrate also depends strongly on age, place of residency and household wealth, and this dependence differs significantly by gender. Men 24 and older are much more likely to migrate than younger men, but there is practically no difference in migration rates by age for women. Similarly, men from urban slums and from rural areas are much more likely to migrate than men from urban non-slum areas, but women from urban non-slum areas are more likely to migrate than women from either urban slums or rural areas. In fact, migration rates from the urban non-slum milieu are practically equal for men and women. Finally, both men and women from richer households are more likely to migrate than their counterparts from poorer households, with differences being much larger for women.

The increase in both migration aspirations as well as actual migration with educational attainment reflects the role of education in raising young people's professional expectations and aspirations besides its enabling role in facilitating migration. Whereas the fact that migration aspirations don't depend strongly on wealth and urban-rural residency, but that migration does, suggests that, unlike education, these factors contribute more to young people's ability to realize their aspirations rather than to shaping these aspirations themselves.

Turning to the motivations for migration that both aspiring and actual migrants report, the distinction must be made between push factors relating to conditions in Egypt and pull factors relating to countries of destination. Again, the most striking finding is the very different motivations reported by young men and women who actually migrated and returned. With respect to motivations related to conditions in Egypt, male return migrants mention the absence of job opportunities (51%), poor living conditions (33.9%), the relatively low income in Egypt compared to other countries (33.0%), the need to assist their families financially (14.7%), and the need to earn money (12.7%) - The figures don't add up to 100% because each individual can report more than one motivation. Female return migrants almost always mention family related reasons for migrating, including migrating with family (62.9%) and family reunification (40.4%). With regards to motivations relating to destination countries, male migrants are more likely to mention job-related reasons, like having a job offer (70.9%), whereas female return migrants mention having relatives there (77.1%). Equal proportions (10%) mention wanting to live abroad.

Aspiring male migrants are also driven primarily by economic motivations. When asked about what pull factors motivate them to migrate, almost 95% mentioned making money. The motivations of female aspirants were much more diverse.

Box 11.1: continued...

They include learning new things and increasing knowledge and experiences (44%), making money (35%), desire to see other countries (26%) and wanting to live abroad (14%). Regarding push factors, two thirds of aspiring males migrants mentioned the lack of job opportunities in Egypt and 44% mentioned the lowness of income. As such the motivating push factors for aspiring migrants are almost identical to those of males who actually migrated. This is not the case for females. Females aspiring migrants look very much like their male counterparts in terms of their motivating push factors, but, as we saw above, male and female actual migrants look very different. This suggests that female aspiring migrants are much less able to act on their own motivations, but that their migration is highly dependent on the migration decisions of male family members.

Studies on the impact of international migration have shown that migration can have significant welfare implications for the households left behind as well as for the migrant him or herself. Roushdy et al. have shown that migration contributes to a significant reduction in poverty for the migrant sending household. Elbadawy and Assaad show that migration and remittances contribute to increased schooling and reduction of child labor. Assaad et al. show that migration enables unmarried young men to significantly reduce their age of marriage, contributing as much as a good job in Egypt.

To conclude, note that youth migration from Egypt is a highly differentiated phenomenon along gender, education, and class lines. It is still quite a rare phenomenon although a fairly large fraction of youth, especially young men, aspire to migrate. Migration aspirations are strongly driven by the higher professional expectations that come with education, but being to realize these aspirations depends on social class and the social, economic and informational resources that come with it.

Source: Ragui Assaad, Background Paper to EHDR 2010

for women are even sharper than would be ascertained from wage data.

A recent research project implemented by the Population Council has attempted to operationalize the concept of job quality in the Egyptian economy by incorporating various dimensions associated with the quality of jobs in a single index of job quality. The index includes aspects of jobs such as formality, earnings, the quality of the workplace, overemployment and underemployment.⁹ One of the most important results of this research is that although job quality in the Egyptian economy as a whole remained fairly constant over time, it has not kept up with the increasing levels of education of the workforce. Consequently, there has been a significant deterioration in job quality over time correcting for level of education. As shown in Figure 11.10, job quality has deteriorated from 1998 to 2006 for workers at all education levels except illiterates and post-secondary graduates for wage and salary workers, and all but post-secondary graduates for non-wage workers. The worst deterioration in job quality was experienced by workers with basic education and technical secondary degrees.

Faced with such falling returns to education in Egypt,

is there a risk that young people and their parents will reduce their investments in education in the future? With declining rates of participation for educated women, are investments in girls' education in particular threatened? While such a risk is present, it is not very likely given the large social value the Egyptian population places on education. This social value is clearly manifested in the marriage market, where both sides strongly value a more educated spouse.¹⁰ The risk of reduced investment in education is also belied by the large out-of-pocket expenditures Egyptian families make in private tutoring to ensure the success of their children in the educational system.

Given this reality, how can public policy ensure that the important public and private investments Egyptian society makes in education produce better returns in the labor market and in the economy in general? The answer almost certainly lies in the need for significant institutional reforms in the education system. The aim of these institutional reforms would be to better align the outputs of the educational system with the skills demanded by the labor market. This can be done in a number of ways:

- First, parents must get the right signals from the labor market as to what skills are in demand and



well rewarded. For years these signals have been confused by widespread public sector involvement that encouraged parents to invest in credentials rather than skills;

- Second, parents need to be able to translate these signals into the appropriate education choices for their children. Currently this ability is constrained by a limited set of choices in a centrally controlled system of public schools;
- Third, schools and other education providers must have the incentive, flexibility and accountability mechanisms to respond effectively to parental demand and market forces. This can be done by tying their rewards to their performance in some way. Nowhere is this structure of incentives and accountability more necessary than in the technical secondary school system that graduates in excess of 600,000 students per year with skills of dubious utility in the job market.

THE OCCUPATIONAL OUTLOOK FACING YOUNG PEOPLE TODAY

There is no question that young people in Egypt today are facing severe challenges in making the transition from school to work, with an increasing number facing uncertain prospects in the informal economy and others simply opting out of the workforce altogether. Although they are increasingly educated, the returns to this education are falling in the face of serious questions about the quality of education they receive. However, are there bright spots in the labor market

in the form of occupations that are growing rapidly and have the potential to absorb more new entrants?

An evaluation of the occupational outlook facing young people in Egypt today analyzes occupational data from three years of the official Labor Force Survey, namely 2000, 2004 and 2007. The advantage of using these surveys over the sources of data used earlier is that they have much larger sample sizes, allowing for a more accurate and detailed classification of occupations over time. 130 different occupational classes in each of the three years for which there is data are considered.¹¹ In the analysis, occupations are ranked based on their rate of growth from 2000 to 2007 and then classified in four categories along this criterion, namely high relative growth, medium high relative growth, medium low relative growth, and low relative growth.¹²

In order to highlight numerically important occupations that are contributing a large number of jobs in absolute terms, ranked occupations are also ranked along their absolute growth from 2000 to 2007 and that ranking is broken down in the same four categories used for relative growth. To compare the growth in the 2000-04 period with that of the 2004-07 period, occupations are identified that (i) accelerated their relative growth from 2000-04, (ii) those that remained in the same relative growth category and (iii) those that decelerated. The summary results are shown in Table 11.3.

The fastest growing occupations that also contributed high levels of absolute growth from 2000 to 2007 include construction workers (building frame and building finishing workers), street vendors, crop and animal producers, non-specialized farmers, and somewhat surprisingly, a class of government employees, customs and tax collectors. These occupations grew at faster than five percent per annum and each of them added more than 20,000 workers per year. Two other occupations that grew a bit more slowly but also added significant numbers of workers are drivers of motor vehicles and specialized farmers. Of all of these occupations, the growth of street vendors, crop and animal producers, and farmers has slowed from 2000-04 to 2004-07, but the other occupations have accelerated their growth or at least remained stable.

The pattern of fast growing occupations is somewhat predictable given the construction boom that Egypt experienced in the 2000 to 2007 period. Building trade workers are the twenty-first and twenty-second fastest growing occupations among the 130 being considered. The growth in the ranks of tax collectors may seem surprising given the virtual freeze on government hiring, but it may have something to do with the tax reform that the Ministry of Finance has introduced recently. The data indicate that the growth has clearly occurred between 2004 and 2007. Such growth is undoubtedly a one-off affair and is unlikely to be reproduced in the future. The growth of street vendors, crop and animal producers and even farmers may indicate the growth of marginal occupations where surplus labor tends to accumulate when it does not find outlets elsewhere in the economy. Interestingly, the only group of professionals or associate professionals included in this high absolute growth category is the tax collectors.

To move to a group of occupations that grew rapidly or moderately and had medium high absolute growth (the second row of Table 11.3). Each of these occupations added something between five and 20,000 jobs per year from 2000 to 2007. The fast growing group

includes potters and glassmakers, carpenters, personal service workers, textile machine operators, food machine operators, security workers. The medium high relative growth group includes painters, directors and chief executives in government, food processing workers, housekeeping and restaurant workers, building caretakers, and primary and pre-primary teachers. This set of fast growing occupations thus includes some craft occupations, like potters, painters and carpenters, some manufacturing workers like food processing and textile workers, some professionals like teachers, and some service workers.

Finally, there is a fairly large group of fast growing occupations that are adding fewer than five thousand jobs per year. These include some of the professional occupations, like computer associates, sales occupations and a number of manufacturing workers and machine operators. One category of professional occupations that appears in a number of places as being fast growing or moderately fast growing is teachers at the primary and pre-primary levels. In an indication of the expansion of the private economy, the third fastest growing occupation is general managers in the private sector.

There appears to be a positive relationship between unemployment (by either the standard or broad measures) and household wealth quintiles (Table 11.1). For example, the standard unemployment rate rises from about 12.5% for young people in the lowest wealth quintile in 2009 to nearly 20% for people in the two highest wealth quintiles. A similar increase is clear in other years and in the broad unemployment measure. This may appear paradoxical at first as many associate high unemployment with poverty. However, it is entirely consistent with the interpretation provided here relating unemployment to the expectation of obtaining formal employment. Poor youth can ill afford to remain unemployed for long and therefore give up on the idea of getting formal employment sooner and take up whatever employment they can find. As a result, their unemployment rates are lower than young people from richer households.

Table 11.3: Classification of Occupations According to Rate of Growth/ Size of Absolute Growth from 2000 - 07

| | High Relative growth | Medium High Relative Growth |
|---|---|--|
| High Absolute Growth | Customs, Tax/Related Government Associate Professionals 2 | Motor-Vehicle Drivers 47 |
| | Building Finishers and Related Trade Workers 21 | |
| | Building Frame and Related Trade Workers 22 | Landholding Farmers – Specialized 44 |
| | Street Vendors and related workers 9 | |
| | Crop and Animal Producers 18 | |
| Medium High Absolute Growth | Landholding Farmers – Not specialized 29 | |
| | Potters, Glass-Makers and Related Trade Workers 19 | Painters, Building Structure Cleaners and Related Trade Workers 38 |
| | Wood Treaters, Cabinet-Makers and Related Trade Workers 36 | Directors and Chief Executives in Government 46 |
| | Other Personal Services Workers 31 | Food Processing and Related Trade Workers 43 |
| | Textile, Fur/Leather-Products Machine Operators 32 | Housekeeping and Restaurant Services Workers 45 |
| Medium Low Absolute Growth | Protective Services Workers 35 | Building Caretakers, Window and Related Cleaners 55 |
| | Food and Related Products Machine Operators 5 | Primary/Pre-Primary Education Teaching Professionals 56 |
| | General Managers in Private Sector 3 | Supervisors and Foremen in Construction 39 |
| | Stall and Market Salespersons 8 | College, University/Higher Education Teaching Professionals 48 |
| | Wood-Processing/Papermaking-Plant Operators 10 | Vocational Training Teaching Professionals 50 |
| Medium Low Absolute Growth | Computer Associate Professionals 17 | Artistic, Entertainment and Sports Associate Professionals 51 |
| | Other Sales Workers 24 | Messengers, Porters, Doorkeepers/Related Workers 54 |
| | General Managers in Government 25 | Blacksmiths, Tool-Makers and related trade workers 57 |
| | Chemical Products Machine Operators 27 | Library, Mail and Related Clerks 58 |
| | Power-Production and Related Plan Operators 30 | Nursing and Midwifery Associate Professionals 59 |
| | Miners, Shortfirers, Stone Cutters and Carvers 6 | Locomotive Engine Drivers and Related Workers 40 |
| | Metal and Mineral Products Machine Operators 12 | Cotton Ginning Workers 41 |
| | Other Supervisors and Foremen of Craft Workers 33 | Fishery Workers, Hunters and Trappers 42 |
| | Printing and Related Trade Workers 37 | Supervisors and Foremen in Handicraft, Precision and Technical Industries 49 |
| | Automated Assembly-Line and Industrial-Robot Operators 1 | Assemblers 52 |
| | Glass, Ceramics and Related Plan Operators 4 | Mining and Mineral Processing Plant Operators 53 |
| | Supervisors and Foremen in Mining and Extractive Industries 7 | Other Teaching Professionals 60 |
| | Religious Associate Professionals 11 | |
| | Tire Repair Workers | |
| | Primary Education Teaching Associate Professionals 14 | |
| | Other Machine Operators and Assemblers 15 | |
| | Rubber and Plastic-Products Machine Operators 16 | |
| | Statistical and Finance Clerks 20 | |
| | Supervisors/Foremen of Automated Assembly Line 23 | |
| | Pre-Primary Education Teaching Associate Professionals 26 | |
| Printing, Binding and Paper Products Machine Operators 28 | | |
| Wood Products Machine Operators 34 | | |

Key:


- Accelerating Growth 00_04 - 04_07
- Stable Growth 00_04 - 04_07
- Decelerating Growth 00_04 - 04_07

Note: Figure next to each occupation is its ranking in terms of relative growth from 2000 to 2007

Endnotes

- 1 The three surveys used are the Egypt Labor Market Survey of 1998 (ELMS 98) and the Egypt Labor Market Panel Survey of 2006 (ELMPS 06), carried out by the Economic Research Forum in cooperation with CAPMAS, and the Survey of Young People in Egypt of 2009 (SYPE 09), carried out by the Population Council in cooperation with the Information and Decision Support Center of the Council of Ministers.
- 2 There is still a small proportion of young people in Egypt (about 11 percent in 2006) who have never gone to school. These young people are almost never unemployed. If they enter the labor force at all, they usually transition to work early and generally work either in agriculture or in the informal economy.
- 3 International Labour Office (2008). *Global Employment Trends for Youth, October 2008*. Geneva: ILO. The figure for Egypt is from the Egyptian Labor Force Sample Survey. The UN uses a 15-24 age range to define youth, as compared to the 15-29 age range used throughout this chapter.
- 4 Defined in this way, joblessness includes all forms of non-participation other than studying. It therefore could include mandatory military service for males.
- 5 A wage and salary job in the private sector is considered formal if the job holder has either a legal contract or social insurance coverage. It is considered regular if the job is either permanent or temporary and irregular if it is intermittent or seasonal. Another term used to describe irregular job is "casual".
- 6 Ragui Assaad and Melanie Arntz (2005). "Constrained Geographical Mobility and gendered labor market outcomes under structural adjustment: Evidence from Egypt. *World Development* 33(3): 431-454.
- 7 Ragui Assaad and Fatma El-Hamidi (2009) "Women in the Egyptian Labor Market: An Analysis of Developments, 1988-2006. In *The Egyptian Labor Market Revisited*. Ragui Assaad (ed.). Cairo: American University in Cairo Press, pp. 219-257.
- 8 Djavad Salehi Isfahani and Navtej Dhillon (2008) "Stalled Youth Transition in the Middle East: A Framework for Policy Reform." Middle East Youth Initiative Working Paper No. 8. Wolfensohn Center for Development at Brookings and Dubai School of Government.
- 9 See Ragui Assaad, Rania Roushdy and Ali Rashed 2009. "Measuring and Operationalizing Job Quality in Egypt." The Population Council. *Gender and Work in the MENA Region Working Papers Series*. Number 1, Cairo. Egypt.
- 10 Asmaa Elbadawy 2008.
- 11 We use the three-digit level of the Occupational Classification System developed by CAPMAS in 1996. This is the classification that CAPMAS used in the 2000, 2004 and 2007 Labor Force Surveys. This is a variant of the International System of Occupational Classification (ISOC -88). To the extent possible, we used the same labels as in ISOC 88.
- 12 Occupations that grew faster than the mean growth rate plus one half a standard deviation in 2000 to 2007 are classified in the high growth rate category. Those whose growth was between the mean and the mean plus one half standard deviation were classified as medium high. Those with growth rates between the mean and the mean minus one half standard deviations were classified as medium low. Finally those with growth rates below the mean minus one half a standard deviation were classified in the low relative growth category. The simple average growth rate for the 130 occupations from 2000 to 2007 was 1 percent per annum. The high growth category grew faster than 5 percent per annum and the slow growth category grew slower than -4 percent per annum.

Chapter Twelve



It is estimated that 600,000 new entrants seek to join the labor market annually. Given the current level of skill sets made available by the education system in Egypt, the formal private and services sectors may not be encouraged to absorb the numbers required to reduce unemployment, especially among young people, although some recent evidence suggests a decline in youth unemployment (see Chapter Eleven). Nevertheless, there is evidently a skills mismatch that has yet to be fully addressed. The reality is that neither higher education nor technical and vocational education and training (TVET) have offered a critical level of skill enhancement that qualifies young people in the search for jobs in the formal economy. The informal sector is perhaps a larger-scale employer that is more tolerant to the relatively poorer skills of those who frequently resort to TVET — the lower income brackets with lower academic abilities — but it generally offers lesser quality jobs that come with low salaries, greater job instability, and more often than not, dated techniques limited to ill-equipped on-the-job training.

Unless Egyptian workers' skills are upgraded in a relevant and demand driven form, the national economy, notably in the industrial sector, will continue to suffer from lack of appropriate technical skills and adequate levels of productivity, thereby contributing to the paradox of unemployment in the midst of unfilled job vacancies

The Egyptian education system offers two main educational tracks: One that is academic and the other that is technical. The former leads typically to university and the vocational route usually ends at the technical secondary school level, with a few exceptions for those that manage to score above 70% to qualify for higher education. Key challenges to the system include the lack of enough linkages between the two tracks in addition to the social stigma that comes with the technical route and its label as a poor second-chance option.

However, with globalization and the current pace of technological development and market shifts, TVET ceases to be an educational tool that targets youth associated with relatively lower academic performance or low socio-economic status. It has become a cornerstone for development. International experience indicates that TVET lies at the core of the life-long learning approach that is so necessary in volatile economies and in a complex and competitive specialized environment. Technical and vocational training can also contribute to closing the gap between an unproductive traditional curriculum and school dropouts, and the increasingly technological skills necessary for market-driven youth employment.

However, to date, the opportunity to make the most of the large number of young people who would benefit both themselves and the economy by acquiring non-academic vocational proficiency has not been grasped fully. The outcome of a survey illustrates these problems within some sub-sectors of manufacturing in Egypt. Here, vocations gaps are reflected primarily in electrical maintenance, mechanical maintenance, electronic maintenance technicians, electronic control process technicians, workshops equipments' operators, electrical welding technicians, and boiler maintenance technicians.¹ These

examples are illustrative of the potential range of proficiency gaps present in other sectors and sub-sectors.

The labor market then lacks technical and skilled workers in terms not only of number but also competence. This forces employers to either turn down production orders at the level of the local and the export markets or to refrain from expanding the business scale. In either case, productivity is reduced while potential manpower remains dormant, untrained and untapped.

THE VOCATIONAL AND TRAINING PATH

There does exist a technical and vocational education and training system for youth in Egypt. This public system is disaggregated among a number of ministries and government agencies that operate largely in isolation of each other. Generally, skill output is poor although some sporadic islands of excellence do exist, notably in those courses offered by the armed forces. However, this poor record is slowly changing due to the creation of the 'Industrial Training Council' (ITC) in 2006 in the Ministry of Trade and Industry (MOTI) with a mandate to improve coordination and direction of all training-related entities, projects, and policies in the Ministry. More recently, two other councils have already been created: The 'Tourism Training Council' and the 'Construction Training Council'.

Since the establishment of specialized councils, there is the view that the existing but limited Supreme Council of Human Resources Development should be operationalized as the platform for the three councils to provide policy directives and to assess overall TVET system performance. Meanwhile, a ministerial committee established by the Prime Minister is developing a TVET strategy which essentially builds on previous studies, interventions, and an influential TVET policy statement in 2002 (see below). It revolves around the key elements of international best practice, inter alia, adopting an integrated approach towards TVET policy directives, funding of training delivery, and inter-linkages between employers and TVET service providers. The blueprint was endorsed by the Prime Minister in late August of 2009. The committee is in the process of formulating its 'Action Plan'.

Table 12.1: TVET Systems and Providers

| Ministry/ Organization | Training System ¹ | Graduate Skill Level | Duration (months) ³ |
|--|--|--|--|
| Ministry of Manpower | Pre-vocational (juvenile) | Semi-skilled | 7m centre-based |
| | Accelerated | Semi-skilled | 2m OJT 4m centre based 4m OJT |
| | Vocational Grading | Semi-skilled | 12-24m OJT |
| Social Solidarity | Pre-vocational (juvenile) | Semi-skilled | 7-24m centre-based |
| | Vocational formation Accelerated & Productive Families Rehabilitation | Semi-skilled | 6-10m centre-based |
| | Pre-vocational (companies) | Semi-skilled | 12-24 centre-based |
| TOMO HAR Ministry of Housing & Reconstruction | Pre-vocational (companies) | Semi-skilled | 6-9 centre-based |
| | Accelerated | Semi-skilled | 4m centre-based 2m OJT |
| | Retraining Upgrading | Semi-skilled Skilled Technician | 6m centre-based 1-8m centre & OJT |
| Agriculture | Upgrading | Different levels acc. to the course | 2-4m centre & OJT |
| | Pre-vocational Accelerated | Semi-skilled Semi-skilled | 9m centre-based 4m centre-based |
| Localities | Pre-vocational Accelerated | Semi-skilled Semi-skilled | 9m centre-based 2-9m centre-based |
| | Industry | Apprenticeship* | Skilled |
| Industry | Apprenticeship* | Skilled | 11m centre-based 21m OJT beside 1-2 days in the centre |
| | Accelerated | Semi-skilled | 4-6m centre-based |
| | Pre-vocational | Semi-skilled | 6m centre-based |
| | Upgrading | acc to the course | 1-3m centre-based |
| | Voc. grading Retraining | Semi-skilled Semi-skilled | 6m enterprise-based 6m centre-based |
| Military factories | Apprenticeship* | Skilled | 12m centre-based 24m enterprise-based |
| | Voc. grading | Semi-skilled | 24m enterprise-based |
| Transportation & Communication | Apprenticeship* | Skilled | 12m centre-based + 2 years OJT 24m enterprise-based |
| | Pre-vocational | Semi-skilled | 7m centre-based |
| | Accelerated | Semi-skilled | 4m centre based |
| | Upgrading | acc to the course | 1-4m centre-based |
| | Retraining | Semi-skilled | 4-10m centre-based |
| | Voc. grading | Semi-skilled | 24m OJT |
| Awkaf | Pre-vocational | Semi-skilled | 24m centre-based |

Source: ETES Report (2000).

Note: All certificates are based on attendance and diplomas are only provided for training systems marked with an asterix.

Under the new labor legislation, which was passed in Egypt in 2003, the law now includes the creation of a training fund to be financed by a 1% levy on net profits applicable to establishments employing 10 or more workers. It is housed within the Ministry of Manpower and Migration. But the fund has not been operational, as a number of firms have now debated its constitutionality in courts of law.

THE CURRENT TVET SYSTEM

At present, basic technical and vocational education is provided through the Ministry of Education (about 1584 technical and vocational schools) and the Ministry of Higher Education (47 Middle Technical Institutes/Technical Colleges). Additional ministries are engaged in TVET provision with around 1200 vocational centers belonging to the Ministries of Trade and Industry², Social Solidarity, Housing, Manpower and Emigration, Agriculture, Health, and Culture.

The system therefore includes technical secondary schools and technical and vocational entities — as presented in Table 12.1 — a few of which offer 3 and up to 5 year diplomas, but most of which offer short-term courses, such as technical colleges (previously middle technical institutes and currently placed within universities) and institutes. Although various ministries target different groups or have different focus areas, technical and vocational delivery often overlaps with little if any common ground in training standards or certification requirements. Further, the quality of the education offered is generally poor.

Although TVET providers cover a wide scope of specialties, the focus has been on industry as it is the main sector that provides formal technical educational through an apprenticeship system. It also holds the prospect of serving the vast majority of non-agricultural private sector employers.

Failings of the Public Sector Programs

Several rounds of surveys have evaluated the current TVET system in Egypt and arrived at similar conclusions. Most TVET institutions have the following profile:³

- They are publicly funded with no clear lines of accountability as annual budgets are a factor of the previous year's expenditure rather than a reflection of overall performance or enrollment rates or even drop-out rates during study years/training;
- They are disaggregated and lack clear standards for curriculum development and training delivery as illustrated in the obsolete equipment used, and neglect of the use of modern equipment that might be available;
- They lack practical 'hands on' training requirements and the few practical training workshops available are overcrowded and render such practical training virtually useless;
- They are supply- rather than demand-driven, thereby often presenting a mismatch with actual market needs. For example, there is a clear disconnect between the TVET system and industry, the major market place for the system's outputs.
- They are characterized by a failure of the educational and training programs to keep up with

prerequisites of ongoing technological development, and excessive dependence on the theoretical parts of the curricula.

- They exhibit shortages of modern and advanced specializations, discrepancies and disparities in the qualifications and in the use of trainers lacking proper technical, vocational and pedagogical qualifications;
- Budget allocations are rarely sufficient for equipment upgrade, for example, or in regard to upgrade of overall quality;
- Frequently, compulsory military service disrupts the training program of individuals at recruitment age, but there are some exceptions if the military assignment is to technical units aligned with a specialization.

Private Sector Contributions

There are a limited number of private sector technical and vocational training centers, which typically offer short-term training courses. Most of these centers offer courses that qualify firms for quality related certification. The centers tend to be relatively well organized, with market driven curricula, trainers with reasonable technical and pedagogical capacity, and modular training courses. Clear rules govern the arrangements, with transparent criteria for those who should get such training and what should comprise such training courses as well as the expected outcome of receiving such training beyond the certification, in terms of tangible growth of profitability.

Employers and Training

Though most small and medium enterprises (SMEs) claim to have a positive attitude towards TVET, they generally offer on-the-job technical training using internal sources/senior staff or supervisors with no real pedagogical experience, but who are believed able to adequately train other workers. They also consider brief orientation sessions offered to new recruits as internal training. The result is frequently ad hoc and unstructured, with no recognized certification. SMEs tend to act differently when it comes to management, or marketing, or other types of 'desk' skills where they would be willing to send employees for professional training. Lack of awareness on available technical training providers is a clear illustration of

Box 12.1: The Private Sector's Don Bosco Experience

One successful private fee-paying model is that of the Don Bosco Institute, run by the Italian Silesian Brothers. Rather than turn out old fashioned/second-chance diplomas, its three and five year diploma courses provide a path to employment, decent pay, and career progression, which are the very same elements lacking in the majority of the public TVET institutions. Don Bosco's credibility lies in its consistency to produce decent quality workers that can actually "do" the list of activities that are indicated by their certificate, which makes the institute's credentials trustworthy and a 'seal' of quality. This is not just because of the relevant curricula taught, but due to the recruitment criteria for the institute's trainers, based on the technical and pedagogical instruction and practice they have received.

This is not the case for the vast majority of other TVET institutions where previous hands-on industrial experience is not a pre-condition for hiring. What also positions the Institute so uniquely among other TVET institutions in Egypt is that it issues final certification that is recognized by both the Italian and Egyptian governments. This is reflected in the eligibility of students attending the five-year courses to enroll in universities within Europe.

Source: Italian Cooperation for Development Institute

serious market information asymmetry.

Small or medium operations frequently overlook the value added from training, which is reflected in the lack of a dedicated training budget line. Employers who complain about their capacity to recruit competent workers are generally reluctant to invest in their human capital for fear of higher rates of pay, high rates of labor turnover, migration, or other behavior that would impact on the bottom profit line. Similarly, owners/managers rarely offer promotion/financial awards/salary incentives to workers because of a short-term low expenditure strategy. The frequent absence of clear-cut contractual arrangements opens such firms to poaching by competitors ready to exploit skills provided by others. A tightening of workers' formal contractual arrangements would be a possible factor to break this vicious circle, as would a system of rewards for good performance.⁴

The Perspective of Prospective Workers

Though access to basic education has notably improved in Egypt in recent years, as reflected in rising primary education rates, repetition rates and school drop-out rates remain high. A significant number of young people then turn to traditional apprenticeships when 'pushed out' of general education. Typically, a new worker becomes the responsibility of a more senior worker to get acquainted with the tools, equipment and techniques. Apprentices are given increasing 'hands on' responsibility as they climb

the learning curve, and it is exposure and experience rather than formal learning that matters. This system is prevalent among many illiterate low-income families who often must pay the master craftsman for the privilege of teaching a useful trade to their offspring.

Those who have achieved preparatory education, but with low scores, enter into technical secondary education as a stepping stone into the higher education track. Indeed, 70% of technical secondary school students who pass the higher education bar prefer to enter university rather than move into the labor market. A negligible percentage of graduates choose to work within their specialization – the majority gets their first job within a period of three months from graduation, but they do not keep the job for long because of the low salary, problems with the owners, or a return to school.⁵

There is evidence that youth are discouraged from working in the industrial sector and would rather be civil servants or bureaucrats.⁶ This is because this type of employment provides long-term stability, is better viewed among peers, removes the prospect of getting fired for low-performance, and because the relatively low pay is acceptable, considering the level of effort required and the long-term security provided.⁷ This option is becoming scarcer as the government of Egypt continues to cut down on recruitment to the public sector (see Chapter Eleven).

Box 12.2: Government-led Technical Interventions

The Mubarak-Kohl Initiative (MKI) is considered the first initiative that links technical education with industry/labor market requirements and is perceived as a successful model for cost-efficient and labor-market-oriented TVET in Egypt. The initiative has aimed to enhance the market relevance of Technical Secondary School graduates' qualifications, through a dual system model of cooperative technical education, with extensive technical cooperation via the German GTZ.⁹ The dual system typically allows students the opportunity to study theoretical material in schools and to practice in workplace/production line. More than 20,000 students have graduated from MKI. Around 85% of these receive immediate job offers. The MKI-Dual System has been handed over to the Egyptian partners from the MOE and the private sector and is now successfully managed and implemented. As of May 2009, the system has been adopted by 76 MKI technical secondary schools, in cooperation with 1,900 companies, to train about 24,000 students.

A recent tracer study of past graduates (2008) indicates that the co-operative dual system seems to have positively affected the perceptions and aspirations of young Egyptians. The dual experience gave graduates an early firsthand taste of the world of work and introduced them to the discipline of the workplace. It equipped them both with the confidence to make informed choices and the judgment to make appropriate job search and career choices.¹⁰

The Mubarak Kohl Initiative- MKI-vetEP, which started in July 2007, is a continuation of Egyptian-German development cooperation on MKI. Youth employment is the program's primary goal as it aims to improve the interactive employability of youths and employers, thus contributing to gainful employment. MKI-vetEP's approach goes beyond educating and training young people to equip them with labor market oriented qualifications — skills, knowledge and attitude — required for performing a job. Interactive employability covers job seekers becoming and staying employable and potential employers being able to employ.¹¹ To date, the program has managed to match and place the first batch of young job seekers. It has agreed to develop and pilot a regional labor market monitoring and forecasting system within the Sixth of October governorate.¹² *Source: Vocational Education, Training and Employment Programme – Mubarak-Kohl Initiative*

When faced with significantly high drop-out rates from workers shortly after basic training or during training, the World Bank Skills Development Project in Egypt survey attempted to understand the rationale behind this behavior among trainees. The survey interviewees indicated that there was a need for employers to do the following: Create an encouraging work environment; create a follow-up committee to track work conditions; develop a better contractual set-up; improve salaries; improve supervisors' skills in managing subordinates; and introduce shorter working hours. It should be noted that the basic training was offered to prospective workers for real jobs within a recruiting readymade garments factory.⁸

A POLICY FRAMEWORK

As early as 2002, the Government of Egypt endorsed a TVET Policy Statement that was jointly developed by the World Bank and the European Training Foundation of the European Union (EU), as a framework for various types of interventions — as presented in Table 12.2 — including those that are donor supported.

This framework includes the following four provisions:

- Establishing a Quality Qualification System fostering the principle of Lifelong Learning;
- Creating a TVET system responding to labor market needs;
- Establishing new legal, institutional and governance frameworks for TVET institutions;
- Developing labor market policies that improve the mobility of labor.

Four key initiatives are involved in relation to this framework:

- Raising private sector demand for technical training;
- Piloting a demand-driven training funding mechanism;
- Introducing a bottom-up approach to create partnership among stakeholders while upgrading training delivery capacity; and
- Establishing a national qualifications framework.

Table 12.2: TVET Policy Statements Interventions

| <u>Policy Statement–Relevant Pillar</u> | <u>Name of Project</u> | <u>Source of Fund & Implementing Entity</u> |
|---|---|--|
| • Establishing a Quality Qualification System fostering the principle of Lifelong Learning; | National Skills Standards Project (See Box 12.3) | Social Fund for Development |
| • Creating a TVET system responding to labor market needs; | Skills Development Project (See Box 12.4) | GOE and World Bank Ministry of Trade and Industry |
| • Establishing new legal, institutional and governance frameworks for TVET institutions; | EC-TVET Project. TVET Policy Reform Project. (See Box 12.5) | GOE and EC Ministry of Trade and Industry |
| • Establishing a Quality Qualification System fostering the principle of Lifelong Learning; | National Qualification Framework | European Training Foundation Ministry of Manpower |

Source: Amira Kazem, *Background Paper to EHDR 2010*

Though these initiatives have started at different points in time, conceptually they operate with some degree of integration and complementarity. Interim outcomes have been encouraging but it may be premature to assess their longer-term outcome on youth skills set or youth employability.

The Skills Development and the EC-TVET projects (see Boxes 12.4 and 12.5) are perceived as companion projects as they were designed around the same time as a natural development of the TVET Policy Statement. They are both housed within the Ministry of Trade and Industry and coordinated through the Industrial Training Council. While the former tackles the demand side for training, the latter adopts a bottom-up approach to support the formulation and implementation of a national TVET reform policy through its components:

- Establish and operate at least 12 decentralized, demand-led Enterprise TVET Partnerships;
- Improve training provision; and
- Assist decision makers in developing the regulatory framework for the TVET reform.

In addition to establishing sectoral and geographic partnerships between training providers and enterprises, the EC-TVET Project has introduced the French-based 'Alternance' Education and Training System, in partnership with the Ministry of Education and with funding from the Ministry of Trade and Industry. This is being carried out in 100 technical secondary schools; an innovative form of cooperative education started in 2008, it ambitiously aims to pre-

pare a critical mass of youth (100,000) prior to entering the workforce through relevant practical knowledge and skills.¹³

In this model, employers at the sectoral and local level are engaged in setting the three year curricula based on their market needs, to be developed and approved by the Minister of Education through technical committees that also have to develop the occupational profiles for these curricula. Employers participate in training the teachers and internal tutors.

Firms receive the students based on a well-designed modular schedule where practical skills are reinforced based on the theoretical part delivered at school. School workshops and equipment are being updated to be more compatible with industry requirements and specifications. Teachers have been trained within the companies through industrial attachments, and school managements trained and orientated on the importance of strong links with industry. This initiative is still in its beginnings, so it is difficult to assess successes.

The Enterprise Training Partnerships (ETPs) approach, independently from the EC-Project, ensures that employers together with public sector training providers shape the TVET system in their respective sectors. This guarantees the relevance and sustainability of the project outputs. Partnerships provide a platform for exchange of training needs and thus ensure a dynamic process for employer-driven training programs.

NATIONAL EFFORTS TOWARDS AN UPGRADED QUALIFICATIONS FRAMEWORK

An Orderly Formal Qualifications Framework

More recently, the national qualifications framework has also attempted to tackle the current suboptimal set-up of TVETs and to address ad-hoc activities, lack of clarity in roles, irrelevance of credentials vis-à-vis labor market needs, and lack of a transparent flow/smooth transition between the education system, lifelong learning and professional/practical experience.

Support is being provided through the European Training Foundation under the auspices of the Minister of Manpower, as chairperson of the Supreme Council for Human Resources Development. Such a framework may assist in developing clearer and comparable qualifications, greater access to qualifications and to skills development, improved relevance of qualifications to employers, enterprises and individuals, and benchmarking and quality assurance of Egyptian qualifications against national and international standards, thus facilitating labor mobility.

Supporting Training Centers

Alternatively, there has been another type of intervention with a more grassroots orientation and on a rather sporadic basis. Over the past ten years or so, a number of current training centers either affiliated to the productivity and vocational training department or TOMOHAR/Training Centers at the Ministry of Housing and Reconstruction have received extensive upgrading support through a number of bilateral sources, such as the Mubarak-Kohl project, JICA, and the French government at a time when some of the TOMOHAR training centers were still under the NSSP curriculum and testing material, which is based on the Egyptian Vocational Qualifications (EVQs).

The real value added offered to such training centers' renovation does not only lie in procurement of more advanced equipment but in the matching capacity to develop curriculum and to some extent tailor such curriculum in a market-responsive manner. In addition, both trainers and centers' management receive

technical and pedagogical training, as well as industrial hands-on experience, locally and internationally. Within some of these projects, trainees get the opportunity to travel to other countries for more advanced levels of training. This is also accompanied by an internationally acknowledged certification.

Tackling Labor Market Information Assymetry

Government Initiatives

In an attempt to tackle information asymmetry, the Information and Decision Support Center (IDSC) of Egypt's Cabinet hosts the Egypt Observatory for Education, Training and Employment, (previously supported technically by the European Training Foundation). The observatory is a multilateral network that includes organizations involved in the labor market and training in the government, private and civil sectors: CAPMAS, Ministry of Education, Ministry of Trade and Industry, Ministry of Manpower; NGOs, and the private sector.

The centre operates as a focal point of support between two main parties: The data producers on the one hand, and the beneficiaries who use this data on the other. The main objectives are to establish a dynamic labor market information system and training structure in Egypt through generating accurate and up-to-date data and information regarding both supply and demand; this is to support the policy makers in relation to education, training and labor market performance system, as well as to forecast labor market needs and labor market assessment needs surveys at the sectoral level.

Non-government-led Initiatives

Leading private sector firms such as Siemens have been engaged in upgrading a number of training centers. In coordination with the Industrial Training Council, a contract, mostly funded through the ITC, is agreed to upgrade 50 training centers in the fields of programmable logic control and computer numerical control affiliated to universities and technical schools nationwide, whereby Siemens provides the equipment for those centers and trains the trainers. There has been a similar protocol between the ITC, Heidelberg Academy¹⁴ and the Productivity and Vocational

Box 12.3: The National Skills Standards Project of Egypt's Social Fund for Development

Within the TVET Policy Statement's first pillar, the National Skills Standards Project does not only establish skill standards but also the procedures for testing and certifying trainees. The framework has been envisaged to be supported by a training providers' accreditation entity, which in turn will lead to a register of "accredited training providers" and their specialities, which is yet to be established.

The National Skills Standards Project (NSSP) was originally funded through Egypt's Social Fund for Development (SFD) and supported by a team of local and international consultants (led by the British Council) in cooperation with employers. It works in three industries (manufacturing, tourism, and building & construction) to develop standards, catering for workers' certification as per their abilities and competencies; transferable credits that carry students across education/training routes; and objective independent assessment mechanisms and accreditation procedures. It covers post-primary school qualifications (broadly equivalent to Levels 1, 2 and 3 of the International Standard Classification of Education – semi-skilled, skilled and supervisor).

The NSSP has developed standards for around 106 trades within the construction, manufacturing and tourism sectors. NSSP has also upgraded around 50 vocational training centers that adopt the developed standards in training delivery.

For sustainability, and further to an Industrial Training Council/SFD protocol, the manufacturing sector's skills standards have been handed over to Egypt's Industrial Training Council (ITC) in early 2007, while those related to Tourism and Construction were handed over to the respective federations. ITC has also managed to attract NSSP's project staff to pursue work on further standards, approaching the Scottish Qualification Agency (SQA) — involved in the earlier stages of NSSP — to further benchmark the standards developed during the early stages and to educate sectoral committees formed within the respective industrial chambers on how to develop Egyptian Vocational Qualifications (EVQs) based on SQA's revised methodologies. *Source: Industrial Training Council, May 2009*

Training Development training center in the Cairo district of Imbaba.

This interaction among a leading manufacturer, training facility, and public funding through the Industrial Training Council provides a magic 'co-branding' and 'accredited' type of training, and it acts as a tangible incentive for youth as it facilitates trainees' certification and employability prospects.¹⁵

There are other ad-hoc community-based initiatives either at the level of individual private sector businessmen or of local NGOs, with the objective of upgrading the local population's basic skills to enhance their employability, coupled with some efforts to arrange for their recruitment within the geographic proximity of their district or village. Considering that such initiatives are limited in scope and scale, they may nevertheless be effective.

THE WAY FORWARD

Resolving the training and labor market failures is a shared responsibility among stakeholders, which include youth, employers, federations/chambers, as well as government. There are two basic concepts that lie behind the paradigm shift necessary to turn around the current failures: Incentives and accountability. At every level of intervention, a clear set of incentives — be it upgraded curricula and equipment, cost-sharing for training and tax incentives to employers, or job openings — must be put in place to enable technical and vocational education and training to become a viable option for youth. Accountability goes hand in hand with the introduction of proper certification, based on recognized and preferably internationally-based standards of performance. Such certification carries its own rewards in terms of promotion and mobility.

Despite the extensive efforts to support TVET in Egypt over the past years, the Egyptian economy still lacks the critical mass of skilled workers with the necessary training and enhanced skills. The various on-going programs and projects do contain elements

Box 12.4: The Skills Development Project (SDP)

The skills development project (SDP) tackles the second pillar of the TVET Policy Statement, by focusing on the demand side of the equation. Hence, it aims to stimulate private sector's demand for training. In doing so, it pilots an operational funding mechanism that provides the private sector with a package of training and training related services to encourage them to invest in technical training. The positive demonstrative effect of the tailored training as well as 90-10 cost sharing experience is an incentive for more technical training, and thus more skills upgrading and labor mobility within the firm and across firms.

The project (2004 - 2010) is a 6-year pilot implemented by the Ministry of Trade and Industry in cooperation with the World Bank. The objective is to stimulate private sector demand for skills development training by piloting a demand-driven and competitively based financing mechanism to provide technical training directly related to the production process for small and medium enterprises (SMEs). The Project has three components: awareness, promotion, and outreach, monitoring and evaluation; funding of and training and management of training delivery; and project management, monitoring and evaluation). Training is envisaged to have a long-term positive impact on the productivity and competitiveness of SMEs. Overall project budget is US 12.5 million.

SDP targets SMEs initially in three sectors of the economy — construction, manufacturing, and tourism — to support training and training related activities (that is, less than 6 months of training) related to the production process on a cost-sharing basis with qualifying SMEs. SMEs access the project through project intermediaries (PIs), which can be the departments or units of businessmen/investors' associations, federations, firms, or chambers, or the Industrial Modernization Center. The PIs develop a training program on the basis of an individual firm's training needs assessments for in-service workers or newly recruited ones, and training providers are competitively selected.

The SDP is designed to help the GOE develop an institutional and financial framework to manage resources to assist the private sector in the provision of skills training. This is particularly crucial given the lack of awareness in the private sector of the value added of skills upgrading; reluctance to invest in their human capital, especially workers, and the overwhelming training market information asymmetry that makes locating a competent training provider a serious challenge, in the absence of a certification and accreditation set-up. *Source: World Bank, Skills Development Project – Project Documents, 2009*

of excellence, particularly with regard the involvement of private sector partnerships and firms' after-training job offers. However, the continued reluctance of many young people to forgo university for vocational or technical training calls for a review of Egypt's higher education system as a whole, as well as of the high value placed on this. TVET must be seen as equally valuable, both socially and economically. This is easier said than done, and would require a sizeable and dramatic national demonstration effect as to the career rewards and financial benefits of shifting to the vocational path.

In the meantime, the upgrade of TVET at the national level under clear policy directives and targets needs to be scaled-up. The urgency is such that individual initiatives should be subsumed under a plan that could contain the following elements:

- The promotion of close inter-linkages between TVET providers and employers, as reflected in

the ETP's model, regardless whether the TVET providers are publicly or privately funded;

- An active involvement of employers via some form of incentive scheme;
- Greater involvement of manufacturers in the provision of curriculum content, equipment, and training of trainers, with close support from government/sectoral training councils;
- International branding of trainees and prospect of mobility for further education and employability;
- Employer-driven packages of training and training related services, as reflected in the Skills Development Project;
- An accredited training organization that delivers accredited training programs/courses, within an integrated system for quality assurance and certification.
- The various training councils should dynamically draw on the Information and Decision Support

Box 12.5: The EC Project: Assistance to the Reform of the TVET System

This EC project falls on the supply side in the context of the first pillar of the TVET Policy Statement. Here, Enterprise Training Partnerships (ETPs) were set up under the TVET Policy Reform Project, (with a contribution from the GOE of Euro 33 million, matched by the EC). Activities started 2005 with the goal of developing decentralized quality technical and vocational training institutes that depend on market demand. The ongoing project also aimed to develop key building blocks for a model TVET system by introducing national regulating bodies as a basis for a decentralized system of demand-driven TVET.

To date, the EC-TVET project has established 12 partnerships/ETPs across a range of sectors — from textiles to tourism — and in addition, six local ETPs out of a total target of 12 in industrial zones, to support local partnerships and training providers. The project has also contributed to capacity building as follows:

- (i) Training Providers: Through curriculum development, upgraded workshops and pre-qualified trainers and teachers, it has improved around 140 training centers and around 100 in-company training facilities in the ready-made garments sector;
- (ii) Trainers: To date, around 1,680 trainers have been trained in the ready-made garments, food, building material, engineering, wood and furniture industries;
- (iii) Training Packages: the project has developed a wide range of training packages based on industry needs, and developed curricula for 16 occupations (based on the technical secondary schools and vocational training centers) with close support from sectoral and local ETPs;
- (iv) Training Sessions: to develop qualified human resources infrastructure as Trainers and Master of Trainers in the different sectors; with an end of project target of 4000;
- (v) Study Visits: to create common understanding, awareness and exchange experience between the local training specialists and their counterparts in EU countries; and
- (vi) Twinning Arrangement: an institutional capacity building mechanism in relation to the regulatory framework. The project also contributes to developing a system of quality in the field of industrial training include standardization, accreditation, and certification. *Source: EC-TVET Project Management Unit, 2009*

Center (IDSC) Observatory in providing market information and directives, as well as prosperous vocations that not only fill a labor market gap but move the links within the TVET market itself in a productive manner.

There have been recent efforts to reactivate the Supreme Council of Human Resources Development within the Ministry of Manpower, as well as the better organization of the Industrial Training, the Tourism Training, and the Construction Training Councils. Yet, clarity of roles among these entities in terms of policy directives and priority setting is yet to be firmed up. This may require a series of legislative and operational procedures to fulfill a nationwide breakthrough, with reduced youth unemployment as a goal.

AN ACTION PLAN Avail Stakeholders with Information

Information provides directives for adjustments and change. There is a critical need for a 'Labor Market Information System.' This would provide youth with the job market needs to encourage enrollment in vocations on the rise. It would also provide TVET institutions and trainers with directives towards a frequently revised set of specializations in demand, and allow for TVET diplomas, courses and programs to follow suit with a dynamic revision of curricula to match market projections.

The Cabinet related IDSC Observatory may be considered a nucleus for such a labor market information system, with its network of organizations involved in the labor market and training in the government, private and civil sectors.



Adopt a Market-Driven Approach

As a first step, TVET institutions should be given a clear role by:

- Providing students and trainees with skills and know-how demanded by the marketplace;
- Adopting elements of success in those training centers that have been rebranded as different but successful;
- Appointing a board of trustees to set priorities and to ensure linkages to each vocational specialization/labor market;
- Developing an own annual plan and annual budget based on market requirements;
- Responding to market needs in terms of courses/ programs, curriculum-design, development and tailoring;
- Recruiting industry based trainers to ensure provision of hands-on industrial expertise;
- Creating an 'Accreditation Body' to which all TVET institutions will be held accountable.
- Making it mandatory for TVET institutions to adopt accredited standards while developing curriculum and testing material for approved certification.

TVET will likely remain mostly public-funded, which does not mean that the government must continue to fund a non-performing body, nor that TVET delivery is confined within the public sector domain.¹⁶ But TVET institutions need to receive technical and financial support to develop their business model

while giving them to authority to make financial and administrative decisions related to fulfilling their mandates. This will most likely trigger a legislative change to allow for income generation, and income retention at the level of the training center, acceptance criteria for students, recruitment policies, etc.

With regard private sector TVET providers, these are yet to see a viable business opportunity similar to that operating in sectors such as tourism or 'quality' training for the food industries. Unless some form of incentive is provided, they are likely to offer short-term training courses on-site to avoid significant capital investment and to minimize market entry and exit barriers.

The model whereby leading manufacturers such as Siemens and Heidelberg enter into a contractual commitment to provide their equipment, curriculum and training of trainers seems a viable mechanism that would not only provide the missing incentive for both youth and employers in terms of quality assurance, but it would also allow the market more time until an accreditation system is in place and functioning effectively. Further incentives could be offered to excelling students in the form of internship within these manufacturers' production lines, either locally or in their respective head offices.

Box 12.6: The Media-based Employment Initiative

Youth are reluctant to be employed as production workers and they indicate obvious preference towards working in the civil service, given the benefits, security and hours. In the meantime, industry suffers from a lack of semi-skilled and skilled workers. The Ministry of Finance, for this reason, sponsored a massive media campaign during the high viewership season of Ramadan 2007 to create a positive attitude towards industrial employment.

This initiative was complemented by the Industrial Training Council's offer of pre-employment training to match available vacancies in private sector firms committed to employ youth who complete ITC's training. The campaign was accompanied by monitoring and evaluation to track progress and youth reactions. The outcome of the pre-implementation survey indicated that youth's acceptance of vocational training did not exceed 2%, irrespective of educational background. As the campaign rolled in, 10% of enquiries (out of a total number of 1,100,000 callers) stated a willingness to be employed on production lines. Of these 110,000 went for interviews, and 87,000 (or 8%) became employed.

Source: Industrial Training Council, May 2009

Private Sector Training Incentive

Employers should be given more time to build a critical mass of awareness as well as to develop confidence between themselves and employees. A set of pre-conditions would include an enriching work environment, fair pay, and investment in upgrading worker skills and responding to career aspirations. These are the very elements that would attract youth towards some vocations versus others.

To date, most employers are more tempted to receive training related technical and financial services for a selection of vocations that have a tangible 'value' such as technical quality certification (ISO, TQM, HAACP) or even basic sewing machine operation, as it cuts their own cost of pre-employment training.¹⁷ This readiness is a viable entry point, prior to enforcing a training levy law, whereby employers are asked for an additional tax or levy to finance a training fund. What is needed is a review of appropriate conditions for applying training-related taxes.

Two pre-conditions to law enforcement could include: (i) pursuing a service-based/cost-share payment vis-à-vis a tax levy, so as to establish a broader base of demand for technical and vocational training and to allow for TVET delivery capacity to rise up to standards; and (ii) legislative revision to be based on the payroll, to replace the controversial net profitability-base training levy that requires firms to pay 1% of their net profitability to finance a training fund. This training levy/tax in Egypt has been challenged as unconstitutional.

Stakeholders within any set-up tend to respond most readily once they can spot a tangible gain or at least a clear path of progression that leads to a concrete benefit. The above sets of recommendations attempt to provide stakeholders with clear incentives while holding them accountable in case they fail to fulfill their part of the bargain.¹⁸ holding them accountable in case they fail to fulfill their part of the bargain.¹⁸

Endnotes


- 1 JICA, 2006
- 2 MOTI's Productivity and Vocational Training Department offers 3-years apprenticeships.
- 3 ECES – World Bank, Cairo Office (2000)
- 4 MOTI, 2008
- 5 JICA (2006).
- 6 Data from the Ministry of Trade and Industry in coordination with EC-funded TVET project "Assistance to the Reform of the Technical and Vocational Education and Training System in the Arab Republic of Egypt" (and from the World Bank supported Skills Development Project). Seen in the joint efforts by the Ministry of Finance, Federation of Egyptian Industries and the Industrial Training Council to provide training and employment.
- 7 MOTI, 2006
- 8 *ibid*
- 9 GTZ- Mubarak Kohl Initiative (2009)
- 10 From: *Graduate Tracer Study and Attitudes of Youth towards the Labor Market in the Context of the Wider Landscape of*

- TVET in Egypt*, CID Consulting, Cairo, March 2009
- 11 Op.Cit., Mubarak Kohl Initiative
- 12 Ibid
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- 14 Heidelberg is a leading German company in the field of printing and is an internationally renowned training provider in the field of printing
- 15 Industrial Training Council,(May 2009) Council Documents.
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- 17 International Standards Organization/ISO, Total Quality Management/ TQM, Hazards Analysis and Critical Control Points/HAACP
- 18 The author would like to express sincere appreciation to the key TVET sector stakeholder for reviewing earlier drafts of the chapter and providing their feedback.

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
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Chapter Thirteen



The interdependence of factors influencing health outcomes in a vision of sustainable human development was exemplified in the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) that place health at the heart of development with health-related aspects in each of the eight Goals. The MDGs are designed in a manner where the realization of each goal can have positive returns on health outcomes. It is the present challenge of global changes and crises to recognize that health is ultimately dependent on the vitality of nature's life-supporting processes and that investment in stronger multi-sectoral public health and primary preventive capacities within national policies can provide quick and positive health returns.

Figure 13.1: Nutrition through the Life Cycle



Source: Prepared for the ACC/SCN Commission on Nutrition Challenges of the 21st Century, Jan 2000, cited in ACC/SCN 4th Report on "The Nutrition Situation: Nutrition throughout the Life Cycle".

Using nutrition as an example to illustrate the segmentation and specialization in the medical sciences — breaking them up into calories, macro and micro nutrients, or neonatology, pediatrics, adolescent health, adult and geriatrics and so forth — has been a barrier to connecting the dots for progress in human health.¹ The common denominator for linkages is a systematic 'life course' approach taking nutrition as an example (Figure 13.1). This provides the goals and informs of the interdependence. Health action is seen as a coordinated effort that necessarily extends beyond the boundaries of the health sector alone.²


Youth Health and its Measurement

Health, nutrition and the environment are presented together as they relate to adolescents and youth in Egypt through a holistic integrated 'life cycle' vision. Validated nationally representative information is provided by the recent census of November 2006 and the 2005 and 2008 Egypt Demographic Surveys. Advance information on the results of the 2009 Survey on Young People in Egypt (SYPE) undertaken by the Population Council was made available to EHDR authors. SYPE is a knowledge, attitudes and practices type of survey that provides the respondents' opinions, and perceptions of their own health and health problems, thereby allowing for comparison with scientific findings on the same issue. Other sources of information from researches and studies that may

not always qualify as nationally representative or validated were taken as indicative or to illustrate a trend in the evolution of a given health problem. In the absence of country specific information, regional type data from international data-bases are included to support the argument of the importance of risk identification, communication and management of a given issue.

HEALTH PROFILE OF YOUTH IN EGYPT

The age group of adolescents and youth is considered a period of risk when health problems with potentially serious consequences occur and problem behaviors which have potentially serious adverse effects on health are initiated. The profile of problems and risks faced during adolescence can start in childhood and merge into that of young adult life, according to the life cycle approach. Although most adolescents make the transition into adulthood in good health, many do not. Some of the health problems faced by adolescents and youth affect them during adolescence itself, such as death caused by suicide or interpersonal violence, or from the consequences of an unsafe abortion or unattended childbirth. Others manifest themselves later in life, for example chronic non-communicable diseases that are nutrition related, or lung cancer resulting from tobacco use initiated early in life, or other types of cancer resulting from exposure to carcinogenic

Figure 13.2: Traditional and Modern Risks to Health

Source: *Global Health Risks: Mortality and Burden of Disease Attributable to Selected Major Risks*, WHO, Geneva 2009

Note: Over time, risks to health shift from traditional risks (e.g. inadequate nutrition or unsafe water and sanitation) to modern risks (e.g. overweight and obesity). Modern risks may take different trajectories in different countries, depending on the risk and the content.

environmental hazards. Furthermore, the health of adolescents and youth may have an intergenerational effect. Babies born to adolescent parents, or to mothers who are undernourished, carry a higher risk of being underweight and of dying.

Globally, the health problems commonly occurring among adolescents and youth relate to malnutrition, sexual and reproductive health, sexually transmitted diseases (including HIV infection), in addition to mental health, substance use and violence. In Egypt, further additions to the list cover health problems arising from social and cultural pressure such as early marriages and female genital cutting (FGC), nutrition related non-communicable diseases (NCDs) of adult life in particular obesity, some prevalent infectious diseases such as tuberculosis and infectious hepatitis, and diseases caused by unhealthy environments (including food borne diseases), as well as environmentally induced health problems.

The disease burden of adolescents and youth is thus the result of diverse environmental, social and behavioral risk factors and is not limited to infectious agents. These risk factors have been calculated to contribute to about 24% of the global burden of disease from all causes and to 23% of all deaths. The risk portion attributable to environmental causes was calculated for the Eastern Mediterranean Region (the World Health Organization region that includes Egypt) to be from 25 to 30 %.³ Figure 13.2 represents the relation between the traditional risks to health

that are still valid in developing countries such as Egypt, on which is superimposed the risks induced by modern lifestyles, contexts and activity.

Youth Perception of Health, Nutrition and Environment Problems

A selection of SYPE results gives an indication of how adolescents and youth perceive the problems related to their health, nutrition and the environment, and provides information on some habits and behaviors.

The aspired family size is small with most respondents' replies peaking at a family size of 2 to 3 children. The majority of the respondents from all age groups seek information on puberty from parents, family, friends and neighbors, and from films, with the school and health workers playing a marginal role. For HIV infection, the media is the main source of information, with school and friends next, followed by printed materials and lastly mosque and church sources. In the case of FGC, 62 % of all ages and both sexes consider it important to circumcise girls. The same trend, commented upon in the DHS 2008 report, is also encountered in SYPE, namely, that the prevalence of FGC among the younger age groups is less than the 90% rate among the older 22 – 29 years age group. In spite of the criminalization of the FGC act in the Child Law, the operation is practiced in a small number of public sector health facilities. Homes and private clinics is where the practice generally takes place, with the number of private clinics double that for homes.

BOX: 13.1. Developing a Physical Exercise Habit for Youth

The importance of physical exercise to maintaining the acquired health capital throughout adulthood and to healthy aging is now well established. Physical inactivity is estimated by the World Health Organization (2009) to cause around 21-25% of the breast and colon cancer burden, 27% of diabetes and about 30% of the ischemic heart disease burden. The practice of various forms of physical exercise is a habit that needs to be developed during the early formative years.

However, in spite of the benefits for health and wellbeing offered by the practice of physical activities a progressive decrease in physical activities and physical education programs in schools has taken place over the past decades in Egypt and across the world at large. The phenomenon is more pronounced in poor areas and in densely populated urban collectivities. There is an urgent need to provide children and youth of both sexes (whether in or out of school) with access to physical education programs and with opportunities to practice physical activities. Frequently, these are not available in schools in Egypt, even though participation in a variety of physical activities early in life is essential for acquiring the willingness and necessary skills and experiences to maintain a regular physical exercise habit throughout life.

The provision of opportunities for physical activity for children and youth is the collective responsibility of parents, the local community, the educational system and society as a whole. The 6 years of compulsory basic education in Egypt represent a population of several millions of children across the whole country. This means that introduction of physical education programs in primary schools can lay the foundation for lifelong active living and enhance youth health and wellbeing, preventing and reducing future health problems.

The first step towards the introduction of physical education activities in schools is to bridge the knowledge gap of the policy and decision makers, teachers, parents, and other professionals and concerned groups and organizations. Concomitant community-based programs need to be initiated to guarantee equitable access to physical activities by out of school children. Though the commendable competitive performance of Egyptian girls in many types of sports at the world level is a witness of the absence of any reservations against the practice of physical activities by girls, certain measures may be needed to overcome any culture-bound traditions that may stand in the way of full participation of girls in physical activities at that young age and later as young adults. *Source: Habiba Hassan-Wassef, Background Paper for EHDR 2010*

Medically attended childbirths account for 76% of deliveries, with the *Daya* or Traditional Birth Attendant (TBA) sharing equally the remaining deliveries with the mother or mother-in-law, with obvious marginalization of the services of the qualified midwife. Breastfeeding for the first six months of life was confirmed by 86% of the women. The use of contraceptives follows the usual trend of low utilization before the first pregnancy, hence only 50% report their use among the 15-21 years' age group while only 20 % do not use contraceptives among the older 22 to 29 year olds. Radio and television head the list of sources of information on contraceptives followed by the health worker and the parents. The school plays a minor role in family planning education. Young males gave the highest score for the inability to identify a source of information on contraceptives.

The majority of the respondents, about 95%, consider

themselves free of any ailments. Anemia leads the list of diseases and complaints of the remaining 5% claiming ill health. Respiratory diseases and asthma, rheumatic disease, heart disease and high blood pressure closely follow. Smaller numbers are reported for headaches and migraine, kidney and skin diseases, diabetes, stomach ulcer, liver disease, epilepsy, bilharziasis, acne and malignant tumors. Cataract and elevated cholesterol levels are at the tail of the list. Diabetes appears more in the older age groups and is reported more by males than females. The data does not provide information on association between the reported disease conditions which commonly occurs in real life situations. The high ranking of undefined rheumatic disease on the list of declared reasons for ill health may need further investigation.

It is to be remembered that the information is that reported by the respondent and not necessarily verified. The health seeking behavior is nearly equally

divided between private practitioners and public hospitals and clinics with preference for private practitioners which increases for females of the older age group of 22-29 years. The younger age groups do not seek health care in non-profit clinics. Medication purchased without a prescription involved mainly painkillers. Antibiotics followed to a lesser extent, with anti-colic and drugs for stomach complaints closely following.

The perception of the presence of pollution was reported positive by 41% of respondents. The symptoms or complaints attributed to pollution were mainly respiratory, followed by digestive system symptoms, skin rashes, kidney disease and lastly liver disease. About 15% of respondents of all ages and both sexes reported having had an accident, with falls ranking first, followed by burns and deep cuts and physical violence and electric shocks. Males seem to be more accident prone reporting more street fights and physical violence, while females are subject to assault more often than men.

On the issue of bread consumed, it was surprising to note that a little over a quarter of the respondents mentioned that they eat home-baked bread. This is a higher percentage than that encountered in real life situations where home baking is not a regular custom and is often limited to feasts and special festive occasions. The local subsidized *baladi* bread is consumed by only half the sample. White bread is consumed in the form of *shami* bread by about 10% of the sample. The low consumption rate reported by the respondents for the subsidized bread that is iron fortified means that the targeted iron deficient child and adolescent population is only half covered.

The one week food consumption recall list reflects the basic features of the traditional composition of the Egyptian dietary system. With bread as the staple diet, Egyptians rely on cereals, legumes and on dairy products for their sources of protein, with poultry, eggs and fish (more than meat) as a source of animal protein. The reduced animal protein intake is understandable as an outcome of the avian influenza epidemic and of the current price of meat, fish and chicken, unaffordable to many.

RESULTS OF THE 2008 EGYPT DEMOGRAPHIC AND HEALTH SURVEY

In addition to the usual demographic, reproductive health, fertility, female genital cutting, mother and child health and nutrition sections of a Demographic and Health Survey (DHS) report, the 2008 report investigated a number of special issues.

There is an observed substantial increase in age at first marriage for Egyptian women. With the increase of the legal age for marriage of girls to 18 years in the new Child Law, it is expected that there will be less exposure of girls to the risk of early marriages.⁴ On the use of contraceptives, in line with the universal attitude among women in Egypt, less than one percent of the married women who had not yet had a child used family planning methods (FPMs). The issue signaled by the DHS was the number of women who discontinued the use of FPMs. The percentage of medically assisted deliveries was given as 79% with *Dayas* assisting in most of the remaining deliveries. This raises the issue which was often encountered in rural areas, of the marginalization of the qualified midwives. The findings on breast feeding showed that though the habit is nearly universal in Egypt, breast feeding practices applied to the new born immediately following birth are not optimal with the babies receiving some type of liquid (often under doubtful hygienic conditions) while awaiting the mother's milk flow to start.

Investigation of the extent and correctness of the knowledge about AIDS shows that only 7% of women and 18% of men were classified as having comprehensive correct knowledge about the disease. This indicates that serious efforts will need to be initiated to bridge this knowledge gap. A similar information gap exists about injection safety. Only 27% of women and 19% of men in the age bracket of 15-59 years had received information on injection safety. Findings about the smoking habits among the 15-59 age group showed that 1% of women are smokers compared to 44% of men. Only 39% of women and 37% of men had information on the adverse effects of second-hand smoke in the six months preceding the survey.

Results of testing the prevalence of the hepatitis C



viral infection (HCV) among the 15-29 age group showed that it started to rise at an older age, and that men seem to be slightly more exposed to infection. HCV infection was higher among rural residents and lowest in Frontier and Urban Governorates. It was found that the higher the education and the wealth, the less the risk of exposure to the HCV infection. In the case of HIV/AIDS, there seems to be a serious knowledge gap that needs to be urgently bridged, with very few of the 15-24 age group having comprehensive knowledge about the disease, or where to obtain it from, or even knowledge of a source for HIV testing. Anemia was not investigated in the 2008 survey, and the findings of the 2005 DHS reported high prevalence of anemia reaching 26% among never married males and 35% among never married females in the 10-19 years age bracket. At least half of the children were considered as mildly anemic. What was important in these results was the fact that childhood anemia in Egypt was shown to cross socioeconomic barriers.

POLICY IMPLICATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Policy Framework

Though there may not be a specific policy framework for youth and young adults as an identifiable age group of the population, significant advances have been gained for the cause of child health, development and well-being in Egypt based on a rights-based approach to satisfy children's needs. The two Child Development Decades that followed ratification of

the Convention of the Rights of the Child (CRC) in 1999 have culminated with the adoption of the Child Law and its revised version of 2008 and the creation of a ministerial portfolio for the Family and Population. The leadership role and the coordination function of the latter will be much in demand to mobilize the different sectors and promote the formulation of integrated policy and strategy formulation to attain shared youth-related objectives.

No program for improving the health and social function of youth can overlook the preventive and curative interventions directed at the first years of life, from gestation to 24 months of age, recognized as most critical to the health and well being of young adults. The Child Observatory, created by the National Council for Childhood and Motherhood in partnership with the Information and Decision Support Center (IDSC) and with UNICEF, is expected to provide — through its Under Three Years' initiative — data that can be used to guide interventions during this period.

The potential contribution of the National Council for Youth and Sports can be very valuable. The policy for creation of youth centers and community based playgrounds across the country for practice of sports and physical activities in all Governorates may need to be revisited to increase their use by the girls as well as the boys, and at a younger age. Schools without playgrounds should be able to negotiate an agreement for the use of the local Youth Center playgrounds (munic-

ipal playgrounds, or even a neighboring sports club) for conducting a sports or physical education class. This is a practice adopted by many European schools that lack playground space.

Institutional Considerations

Experience and lessons learnt from the success story of the management model of the Population Program with the specially created supra-sectoral Population Council could serve as a model for a National Nutrition Program. Much can be gained by broadening the sectoral base of actions for improving food security and nutritional status in the country. The recent creation (December 2008) of inter-ministerial Nutrition Committee for accelerating the implementation of the national nutrition policy and strategy is a step in the right direction. The Committee can serve as a policy coordination body as it brings together the main ministries concerned with food and nutrition, namely: the Ministries of Health, Agriculture, Family and Population, Social Solidarity, Trade and Industry, and Environment. However, experience has shown that a number of basic prerequisites have to be in place to prepare for this high level policy dialogue and support implementation of the resultant integrated policies in a manner that can generate synergy and complementarity between the sectors.

Social Protection

Equitable access to programs and services and equal opportunities are appreciably enhanced by social protection programs in Egypt where pockets of poverty exist in spite of the progress made in economic development and growth. The extensive social reforms initiated over the past few years provide a much needed safety net for the families with limited incomes. A review of the social reform and of the policies and strategies impacting on children and adolescents has been made in the recently completed study of multi-dimensional child poverty in Egypt (Child Poverty and Disparities Study, in press). Better targeting of those families in need, and controlled conditional cash transfer to improve the health, nutrition and educational outcomes of their young children, is an important adjunct to efforts for enhancing the health and well being of youth.

Effective Coordination

The breaking up of youth related issues and problems into sector related fragments managed by the “mandated” sector, whether health, education, sports or other, brings to the fore the need for coordination between their respective programs. The desired impact and outcome requires addressing an *inter-dependent* problem facing youth and young adults. Successful outcomes depend primarily on team spirit and the mobilization around shared objectives. The presence of information systems that are accessible to all partners and that allow the timely sharing of the data between them is a basic requirement for good intersectoral coordination. Formulation of integrated policies, good governance and accountability are the backbone of successful implementation of programs that cut across different sectors. Other contributing factors include:

- Information that is generated and shared among all sectors to support joint policy/strategy formulation and monitoring and evaluation;
- A continuous sustained policy level dialogue between the partners/sectors;
- Institutional design that can allow effective trans-sectoral collaboration at all stages of a program and at all levels, central, regional and local;
- Joint conception, design and planning of integrated strategies;
- A program implementation management model that defines responsibilities and can track accountability;
- A financial management model that can allow respect of the financial accounting rules and regulations of each partner; and
- Adoption of population-based approaches to identified problems with participation of youth as beneficiaries as well as actors for implementation of strategies developed in function of the imperatives of local contexts.

Strengthening The Youth Dimension

It is proposed to adopt a policy to revisit current national programs targeting (or potentially targeting) youth health and well being for strengthening of their youth dimensions. This may be opportune timing since three sectors, namely, health, education and

social solidarity, are in the midst of a reform process. The coordination role awaited from the Family and Population Ministry is expected to benefit from the design of the aforementioned information sharing systems, of a financial management model to facilitate accounting and accountability in jointly implemented programs, and a management model for multi-partner interventions.

UN system programs being implemented in Egypt and that target adolescents, youth and young adults should also be revisited. Initiation of activities for accelerating progress towards the realization of the MDGs will benefit the health and well being of youth, as well as programs specifically targeting adolescents and youth, whether World Health Organization programs for adolescents' health, drug dependence, reproductive health, sexually transmitted diseases, environmental risk assessment, nutrition and nutrition related non-communicable diseases (and obesity), water and sanitation, as well as UN HIV/AIDS program and UNICEF's adolescent development and participation, and communication for development programs. Now that the report has been issued, there may be a unique opportunity to analyze and strengthen the youth dimensions in the country action plan for implementation of the recommendations of the WHO Commission on the Social Determinants of Health (2008). The contribution of youth to the implementation of such a plan would be both as partners and as beneficiaries. The membership of Egypt in the Commission is an advantage.

MENTAL HEALTH AND MENTAL DISORDERS

Mental health is a state of well-being whereby the individual recognizes his/her abilities, is able to cope with normal stresses of life, works productively and fruitfully, and makes a contribution to the community or society.

The existing mental healthcare system in Egypt is focused rather on mental disorders typically evident across age groups. These are disorders that affect the behavior, thinking, emotions, perception and volition of human beings and are due to various biological, social and psychological stressors, and they need

medical attention with a psychiatrist and/or mental health professional.

While a limited number of youth may suffer from serious disorders requiring medical aid, the vast majority of young people in Egypt will not need to refer to the existing health care system. They might, on the other hand, benefit from some form of counseling, but for cultural reasons, prefer to turn to family, mentors or friends for help. Indeed, professional help at that level is missing. There are, at present, few if any trained counselors in Egypt, let alone practitioners specialized in youth services.

The Broad Picture


In Egypt, there are 29 governorates that have psychiatric and mental health services. There are four main governmental hospitals: Abbassia (opened in 1883) with a capacity of 2171 beds, El-Khanka (opened in 1913) with a capacity of 2109 beds, El-Mamoura (opened in 1967) with a capacity of 948 beds and Helwan (opened in 1979) with a capacity of 600 beds. There are also 10 smaller hospitals in different governorates. Psychiatric services are found in all 17 medical and university hospitals in Egypt. Psychiatric hospitals and services are also found in the private sector and military hospitals.⁵

A MENTAL WELL-BEING PROFILE FOR EGYPT'S YOUTH

At present, information available on youth mental well-being relies on observation, as statistical data obtainable from research in Egypt rarely distinguishing between age groups and focuses generally on the more serious mental disorders. Nevertheless, what information there is suggests that a predominant problem is social exclusion. For example, research on various aspects of social behavior has shown that levels of youth volunteerism are very low, and participation in elections remains dismal.⁶

Additionally, unemployment among youth is at an all-time high, already at 11% of the total labor force for the period of 1996-2005. Migration is a common goal, and freedom to express opinion is a desire expressed in numerous websites on the Internet.⁷ A swell in sexual harassment, rape, and secret marriage

Figure 13.3: Vicious Circle Linking Poverty to Mental Illness (Adapted from Saraceno, 2004)




gives rise to some concern, given that these occur most frequently among youth. Further, a re-emphasis on national and religious identification, visible in the proliferation of religious symbols – such as headscarves or prominent Christian crosses – indicates an intensified conservation of distinct identities among youth. This phenomenon has inadvertently given rise to countrywide distinctions largely absent in the past, and it has intensified a feeling of alienation among minority groups.

The question arises as to why young Egyptians choose not to engage more dynamically in social affairs beyond their immediate concerns. It is clear that reasons are both cultural and often exogenous. The paternalistic and authoritarian environment in which youth operate discourages participation, while lack of employment removes the opportunity for independent initiative.

The Treatment Gap

The prevalence of mental disorders is closely related to social, economic and cultural conditions. Research has shown that poverty and mental disorders feed into each other, one leading to another in a vicious circle that has to be broken either by the eradication of poverty, adequate intervention with patients with mental disorders, or preferably both (see Figure 13.3). More alarmingly, it shows that the gap between the treated and untreated with child and adolescent disorders is the greatest compared to major depression and schizophrenia, i.e. the coming generations which will hold the responsibility of the world are the ones

Figure 13.4: Treatment Gap Rates (Adapted from Saraceno, 2004)



which are the most marginalized in the provision of mental health care (see Figure 13.4).⁸

Rapid changes in Egypt provide both a threat and an opportunity for psychiatry. Cuts in government spending represent the most obvious risk to the poor. Private psychiatric services are largely targeted at the upper income brackets. On the other hand, demand for psychiatric services, both quantitatively and qualitatively, is increasing. Egypt's mental health budget is the Cinderella of the total health budget. While the total health budget ranges from 1-5% in Egypt (currently 2.5% as stated by the Ministry of Health) compared to 12% and 15% in the USA and some European countries, estimates suggest that only 1.5% of the total health budget is spent on mental health services, while the World Health Organization recommendation is 10% of the total health budget.

INCIDENCE OF DISORDERS IN EGYPT

In Egypt, the most common mental health disorders fall under the following categories:

Depressive Disorders

The prevalence of depression is perhaps one of the common psychological complaints. In Egypt, it is estimated that there are 1.2 to 1.4 million people suffering from episodes of mild, moderate or severe depression characterized by lowering of mood, reduction in energy and decrease in activity, with enjoyment, interest and concentration reduced, and commonly, marked tiredness after even minimum effort. It is also found that symptoms of depression are higher in a

rural than in an urban population, which is attributed to the vast difference in services and opportunities for youth in rural and urban areas.⁹

Similarly, there is an increase in cases of adjustment disorders arising in the period of adaptation to a significant life change or a stressful life event, whether at work or at home. Interestingly, it was found that in Europe, cases of adjustment disorder are usually secondary to work stress, while in Egypt it was found to be secondary to home and family stress. These results can be interpreted optimistically in that in Egypt, family comes first, or pessimistically, in that work is not a priority in a person's life.

Somatization disorder — or multiple, recurrent and frequently changing physical symptoms of at least two years duration — is a common characteristic of depression. Somatic presentation seems to render mental ill-health more acceptable, since psychological symptoms, as in Egypt, may frequently be culturally perceived as a sign of lack of faith and religiosity, weak personality or predominantly inflicting females.

Anxiety Disorders

The first attempt to study the socio-demographic aspects of anxiety disorders in Egypt and to apply the Arabic version of the Present State Examination in evaluating the profiles of clusters and symptoms of anxiety was in a sample of 120 patients with anxiety. The findings revealed that the most common symptoms were worrying (82%), irritability (73%), free-floating anxiety (70%), depressed mood (65%), tiredness (64%), restlessness (63%), and anergia and retardation (61%). The rarest were alcohol abuse (2%) and drug abuse (5%).¹⁰

An early study on psychiatric morbidity among university students in Egypt showed that anxiety states were diagnosed in 36% of the total sample. By 1993, anxiety states represented about 22% of the psychiatric out-patient clinic in a selective Egyptian sample.¹¹ Recently, it has been noted that some anxiety disorders are on the rise, such as social phobia, which has symptoms such as palpitations, sweating, dryness of the mouth, and blushing that occur in social situations or interactions. Interestingly, it was found

to be equal among males and females in Egypt compared to other Arab countries in which there is a marked gender difference, males having a higher incidence. This has been attributed to segregation between sexes at schools and activities, as well as religious influences and the demand in some societies that males be more dominant and responsible while females can be passive.

A crude estimate of suicide in Egypt would be about 3.5/100,000, assuming that one in ten suicide attempts ends with actual suicide. There are no exact figures on suicide as it is not reported in many cases by the families of the deceased for religious, social and cultural reasons.

A recent study attempted to find the current prevalence of attempted suicide by ingestion in a representative Egyptian sample. It showed that 64.2% of the sample was female with emotional problems, while males attempted suicide because of studies/work problems; 38.6 % of the attempters were students with emotional problems and 27 % were unemployed.¹²

Obsessive-Compulsive Disorder

Obsessive-Compulsive Disorders (OCD) are recurrent obsessive thoughts that enter the patient's mind again and again in a stereotyped form or compulsive acts or rituals that are repeated again and again. This was once believed to be a rare condition. An early study in 1991 conducted in Cairo of 1,000 psychiatric patients attending a university clinic showed an incidence of OCD of 2.3%, indicating the stability of the prevalence of the disorder over time.¹³

A study was conducted to determine the prevalence of obsessive-compulsive symptoms among Egyptian students. Prevalence rates for psychiatric morbidity, obsessive traits and symptoms were 51.7%, 26.2% and 43.1 %, respectively. Obsessive-compulsive symptoms were more prevalent among younger students, females and first-born participants. Aggressive, contamination and religious obsessions and cleaning compulsions were the most common.¹⁴

In the Arab World and in Egypt, people with OCD

wait an average of 10 years before seeking help since most of the obsessions and compulsions are of a religious nature and are believed to be because of poor faith. In Islam, *weswas* or compulsive thoughts and behavior are attributed to the devil (OCD also uses the Arabic word *weswas* to describe obsessions). As a result, many patients refer to religious scholars and sheikhs before turning to psychiatric help.¹⁵

Substance Abuse

Heroin abuse is traced to 1985 and peaked in 1988, where 1335 kilograms were seized. The average amount of heroin seized annually is about 50 kilograms. This represents about 10% of the consumption. If we calculate that the average daily intake is 1/4 to 1/2 gram per addict, we would therefore estimate about 7-10,000 heroin abusers in Egypt in a population of 70 million. For the last 5 years, opium and cannabis plants have been locally planted, especially in Sinai. Cocaine is rarely used where the amounts seized annually range from 500-1000 grams.

An integral part of the work of the National Council for Addressing Narcotics in Egypt is an assessment of the national size of the problem. Surveys were conducted as early as 1998 among secondary school pupils, male and female university students and industrial workers regarding their drug habits. The results revealed that, on average, the most abused substance was nicotine, followed by alcohol, hashish, stimulant drugs, tranquilizers, hypnotics and finally opium. Female university students abused fewer substances than male university students, except in the case of tranquilizers and hypnotics, where the prevalence was similar.

Understanding the pattern of abuse is crucial for developing any strategy that claims to address the issue. Why is it that people abuse substances in the Egyptian context? A study reports different reasons for the different user categories. For secondary school students, the main reason was entertainment on social occasions and socializing with friends – the substance mostly used being hashish. Sedatives and hypnotics were the next most frequently abused substances in situations of physical exhaustion and fatigue, as well as to cope with psychosocial problems

or difficult working conditions as well as at times of studying and exams.¹⁶ For university students, the pattern was relatively similar with a greater tendency to use hard drugs. Industrial workers tended to use hashish and opium for recreation and psychoactive substances to overcome exhaustion and to cope with psychosocial problems.

Egyptian surveys have found a gradual increase in the consumption of alcohol among Egyptians with a prediction that it will become the most common abuse in the next few years. It is interesting to note that although alcohol is religiously prohibited in Islamic countries and despite its availability in Egypt compared to the Gulf countries, the incidence of alcohol abuse is much higher in the Gulf states, where its sale is prohibited.¹⁷

A comparative study on drug abuse among youth in general secondary school and technical education was part of a series of studies of the Permanent Program for Research on Drug Abuse. The sample was comprised of 12,969 students (4 percent of the total population) from general secondary education and 11,966 students (2 percent of the total population) from technical secondary education. The study identifies the reasons behind the continued use of drugs. Youth in the less prestigious technical education stream experience far more drug abuse (i.e. drugs, cigarettes and alcohol) than those in general secondary education.¹⁸

Availability of drugs may be a large driver behind these findings. In the case of cigarettes, for instance, youth in technical education identify failure in education, experiencing pain and availability of cigarettes as the main factors driving them to smoke. Fortunately, the figures show that only a quarter of those who continue to use drugs from both groups experience addiction or dependence on drugs. The majority of the sample use drugs occasionally, with a small minority using them on a regular basis.

In a more recent study on the lifetime prevalence of substance misuse in Egypt, a community survey as a multistage study in 8 governorates, found the life time prevalence of substance abuse to be 9.6%, including

3.3% experimental and social use and 4.64% regular use; 1.6% of the sample was diagnosed with substance dependence and the prevalence of substance use in males was 13.2% and 1.1% in females. The study also stated that the age range from 16 – 19 showed the highest onset of substance use, with cannabis being the drug mostly misused in the study, followed by alcohol, pharmaceuticals, opiates and stimulants.¹⁹

Women: A Special Case

Several studies have indicated that women are disproportionately affected by mental health problems and that their vulnerability is closely associated with marital status, work and roles in society.²⁰ These findings have been widely replicated worldwide. The aim here is to shed light on some social elements that contribute to women's psychological distress. However, since those elements constitute part of a woman's everyday life, they are often overlooked together with the psychological ailments they may produce.

Depressive disorders account for close to 30% of the disability from neuropsychiatric disorders among women, but only 12.6% of that among men. Several studies suggest that anxiety in women tends to increase with age and with decreasing socioeconomic status. Anxiety has been described as fear of anticipated future loss; depression is described as a reaction to perceived loss. Fear of loss of face, esteem, respect, status, love, income, attachment, being fired and retiring all reinforce insecurity and create a perceived inability to predict or control outcome.²¹ Described that way, anxiety may not be an altogether inappropriate response, given the life situation of many women in our country and region – women, young and old.

Factors that have been found to put women at risk of depression include infertility, domestic isolation, an unhappy marriage, physical or sexual abuse, powerlessness and poverty, all being associated with higher prevalence of psychiatric morbidity (exclusive of substance disorder) in women. Other factors include sexual and reproductive problems and domestic violence.

Gender Roles and Psychological Distress²²

A Passive Life Partner to the Man

It is one of the basic principles of Arab and Egyptian culture that the man has the major responsibilities in making important decisions. Decisions like getting married or obtaining a divorce must be endorsed by the father or the husband. Giving away vital personal and life detrimental decisions to another person puts Egyptian woman in a passive, observant position to events happening to her and her person. The position of being passive observant to painful events is similar in many ways to the learned helplessness model described as one of the dynamics of depression.

Forced Dependency

In the Arab culture, a woman cannot choose to be independent even if she is able to. There is a simple rule stating that no woman is expected to live alone. The sense of entrapment can be a source of much stress contributing to the state of helplessness. An unmarried woman is so uncomfortable in her single status that she might accept any offer of marriage. That would especially be the case when she is facing a cruel father or a rejecting brother. But even when this is not the case, a divorced Egyptian woman is stigmatized among her family and neighbors, and no matter what the reason for the divorce she always has to live the guilt that it was her fault she could not maintain that marriage.

The Less Privileged Partner

There is a common but equally erroneous belief that traditions and social norms in the Arab world and Egypt are derived from the religious teachings of Islam. Prohibition of sexual freedom and the extreme punishment for it is, however, an Islamic tradition that equally treats both males and females. Extramarital sex is just as prohibited for males as for females; however, the culture does not frown on male's extramarital sex but considers the same action by a female often deserving of no less than death. This double standard is the core dynamic to many issues that are dealt with in psychotherapy.

The spectrum of violence, of which women are either directly or indirectly the victims, extends from the private to the public. Violence against women may originate in symbolic cultural practices with long standing traditions or as an expression of the existing

gender relations, which allow for this violence without major social condemnation.

Culturally Determined Gender Violence

One of the most contested cultural traditions is female circumcision or female genital mutilation performed by mothers and adult women upon female children as part of ritual initiation into the status of womanhood in Egypt and elsewhere. Negative health consequences of circumcision are said to range from high rates of urinary tract infections to vaginal tearing, fistulas and damage to the vagina and urinary tract during childbirth and sexual intercourse.

Most of the attention given to health problems related to female genital mutilation concentrates on the physical aspect, with little attention to the psychological problems. Psychological problems include nightmares, shock, passivity and feelings of betrayal. These emotional disturbances lead the way to some psychiatric disorders like Post Traumatic Stress Disorder, with an estimated high rate of up to 30% of cases. There are no exact figures for the incidence of emotional or psychological effects, but it is probable that this would be small in communities where social pressures are strongly in favor of female circumcision. Conversely, in such circumstances, the uncircumcised girl may be the object of disapproval and derision.²³

No studies have been conducted in Egypt to measure the effect of the trauma. The psychological complications of female genital mutilation may be submerged deeply in the girl's unconscious. In light of this, public health departments and women's movements in Egypt have recently sought ways to curtail the practice and have brought about changes. New laws have prohibited the practice of female circumcision, but will that be enough to change the cultural traditions?

Domestic Violence

The vast majority of victims of domestic violence are women. When the violence is between spouses, 98% of the time, it is the wife who is assaulted. The private nature of this form of violence, and the shame, guilt and social taboos associated with it means that much remains hidden, not only from the public but

from family, friends and health care practitioners. This makes accurate information on the prevalence of domestic violence difficult to obtain.

An early Egyptian study revealed that 32% of a sample of 500 women of low and middle social class, some of whom were university graduates, was beaten by their husbands.²⁴ Half of them were beaten hard enough to require medical help. The Egyptian Demographic Health Survey of 1995 reported that one out of three married Egyptian women has been beaten at least once since marriage and one-third of those were beaten during pregnancy.²⁵ Domestic violence remains a serious public health problem and is a major contributor to psychiatric symptomatology. A study carried out by the Egyptian Centre for Women's Rights Health Demographic Survey in 2000 found that one out of three women were subjected to violence, 40% of them during pregnancy.

Rape

Rape is a masculine predilection, an act of violence in which women figure not as victims but as objects. The psychological consequences of rape in societies where a young woman's worth is equated with her virginity are particularly ruinous. Women who are raped are socially wasted. Their ruined reputation cannot be amended. A pre-marital sexual relation is said to spoil something intrinsic in their physical and moral person. Until recently, Egyptian law allowed rapists to marry their victims, in which case their punishment would be withdrawn. Fortunately, this provision has been removed from Egyptian law upon advocacy work of women's organizations in Egypt. The attitude behind such legislation focuses on virginity and physical trauma, overlooking the considerable mental trauma for a woman. The strong cultural stigma attached to rape means that women survivors of sexual violence are often reluctant to seek medical assistance or to file police reports. Even when incidents are reported, effective responses may not be forthcoming, since many people hold women responsible for being raped.

Sexual Harassment²⁶

A recent study of 2000 Egyptian participants (50% males and 50% females) as well as 109 foreign women

living in Egypt, conducted in the three governorates of Cairo, Giza and Qalyubia, found that 48% of Egyptian, whether veiled or not, and 51.4% of foreign women of all ages were subjected to sexual harassment. However, 62.2% of the male sample indicated that women in the age group 19-25 years old were more susceptible to sexual harassment.

The study showed that 90% of Egyptian women, 78% of foreign women and 59% of males reported that the harasser did not distinguish between victims in regards to economic class. The study concluded that working women are most likely to be subject to sexual harassment, followed by female tourists, housewives and the mentally disabled.

Sexuality, Delayed and Secret Marriages

Sexuality is a central aspect of being human throughout life and it encompasses sex, gender identities and roles, sexual orientation, eroticism, pleasure, intimacy and reproduction. Sexuality is experienced and expressed in thoughts, fantasies, desires, beliefs, attitudes, values, behaviors, practices, roles and relationships. While sexuality can include all of these dimensions, not all of them are always experienced or expressed. Sexuality is influenced by the interaction of biological, psychological, social, economic, political, cultural, ethical, legal, historical and religious and spiritual factors.²⁷

A study in Egypt on youth²⁸ found that one third of the females and half of the males were unmarried, and while most single women were economically dependent on parents, single men exhibited varying degrees of dependence that could even include support and contribution to the family. Sixty-four percent of all males and 35% of all females surveyed reported the reason to marry was love, while 31% of females reported that the marriage occurred because it was arranged, (more acceptable for females than males).

Single females found 21.7 years to be an appropriate age for marriage while engaged/married females found 17.7 to be appropriate; single males found 25 years to be an appropriate age for marriage while engaged/married males found 22.6 to be appropri-

ate. It is worth noting that 37% and 18% of males and females, respectively, were likely to remain unmarried beyond the age of 30, and those figures jumped to 60% and 47% for those with post secondary education. Insufficient financial resources and the desire for career success were the most common impediments for young males to marry, while the desire for further education and the lack of opportunity for introductions were most common for females.

The incidence of marrying too young — that is, below the age of 14 years — was found to be concentrated mainly among females who had low education attainment levels and/or were residents of rural Upper Egypt. Those married at young ages were also most likely to reside in the same house as the parents.

Relationships outside of an official marriage appear to be on the rise, with a third of males and a quarter of females reporting such relationships, and 13% of males and 3% of females reporting knowing someone whose relationship involved sexual relations. Secret, or *urfi*, marriages (undeclared, unregistered) were found to be subject to social stigmatization. Nevertheless, 4% of youth had a secret marriage, with the figure rising to 6% of university students. This phenomenon is often found to be a compromise solution to the financial impediments to marriage as well as to the religious and cultural stigma of sex before marriage.

Aggression in Youth

Aggression refers to behavior that is intended to cause pain or harm to another. Violence, on the other hand, is the expression of physical force against the self or other, such as in the destruction of property or goods.

There are several determinants of aggression and violence:

- *Social factors*, which include frustration. In Egypt, this can be frustration in not receiving a decent education or job, being unable to get married, and the perceived inequality in the provision of justice. Direct provocation from others, as well as exposure to aggressive models, are also important determinants of aggression.²⁹
- *Situational factors*, which include increased physiological arousal as seen at demonstrations,

soccer matches and competitive activities. Group and crowd dynamics can play a part. Exposure to sexual arousal through films or pornography can increase aggressive behavior.

- *Environmental factors* which include increased pollution, noise and overcrowding, poor transportation, and Egypt's hot climate are all factors present in most of the cities of Egypt.

Language and Culture

Our cognitive schemata and thinking are dependant on language which gives us the ability to communicate, update our knowledge, appreciate abstract ideas, build up logical sequences and develop aesthetic values. Language is also an essential component in the formation of a person's national identity. Currently in Egypt, language takes many shapes: As a base, there is the high classical Arabic of the Quran, which differs from the everyday vernacular spoken at home or school, modified and simplified in the press, or juggled around in songs and popular culture; added to these usages is the new hybrid cyber language of the computer, mixing Arabic with new technical terminology, often in Latin script. There is concern that this chaotic combination affects youth's ability to clearly express thoughts and ideas in some form of collective shared language.

This trend has been exacerbated by the choice of the upper and upper middle classes in Egypt to move children's education from the national to private foreign education provided by, for example, British, American, French, German, and Canadian schools. These teach at all levels in a foreign language and their qualifying exams for higher education are not in Arabic. This, in turn, has lead to a dilemma. Mastering languages other than Arabic, while practical in a globalizing world, can also distance young people from their own culture and from large segments of their own population by reducing their mastery of their mother tongue.

Further, deterioration in the teaching of the Arabic language has created a generation of students who are unable to use the Arabic language properly. Numerous studies have confirmed that the use of a mother language during the years of education has a marked influence on the sense of pride in belonging to a society or a country. The question arises as to what extent the evolution or transformation of traditional Arabic usage can be seen as a drawback or a loss to the awareness of national identity, or whether it indicates, rather, an expansion of such an identity.

Spirituality and Mental Health

The spiritual dimension is often overlooked as an aspect of health, particularly mental health. Spirituality and religion are often used interchangeably. A working definition of both could argue that religion is the outward practice of a spiritual system of beliefs, values, codes of conduct and rituals. These provide a context and a framework to socially accepted behavior.

Unfortunately, cultural and religious approaches now appear to have become a part of what goes on in the name of mental health practice in many countries. But there are two lurking dangers in this approach:

The first is that of ethnocentricity or the belief that "my culture is the best" and the second is the danger that mental health procedures might move away from their scientific roots, which are the basis on which medical practice is built. The rise in religiosity and ritual behavior observed across Egypt today points to the need for a set of values that make sense of the world. Science and technology have made our lives easier, but they do not teach us how to live. The struggle between traditional faith and modernity has yet to play itself out, but it is clear that for young people, a spiritual framework can be an added asset to mental well-being.

Endnotes


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Chapter Fourteen

HOUSING AND TRANSPORTATION: A YOUTH PERSPECTIVE



Housing and transportation services are among the crucial services that affect daily life, including that of each young person, whether to fulfill the basic human need of acquiring suitable shelter, or for commuting to work or to other daily activities. This chapter focuses on the existing progress of the National Housing Program adopted by the Ministry of Housing, Utilities and Urban Development (MOH), and recommends ways to efficiently benefit youth. The chapter also highlights the access of youth to housing and basic services in informal settlements. It then moves to discuss the 1000 poorest villages program and how this can effectively benefit youth. The chapter ends by analyzing transportation challenges facing youth and how these affect their living conditions and access to work and basic services, with recommendations for improving this vital service to the benefit of the younger users.

Table 14.1: Distribution of Housing Units According to Seven Axes of National Housing Program

| Axis | No. of units built (1000s) | No. of units under construction (1000s) |
|---|----------------------------|---|
| Owned units in Governorates/cities (Tamleek) | 117 | 110 |
| Providing small land plots for individuals in cities (Ibni Beita) | 89 | 0 |
| Providing land for private developers to build 63sq.m. housing units | 16 | 20 |
| Units with 30-40 sq.m. for mostly deprived groups | 4 | 43 |
| Rental units of 63 sq.m. in Governorates, new cities and Awkaf land | 4 | 12 |
| Owned rural housing units in Governorates and villages in desert hinterland (Tamleek) | 4 | 3 |
| Owned family houses in 6th October City (Tamleek) | 1 | 2 |
| Total | 235 | 190 |

Source: Ministry of Housing, 2009

STATUS OF THE NATIONAL SOCIAL HOUSING PROGRAM

Four years from the beginning of implementation, the National Housing Program is moving towards realizing its target of 500,000 units within a six year period. As of end of December 2009, 235,000 units and land plots have been built or delivered to beneficiaries, while some 190,000 units are under construction. The program has been implemented through seven axes — among which three axes are *Ibni Beita* land plots, rental and owned housing units, and private developers — are considered the most important and widely applied. Table 14.1 shows the distribution of units built according to each axis.

This sites-and-services model initiated by the Ministry of Housing (MOH) in 2006 is to be developed in the 18 new cities and urban communities. Each household is allowed to build a maximum of a ground plus two floors on 50% of the 150 square meters land plot. The serviced land price asked of households is LE70 per m² (compared to an average of LE150 per m² as indicated by the Ministry, for infrastructure cost recovery). The land price is payable over 10 years, with a 10% down-payment, a 3-year grace period, and the balance in annual instalments over 7 years without interest. The LE 15,000 upfront subsidy is disbursed in three stages, tied to construction progress.¹

By the end of the fourth year of the National Democratic Party (NDP) electoral program, the Ministry of Housing had delivered 89,000 land plots within the new cities, distributed as shown in Table 14.2. In addition, the Ministry has been keen to provide those

Table 14.2: location of Ibni Beita Units

| City | No. (1000s) | City | No.(1000s) |
|------------------|-------------|---------------------|------------|
| 6th October | 39.7 | New Menia | 5.7 |
| 10th Ramadan | 15.9 | New Asyout | 5.2 |
| Badr | 2.3 | New Salhia | 0.6 |
| New Nubaria | 1.6 | New Fayoum | 2.3 |
| Sadat | 3.7 | New Sohag | 2.4 |
| New Burg El-Arab | 1.5 | New Aswan | 1.5 |
| New Beni Suef | 5.6 | New Valley | 1 |
| Total | | 89.000 units | |

Source: Ministry of Housing, 2009

Table 14.3: Distribution of Ibni Beita Units

| Type of Services | First Phase | Second Phase | Total |
|----------------------|-------------|--------------|------------|
| Schools | 17 | 26 | 43 |
| Health units centers | 26 | 31 | 57 |
| Shopping malls | 42 | 14 | 56 |
| Kindergartens | 18 | 17 | 35 |
| Sports Centers | 3 | 0 | 3 |
| Total | 106 | 88 | 194 |

Source: Ministry of Housing, 2009

new communities with basic social services such as schools and health care units, constructed in parallel with the development of the housing units in two main phases. The distribution of those services is shown in Table 14.3.

Rental and Owned Housing Units in Governorates

The total number of units built so far has reached 89,000 units in addition to 95,000 units under construction. The selection of sites, tendering, management of construction and units allocation are the

responsibilities of the governorate, while the Ministry of Housing is basically the financier of the process through allocating the nominated grant for each unit (LE 20,000) based on real evidence of construction delivered by the governorates.

Private Investors Housing Projects

The Ministry of Housing has allocated about 6300 feddans through this axis, of which 5300 feddans have been used for the construction of 63 m² units, while the remaining area has been utilized for the construction of units with an area less than 120 square meters. Currently, 66 private companies are building 21,000 units in several new urban communities with the expectation that this will provide more than 263,000 units within the coming five years. In addition, the Ministry of Housing in 2008 started the allocation of land plots to be used for middle-income housing to be developed by housing cooperatives, syndicates and government bodies.²

Evaluation of the National Housing Program as it Impacts Youth

The introduction of new housing options has enhanced housing market diversification for low income youth households. The smaller 35m² rental units give an affordable option for the lowest income groups who do not have enough savings for a down-payment on a homeownership unit and are very income-constrained. The larger 63m² rental units attract moderate income youth households with a preference for a starter home, with a 5-10 year lease duration, and do not have the required down-payment for ownership. Moderate-income youth households with a preference for homeownership and with the ability to provide a down-payment have options in the new urban communities and governorates 63m² ownership units. Finally, middle-income youth households with the ability to afford higher down-payments and secure larger loans would represent the best target group for the *Ibni Beita*k option or could acquire existing units developed by the private sector.

Another innovative step, offered by the Ministry of Housing for the owners of *Ibni Beita*k land, has been to enable those who are willing to build a second unit for a qualifying household to access a second National

Housing subsidy.³

Despite the innovative approaches adopted by the government and the significant efforts to enhance the subsidy mechanisms in order to reach the targeted groups, especially young people, there are major concerns over the sustainability of such efforts:

- The National Housing Program (NHP) is proving to be very expensive for the government. The total direct subsidy for each single unit within the original 500,000 units is estimated at LE 32,500. This subsidy includes the direct upfront grant allocated for the unit (15,000LE), the difference between the actual price of land served with infrastructure (150LE/m²) to the sold price (70LE/m²), in addition to differences in total construction cost of the unit due to increases in building materials prices. This is apart from the indirect subsidies, such as the opportunity cost of unserviced land and below-market rate financing. Adding those indirect subsidies brings the overall bearable cost by the government for each unit to LE 52,000. This subsidy can exceed LE 70,000 for the 63m² rental unit.
- The decision to extend an equal LE15,000 upfront grant for all NHP qualifying households contradicts the progressive subsidy policy approach in which governments would provide a higher subsidy share of unit cost for lower-income households, in line with their affordability, versus a lower subsidy share for products targeted at households with relatively higher incomes. Yet, the reality after accounting for other subsidies extended under the program is that the beneficiary of a product such as *Ibni Beita*k, receives the largest direct subsidy amount per unit.
- The current global economic crisis has contributed to slowing down the unprecedented increase in the price of building materials that took place before the crisis. However, the forecasted increase in construction costs will likely pose a great budgetary challenge for any housing program in the coming years given that most subsidy programs within it are tied to specific income levels and unit price targets. Accordingly, pressure is likely to build on the government to fill the gap with additional subsidies.

Box 14.1: The Housing Market and Youth

The housing market in Egypt had seen a number of market-oriented reforms started by President Sadat in 1974. This was crowned by Law No. 4 of 1996 which allows landlords to sign definite duration contracts, and known in the housing market as “the new law rent” compared to the traditional unlimited period contracts known as “old law rent.” Both SYPE (2009) and ELMPS (2006) surveys have indicated the significance of this law and the overall set of reforms in the housing market. While the share of old rent housing in the housing market dropped from 14.2% in 2006 to 7.5% in 2009 among married males aged 18-29 years, the share of new rent housing rose from 4.5% in 2006 to 10.7% in 2009.

The growth in new rent housing in 2009 is tangent to a wide and different variety of young groups. This pattern of housing is gaining increased attention in rural areas. SYPE shows that it seized 5.5% of the housing market in rural areas, compared to only 2.4% measured in the ELMPS. In addition, the new rent contract is becoming more attractive to all classes. The survey showed that the middle class benefited the most from this law as its members account for 47% of new rent housing. However, SYPE also shows that other classes, even the rich, utilize this law, as the richest 40% of married males aged 18-29 accounted for about 50% of new housing contracts.

This suggests that young people find this new pattern of housing contracts a satisfactory solution to overcome the largest bulk of marriage costs. According to ELMPS, one-third of the total cost of marriage is allotted to initial housing costs. Assaad and Ramadan (2008) based on the 2006 ELMPS prove that the marked decline in age of first marriage is partly due to the increased availability of new rent housing since the 1996 housing reforms. This reflects the importance of these reforms on length of the ‘waithood’ period, specifically for marriage formation.

The other marked change in the housing market is the increase in housing ownership. The share of owned housing among married young males aged 18-29 years rose in the period 2006-2009 by 60%. The share of owned housing is now 78% in the total housing market in 2009. The national housing project cannot explain this growing demand because beneficiaries do not exceed 1.5% of ownerships among married young males aged 18-29 years. *Source: Mohamed Ramadan, IDSC*

Another concern is affordability, since some axes of the NHP (such as the private sector axis) require a contribution by young people that is beyond their financial means. This is coupled with the fact that the mortgage loan, a main channel to acquire financial support apart from a government direct grant, is constrained by a stipulation in the Mortgage Law that restricts monthly repayment to 25% of household income.

With a maximum loan amount still ranging from LE 30,000 to LE 45,000, youth beneficiaries are obliged to make down-payments of between LE 23,000 to LE 40,000, significantly above the LE 5,000 envisioned in the NHP. Unless the affordability constraint is resolved, it is likely that there will be leakage of units to higher income households. There would definitely be growing pressure to increase subsidies to keep the units affordable to the less affluent target group in any future housing program adopted by the government.⁴

IMPROVING THE EFFICIENCY OF SUBSIDIES TO REACH TARGET GROUPS

Given the remarkable success of the ongoing National Housing Program so far, the Ministry of Housing has adopted plans to support this innovative program by:

- Increasing the contribution of the private sector in the various social housing schemes; in this respect, ‘base of the pyramid’ housing for the poor have been developed by private sector companies in Egypt, notably by Orascom and ADAPT;
- Moving towards a more efficient mortgage-linked finance system with the government in providing housing for the most deprived groups;
- Developing the institutional framework for the policy of subsidized housing which complies with and reflects the subsidy mechanisms and its annual budget on the national level;
- Enabling more decentralized management within governorates or new urban communities according to general guidelines set by the Ministry of Housing;

- The National Democratic Party in its 2009 housing working paper has emphasized the need to adopt subsidy reform to better reach the real beneficiaries and avoid current distortions, in addition to providing flexible and various subsidy packages that are affordable to different income groups.

Strengthening the mortgage-linked finance scheme appears therefore crucial for a future subsidy program. A new scheme of upfront household subsidies should be part of a comprehensive package to finance a unit including a mortgage credit and household down-payment. Increasing access to housing finance will increase the ability of lower-middle and middle-income households to purchase housing and thus allow the government to focus on implementing housing programs for the low-income.⁵ This is critical because there is potential for the private mortgage market to serve a large portion of the middle and lower-middle income households with much less subsidy (and with the ability for segmentation among beneficiary groups) than in the traditional, supply-side government housing programs.

Such measures would enable the government to concentrate its limited resources on those who need them most. The advantages of such a program are that:

- The subsidy benefits the consumer directly, rather than indirectly through a subsidy to developers – this generally improves the efficiency and transparency of household subsidies;
- It increases the ability of middle and lower-middle income groups to access credit and hence lowers the amount of needed subsidy; and
- It allows expanding mortgage markets to play a pivotal role in increasing the housing supply.

However, mortgage-linked subsidies are only feasible for households that are creditworthy and for properties trusted as collateral by lenders. In the Egyptian housing market, this means that a large proportion of households deserving of a subsidy cannot be served through such a program. Consequently, it needs to be complemented by alternative subsidy programs that cater to those households excluded from mortgage lending – for example, sites-and-services projects

that combine a serviced land with a subsidy, self-help construction with access to micro-loans, subsidized rental housing, as well as such instruments as guarantees and contractual savings schemes for access to mortgage finance by qualifying households with undocumented/irregular income.⁶

Finally, there is a need to promote an improved system for private sector development of subsidized housing. The ongoing private sector scheme has drawn several lessons. Among them are introducing pre-determined unit sales price targets, sharing commercial risk with private developers, improving land and subsidy disposition, and improving the monitoring of project outcomes by the Ministry of Housing.

THE NATIONAL PROGRAM FOR IMPROVING THE POOREST 1000 VILLAGES

In a concerted effort to eradicate poverty in rural areas and enable youth to acquire their basic needs of housing and social services, the government in 2008 launched a national program to improve living conditions of the most deprived families in the poorest 1000 villages in Egypt by providing access to basic urban services. The program is being implemented by several ministries (Ministries of Housing, Local Development, Education, Social Solidarity, Environment, Transportation, Health, Family and Population, and Higher Education), as well as central authorities (Social Development Fund, National Councils for Sports and Youth, National Post Authority and National Authority for Illiteracy Eradication).⁷

The Program includes 14 different aspects with the objective of reaching higher standards of infrastructure and social services, including:⁸

- Improving the water supply and sanitation;
- Upgrading of health services and emergency and ambulance facilities;
- Improving the quality of basic education and raising the standard of other education levels;
- Widening social support and services for critical cases;
- Housing the most deprived groups;
- Upgrading of youth and sports services;
- Eradicating illiteracy in groups between 15-35

- years of age;
- Providing civic protection services;
- Providing job opportunities through small loans facilities;
- Improving environmental conditions and dealing with solid waste;
- Upgrading local road networks connecting villages;
- Upgrading the postal services;
- Preparing detailed development plans for these villages; and
- Enabling the participation of NGOs in implementing the program.

A total of 1141 villages will benefit from the program, with a total population of 12 million. They are placed as a top priority in the investment plans of all ministries involved. 151 villages in 24 local units in six governorates, with a total of 1.5 million inhabitants, have been selected as the first phase of the program to be implemented in a three-year period.

Several implementation steps have been achieved or are underway. For instance, the Ministry of Housing has allocated LE 4.2 billion for improving the water supply in these villages and a few poorest urban areas in the fiscal year 2009/2010. The project will end in two years. In addition, 102 projects for sanitation are planned to be finished in these villages in the coming two years, with a total investment of LE 1.2 billion.⁹

Under the National Social Housing Program, the Ministry of Housing plans to construct about 42,000 new housing units within these poorest villages, mainly for young families. Construction of 27,000 units with a total cost of LE 1.4 billion will be implemented in the coming three years. The units enjoy the same privileges as the housing program.

The Ministry of Health has covered the 151 villages with ambulance and emergency services in addition to constructing or upgrading 40 health care units together with 153 units under implementation. The program will extend to cover a total of 576 health units within the poorest villages with a total budget of LE 1.1 billion.


The Ministry of Education has now finished 100 schooling projects in addition to another 123 projects to be finished by 2010, with a total budget of LE 500 million. The Social Fund for Development has allocated LE 128 million for small-scale projects in addition to LE 63.2 million in form of grants for public works and community development projects.

Finally, the program concentrates on creating job opportunities for youth through a small loans facility. In 2008, LE 10.7 million was allocated for 270 small projects which have generated 755 new jobs. In addition, LE 22.2 million for 6647 very small projects created 7,975 new jobs. By 2009, the numbers increased to LE 54 million for small and very small projects.¹⁰ Already, an analysis of households within the pioneer 151 villages has revealed that there are more than 22,000 women-headed families, who in all probability are suffering from gender-related unemployment and absence of economic security. These loan facilities should help alleviate poverty by creating income-generating opportunities.

This innovative 1000 villages program is considered to be one of the most effective national attempts to target the poor by combining and integrating the efforts of all concerned ministries and central authorities. However, given its large size and multiple dimensions, the program requires an efficient project management setup with a continuous monitoring and evaluation mechanism to ensure objectives are met in a timely manner and that obstacles are overcome on the way. It is anticipated that this ambitious undertaking will cover the total number of 1141 villages over a period of 10-12 years.

HOUSING STATUS OF YOUTH IN INFORMAL SETTLEMENTS OR AASHAWIYAT

It is estimated that at least 45-50% of the urban housing stock in Egypt faces problems such as vacancy, rent control, and informality. Informal housing stock represents great potential for providing affordable and flexible alternatives for low and middle income groups, especially among youth and newly established families, since it offers a wide variety of financial models starting from an upfront down payment



linked with long term monthly instalments, to rental units for a limited period that could extend up to 10-12 years.¹¹

It is also estimated that within the informal sector, there are thousands of existing units on the market. Construction continues to be strong, and there are a considerable number of semi-finished and vacant units. Greater Cairo alone has at least 500,000 such units out of a total of one million units in urban areas. El-Khosous in Qalyubia Governorate (north of the Greater Cairo region) represents one of the largest informal settlements in Egypt with a population of more than 300,000 inhabitants, and has more than 65,000 vacant units that are expected to be occupied mainly by those young and newly established families who cannot afford the price of units within the Cairo and Giza Governorates.¹² Accordingly, the largest potential stream of affordable housing supply, especially for the young, lies through this existing stock.

Many individuals and small developers operate within the informal sector to meet the growing housing demand of lower income households. While the majority of units are of relatively good quality, a large number do not have access to adequate public infrastructure. Constrained by high building and zoning standards, as well as a bureaucratic and costly permitting process, informal settlements represent the de facto housing choice of poor and sometimes middle income groups. Unable to access the housing

units or lands offered by the National Housing Program, many young people find that informal housing is the only available option that meets their financial means. However, since they are officially illegal with no ownership documents, the informal housing stock cannot benefit from any official subsidy or privilege offered, whether by the Ministry of Housing through the National Housing Program or by financial institutions such as banks or mortgage companies.

If a new national housing policy is to have wider coverage and lead to more affordable housing solutions, more focus is needed on addressing the constraints facing the vast private informal housing market and on how to integrate it into the formal housing mechanism in order to open up more channels of housing supply for youth.

Allowing the use of the proposed mortgage-linked subsidies for existing units in informal areas would drastically increase the number of units on the market within the income band targeted under the coming phase of the National Housing Program and introduce a product that could compete with the new construction of private sector units, thereby also serving as an efficient way of ensuring timely delivery and competitive unit pricing by developers. Consequently, in the next phase of the NHP, the government should consider incorporating informal settlement upgrading into the range of subsidy products for low-income households.¹³

Box 14.2: Life in Informal Districts of Cairo

Informal areas are not inhabited only by the poor. Authorities declare that almost 17 million Egyptians live in informal areas around cities. That figure includes many more than just the very poor. Studies reveal the profile of informal areas to include a wide spectrum of socio-economic groups; its resident could include street vendors as well as judges. Residents of informal areas include government employees, workshop owners, and artisans, as well as professionals such as doctors and lawyers. A common pattern is the family-owned apartment building, with may be one or two poorer tenants renting on the ground floor. Who else lives in informal areas? Those with low car ownership (in many areas only 10% of residents own a private car); those who use mass transportation for their main means of transport; people many Egyptians meet on the street; the waiter, the taxi driver, a colleague at work or the fellow next to you at university. In short, almost any Egyptian may live in an informal area.

Housing research since the 1980s in Egypt has focused on the problems of informal areas, hardly attempting to explicitly address the advantages that have made this sector grow faster than any other housing sector in the country. Informal areas are a 100% self-financed, self-help housing mechanism. They are demand-driven, incremental in growth, compact in form, low-energy-consuming, with an efficient mixture of uses allowing work-home proximity and district self-sufficiency in terms of daily and seasonal needs. Advantages of these areas include the 'walkability,' the convenience, safety, social solidarity, and resident participation. Outcomes of such things have great significance, where for example, the non-chaotic distribution of commercial uses allows people to walk where they need to (decreasing pollution from vehicles, saving money spent in transportation costs, and increasing social inclusion/co-existence of various groups in the public domain which is the seed for community building). Consequently, safety comes in the form of social solidarity, appropriation of space and self-policing (which saves the government money in the decreased need for administration), and resident participation gives rise to feelings of ownership, self-empowerment, and purpose. Inhabitants of these informal areas also describe them as 'popular districts' that are lively and friendly, however they are not oblivion to the want in quality of self-provided services such as private un-regulated collective transportation means. What they want from the government is acknowledgement (of those private initiatives) and partnership in domains where they cannot help themselves, such as solid waste management and infrastructure maintenance; "pick up where I leave" sort of partnership. What are missing are regulations that respect such private initiatives, that enable those working solutions to continue yet with improvements, instead of abolishing them in the name of modernity and development.




Source: Dina Shehayab, Housing and Building National Research Center

This proposed upgrading scheme to integrate the existing housing stock in informal areas within the formal market should be combined with improving the living conditions within those deprived areas and improving the quality of life for citizens by overcoming problems such as solid waste disposal, lack of basic social services, inefficient infrastructure, accessibility to, from and within the area, and pollution.

A survey among two thousands households living in Greater Cairo conducted in 2009, focusing especially on those living in informal and deteriorated areas such as Nazlet El-Samman, Old Cairo, Boulaq El-Dakrouir and Matariyah, highlighted the problems facing those families and priority of intervention required from government according to citizens.¹⁴ Figures 14.1 and 14.2 illustrate the result of the survey.

Citizens expressed their expectations of government towards their neighborhoods, as shown in Figure 14.3. They suggested that the main role of the government should be providing infrastructure, solid waste disposal, public transportation, securing unsafe areas and removing pollution, such as that from uncollected garbage. The survey indicated that the citizens do not see any existing activity from the non-governmental/communal sector, but the vast majority believed that this sector could play a crucial role in social services, job creation and environmental development activities.¹⁵

The government has recently taken an important step towards institutionalizing the upgrading of informal settlements in Egypt through the creation of the Informal Settlements Development Fund (ISDF)

Figure 14.1: Main Problems Facing Households in GCR**Figure 14.2: Priorities for Improvement According to Citizens' Preference****Figure 14.3: Envisioned Role for Government in Improving Informal Settlements**

Source: GOPP, 2009-2

headed by the Minister of Local Development. A lump sum of LE 500 million has been allocated to the ISDF in a revolving fund to be utilized for the development of those areas on a cost recovery basis. This would come through improvement of those areas especially in prime locations within cities, as well as making use of part of the land after upgrading in covering the total expense of improvement activities.

Two different groups of informal settlements has been identified by ISDF, insecure areas which represent a danger to the life of their citizens, and unplanned areas which represent the vast majority of informal settlements in Egypt – these contain well constructed buildings in non-hazardous locations but lack basic services and efficient road networks. The ISDF has set the improvement of the insecure areas as an intervention priority with the objective of developing them over 10 years. It has finished a national map identifying the location, size and population of all insecure areas in all Egyptian governorates together with a proposal for priority of intervention. A total of 404 areas with a total of 212,000 units have been classified as insecure areas, among which 154 areas with a total of 66,000 units have been identified for the first phase of intervention in the coming five years. However, such a massive program will require an efficient communication strategy to raise the awareness of the public and to offer flexible alternatives for allocating those families living in dangerous areas.

ACCESS TO TRANSPORTATION AND THE IMPACT ON LIVING AND EMPLOYMENT

Urban transport represents one of the most critical challenges facing urban development in Egypt. Citizen's mobility within the major urban centres is one of the daily problems contributing to traffic congestion, especially in Greater Cairo and Alexandria. On both the national and regional levels, the railway system remains the main means of public transportation and provides daily service for millions of citizens. However, due to long dereliction, this important service has reached a critical stage that has forced the government to place it on the top of the development agenda within the last four years. Despite this attention, a substantial improvement in this sector will not be realized before five years due to lack of required financial and human resources.

While highly diversified, in terms of supply and related infrastructure and facilities, Greater Cairo Urban Transport System suffers major inefficiencies which can be described as follows:

- Aggravated traffic congestion: Cairo is experiencing traffic congestion that places it among the worst in the world. It is estimated that the average speed of vehicles in peak hours in central areas does not exceed 12 km/hr. This has serious economic consequences, given poor mobility, especially among youth in their trips to/from work, and contributes to air pollution.

- **Poor public transport system:** Cairo relies on underdeveloped, overcrowded and unreliable public transport services. The only acceptable facilities are the two underground metro lines. Other public transport systems such as buses and omnibuses are totally outdated and do not meet the actual demand both qualitatively and quantitatively. Public buses are poorly maintained and many are out of service. This has left room for private operators of mini and micro buses to dominate the public transport system all over Cairo, as in other major Egyptian cities. In addition, the large number of operators and the lack of an institutional or organizational framework to properly manage and regulate the system have led to a lack of integration among passenger transport modes and the rapid development of very low quality and unsafe supply.¹⁶
- **Transport conditions are worse when related to new urban communities around Cairo** such as 6th October, Obour and New Cairo cities. Based on the experience of several young people from these outlying cities, it costs each individual about LE 150-200 more in transport per month than those living in areas within Greater Cairo. This is as a result of the need for at least two additional trips per destination, usually by the more expensive private micro-buses. This significantly affects the accessibility of higher education or job opportunities to young people living in these new cities. The situation is even more complicated for women who are frequently reluctant to apply for jobs due to difficult mobility to/from new cities. Although several private universities and factories have offered means of transportation to their students, staff and workers, the majority still must rely on private transport modes such as micro buses.
- **A high accident rate:** The road transport death rate in Cairo is very high. According to a World Bank study, at least 1,000 persons die each year in motor vehicle accidents, more than half of them pedestrians, and over 4,000 are injured.¹⁷
- **Air and noise pollution:** Air pollution in Cairo is serious. Noise levels are high and aggravated by a large proportion of old cars and taxis. Vehicle inspections that should limit exhaust gas pollution are mostly ineffective.¹⁸
- **Institutional weaknesses and fragmentation:** Cairo currently suffers from highly fragmented, largely uncoordinated and inadequately staffed institutions to deal with urban transport problems of this magnitude. Several ministries and public authorities are responsible directly or indirectly on different transportation, roads and traffic management. Mostly, there is hardly any coordination between those bodies.
- **Inadequate financial arrangements:** Inadequate financial arrangements lead to under investment in transport facilities, especially in public transport capacity which suffers major shortages, in inadequate cost recovery and consequent excessive subsidies for urban public transport, and in little participation of formal private sector in financing and/or managing urban transportation infrastructure and services.¹⁹

After several decades of dereliction, public transportation became a priority on the government agenda within the last five years. Huge investments have been pumped in to improve the national railway system and highways. However, the road to satisfactory status is still very long. In Greater Cairo, following the Urban Transport Master Plan of 2002, the government is currently engaged in implementing several mega projects such as the third underground metro line, improvement of the ring road, together with starting the construction of the regional ring road and other corridors to connect new urban communities with the urban agglomeration. Further, several studies are underway to connect new communities with rapid public transportation means such as the 'supertram', 'bus rapid transit' and electric trains within the coming ten years.

However, recent experience gained since 2002 suggests that there is need to put an even greater emphasis on people's mobility through public transport systems, as well as on traffic and demand management and that their successful implementation requires even more efforts on institutional restructuring and human resource development. The resources required for infrastructure development, proposed in the Urban Transportation 2009 Adapted Plan for Greater Cairo, exceed LE 70 billion. This calls for more rigor-

ous investment prioritization on the basis of objective economic criteria and cost effectiveness.²⁰

There is, therefore, an urgent need for the government to develop and implement a more sustainable financing framework for the urban transport sector. This should include application of adequate user charges policies to reflect, to the extent possible, actual transport costs for all transport modes. Although, the social objective of making public transport affordable hinders the revisiting of public transport fares, it can be better achieved at lower cost by using more effective public transport modes (high capacity and mass transport systems), efficient transport operators (concessions/lease to private operators) and more appropriate subsidy schemes to those who really need them.²¹

It is believed that the transportation problem in Greater Cairo will substantially be improved by increasing the current share of Cairene citizens of underground metro lines – in Cairo the share is 4 km/million inhabitants compared with cities like Bangkok (20 km/million inhabitants), Sao Paulo (31 km/million inhabitants), Moscow (30 km/million inhabitants), and Paris (150 km/million inhabitants). Although the government is currently focussing on implementing the third line of the underground metro to be finished by 2017, in addition to starting the implementation of the fourth line in 2011 to be finished by 2020, more rapid action is required to improve the existing critical situation of transportation in Greater Cairo such as:

- Improving public and large-capacity bus facilities. There is an urgent need to develop a competitive, well organized, mostly formal high capacity bus-based transport supply. The restructuring of this sector should concern private mini-buses and the large public bus companies in particular. The proposed restructuring has to consist of gradual ‘formalization’ of the informal sector (through an adequate regulatory and incentive framework) and rapid commercialization of the public sector bus operations (concession and contracting out of reorganized parts of the bus network).²²
- This would directly benefit the many young people represented in the ownership or operations of informal micro-buses and offer new job opportunities within newly established companies. It is also suggested that an upgrading program of bus dedicated facilities (bus stops, dedicated lanes, priority at selected intersections, bus information system) be implemented to increase the productivity of the overall system, improve the quality of bus services and encourage a modal shift toward increased use of the public transport system at the expense of private cars.
- Finally, the provision of priority bus rapid transit is proposed as a cost-effective solution to providing capacity in corridors that connect Cairo with new cities, such as 6th October, and New Cairo, possibly to be upgraded later to a fixed rail system with more capacity. These new projects of high capacity mass transit systems can be structured to attract the private sector through appropriate concession/leasing arrangements.
- Improving transportation and traffic management. The government of Egypt has recently decided to establish the Greater Cairo Regional Transport Management Authority under the direct supervision of the Cabinet to be the main body responsible for managing traffic all over the region. This covers, among other responsibilities, setting the tariff for different modes of public transportation, issuing a unified ticket between different modes, approving the routes of all modes and their connections, monitoring and evaluation of traffic flow, and suggesting mega projects required for traffic improvement within the region.
- Embarking on an efficient parking program. The government should carry out a wide program for establishing multi-story off-street garages linked to the on-street paid parking program. This program can be implemented with an enhanced role for the private investment and operation under public-private-participation arrangements. Well-located parking garages could be provided by the private sector at little cost to government if an adequate parking management framework is in place as well as a transparent competitive bidding process for provision and operation of these facilities. Such a wide scheme can provide large numbers of jobs for youth in managing, operating and maintaining those facilities.

Endnotes

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|----|---------------------------|----|--------------------|
| 1 | NDP,2009 | 12 | GOPP, 2009 |
| 2 | ibid | 13 | World Bank, 2008 |
| 3 | Ministry of Housing, 2009 | 14 | GOPP, 2009-1 |
| 4 | World Bank,2008 | 15 | GOPP, 2009-2 |
| 5 | ibid | 16 | World Bank, 2006-1 |
| 6 | ibid | 17 | World Bank, 2006 |
| 7 | NDP, 2009-1 | 18 | Ibid |
| 8 | Ibid | 19 | Ibid |
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| 10 | Op.cit. | 21 | World Bank, 2006 |
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Chapter Fifteen

CONSTRUCTING A YOUTH WELL-BEING INDEX



The culmination of a country's awareness of the importance of progress in human development can be considered as the time when it is ready to design and reach consensus on a broad set of indicators that measure the well-being of society or a subset of society and that can be summarized in a single index. The UNDP Human Development Index first appeared in 1990 as a single number that captured elements of income, health and education indicators and was hailed as introducing a more complete measure of human welfare than the income indicator of GDP per capita could alone. Today, many countries and organizations including UNDP are still striving to formulate new, more integrated and comprehensive measures of well-being. Over time, the process has moved from having the HDI, which integrates three variables, to having indices for multidimensional poverty, gender welfare, child welfare and many others. The process has reached a stage where more and more of the components used in measurement try to capture the non-material aspects of well-being.

In this chapter, a first attempt is made to identify and quantify indicators of youth well-being and to then aggregate them into a proposed Youth Well-Being Index. The purpose is to move beyond those variables and indicators which are available for such dimensions as education, health, income, gender, political participation, access to ICT, and so on. What will be more difficult and yet very important will be the measurement of such things as leisure and well-being, employment and the quality of jobs, and even the dynamics of the family including social capital and cohesiveness.¹

OBJECTIVES AND PRIORITIES

There are three objectives in preparing a Youth Well-Being Index (YWBI) for Egypt. The first is to provide a mapping of levels and severity of youth deprivation from basic rights and basic needs; the second is to situate Egypt's youth in a time and space perspective so as to measure progress over time as well as compare the status of Egypt's youth with youth in other countries; and the third is to disseminate the results and raise awareness among all social actors of the relevance of each indicator and encourage public debate. The first objective is to collect and process all relevant information and variables so as to provide a profile of youth in the chosen age bracket (18-29) and their status in terms of key human rights and basic needs. The most important of these which are recognized and already available are selected from among the 48 indicators related to the MDGs, mainly on poverty, education, health, gender and environment. Implicitly, this aspect of the index is a judgment on the level of deprivation affecting youth of both sexes. This also helps identify and select what the most important priorities and options are for policy making.

The second objective is to provide a benchmark from which to measure progress over time as well as make comparisons between Egypt and other countries. This would mean answering three key questions which are germane to the inquiry on any Human Development Index: Is Egypt making progress with regards to the well-being of its youth citizens? Which elements of the Index are responsible for that progress and which are responsible for impeding progress and deserve increased action? And where does Egypt rank among

other developed and developing countries overall and with regards specific indicators?

The third objective is to raise awareness among policy makers, civil society, and the general public about the meaning and relevance of each element in the index as well as its overall magnitude. For policy makers, benchmarking indicators provide a measuring stick by which to set targets for improvement. For civil society, these indicators become the focus whereby activism is used to pressure for attention to various issues and problems. As to the general public and the media as opinion-makers, the Well-Being Index, domains and indicators become a tool to sensitize all segments of society of such problems as gender discrimination, drugs, crime, obesity and others.

The adoption of a multidimensional concept of youth well-being presumes two things: The first is that an equitable distribution of capabilities and opportunities should be attained for all of Egypt's youth, and the second is that both older and younger generations alike must bear an equal responsibility for preservation of the environment, citizen safety, community values, positive aspects of culture, good governance and agency.

DEFINING AND MEASURING POVERTY

Poverty measurements discussed in this study include both economic measures of poverty based on monetary measures as well as a range of outcome measures reflecting the health and survival and the education and personal development of youth. Monetary and non-monetary approaches of defining poverty are complementary rather than competing approaches, and both are considered. It is true that income alone is not sufficient to provide children or youth with the education and health care they need, but it is also true that adequate provision of such services alone cannot guarantee that they will utilize such services. Utilizing public social services is not costless; households should have enough income to use these services. For instance, there are transportation costs as well as time off work that are involved in going to obtain health care services. There are also obviously close links between shelter deprivation and low income. On the other hand, ignoring income deprivation may

lead to the exclusion of income enhancing policies and programs which are essential for poverty reduction, whatever the definition of poverty.

Measuring youth poverty (see Chapter 6) is not only done within the context of lack of income, since some non-poor households – according to the financial measurement – can suffer from deprivation of some services and capabilities. Therefore, youth poverty measurement is related to deprivation measurement, by which a series of basic services and capabilities can be determined and the number of youth with no access to these services and capabilities is then measured.

A rights-based approach to addressing the needs of young people in poverty is particularly valuable for four reasons. First, a rights perspective provides a greater focus on the root causes of poverty by highlighting the importance of specific rights and the obstacles to realizing those rights. Second, using a rights-based approach makes it easier to specify the criteria for measuring outcomes rather than mere outputs. Third, governments and other agencies under a rights-based approach need to give attention to the processes involved in working out priorities for action – this usually means involving the poorest, as far as practicable, in the development and implementation of public policy to give effect to their rights. Finally, the rights-based approach can encourage governments and NGOs to monitor the delivery of basic services to see whether they are reaching the poor.

Youth living in poverty face deprivations of many of their rights: Rights to survive, learn, work, participate, and be protected (Tables 15.1 and 15.2). In order to operationalize this rights-based approach to youth poverty, and analogous to the UNICEF approach of child poverty, the study uses a series of indicators to measure youth's access to seven rights (water, sanitation, healthcare, flooring, crowdedness, education, and information). Where a young person does not have access to one of these rights, it is described as a severe deprivation. The term 'absolute poverty' is used for cases when an individual has been exposed to two or more severe deprivations. The dimensions and indicators employed in this study are as follows:

- *Water deprivation:* Youth 18-29 using water

from an unimproved source such as an unprotected well, unprotected spring, surface water (for example, rivers, streams and dams), tanker truck or cart with small tank or who it takes 30 minutes or more to get water and come back.

- *Sanitation deprivation:* Youth 18-29 who live in households with pit latrine, bucket toilet or no facility, or, used modern flush toilet, traditional tank or traditional bucket flush and in the same time the drainage system is piped connected to canal, or to ground water or no drainage system.
- *Floor deprivation:* Youth 18-29 who live in dwellings with no flooring material (for example, a mud floor).
- *Crowdedness deprivation:* Youth 18-29 who live in dwellings with five or more people per room (severe overcrowding).
- *Information deprivation:* Youth 18-29 with no access to radio, television, telephone, or computer at home.
- *Education deprivation:* Youth 18-29 who had never been to school or who dropped out before completing their primary education.
- *Health deprivation:* Ever married women aged 18-29 who gave birth during the preceding five years before the survey (EDHS, 2008) and did not receive antenatal care during their last pregnancy from a doctor or nurse or midwife, or who did not receive any tetanus injection during that pregnancy (last pregnancy).

Income Measures of Poverty

Income is universally an important element, even while most agree that money metrics are too narrow to capture all relevant aspects of poverty. Income poverty is known as the material incapability of securing a decent standard of living (providing basic needs) based on which an individual's status is defined as poor or not. Determining who is poor requires a definition of poverty and the poor. In order to do this, two questions must be answered: First, what living standard indicator should be used to measure the standard of living, and second, how can one differentiate between the poor and the non-poor? In other words, the definition of poverty calls for choosing a criterion to measure the standard of living and defining the poverty line that divides the society into the poor

Table 15.1: Most Deprived Youths by Youth Characteristics

| | Crowdedness | Floor | Sanitation | Water | Information | Education | Health | Income Poverty |
|--|-------------|-------------|--------------|----------------------------|----------------------------|-------------|-------------|----------------|
| Total (%) (Average) | 1.2 | 10.9 | 3.7 | 2.6 | 2.2 | 17.2 | 15.2 | 23.2 |
| <u>Individual Dimension</u> | F 25-29 Yrs | M 18-22 Yrs | M 23-24 Yrs | M 25-29 Yrs F 18-22 Yrs | M 25-29 Yrs F 25-29 Yrs | F 25-29 Yrs | F 25-29 Yrs | M 18-22 Yrs |
| <u>Household Dimension, Household size</u> | 7+ | 7+ | 7+ | Less than 3 | Less than 3 | 7+ | 3-4 members | 7+ |
| <u>Household Dimension, Head's education</u> | None | None | Some Primary | None | None | None | Secondary + | None |
| <u>Geographic Dimension, Region</u> | Rural UE | Rural UE | Rural LE | Frontier governorates | Rural UE | Rural UE | Rural UE | Rural UE |
| <u>Residence</u> | | Rural | Rural | Rural | Rural | Rural | | Rural |

■ 25%-50% worse than the average ■ 50%-100% worse than the average ■ Over 100% worse than the average

Source: Calculations based on DHS 2008

and the non-poor. In this regard, the classification of individuals as poor and non-poor must not depend on the individual's class. According to Ravallion, 1991,² the diagnosis of poverty and the poor characteristics must be coherent, meaning that the poverty line must have a fixed value over time, between regions or between different social categories. Therefore, the coherent comparison between individuals means that any two persons of the same real consumption level are being classified as poor or non-poor regardless of time or space.

The poverty line in Egypt was constructed using a cost-of-basic-needs methodology. This method yields poverty lines that are household-specific, objective, regionally consistent, and use unbiased absolute poverty lines (World Bank, 2007). A food bundle is constructed such that it is consistent with the consumption of poor households and reaches the calorie requirements. A bundle is defined for individuals in different age brackets, gender, and activity levels (using tables from the World Health Organization). The cost of these food bundles is then established. This is known in Egypt as the Food Poverty Line (FPL). Households whose expenditure is below the

Table 15.2: Correlates of Severe Youth Deprivations

| Region | Severe Deprivation | Absolute Poverty | Income Poverty |
|-----------------------|--------------------|------------------|----------------|
| Urban governorates | 15.5 | 2.1 | 8.2 |
| Urban LE | 14.3 | 1.3 | 8.8 |
| Rural LE | 33.5 | 7.4 | 19.3 |
| Urban UE | 22.2 | 4.9 | 22.7 |
| Rural UE | 59.6 | 23.7 | 44.3 |
| Frontier governorates | 32.8 | 11.8 | 19.4 |
| <u>Residence</u> | Severe Deprivation | Absolute Poverty | Income Poverty |
| Urban | 17.3 | 2.8 | 12.4 |
| Rural | 44.9 | 14.5 | 30.6 |
| <u>Sex and Age</u> | Severe Deprivation | Absolute Poverty | Income Poverty |
| Total | 33.1 | 9.5 | 23.2 |
| Male | 27.0 | 5.8 | 25.5 |
| 18-22 Years | 25.9 | 5.5 | 28.5 |
| 23-24 Years | 27.7 | 6.1 | 24.7 |
| 25-29 Years | 28.2 | 6.0 | 21.3 |
| Female | 39.0 | 13.2 | 20.8 |
| 18-22 Years | 31.6 | 10.1 | 24.0 |
| 23-24 Years | 38.6 | 13.5 | 19.1 |
| 25-29 Years | 48.6 | 16.9 | 17.4 |

Source: Calculations based on DHS 2008 and HIECS 2008

Table 15.3: Estimated Average per Capita Food & Total Poverty Line (LE per year), by region, 2008-09

| Region | Food Poverty Line | Total Poverty Line |
|--------------|-------------------|--------------------|
| Metropolitan | 1,715 | 2,284 |
| Lower Urban | 1,613 | 2,177 |
| Lower Rural | 1,687 | 2,278 |
| Upper Urban | 1,581 | 2,158 |
| Upper Rural | 1,602 | 2,170 |
| Egypt | 1,648 | 2,223 |

FPL are referred to as “extremely poor”. A second poverty line was also constructed by augmenting the FPL with an allowance for expenditure on essential non-food goods. This results in what is called the Total Poverty Line (TPL). Households spending less than the TPL are considered “poor”. The extremely poor are thus a sub-group of the poor.

On average, a person who spent less than LE1,648 per year (LE134 per month) in Egypt in 2008 was considered extremely poor and those who spent less than LE2,223 (LE185 per month) were poor. Poverty lines vary by the number of persons in a household, the age of household members, as well as regional differences in relative prices. Children living in households whose consumption is below one of the poverty lines are also considered poor or extremely poor. Table 15.3 shows the consumption levels of food and total poverty lines for different regions in Egypt.

INTERNATIONAL APPROACHES TO THE WELL-BEING INDEX

This section of the chapter reviews a number of approaches, frameworks and methodologies that are in use internationally and which have been considered when preparing Egypt’s Youth Well-Being Index. The United Nations has a large Programme on Youth that began in 2005 as well as a work-in-progress set of indicators (Box 15.1). Another interesting and comprehensive multidimensional poverty index is that of the Oxford Poverty & Human Development Initiative. Further, Ireland, Canada, Brazil and Bhutan are among some of the countries that provided valuable frameworks and approaches for consultation.

Oxford Poverty & Human Development Initiative

The Oxford Poverty and Human Development Initiative (OPHI) is a research center at the University of Oxford. OPHI aims to build a more systematic, methodological and economic framework for poverty reduction. Essentially, OPHI’s purpose is to build a multidimensional framework for reducing poverty, one that is grounded in the experiences and values of individuals. Two current research themes at OPHI are: Identifying missing dimensions for poverty measurement and developing survey modules in various countries, and examining issues relating to comparisons of multidimensional poverty and applying new methodologies in various countries. The ultimate goal at OPHI is to allow decision makers and policy advocates to most effectively make advances in the field of human development.

The focus on missing dimensions of poverty data is one particularly impressive research area at OPHI. They have found that while there exists a great deal of data for the measure of human development, there are still gaps related to internationally comparable indicators of rather important dimensions. The goal at OPHI in this regard is to advocate for collection of data for indicators on the missing dimensions of development that in fact matter most for the poor. Thus far, five dimensions have been identified, including employment (both formal and informal employment, and with particular attention to the quality of employment), empowerment, physical safety, the ability to go without shame (emphasizing the importance of freedom from humiliation), and psychological and subjective wellbeing.

Ireland’s Child Well-Being Index: A Comprehensive and Valuable Source

A key objective for Ireland’s National Children’s Strategy of the year 2000 was the identification of a set of child well-being indicators which would form the basis of their State of the Nation’s Children report. The compilation of the inventory of existing domains and indicators helped define priorities for the national set of child well-being indicators; the results were later published in the 2005 Report on the Development of a National Set of Child Well-Being Indicators

Box 15.1: Youth and the United Nations

The UN Programme on Youth (UNPY) aims to build an awareness of the global situation of young people (youth are defined by the United Nations as those between the ages of 15 and 24) and promote their rights and aspirations; UNPY also aims to achieve greater participation of youth in decision making, primarily for the achievement of peace and development.

In 1985, the UN General Assembly observed International Youth Year, drawing attention to the importance of recognizing the potential contributions of youth to the goals of the UN Charter. Ten years later in 1995, the UN strengthened its commitment by adopting an international strategy, namely the World Programme of Action for Youth to the Year 2000 and Beyond (WPAY). Yet another ten years later in 2005, UNPY organized a meeting of experts with the goal of developing a set of Youth Development Indicators. The group (consisting of representatives from youth organizations, UN agencies, intergovernmental organizations, academia, and policy advisers) provided input for the draft set of indicators aimed at measuring the development of youth over time.

The group defined a set of indicators for the 15 areas outlined in the WPAY – these indicators measure the development of youth, compare the progress in and between countries, identify areas that need greater attention, encourage the collection of data related to youth, enhance advocacy efforts for more investments in youth, and advance the possibility of developing a comprehensive Youth Development Index (YDI). As such, the group of experts provided a set of proposed indicators which culminated in the work-in-progress set discussed here. The 15 areas of priority are grouped into three clusters: Youth in a Global Economy, Youth in Civil Society, and Youth at Risk. The YDI is as follows:

General Demographic Info

Total population 15-24 years
Youth as % of population
Percent of youth ever married

Education

Youth literacy rates
Gross enrolment ratio sec. edu.
Net enrolment rate sec. edu.
Gross enrol. rates tertiary. edu.
Transition rate to gen. sec. edu.

Employment

Youth unemployment rates
Ratio youth:adult unemp rates
Youth emp-to-population ratios
Youth labor force participation

Hunger and Poverty

% severely underweight youth
% of underweight youth
% youth in absolute poverty
% youth in poverty

Drug Abuse

Lifetime prevalence of drug abuse among youth

Leisure

Health

Adolescent fertility as % of total fertility
% in-union young women using contraception
Maternal mortality ratio
Top 3 reported deaths by cause for youth
Probability, for a 15-year old, of dying before age 25

Environment

Percentage of youth severely deprived of water
Percentage of youth severely deprived of sanitation
Percentage of youth severely deprived of shelter

Juvenile Delinquency

Rate of children admitted to closed institutions
Age people are held liable as adults for transgression of law

Participation

Voting age
Legal min. age of marriage without parent consent
Existence of National Youth Council

Girls and Young Women

% of women undergone FMG

Globalization

Ratio of international youth to adult migrants
Internationally mobile students in ter. edu.

ICT

Proportion of young used computer in last 12 months
Proportion of young used the Internet in last 12 months

HIV/AIDS

HIV prevalence rate in youth
% youth with full, correct knowledge HIV/AIDS
% youth who used a condom at last high-risk sex

Armed Conflict

Est # of youth refugees

Intergenerational Relations

Median age of population

and subsequently followed by updated information in the State of the Nation's Children Reports of 2006 and 2008.

Initially, many widely used measures of child well-being were identified, including infant and child mortality rates, mental health problems, teenage fertility and sexual behavior, tobacco, alcohol and drug use, child poverty, children as perpetrators and victims of crime, and participation in education. The key domains for conceptualizing child well-being, namely demographic characteristics, economic status, education, family, school and community context, health and safety, and social, emotional and behavioral development, were highlighted. Furthermore, several challenges to developing the national set of child well-being indicators were identified in the review, including the difficulties in identifying indicators allowing for international comparisons, the different understandings or focus on single specific phenomenon, and the imbalance in the availability of data for all periods of childhood from infancy to adolescence.

The national set of child well-being indicators in Ireland allows for assessment and description of the condition of children growing up in Ireland, identification of children who are at risk (and require preventative services) or have avoided risk (and thus provide an example of what does work), monitoring child outcomes over time, implementation of policies and programs, and evaluation of the success or failure of policies, as well as the resource investments in selected programs. Ireland's well-being index for children took the perspective of the child being an active participant in shaping his or her own life and nine dimensions were identified, as follows: Physical and mental well-being, emotional and behavioral well-being, intellectual capacity, spiritual and moral well-being, identity, self care, family relationships, social and peer relationships, and social presentation. Further, the indicators⁴ cover such specific areas as abuse and maltreatment, accessibility of basic health services, attendance at school, availability of housing for families with children, community characteristics, crimes committed by children, economic security, environment, infant health, mental health, nutrition, participation in decision making,

pets and animals, public expenditure on services for children, relationship with parents, family and peers, self-esteem, self-reported happiness, sexual health and behavior, things to do, and values and respect.

The Canadian Index of Well-Being

The Canadian Index of Well-Being (CIW) is another useful example that was consulted when developing the proposed Index for Egypt. The CIW goes far beyond the usual economic measures to cover such areas as standard of living, health, quality of the environment, education and skill levels, time use, vitality of communities, participation in the democratic process, and the state of arts, culture and recreation. Moreover, the Index highlights connections among the important areas and draws linkages between domains. At present, the CIW provides three detailed research reports on different categories of well-being, namely living standards, healthy populations, and community vitality; it also provides a first report that connects the three specific reports to include highlights and summaries. Furthermore, the Index includes domains related to arts, culture and recreation, civic engagement, education, environment, and time use; the related reports were still to be developed at publication and will be used in the composite CIW.

The Case of Brazil

Brazil has also created a General Youth Well-Being Index (GYWI) comprised of three sub-indices, namely the General Well-Being Index, the Child-Youth Well-Being Index, and the Youth Well-Being Index. Brazil's Well-Being Index aims to measure how well the youth of Brazil are transitioning into adulthood, a task deemed difficult due to the multi-dimensionality of youth behavior and the complexity of tracking progress over time. The goal of such an undertaking was that the methodology would be used in Brazil to estimate the indices every year, allowing policy makers and society at large to track the well-being of its youth. Brazil's General Well-Being Index includes all the indicators that were deemed valuable and the Youth Well-Being Index includes only indicators that pertain to youth aged 15-24. All three indices are the Brazilian adaptation of the US-based Child-Youth Well-Being Index.⁵ Brazil used five broad categories in its Well-Being Index: Health, Behavior, School



Box 15.2: Gross National Happiness Index of Bhutan

There are four strategic areas that were initially defined in the design of the multidimensional GNH Index. These four areas are: Sustainable and equitable socio-economic development; environmental conservation; preservation and promotion of culture; and good governance. These core objectives have been translated into nine dimensions which are equally weighted, such that each is considered relatively equal in terms of its intrinsic importance.

| | | |
|---------------------------------|---------------------------|-------------------------------------|
| <u>Psychological Well-Being</u> | <u>Cultural Diversity</u> | <u>Folk and Historical Literacy</u> |
| General Psychological Distress | Dialect Use | |
| Emotional Balance | Traditional Sports | <u>Living Standard</u> |
| Spirituality | Community Festival | |
| | Artisan Skill | <u>Ecological Diversity</u> |
| <u>Time Use</u> | Value Transmission | Ecological Degradation |
| | Basic Precept | Ecological Knowledge |
| <u>Community Vitality</u> | | Afforestation |
| Family Vitality | <u>Health</u> | |
| Safety | Health Status | <u>Good Governance</u> |
| Reciprocity | Health Knowledge | Government Performance |
| Trust | Barrier to Health | Freedom |
| Social Support | | Institutional Trust |
| Socialization | <u>Education</u> | |
| Kinship Density | Education Attainment | |
| | Dzongkha Language | |

Box prepared by Defne Abbas for the EHDR 2010

Behavior, Institutional Connectedness, and Socio-economic Conditions. The number of indicators totaled 36, of which 25 were used in the Youth Well-Being Index and 28 were used in the Child-Youth Well-Being Index.

Bhutan Provides a Unique Well-Being Framework

Bhutan’s development vision incorporates far more elements from culture, spirituality, ecology, emo-

tional well-being and community, alongside the western-based concepts and measures of material living standards, health, education, and governance.⁶ What is exciting about its conceptual approach and practical application is that it recognizes that the purpose of life is more than just the fulfillment of material satisfaction. Many countries around the world are now looking at the Bhutan model and its measures, and Egypt would do well taking the challenge and adopting a similar approach, fusing the cultural and spiri-

tual alongside the material aspects of well-being.

The term gross national happiness (GNH) was coined as far back as 1972 by the King of Bhutan, and it has obviously been consistently followed, such that the country had improved on all of its human development outcomes to now stand as a middle income country. Bhutan's overarching goal of gross national happiness appears in its Five Year Plans as 'the single unifying idea that guides the nation's long-term development.' The goal of GNH was first articulated in Bhutan's Constitution as a key principle. Along with happiness, poverty reduction is also considered a primary goal in the country's tenth Five Year Plan (2008-2013). It has taken several years to identify the measures used in calculating the GNH Index and to quantify those variables, many of which require citizens' introspection and personal value judgment. In parallel, Bhutan has designed a holistic framework of development and system of prioritization that can also serve as a guide for allocating resources according to GNH screening tools and targets (Box 15.2).

Whereas some dimensions of Bhutan's GNH Index are common with well-being measures from around the world, such as living standard, health, education and good governance, what is new and interesting are the dimensions pertaining to emotional well-being, which includes indicators of emotional balance and distress as well as spirituality (which is deemed valuable for an individual's happiness). The second interesting dimension is that of community vitality, which includes indicators on the family as well as the neighborhood. Family-related indicators relate to the individual's access to a direct support system, with – for example – value being attached to the proximity of relatives living in one's neighborhood. Community-related indicators measure the extent to which community values, such as trust, social support and socialization, are enjoyed by the individual. The dimension of cultural diversity is especially important for countries that enjoy multiple ethnicities, such as the use of different dialects in Bhutan, and yet it also captures the importance of traditional artisanal skills and cultural expression which are important to all countries, including Egypt. Finally, the ecological diversity dimension

covers environmental awareness as well as physical measures of ecological degradation.

IDENTIFYING DOMAINS AND INDICATORS FOR EGYPT'S YOUTH WELL-BEING INDEX

The choice of domains for Egypt's proposed Youth Well-Being Index is based on a review of the limited number of similar exercises that are being conducted or have been completed and are in use across the world. Those models that were closely studied include UNDP's work-in-process as well as the models utilized in Ireland, Canada and Brazil. In terms of the number of domains, the framework is such that each should represent a cluster of indicators or elements that are homogenous and that together provide as faithful a profile of youth as possible for that domain. As to the indicators themselves, they are selected according to their significance while ensuring that there is little overlap between them.

Although it is possible to take account of many dozen elements, indicators and domains, experience suggests that it is safest not to over-extend the total number in order to make the exercise manageable. At the other extreme, it is also recommended that there should be a sufficient number of domains and related indicators so as to cater for the needs of various stakeholders in the policy-making and civil society spheres. For example, the Ministry of Education would feel responsible and able to identify problems and issues as reflected in the education domain and all its elements/indicators for communicating to the general public the how and why of levels or progress of these entries. On the other hand, human rights organizations would feel responsible to keep a close eye on the indicators pertaining to the political participation and security domains.

Table 15.4 provides the proposed Youth Well-Being Index for Egypt as of the time of publication. There are 10 domains, each of which covers a cluster of indicators that belong to that domain, and the total number of indicators is 54. For each domain, the information and data necessary is either readily available (such as educational enrollment) or will have to rely on regular surveys of Egyptian youth (such as SYPE).

Table 15.4 Egypt's Proposed Youth Well-Being Index

| Domain/Indicators | Resources* | Domain/Indicators | Resources* |
|--|------------|---|------------|
| 1. Education | | 5. Environment | |
| 1. Gross enroll ratio sec edu | c, d, i | 1. Percent youth severely deprived of water | c, d |
| 2. Net enroll rate sec edu | c, d, i | 2. Percent youth severely deprived of sanitation | c, d |
| 3. Gross enroll rate tertiary edu | c, d, i | 3. Air quality | j |
| 4. Youth's school drop-outs | d, i | 6. Security | |
| 5. Youth literacy | c | 1. Rate of convicted youth admitted to closed institutions | k |
| 6. Transition rate to gen. sec. edu. | c, i | 2. Percentage of young at prison of total people at prison | m |
| 7. Average years edu of 24 year old | d, f | 7. Leisure-Time Activities | |
| 2. Employment | | 1. Percent youth no leisure-time | d |
| 1. Youth labour force participation rates | a, l | 2. Total time doing physical activity | d |
| 2. Share of working 16-24 olds in a formal sector job | a, d | 3. Passive leisure time | d |
| 3. Youth unemployment (15-24, 25-29, 30-35 year) | a, d | 8. The Situation of Girls & Young Women | |
| 4. Ratio of youth unemployment to total unemployment | a, d | 1. Percent of women undergone female genital cutting | d, e |
| 5. Weekly earnings | a | 2. Percent of women married before age 18 | d |
| 6. Weekly hours worked | a, d | 3. Absolute reported cases of sexual harassment | d, m |
| 3. Hunger & Poverty | | 9. Participation in Decision Making | |
| 1. Percentage of young living in absolute poverty | b | 1. Percent of youth who feel tolerance & respect exist in society | c, d |
| 2. Percentage of young living in poverty | b | 2. Trust in others | g |
| 3. Percent of underweight youth | d | 3. Percent of youth participating in volunteering activities | d |
| 4. Percentage of young living in income poverty | b | 4. Percent of youth who have electoral card | d |
| 5. Income distribution | b | 5. Percent of youth participating in voting | d |
| 6. Wealth index for youth | b, c, e | 6. Percent of youth participating in political activity | d |
| 7. Percent of youth living in house with 5+ persons per room | c | 10. ICT | |
| 4. Health | | 1. Proportion of young who used computer in last 12 months | h |
| 1. Percent married young women using modern contraception | c, d | 2. Proportion of young who used Internet in last 12 months | h |
| 2. Rate of youth with disability (as reported by parents) | c, d | 3. Computer access in schools/ universities | d |
| 3. Smoking | d | 4. Access to IT clubs | h |
| 4. Adolescent fertility as percent of total fertility | e | 5. Percentage of youth have cell phone | c, d |
| 5. Top 3 reported deaths by cause | k | 6. Percentage of youth with access to land line phone | c, d |
| 6. Probability for 15-year old of dying before age 25 | k | | |
| 7. Rate of overweight youth & adolescents (age 6-19) | d, f | | |
| 8. Youth mental health | c, d | | |
| 9. Lifetime prevalence drug abuse | d, m | | |
| 10. Percent of youth with knowledge of HIV/AIDS | d, e | | |
| 11. HIV prevalence rate in youth | e | | |

Sources of Data

a CAPMAS (including Labor Force Sample Survey)
 b CAPMAS, HIECS
 c IDSC Observatory of Egyptian Household Conditions
 d SYPE (Survey of Young People in Egypt)
 e DHS
 f Adolescent Survey
 g IDSC Values Survey

h Ministry of Communication and IT
 i Ministry of Education
 j Ministry of Environment
 k Ministry of Interior
 l Ministry of Labor Force
 m National Center of Sociological and Criminological Research

Table 15.5: Calculating Egypt's Youth Well-Being Index

| Domains | Indicators | Calculated | Data | Unit | Year | Source | Domain Value |
|---------------------|---|--|------|---------|------|--------|--------------|
| 1. Education | 1. Gross enrolment ratio for secondary education | | 42.2 | % | 2009 | HIECS | 51.1 |
| | 2. Net enrolment rate for secondary education | | 39.7 | % | 2009 | HIECS | |
| | 3. Gross enrolment rates for tertiary education | | 10.2 | % | 2009 | HIECS | |
| | 4. Youth's school drop-outs | | 29.8 | % | 2009 | SYPE | |
| | 5. Youth literacy rates | | 84.0 | % | 2009 | HIECS | |
| | 6. Transition rate to general secondary education | | | | | | |
| | 7. Average years of education of 24 years old population | Average yrs of schooling among youth 18-24 | 9.6 | years | 2008 | DHS | |
| 2. Employment | 1. Youth labor force participation rates 18-29 | | 54.9 | % | 2009 | HIECS | 78.1 |
| | 2. Share of working 16-24 year olds in formal sector jobs | | 42.8 | % | 2009 | HIECS | |
| | 3.A. Youth unemployment rates (15-24 years old) | | 15.1 | % | 2009 | HIECS | |
| | 3.B. Youth unemployment rates (25-29 years old) | | 5.8 | % | 2009 | HIECS | |
| | 3.C. Youth unemployment rates (18-29 years old) | | 11.4 | % | 2009 | HIECS | |
| | 4. Ratio of youth unemployment to total unemployment | | 88.9 | % | 2009 | HIECS | |
| 3. Hunger & Poverty | 1. Percentage of young people living in absolute poverty | Absolute poverty by deprivation criterion | 9.5 | % | 2009 | SYPE | 81.7 |
| | 2. Percentage of young people living in poverty | Poverty by deprivation criterion | 33.1 | % | 2008 | DHS | |
| | 3. Percentage of underweight youth | Gini Coefficient | 2.0 | % | 2008 | DHS | |
| | 4. Percentage of young living in income poverty | Ratio of the richest 20%/ poorest 20% = | 23.2 | % | 2008 | DHS | |
| | 5. Income distribution | | 29.5 | % | 2009 | HIECS | |
| | 6. Wealth index for youth | | 2.4 | up to 1 | 2009 | HIECS | |
| | 7. Percentage of youth living in housing units with 5 or more persons per room "Severe overcrowding". | | 1.2 | % | 2008 | DHS | |
| 4. Health | 1. Percentage of married young women using modern contraception | | 47.8 | % | 2008 | DHS | 82.0 |
| | 2. Rate of youth with disability (as reported by parents) | | 1.5 | % | 2009 | SYPE | |
| | 3. Smoking | | 16.8 | % | 2008 | DHS | |
| | 4. Adolescent fertility as a percentage of total fertility | | | | | | |
| | 5. Top 3 reported deaths by cause for youth | | | | | | |
| | 6. Probability, for a 15-year old, of dying before age 25 | | | | | | |
| | 7. Rate of overweight youth and adolescents (Ages 6-19) | Percentage of overweight youth 18-19 years | 20.4 | % | 2008 | DHS | |
| | 8. Youth mental health | | 18.3 | %-Index | 2009 | SYPE | |
| | 9. Lifetime prevalence rates of drug abuse among youth | | 1.7 | % | 2009 | SYPE | |
| | 10. Per. of youth with comprehensive correct knowledge of HIV/AIDS | | 85.2 | % | 2008 | DHS | |
| | 11. HIV prevalence rate among youth | | | | | | |

| Domains | Indicators | Calculated | Data | Unit | Year | Source | Domain Value |
|---------------------------------------|--|------------|------|------|------|--------|--------------|
| 5. Environment | 1. Percentage of youth severely deprived of water | | 2.6 | % | 2008 | DHS | 96.9 |
| | 2. Percentage of youth severely deprived of sanitation | | 3.7 | % | 2008 | DHS | |
| | 3. Air Quality | | | | | | |
| 6. Security | 1. Rate of convicted Youth admitted to closed institutions (by gender) | | | | | | --- |
| | 2. Percentage of young people at prison of total people at prison | | | | | | |
| 7. Leisure-Time Activities | 1. Percentage of youth with no leisure-time | | 0.4 | % | 2009 | SYPE | 63.7 |
| | 2. Total time doing Physical activities (Sport) | | 0.2 | % | 2009 | SYPE | |
| | 3. Passive Leisure Time | | 8.8 | % | 2009 | SYPE | |
| 8. The Situation of Girls/Young Women | 1. Percentage of women who have undergone female genital cutting | | 89.6 | % | 2008 | DHS | 43.4 |
| | 2. Percentage of women who get married before the age of 18 | | 29.9 | % | 2008 | DHS | |
| | 3. Absolute reported cases of sexual harassment | | 50.3 | % | 2009 | SYPE | |
| 9. Participation in Decision Making | 1. Volunteering - "Percentage of youth participating in volunteering activities" | | 3.1 | % | 2009 | SYPE | 23.2 |
| | 2. Percentage of youth who have Electoral card (by gender) | | 12.2 | % | 2009 | SYPE | |
| | 3. Percentage of Youth participating in voting | | 28.4 | % | 2009 | WVS | |
| | 4. Percentage of Youth participating in Political Activities (18-29 age) | | 9.1 | % | 2009 | WVS | |
| | 5. Per. of youth feeling that tolerance and respect exists in society | | 70.5 | % | 2009 | WVS | |
| | 6. Trust in others | | 15.8 | % | 2009 | WVS | |
| 10. ICT | 1. Proportion of young people who used a computer in last 12 months | 7 days | | | | | 30.8 |
| | 2. Proportion of young people who used the Internet in last 12 months | | | | | | |
| | 3. Computer access in schools/ universities | | 9.7 | % | 2009 | SYPE | |
| | 4. Access to IT clubs | | 17.2 | % | 2009 | SYPE | |
| | 5. Percentage of youth who have cell phone | YWBI | 45.2 | % | 2009 | SYPE | |
| | 6. Percentage of youth who have access to land line phone | | 51.0 | % | 2009 | SYPE | |

CALCULATING EGYPT'S YOUTH WELL-BEING INDEX⁷

Egypt's Youth Well-Being Index (YWBI) consists of ten dimensions which are equally weighted – both for the sake of simplicity and making necessary adjustments over time, and because each dimension is in fact considered relatively equal in terms of importance in the YWBI. The YWBI is a composite index in which the ten domains support different aspects of the youth life cycle (education, employment, hunger

& poverty, health, environment, security, leisure-time activities, the situation of girls and young women, participation in decision making, and ICT).

Each dimension in the YWBI is based on a list of selected variables that describe the situation and variations in that respective dimension. The whole set of variables includes 54 estimated statistics, calculated from four nationally representative surveys, namely the Household Income & Consumption Survey, the

World Value Survey, the Demographic and Health Survey and the Survey of Young People in Egypt; in all the surveys, the sampling weights were used to retrieve the country representation. The 54 indicators were selected after careful consideration and they are believed to remain informative over time. Of the 54, only 10 could not be calculated due to data limitations (Table 15.5).

In each domain, the selected variables were defined as per international literature and they were adjusted to cope with the direction of good wellbeing at 100%; most of the variables target the age group 18-29 years. The first step in the calculations is to produce the 10 sub-indices, carried out as unweighted averages, and the second step is then to produce the final composite index as an unweighted average of the 10 sub-indices.

The resulting composite YWBI for Egypt was calculated to be 61.2%, which can serve as the base from which progress can be followed-up in the future. This index, presented in Table 15.5, is not differentiated by gender, but the available and disaggregated data from HIECS and DHS did provide striking differences between some of the indicator values for men and women. This was particularly true for such indicators as labor force participation and unemployment rates, as also clear throughout the report. Absolute poverty figures and average annual income are also found to place women at a clear disadvantage, with the poverty rate at twice as high for young women as young men, probably a function of women-headed households.

The following presents the construction of the Youth Well-Being Index.

1) Adjust the variables:

The adjustment process aims to unify all variables to put their maximum at a level of 1 or 100% well-being. Therefore, there are some variables whose value should be restructured in the opposite direction, e.g. unemployment rate is adjusted to be employment rate.

if i max (X) means wellbeing ... $X_i = X_i$

otherwise $X_i = (\max(X_i) - X_i)$ ($i = 1, \dots, 54$)

In other variables, a specific target value rather than the theoretical ceiling is used, and thus the variables are treated as follows:

$$X_i = \frac{\text{target}(X_i)}{\max(X_i)} \times X_i$$

2) Build the 10 dimension sub-indices:

$$D_k = \frac{1}{k e D_k} \sum_{i \in D_k} X_i \quad (K = 1, \dots, 10)$$

3) The YWI is:

$$YWI = \frac{1}{10} \sum_{k=1}^{10} D_k \quad (K = 1, \dots, 10)$$

Notations:

X_i : is the i -th variable, $i=1, \dots, 54$.

D_k : is the k -th dimension $k=1, \dots, 10$.

YWBI : Youth Well Being Index.

X_i : is the adjusted variables toward good well being.

Endnotes


1. Special thanks are due to Defne Abbas for researching the various approaches and frameworks utilized in measuring well-being indicators. Thanks are also due to Iman Refaat for her excellent statistical analysis and preparation of the draft results of the Egypt Youth Well-Being Index.
2. Ravallion, M., 1992. *Poverty Comparisons - A Guide to Concepts and Methods*, World Bank Paper 88.
3. <http://www.ophi.org.uk/index.php>
4. A small number of indicators were identified as being optimal for project management and focus, chance of acceptance among policy makers and politicians, and overall general understanding.
5. Dell'Aglia, Debora, Cunningham, Wendy, Koller, Silvia, Borges, Vicente Cassepp and Leon, Joana Severo, *Youth Well-Being in Brazil: An Index for Cross-Regional Comparisons* (April 1, 2007). World Bank Policy Research Working Paper No. 4189.
6. Alkire, Sabina, Santos, Maria Emma, Ura, Karma (November 2008). *Gross National Happiness and Poverty in Bhutan: Applying the GNH Index Methodology to Explore Poverty*.
7. This first exercise at calculating the Youth Well-Being Index was conducted by Mohamed Ramadan, at IDSC

ANNEX

Annex 15.1: An Explanation of Domains and Their Related Indicators

1. **Education:** The gross enrolment ratio is the total number of pupils or students enrolled in a given level of education, regardless of age, expressed as a percentage of the population in the theoretical age group for the same level of education. For the tertiary level, the population used is the five-year age group following on from the secondary school leaving age. The net enrolment ratio is the number of pupils of the theoretical school-age group for a given level of education who are enrolled in that level, expressed as a percentage of the total population in that age group. Youth school drop-outs show the number of those aged 20-24 who are not attending school and who have not graduated from high school and is expressed as a percentage of Egyptians aged 20-24. The youth literacy rate is the percentage of young people who can, with understanding, both read and write a short, simple statement related to their everyday life. The transition rate to general secondary education measures the degree of access to a given level of education from the previous level of education.
2. **Employment:** Labor force participation rate is the measure of the proportion of a country's working-age population that engages actively in the labor market, either by working or actively looking for work, and it is calculated by expressing the number of persons in the labor force as a percentage of the working-age population. The unemployment rate is calculated as the unemployed as a fraction of the labor force, and the youth unemployment rate refers to those in the specified youth age range. Weekly earnings show the average weekly earnings for an employed person (wages before taxes and other deductions); this indicator had been changed by average of the annual youth income. Weekly hours worked is the average number of hours spent at work per week.
3. **Hunger and Poverty:** The percent of youth living in absolute poverty refers to those who experience at least two severe deprivations of basic human needs (food, safe drinking water, sanitation facilities, health, shelter, education and information). The percent of young people living in poverty refers to the percentage of those that experience any deprivation of basic human needs. The percentage of youth living in income poverty is based on a national poverty line. The percent of underweight youth measures the percentage of young people that are underweight. The income distribution indicator measures the differences in after-tax income among families, which is based on the Gini coefficient. The wealth index for youth follows the Egypt DHS methodology and the percentage of youth living in housing units with more than five persons per room is known as severe overcrowding.
4. **Health:** Contraceptive prevalence among married women is the percentage who are using, or whose partners are using, a modern form of contraception. Smoking refers to the percentage of men and women who smoke cigarettes. The fertility rate is the number of children that would be born to each woman if she were to live to the end of her child-bearing years and bear children at each age in accordance with prevailing age-specific fertility rates in a given period. The top three reported deaths by cause for youth provides insight into the specific health risks for young people, the probability at birth of not surviving to a specified age is calculated as 100 minus the probability (expressed as a percentage) of not surviving to a specified age for a given cohort, the rate of overweight youth refers to obesity, and mental health measure the mental health score based on WHO methodology. Lifetime prevalence of abuse (used at least once in a lifetime) is an appropriate measure, in particular regarding youth, as it indicates the potential for development of more frequent and problematic patterns of drug abuse. A large proportion of the "users" among the youth population have used an illicit drug only once or twice in their lifetime. HIV prevalence is the percentage of people aged 15-49 who are infected with HIV.
5. **Environment:** Water deprivation refers to youth using water from an unimproved source such as an unprotected well, an unprotected spring, surface water, a tanker truck or cart with small tank or who it takes 15 minutes to retrieve water. Sanitation deprivation refers to youth who live in households with a pit latrine, bucket toilet or no facility at all, or use modern systems where the drainage is connected to a canal, groundwater, or there is no drainage system. The air quality indicator reflects the potential population exposure to ground-level ozone and fine particulate matter, two key components of smog that are harmful to human health.
6. **Security:** The rate of convicted youth admitted to closed institutions measures the response of the criminal justice systems to illegal behaviors, rather than juvenile delinquency.
7. **Leisure-Time Activities:** Time use generally refers to time spent on activities such as household maintenance, management and shopping for own household, care for children, the sick and the elderly, and community services; physical activity is meant to refer to sports, and passive leisure time is meant to measure the amount of time per day that youth watch television, play video games and chat on the phone with friends
8. **The Situation of Girls and Young Women:** Indicators include FGM rates, age of marriage and reported cases of sexual harassment.
9. **Participation in Decision Making:** Volunteering refers to the extent to which young people volunteer their time to charitable and non-profit organizations. Tolerance, respect, and trust refer to the proportion of young people who feel that these values exist in society.
10. **ICT:** ICT indicators include access to computers, the internet, IT clubs, cell phones and landlines.

Chapter Sixteen



As this EHDR 2010 was being prepared, a group of representative young people were asked to initiate focus groups at university or their place of work or leisure to determine hopes and aspirations of youth by the year 2020. Based on these observations and on preliminary results of the large Survey of Young People in Egypt (SYPE) initiated by the Population Council (2009) as well as on their own experience, the group presented their outlook in short reports reproduced below.

SALLY: AN OVERVIEW

With nearly 34% of the population under 30 years of age, to talk about youth's inclusion in social and political affairs raises questions not only about possible channels for participation and approaches of inclusion but about the existence of an enabling environment necessary to create and trigger these mechanisms. In Egypt, the discourse has been centered on the apathy and reluctance of youth to be engaged in civic activities and to participate politically. On the other hand, very little attention has been given to the current socio-political environment and whether this actually enables participation, voluntarism and civic engagement from youth.

In this respect, a large portion of the blame for modest participation and little civic engagement from youth should be placed on the present social, cultural, political and economic environment in Egypt rather than on the youth themselves. The potential for the creation of an enabling environment also appears to be greatly undermined by the country's poor record of democracy and respect for human rights, as well as by a malfunctioning educational system, increasing unemployment rates, high levels of corruption, worsening individual and community values, and prevailing religious extremism.

In the SYPE survey on youth opinions and attitudes in Egypt, as well as in focus group discussions conducted by the authors of this chapter, the fact that youth are interested in discussing the ills of their society and dream about better living conditions was clearly expressed. Youth aspirations revolved around better education, suitable job opportunities, decent wages, and family encouragement for civic and political engagement. These opinions were a result of the conviction amongst youth of the current futility of participation, the perception that opportunities were unequally distributed, the presence of nepotism and favoritism, and the many economic hardships faced, largely as a result of unemployment.

Despite the pessimism that underlined this critique, youth in Egypt remain to some extent optimistic that venues of positive change are possible. This was expressed enthusiastically in their "vision" for

youth equity and socio-political inclusion, believed to be realistic and attainable. This vision, achievable by 2020, explored possible solutions as well as new approaches to the problems inherent in the system itself, to enable youth to integrate and to effectively play their aspired role in society. The basis of the vision would lie in creating an enabling environment and in allowing youth dreams and ambitions to be both expressed and addressed.

As a first step, the prevailing conviction that youth are incapable of making decisions for themselves must be contested. In a paternalistic society such as in Egypt, there is the belief that adults must care for and watch over young people until a relatively advanced age. This attitude is responsible for prolonging the years of dependency and can be said to contribute significantly to apathy. A potential way out would be to encourage young people to participate at all levels of the decision-making processes which affect them, both inside and outside of the home. This could be best applied in schools, at universities, and in youth centers where the habits of responsible participation could be instilled from the earliest stages.

The poor and often counterproductive role performed by secular institutions (schools, universities and youth centers) — where authoritarian supervision is the rule — has resulted in paving the way for religious-based associations to take the lead in attracting youth and in shaping their attitudes. This, in part, is due to the fact that these groupings are well-organized and present an opportunity, not available elsewhere, to give voice and to address matters of concern. Statistics demonstrate that the percentage of youth that participate in civic activities is estimated at approximately 2%, 65% of which do so through religious channels. Islamic CSOs formed by and targeting youth represent a growing part of Egyptian civil society and in the past decade the majority of them began through student initiatives, such as the case of *Resala*, which today has over 25 branches and more than 50,000 volunteers. Similarly, Coptic Christian youth appear increasingly to turn inwards to their churches and communities where voluntary civic activities are concerned, thereby becoming more excluded from the mainstream.

These developments indicate that the secular channels of the state and civil society organizations have not succeeded in integrating youth into socio-political life, but have allowed a vigorous role and space for faith-based CSO movements. As a consequence, the question becomes how to enhance youth secular civic engagement that is derived out of a sense of belonging and citizenship rather than from religious affiliation. Mechanisms to do so are available and could be divided along three dimensions: The first is to empower youth and encourage them to realize their capabilities and their usefulness to their communities. This could be best performed through family, educational institutions and religious establishments. The second is to enable and empower government and non-government secular institutions to attract youth, for instance, by creating and activating relevant youth forums, summer civic activities, and awareness programs. The third is facilitating and advocating youth civic engagement and volunteerism in schools, universities, and youth centers through public awareness campaigns.

Youth themselves can also be considered a catalyst for change. A considerable portion of Egypt's educated youth is now involved in what is known as "virtual activism". Youth have created/participated in blogs and e-forum discussions to freely express their views about pressing political, cultural, social and economic issues in Egypt. However, according to a recent study by the Central Agency for Public Mobilization and Statistics (CAPMAS), only 19% of the estimated 160,000 Egyptian blogs are of political nature.

Moreover, according to the Population Council's Survey of Young People in Egypt (SYPE), only 23% of Egypt's youth are internet users and 13% of these use the internet to be informed about or participate in discussions on socio-political issues. These figures indicate that although effective, virtual activism has to be further enhanced.

It is equally important to address negative trends in community values. The most effective way to do so is to concentrate on youth — since it is young people who are most influenced by negative values. From the viewpoint of youth — and noting the diversity

among young people themselves — the predominant harmful trends in community values are intolerance to others' beliefs/opinions, individualism and selfishness, passivism, religious extremism, and a growing inclination to adopt male-dominated attitudes and gender inequality.

To correct these unaccommodating trends is to work on those constituencies responsible for shaping them. That is, family, educational institutions, religious establishments, and the media. Parallel to this is the urgent need to highlight the accomplishments of role-models in a variety of fields so as to create a sense of pride and of belonging, thereby promoting the confidence that comes with success.

There is a predominant tendency among scholars to describe the major swings that the Egyptian socio-political environment has been undergoing ever since the advent of the Mubarak Presidency in 1981 as a process of liberalization of society rather than democratization of the state. Nevertheless, youth can still take advantage of the space offered through the process of liberalization in pushing for democratization. Youth enthusiasm and persistence could energize them to assume vigorous roles in the quest for democratization and the enforcement of the rule of law. From youth perspective, major obstacles to an effective rule of law are corruption, favoritism and autocratic rule.

With the Egyptian government's ongoing plans to implement decentralization, which entails empowering local popular councils (LPCs) on village, district/town and governorate levels, a new platform for youth participation can be seen, particularly that the percentage of youth elements in LPCs — in which membership starts at the age 25 — has increased in the 2008 local elections from less than 0.8% to 4.1%. Although, the percentage remains low, and the implementation of decentralization will give youth a greater chance to participate in guiding the choices of their local communities whether through participatory planning in the formulation of local policies or through representation in LPCs.

SHAHEER: THE POLITICS OF PARTICIPATION

For youth to integrate in social and political life in Egypt, early beginnings start with school. Youth cannot feel that they are citizens — with rights and responsibilities — unless they practice these values in an enabling educational environment. But although Ministerial Decree 203 for 1990 states that student unions must be set up in each school in Egypt, with the participation of all levels, in practice, elections do not take place at schools. There appears to be no awareness of the importance of this process to civic participation and no serious intent in instilling the principles of democracy among students. The budget allocations for student unions are persistently allocated to other activities, with no say from students, although the law states otherwise. An aspiration for 2020 is that while minimal changes are needed in the legal context, enforcement and integrity in applying Decree 203 should take place.

The question is whether there should be some form of administrative oversight over any school's attempts to raise awareness on student rights and roles in student unions, and whether regulations should be made public to all? The answer must be a strong 'yes'. A further improvement could also be to incorporate students' voice in school decisions, even at the national student union level, as well as in any change that affects the school education system in Egypt since it is through collective work and participation in decision making that the foundations of citizenship are developed. By 2020, it is hoped that credible student unions would have created good citizens with the right to argue and defend opinions, willing to engage with their realities and be critical of these.

Young people in Egypt, currently in common with other citizens, share an excluded status in respect to public concerns and political socialization. This marginalization undermines any feeling of group identity and engagement. The recent SYPE survey indicates that almost 90% of Egyptian youth between the ages of 15-29 do not trust each other as a group. This is understandable given that the outlets that enable young people to come together are minimal, especially those that promote civic awareness and public inter-

est. Delayed marriage, unemployment, and lack of voice have also led to apathy so that that young people chose rather to mingle socially in cafés and distance themselves from the daily frustrations of exclusion.

The sanctioned contribution to youth activities has been the official creation of youth clubs across Egypt, the focus of which has been on sports alone, despite the fact that the National Council of Youth classifies sports as just one part of their activities. On the official Council website, successes of this initiative cover mainly physical accomplishments: for example, that four swimming pools have been built and that four are under construction, 56 open playgrounds have been developed, 157 closed playgrounds established, 106 gym halls in operation and 54 wrestling mats newly purchased.

However, according to the National Youth Council decision 120/2010 that newly restructured the main statute of all youth centers in Egypt these centers are aimed at training youth in leadership and life skills, civically educate them and help them discover their talents and foster their creations. This does not occur and centers play no role in recruiting youth volunteers for public services and national projects such as illiteracy eradication and family planning. The SYPE survey not surprisingly indicates then that only 0.01 of youth surveyed actively participate in youth centers.

The refocus of youth centers on social and cultural activities by 2020 could reorient and reemphasize feelings of citizenship. It would give room for girls — at present largely excluded, especially in Upper Egypt — to engage in enriching pursuits outside of the home. Volunteer work, educational and artistic activities could allow girls and boys to interact, under socially acceptable conditions, although, in conservative areas, it would not preclude regular hours for girls alone to socialize and practice sports.

For the minority Coptic community, whose churches are nowadays filled with social and cultural activities, well-run national youth centers could become a stimulus to bring Copts outside of churches and integrate more fully with the larger community. Cen-



ters provide an enormous opportunity that should be consciously seized to attract all youth — Muslim and Christian alike — and reinforce their allegiance to a larger identity, which is that of the nation to which they belong.

At present, however, most youth engaging in socially productive work act through religious institutions. A large 67% of youth look for volunteering opportunities in religious institutions against only 23% in non-government organizations. For example, 47.7 % of those working with the deaf are in religious institutions in comparison to only about 19% in civil society organizations (CSOs); 38% help in teaching educational and computer skills in comparison to 17.7% in CSOs.

The potential activation of youth centers in transforming their activities cannot be overlooked. It would be good if young people by 2020 were much more vigorous in centers' general assemblies, where they could elect board members and help decide on important issues such as budget allocations. Presently, these are rights guaranteed by law but not reflected in the norm.

The legal system covering youth centers appears at variance and is often stifled by laws that need more precision. Such is the case of Law 77 for 1975. This concerns youth and sports institutions, and clarity is especially needed given the current division between

the National Council of Youth and National Councils of Sports. In addition, in relation to the National Youth Council decision 120/2010 that tackled many of the problems of the old statutes, some amendments are yet required and their application ensured. For example, Article 46 should be amended for no board member is to be assigned by the government but must be elected by the general assembly. Also the right of the minister in article 60 to dissolve the board can be maintained but not for a year and immediate call for general assembly has to take place for a new board election. And finally aside from enacting article 46 that states 50% of the board should be less than 30, of which two are females, the managing director of the center in article 56 should never exceed 35.

For a vision where youth are educated on citizenship and enjoy the social space to formulate opinions and be politically socialized, there is first the need to establish the right to practice politics. Two domains are important where this is applicable:

1. University Campuses

An uncensored university life has been a rich source of political socialization and for stimulating a sense of concern over public issues, and has, until recently, been traditional among Egyptian youth (see Box 16.1).

University independence has once more to be respected by 2020, starting with the removal of security officers affiliated to the Ministry of Interior and

Box 16.1: Recollections from a Freer University Era

An account by a former student at the University of Menia recounts how he started university with no interest in politics and the extent to which that changed. His description of his first day was as follows;

“I walked through the university gates, and everywhere, the wall magazines surrounded me. They were posted all over the walls so that there was little space for anything else, and they hung off pegs from ropes stretching from one end of the courtyard to the other. They spoke of politics, poetry, holy scripts, and swayed as they did in the air, confronting and challenging each other ...

The university was charged with life, energy and ideas, it was as if I had just stepped into the world!”

**An extract from M.A. thesis, ‘Youth Movements in Egypt’ by Alia M. Mossalam*

replaced by security officers under the supervision of each university dean, as stated in Article 317 in the Executive Statute for Universities Administration. This independence should also be reflected in student unions, which must be created and managed by students in consultation with faculty members, even with regard their financial resources. The right of students to express their political views should be liberated from university administrative domination and political committees in student unions should be reinstated. Allocation of time for student activities should be freed up, and there should be no obstruction to students choosing the activities they prefer.

By 2020 it is hoped that the university administration would have revoked the clause that bars membership to unions councils of students whose freedoms were previously restricted — or at least amended to include the exception of exposure to the same penalty for political reasons. Also, an umbrella student union representing all universities could be created to work on strengthening the relationship between diverse universities, and help break the present fragmentation of students. Regulations for student union elections should be widely publicized with adequate time for students to nominate candidates. At least 50% percent of registered students should take part for elections to be valid. They should never be scheduled to take place on holidays. Finally all students should pay 3% of the fees for union activities, to increase union revenues and act as an incentive for greater participation in activities. Within ten years, it is hoped that the perception that student unions ‘do nothing’ — as was found in focus groups — will have disappeared.

2. The Public Space

A public space ought to be free from an emergency law that restricts political parties’ ability to organize and campaign freely. Focus groups and the SYPE survey indicate that young people seem not to approve of the current political actors, and secular actors are missing. The secular need is also important for Coptic youth’s integration into society. Less than 25% of eligible voters participated in the 2005 elections and the percentage of youth taking part was very low according to the SYPE survey.¹³ This shows that a very large segment of the electorate is still not reached. Coptic youth in focus groups felt they were rarely approached by political parties so that they would rather seek church and parents for trustworthy opinions on political issues. However, by 2020, it is hoped that genuinely open non-sectarian parties have learnt to identify potential new constituencies among all Egyptian youth and bring them into the organization.

Virtual space should also be promoted, with less surveillance. According to the Open Net Initiative and Freedom House reports of 2009, internet filtering is not taking place. However, arresting bloggers should cease to take place for youth to feel secure enough to participate and engage. In 2020, articles of the penal code and the Emergency Law which give security agencies broad authority to monitor and censor all communications should hopefully be removed. Amendments to the Press Law passed in 2006 with provisions that criminalize ‘false news’ and apply to online writings should be reviewed. And finally Constitutional amendments passed in 2007 that paved the way for future counterterrorism legislation

Box 16.2: What is Missing in the Education Curriculum in Egypt

Many courses (including electives) are taught at schools in some countries like the United States; these types of courses are not present in the Egyptian Thanaweya Amma. Important examples include “national security” and “ethics.” An introduction of “national security” as a course would be a challenging step to do, and it seems necessary even if by force. It is more than likely that Egyptian students are not fully aware of the significance of introducing such a subject, and while it has technically always been a part of the social studies curriculum, its focus has been simply chronological and episodic with major attention given to wars, especially in the United States. As for Egypt, little attention has been given to the evolution and structural arrangements of the nation’s security, the underlying global and national premises for maintaining security, and the basic context in which security has been achieved. Egyptian students should be exposed to more specific criteria, not currently directly taught in social studies, such as worldwide threats that include monetary instability, global inflation, ecological disturbances, and nuclear weapons. Education about national security has an important and distinct contribution to make to education for full and competent citizenship, the supposed primary goal of social studies education in Egypt. As for “ethics,” it should be introduced as a subject apart from religion and should definitely be a mandatory course for all students.

The Ministry of Education seems to be making promises that results in no changes. Even the changes in the curriculum are proving superficial and ineffective within a system that is highly resistant to change. It is not enough to adopt a system without reforming the schools and having qualified teachers. If the English system was adopted, schools and teachers would first need to be at the same level of professionalism as they are in schools in the UK. Internet availability in schools is a must, and while it is present in Egypt, what can be said about the efficiency? Are there qualified teachers that are properly trained to serve these students or not? A serious increase must be made on the emphasis placed on the teaching of foreign languages and on computer skills, and most importantly, on teacher’s pay. These reforms could be financed by increased taxation or by investment. In an interview with a Thanaweya Amma student, he cited wondering why he had to take a course by force – one that would not be in any way beneficial; he himself proposed the idea of having electives instead.

Source: Engy El Rafeae, prepared for the EHDR 2010

should be amended to still uphold freedom of speech enshrined in the Constitution and not affect citizens’ right to privacy stated in the 2003 Law on Telecommunications.

A vision for reform by 2020 stands complete when an enabling environment for youth to vote is guaranteed. This environment should ensure no vote rigging and genuine competition among different parties to encourage young people to feel their vote makes a difference. More importantly are the dealings of the police in the shape of bullying and harassment. This discourages any kind of participation and engagement in the public space.

Youth by 2020 should have become enabled to base their opinions on facts rather than on the experience of exclusion, or on family and narrow allegiances. Transparent facts present opportunities to integrate socially and politically, replacing the current focus

on grievances. But youth integration is not a linear path in Egypt or elsewhere. It entails the struggle to be heard and respected against a background of authoritarian values and vested interests. Therein lies the challenge.

NIHAL: THOUGHTS ON EDUCATION

“Going to school is biggest waste of time of all. Teachers are only concerned with giving private tutoring classes, nothing gets done inside school, it’s useless.” With remarks such as this from a young man in a focus group in Beni Suef, the question of how effective the education system is in Egypt is bound to come up. Egypt still suffers from low enrollment rates with almost 20% of young boys and girls never having been to school. Young people end up dropping out of schools at alarming rates and those who drop out, do so at as young as ten years of age.

Box 16.3: Turkey’s Student Selection Exam (OSS)

What is the sense in having thick books, a huge number of courses, and unnecessary subjects?

When using Turkey as a case study, we find that at the end of high school (following the 12th grade), students should take a “high school finishing exam,” namely the OSS (Ogrenci Secme Sinavi, translated as the Student Selection Exam); this system was applied in the country in the late 1960s. Students take the “high school finishing examination” as a prerequisite, and they are required to pass this exam in order to take the OSS and continue on to the university level. The benefit of OSS is that the exam scores are weighted to provide students in each track with different opportunities when entering higher education, as follows:

- Mathematics: International Relations, Law, Education, Psychology, Economy, and Business Management.
- Science: Engineering, Computer Science, Medicine, and other science related professions.
- Social Sciences: History, Geography, Education.
- Languages: Language, Linguistics, and Language Teaching.

The OSS exam simply tests the students’ analytical thinking, and problem solving abilities, as well as the knowledge of the high school curriculum in all areas. Each student must answer all questions on the test regardless of his/her department. Seemingly, it is more of an advisory exam, where students can see what fields are more appealing to them based the weighted average score. Allocation of the students takes place according to the scores obtained from the OSS, students’ average high school scores, and priority ranking of field of study.

Comparing the Turkish educational system to the Egyptian Thanaweya Amma shows the former to be far more efficient and specific for students themselves than the latter, specifically the “Matktab El-Tansee,” which has actually proven a failure year after year. The problem with the Thanaweya Amma is that student must literally shut off mental functions to score high and immediately apply for the “Tansee,” which randomly chooses the destiny of the student based on scores from high school. In Turkey, the “dershane” system allows for students to be drilled on various aspects of the OSS, and students typically participate on the weekends and after school hours (especially in their last year). Interestingly enough, the unified university entrance test exam system has transformed these schools into intense test tutoring centers where students are trained for four years on taking the OSS test. More information can be found at <http://www.euroeducation.net/prof/turkco.htm> Source: Engy El Raftae, prepared for the EHDR 2010

The national school curriculum remains one of the system’s biggest challenges. According to interviewed students “...the curriculum diminishes creativity. There needs to be more attention given to foreign languages, we need to learn English phonetically not just read and write”. The content taught at national schools needs to undergo a thorough process of reviewing and revamping to equip students with relevant skills rather than obsolete ideas. New subjects need to be introduced to the curriculum such as financial education (accounting, cost-benefit analysis, saving, and so forth), and ICT. Schools do house computers (indeed, 90% of students in the SYPE survey reported their schools housing computer labs), but school administrators regard the devices as an endowment. Computers are often left in boxes, to come out only upon Ministry of Education (MOE) inspections. Students are often not allowed to use or

touch the PCs.

Most teachers are not adept PC users themselves and are therefore unable to impart practical skills. Most young people cannot afford to own computers While internet cafes abound even in rural areas, young people use them only to access the internet and chat websites rather than getting basic knowledge of software programs (Word, Excel, etc).

Many NGOs have been delivering life skills education through their local organizations. Such programs are particularly successful among young girls without alternative sources of information, restricted mobility and limited exposure. Indeed, SYPE states that at least 24% of young rural girls of ages ranging from 10 to 29 years said they attended literacy classes at local NGOs. But popular and useful as they are, stand-alone

NGO efforts are insufficient to meet the informational needs of poorer young men and women.

The formal curriculum needs to include a life skills component in order to address young people's needs. Basic health and hygiene are essential components of life skills education; however, providing youth with 'psychological education' is of equal importance. Notions of acceptance of 'the other', social integration, reinforcement of the national rather than religious identity and acceptance of other cultures are more relevant than ever in our fragmented society.

The majority of Egyptian schools suffer from poor quality staff. Low financial remuneration, weak training, limited exposure all combine to create lower levels of motivation among school teachers who display the same apathy and disinterest that plagues the country. Interviewed students reveal there are no teaching standards, instructors receive no training and deliver information according to their whims. There is a desperate need to breathe life into the teaching body and/or create an alternative pool of motivated educators. One idea would be for the MOE to create a competitive system whereby teachers are evaluated by students. In the case of positive feedback, teachers would receive financial bonuses, or benefits to their families. It is possible to explore partnerships between the MOE and the private sector to create such a scheme.

An alternative path is to mould a different 'type' of educator. Motivated young individuals should be recruited and trained to become teachers in their local setting. There are several possible mechanisms of cooperation between the MOE and civil society to create 'new' teachers. For example, local school graduates are an untapped resource, but they are ideal candidates to work as teachers for younger children in their local areas – particularly in the case of non-formal education. This group should be recruited systematically and trained to teach at local NGOs. This is particularly suitable for many young women who find it difficult to find a job due to cultural restrictions on their mobility. Some programs have succeeded on capitalizing on such young women and use them to deliver their literacy, life-skills and sports

curricula to out-of-school girls. Being closer in age to their students, these young women become role models and often act as mediators between them and their families.

Various vocational systems have been implemented in Egypt, but all leave room for improvement. One student who was interviewed said "...the lack of attention to crafts has made craftsmanship the job of those who are jobless!" It is critical therefore to alter this perception, nurturing a more dignified status to craftsmen and workers. To this end, several nationwide awareness campaigns should be launched in cooperation between the Ministry of Education, the Ministry of Manpower and major civil society organizations.

Local business owners could offer students the opportunity to become trainees and apprentices of their businesses while they are still attending school. Trainings and apprenticeships could take place during the summer vacation or, alternatively, after daily classes. Eventually, upon graduation, students would be hired as full time employees at the factory/business where they were trained. This mechanism offers students both the chance to receive an education and secure employment in their local area.

SEIF: ENTREPRENEURSHIP AND YOUTH

Young entrepreneurs in Egypt face plenty of challenges, such as – but not limited to – problems of funding, hiring and sustaining skilled labor, poor access to information due to limited resources, poor support system for sustainability and risk management, inability to mobilize funds to support functions related to technology, training, or office operations. Any vision for youth has to give significant attention to these factors. This part of the vision needs the effective participation of all the stakeholders in order to deliver strong results.

Skilled Labor Force

Building a skilled labor force is one of the most important tasks of the government and the political leadership in Egypt. However, the formula is more than just a matter of supply and demand. The demand from employers has to be matched by a supply of employ-

ees in sufficient numbers who have adequate skills. In addition, the growing public rhetoric focuses on matching the needs of the big players, whether local or international, disregarding that SMEs constitute the biggest portion of employment rates in the country. Therefore, the needs of the SMEs have to be matched, through educating Egypt's students on entrepreneurship, small business management, and equipping them with the competencies necessary to be innovative, risk-taking, and proactive.

A newly founded not-for-profit higher-education institution in Egypt has taken the initiative on this issue through introducing an undergraduate program on small business management and entrepreneurship. Several other initiatives have also been started – at least at the level of introductory courses – in other private universities. These efforts have yet to develop more into fully-built programs and university majors with the aim of graduating alumni capable of starting and managing businesses.

Business Development Through Government Spending

As government is always required to spend in order to create job opportunities in times of crises, it is now required to allocate its spending to favor its SMEs. According to the Business Development Services Support Project (BDSSP), there are 318 items that the government already buys that can be purchased from the SMEs registered in the Social Fund for Development.¹⁸ Directing this amount of money to SMEs would have a remarkable impact on its growth and generate a positive domino effect by increasing SMEs capabilities of investing, hiring, and developing.

Moreover, the government should increasingly develop the support system for SMEs as organizations, and entrepreneurs as individuals. This support system can take place in many forms, such as – but not limited to – incubators, venture capitalists, apprenticeship, investors networks, financing institutions, and even a stock market for SMEs. The government has already taken steps in this regards, by introducing Nilex; a stock market exchange for Middle-Sized Companies (starting LE 500,000 in Capital). The Social Fund for Development provides

financial, training, and marketing services for start-up and existing businesses.

Support Services

The Industrial Modernization Center (IMC), provides subsidized training and consulting services (with subsidies reaching up to 90%) for its member Egyptian industrial companies. The IMC, however, works with large enterprises in the industry/manufacturing business, but nonetheless, it acts as a model that the government can pursue for developing a similar institution for subsidized training and consulting, also subsidized services for consulting, market research, and major marketing services (such as branding, strategic planning, etc.).

In addition, decision makers should be encouraged to enact laws that facilitate the establishment of incubators, venture capital, and investor networks. They could also initiate public-private partnerships as an implementing body of those institutions aimed at funding and transferring the know-how to young Egyptian entrepreneurs and SMEs. Those bodies can also take the form of private equity or angel investment funds on a smaller level per investment, in order to utilize the savings from remittances of those young Egyptians in the villages and/or those who come back from the Gulf, as providing an alternative to saving remittances in a bank or spending them on housing. However, this requires a level of awareness and risk-taking that has to be promoted as well as protected by the government through legislation and fiscal guarantees.

One more important aspect is the need of Egyptian youth to be inspired. This vast potential of youth – to be untapped – needs more than legal systems and governmental structure. Large-scale awareness campaigns about success stories must be circulated in all types of media in order to encourage young Egyptians to become entrepreneurs and start their ventures. In a research project undertaken by the Agency for Development and Advancement (ADAA) that involved in-depth interviewing of 30 young Egyptian entrepreneurs, almost all the entrepreneurs cited the existence of a role model in their lives that inspired them to become entrepreneurs.

Another level of awareness can be created among youth with simpler educational backgrounds, who do not have the know-how or the skill set to start an SME. Microenterprises act as a viable self-employment solution for those who cannot be employed due to the lack of skill set. The government can promote microenterprises through facilitating and guiding the very small investors towards certain projects. For example, it can facilitate loans and training for those who want to start micro-businesses in a certain favored industry, such as transportation, etc.

On another level, angel investors' networks and funds are integral to promote entrepreneurship among the people who reside at the both ends of the spectrum; those who have the capital but not the ideas, and those who have the ideas but not the capital. With youth constituting the majority of the former, it is a much needed service for creating a generation of entrepreneurs who have the ability to start and grow their enterprises with protection and support from those who have the know-how and the money. Other government support systems could be mentorship programs from senior/retired citizens and experienced entrepreneurs, who transfer their years of experience to the young businessmen, thus saving the money and time that others have to carry due to practicing their businesses by trial-and-error.

Another challenge posed to entrepreneurs is the ability to hire and retain high caliber employees. As expressed by the majority of entrepreneurs interviewed by the Agency for Development and Advancement, the turnover rate of employees is significantly high, because of the inability of SMEs to provide attractive packages with medical and social insurance to their employees, and the tendency of young graduates — who constitute the majority of the SME labor force — to shift to multinationals after they acquire the necessary experience from the SMEs. Government can have some influence on the former weakness, through providing low-priced/subsidized medical and social insurance packages for SME employees.

Last but not least, the role of the decision makers to devise policies should be based on comparatively studying the best practices of other countries. Many

rising or strong economies have depended on SMEs as the driving force of their markets, achieving high success rates in Asia, Europe, and the Americas. One example is the successful model of Italy, the 7th biggest economy in the world, where SMEs constitute more than 98% of its economy.

The Legal Framework

Laws in Egypt have to spare the entrepreneurs going through legal risks, which they could suffer as a result of not being able to pay loans or improper cash flow management. Lawmakers, therefore, should enact a package of laws that give protection for entrepreneurs if their businesses fail, if they go bankrupt, etc. in addition to providing guarantees for loan-givers, whether they are banks, investors' funds, or even individual investors to protect them from bad debts. Also, the lawmaking body can encourage the private sector to finance start-ups through structural changes in the legal instruments pertaining to corporate social responsibility. This can be achieved through more tax exemptions directed towards angel investment or zero-interest loaning to the SMEs sector on the part of the large enterprises' CSR programs and departments.

The Role of Civil Society

There are existing civil society models in Egypt now that are working hard to support individual entrepreneurs, their enterprises, and even to create a culture of entrepreneurship. For example, a foundation called Endeavor Egypt — a branch of Endeavor International — focuses on supporting high impact entrepreneurs, defined as those entrepreneurs who have the biggest ideas and most ambitious plans. And they have the power to inspire countless others. Another model is the NGO *Nahdet El Mahrousa* (Renaissance of Beloved Country) which has an incubator for innovative social enterprises. This acts as a hub for social entrepreneurs who devise a program catering for a social need/gap, yet in a self-sustainable (i.e. revenue generating) manner. Developing social ventures/enterprises is also evident through another NGO that has a pioneering experience. *Alashanek Ya Balady* (For You My Country) has started social ventures that create revenues for the operations and development projects of the NGO.

Social enterprises and ventures are organizations whose core function is a type of social impact. For example, social enterprises could be built solely to employ more people, not to generate revenues. Furthermore, and in addition to internships and job shadowing, CSOs can provide experiential learning programs for youngsters to initiate business start-ups at a younger age. In addition, training and mentorship programs for entrepreneurs, entrepreneurship services centers and apprenticeship (whether traditional or professional) services can be additional programs with remarkable effects from the CSOs. Last but not least, CSO should develop the mechanisms of their microfinance programs to entail the transfer of the know-how of the micro-business to the borrower as an added-value.

Social and Cultural Characteristics

The mindset of young Egyptians favors working for already established corporations, and looking for a stable source of income. This culture cripples the progress and innovation provided by entrepreneurship, which requires risk-taking as a prerequisite for positive change. Those social and cultural characteristics can change through promotional efforts by the government and private media. On another level, education and training could play a major role in gearing the mentality of young Egyptians towards entrepreneurship as a viable and rewarding career option.

With every new business created there are more employment opportunities, more sales volumes for other businesses, more investment opportunities, and arguably, more linkages with other sectors of the economy. It has been reported that the return on investment to government of every \$1 invested in SMEs is \$25, in the form of taxes, increased sales and job creation, among other benefits. These claims are based on statistics provided by the Small Business Administration in the United States. This multiple return should provide the incentive for government, the private sector and civil society to promote entrepreneurship as a dynamic tool for economic development in Egypt.

ABEER: FAMILY FORMATION

Egypt has promulgated many laws related to forming families, starting with the Personal Status Law and the Family Court and Child Laws.

In June 2008 Egypt's People's Assembly approved a law raising the minimum marriage age to over 18 years. It included obliging couples to undergo medical checkups prior to marriage as a condition to register marriage contracts. The new law has caused problems, the most prominent of which is the spread of *urfi* marriage due to the high cost legal marriages incur. Bribes are widespread to avoid medical exams, and certificates are forged to conclude marriage contracts. This is a problem that must be addressed in the immediate future.

Most personal status problems in Egypt are restricted to women's desire to get a divorce. Law 10/2004 established Family Courts with the aim of peacefully settling disputes, if possible, before referring them to court. However, when human relations experience conflicts, there is a need for integrated bodies concerned with the successful enforcement of the law. For example, Law 10/2004 requires that the parties to the conflict resort to the Family Conflict Resolution Bureau.

This prolongs conflicts, when some cases need to be quickly settled, including, for example, cases of alimony. Investigating a husband's income until the adjudication of the claim will affect the alimony claimant who, in most cases, is the weaker party in need of financial support. Egyptian lawmakers are expected to address such procedures and others by rendering Family Court decisions final, thus ending all marital disputes and consequent rights, but in reality this is not the case and procedures can take as long as 15 years to resolve a case.

The *Khula'* procedure facilitates divorce for women as it reduces litigation and protects them from the intransigence of husbands. However, this right is only valid when the wife files a lawsuit asking for *Khula'*, giving up all her legitimate rights, as well as returning the dowry the husband had given her. This may be a successful alternative to resorting to the Family Court

as it reduces the duration of the family dispute, but it is affordable only to the better off. More women need to accept the divorce clause they are entitled to in the standard marriage contract, rather than decline this option as a result of social pressure.

According to the Census Bureau (2008) 34.5% of divorces fell in the first year of marriage, 40% occurred in couples under thirty, and the highest divorce rates were at the ages of 20 to 30 years. Figures of the Justice Department match these alarming statistics that indicate that a significant proportion of divorces take place among young couples. One of the main reasons for early divorce is the increasing liabilities and costs of marriage, rendering the young husband tangled in a mesh of debt premiums and mortgages. There is also the possibility that the young wife would choose not to participate in family expenses claiming it is the man's responsibility according to tradition.

The media can also play a negative role; couples appear unrealistic in TV dramas, making marriage a rosy fantasy, where a handsome young man leading a stylish life lavishes his wife with gifts. The wife is featured as beautiful, attractive, always wanting to be pampered, knowing nothing about childbirth, breastfeeding, bringing up children or house-care skills. The young wife, in short, is a creature for pleasure and lust.

Many working mothers are compelled to take on the responsibility of the house and children regardless of the fact that they exert the same effort as the father. Society lacks awareness of the necessity of equality between men and women, not only in political rights and democratic practices, but in family duties and social rights as well. This short-sighted vision leads to an unbalanced relationship.

NERMINE: THE CENTRALITY OF SEXUALITY

Islam is among the most explicit religious texts that recognize sexuality as an intrinsic part of being human. The Quran uses beautiful lyrics to describe the joys of paradise, granted to men and woman equally. Islamic tradition acknowledges the right of both man and woman to pleasure, and it commands in many instances that both the wife and the husband

be aware of each other's urges and needs. Islam recognizes the interdependent nature of the soul and the body: A person who is aware of his/her body's capacity and drives is more likely to respond effectively to his/her needs and lead a healthy mental and physical life, pursue a righteous path and contribute positively to society.

Sexuality can be described as emotional and physical well-being. All human beings are sexual whether or not they engage in sexual acts or behaviors. Our sexuality is expressed through an extensive web of social roles, behaviors, relationships, thoughts and feelings. The expressions of sexuality are further influenced by various factors including social, economic, spiritual, cultural, and moral concerns. For most of young Egyptians, sexuality is an issue layered with several unanswered questions, little and sometimes inaccurate information, mixed expectations, and feelings ranging from fear, shame and guilt to pleasure. What is mostly needed in guaranteeing that sexuality is expressed positively, through consensual, mutually respectful and protected relationships that enhance well-being, health and the quality of life.

In Egypt, however, societal attitude and cultural practices impede adolescents from tackling the issue overtly and does not allow them access to unbiased information. The emerging conservative wing, which is increasingly spreading throughout Egypt and influencing youth, makes the issue of sexuality a conflicting topic to religion putting more liability over the adolescent, particularly the girl. Societal attitudes over adolescent sexuality range from extreme practices like imposing on young girls to wear the headscarf at a very young age, preventing them from playing sports, or undergoing genital mutilation operation. Society has instituted a code of conduct that impede adolescents from learning about their bodies and being safe expressing their sexual needs and urges, particularly those which come with the puberty cycle, the shapes and functions of genitals, how to engage in concessional relationships and to gain clarity about one's values and respect of others' values. The absence of parents, school teachers and religious figures responding directly and effectively to adolescents' sexual concerns has led to the existing

sexual frustration and ignorance that we are witnessing among Egyptian youth.

In Egypt, the transition to adulthood comes with marriage and parenthood, but it would be blind to believe that sexuality begins in the confinement of marriage or is the privilege of adulthood. Childhood and adolescence are stages where the self, the body, and identity are constantly positioned and re-positioned. The religious discourse in Egypt over sexuality is still confined to the parameters of adulthood and married life, and does not tackle the needs and concerns of youth of both genders.

Further, censorship and prohibition do not resolve the problem. On the contrary, it increases frustration and perplexity over what should be tackled as a basic human right. Only recently Egyptian sexologists have openly spoken over Egyptian cable television on issues of sexuality for married couples, but still the use of the term 'sexuality' in Egypt is uncommon and the concept is shaded with skepticism and misinterpretation. This unfortunate taboo has direct repercussions over young people's physical and mental health and keeps them trapped within the stereotypes of vulnerability, recklessness and danger. What is needed is a discourse that addresses the needs of both women and men for sexuality and recognizes that information and services on sexuality evolve and move with the times and apply throughout the life cycle.

The existing cultural and institutional framework, within the family, in the school, in state institutions and among peers, does not give the adolescent or the young adult the entitlement to the appropriate space to learn, share and access accurate and unbiased information. Further, youth in Egypt who are poor and inadequately educated often bear the physical and physiological strain of adulthood before they are fully equipped to deal with their sexuality, and are often subject to sexual violence, exploitation and abuse, which diminish their dignity and self worth, and may cause long-term harm.

There is a pressing need to rethink youth sexuality in Egypt from a rights based approach and extend beyond religious conservatism and social norms that

repress youth well-being. The formulation of effective programs and services that are susceptible to cultural and religious sensitivities is needed. Programs that can be translated into non-judgmental services that encourage youth and adolescents from both genders to discuss their concerns in safe environments such as schools, health care clinics, and through formal and informal channels (family, school, youth centers, clubs, the internet, associations, religious organizations) are also essential.

For parents to be able to provide accurate advice to their kids and protect them from all forms of abuse or subjection to any form of exploitation, they themselves need to be well informed and readily open to discuss sexually related matters safely and without shame or fear. Creating an enabling environment is what we need, providing educational and pedagogical programs on reproductive health issues, disease prevention models, and so forth. Further, bringing the religious discourse closer to the needs and demands of youth will ensure that sexuality does not oppose religion or faith. These programs should be designed on evidence, provide 'value-free' information and rely on core values based on informed choice and decision making.

SALMA: YOUTH AS VEHICLES OF SOCIAL CHANGE

We are young only for a short time. For many, the issues faced while young will fade with adulthood, and perspectives and priorities will change. However, youth does involve a transition toward greater social responsibility. As we venture into adulthood, the opinions, attitudes, and beliefs of new generations will affect visions of the future, how communities organize, and how institutions operate.

As youth then, we occupy a paradoxical position. Opportunity stretches in front of us; change is always a possibility. We have the energy and time to pursue dreams and hopes, yet our eagerness and passion are at times blocked by older generations. It is not uncommon for us to be perceived as troublemakers and potential sources of disruption, rather than productive and constructive social actors. Nevertheless, the past several decades have seen an opposing view:

Box 16.4: The Operation of Turkey's Youth Councils

Youth Councils in Turkey, and under the auspices of the local agenda LA21 program were envisaged to include the following:

- The representatives of associations and foundations, as well as civil initiatives conducting activities geared toward the youth in the target age group;
- Representatives of Student Councils of Universities;
- Representatives of Student Councils of Secondary Schools;
- Representatives of youth clubs, student clubs, and student boards in schools;
- Representatives of unorganized youth (representatives of the working, unemployed, disabled, etc. youth identified via working groups and/or from neighborhoods);

Common principles endorsed by all Youth Councils encompass the following: the opposition to all kinds of discrimination; the protection and enhancement of the rights of the youth at local level within the framework of national and international conventions; not being vertically involved with any political affiliation; targeting gender balance; being transparent and collaborative; sharing of information on an unbiased, unconditional and equal manner; avoiding the utilization of activities for personal profits; working on the basis of "voluntarism"; publicizing all activities; and consulting with the members and ensuring their participation.

Furthermore, the multi-faceted functions of the Youth Council include increasing the participation of the youth in the planning, decision-making and implementation processes, promoting the development of youth-related programs and facilitating their realization, and contributing to the development of integrated youth policies at the national level and to the establishment of a National Youth Council.

The Turkish experience was highlighted as a global "best practice" during the 2002 World Summit on Sustainable Development in Johannesburg, and more than 21 countries from Europe and the CIS region traveled to Turkey to learn more about the process and its benefits. It has emerged as a civil society movement that has demonstrated its potential to trigger social transformation, accelerating the decentralization and democratization process in the country. *Source: UNDP, Turkey Online*

Youth's combination of vision, determination and vigor has led, in many parts of the world, to effective initiatives, campaigns and movements through which we young people have voiced our ideals and changed the course of our societies.

There are a wide range of definitions as to what constitutes participation. For example, the Save the Children 're-action toolkit' defines participation as "people sharing ideas, thinking for themselves, expressing their views effectively, planning, prioritizing and being involved in the decision-making process." In Egypt, however, it seems that youth do not participate because they believe that their engagement and activism do not count, according to the 2004 UNDP/NCCM Youth Aspirations Survey. This belief may have been precipitated by a social understanding that places us as passive recipients of goods and services and which rewards passivity but gives no benefits for innovation and activism. A lack of channels through

which dissent can be expressed or remedies provided may also be a contributing factor.

However, experiences from abroad demonstrate that given the right conditions and the proper incentives, young people can and do contribute to their societies. There is every hope that many more youth in today's Egypt will transfer their need for inclusion into actual demonstrations of social competence, if given the opportunity and the cultural space to do so. The onus lies with their elders to provide the environment that would enable them to transition to maturity as participating members of a community.

Naturally, importing schemes based on the social and economic peculiarities of other countries could simply be ineffective in Egypt and require much adaptation to local circumstances. Nevertheless, the impulse remains constant: Young people participating to help each other in an enabling environment. As an 'alter-

native' community with credibility among their peers, they are best equipped not only to make appropriate choices, but also benefit in the outcome in terms of responsibilities taken and successes achieved.

One example of effective participation by young people comes from Turkey. In 1997, several cities throughout Turkey joined the global network "Local Agenda 21" (LA-21), aiming at establishing local agendas for their own future. Public institutions, local authorities and civil society organizations formed a triangle of the local decision-making process. City Councils aimed to provide equal opportunity for the representation of all local stakeholders. The central government and municipal representation constituted only one third of the councils, with the remaining two-thirds consisting of representatives of foundations and associations, professional chambers, private sector organizations, trade unions, academic institutions, and, most importantly, youth groups. The establishment of Youth Councils was therefore necessary in order to help young people get organized and focus on the issues that directly concern them.

According to the Turkey HDR for 2008, 73 youth councils and 35 youth centers have been established under the LA-21 program. Through a series of projects youth councils have manifested a remarkable progress in promoting local governance, and have culminated in the establishment of the LA-21 National Youth Parliament in 2004, which was adopted as the organizational model for the nation-wide network of Youth Councils established in LA-21 cities. Parliament has also been working toward building the capacities of local youth platforms, as well as contributing to the development of national youth policies and a model for the National Youth Council.

Youth Councils and participation In Egypt should not be just a dream. In 2005, the National Youth Council of Egypt (NYC) was established following a presidential decree, with the main objectives of building the capacities of young people and promoting their active involvement in public life. The NYC 2006-2010 work plan primarily focuses on three aspects, which are:

- Political Empowerment Programs include an annual youth conference with over 1000 young outstanding participants, a number of lectures,

workshops and seminars, public awareness campaigns, and a youth parliament model, among others;


- Economic Empowerment Programs include the "Youth Villages" project, SME funding in partnership with Egypt's Social Fund for Development, and employment programs at youth nationwide centers;
- Social Empowerment Programs mainly consisting of youth service centers that facilitate the provision of government services and the establishment of youth clubs and youth centers in all governorates.

There are 4302 youth centers throughout Egypt, and more, we are told, are being established. However, although youth centers, under the supervision of the National Youth Council in Egypt offer a wide range of beneficial activities to young people, it can be argued that they do not necessarily contribute to genuine youth participation in decision-making, or promote legitimate youth representation. This is probably due to poor central and local management.

Nevertheless, the NYC and its 4302 youth centers do provide the infrastructure for replicating a successful Turkish experience in Egypt (see Box 16.2). The governance, however, of these structures needs to be radically altered. Young people have to be offered the opportunity to be part of the NYC Board through democratic elections by other young people. They have to be given the space to represent the interests of these youths and to be involved in the planning, decision-making and implementation processes of all youth-related programs.

Furthermore, the NYC can act as the coordinating body for the numerous youth centers operating in all governorates, which are to include representatives of all youth groups residing in the respective city/village, such as student councils, youth clubs, youth associations, as well as random and marginalized youth groups. By developing their own local agendas, prioritizing their needs and proposing developmental projects, these youth centers can effectively contribute to the promotion of local governance and decentralization efforts in Egypt.

Technical Notes and Sources of Data



A. HUMAN DEVELOPMENT INDEX (HDI)

The National Human Development Report for 2010 presents a summary on the average achievements that have been realized for Egypt of three key human development dimensions:

1. Longevity, measured by life expectancy at birth.
2. Education, measured by the weighted average of literacy rate (15+) (two-thirds) and combined basic, secondary and tertiary gross enrolment ratio (one-third).
3. Standard of living, measured by GDP per capita in US\$ according to the purchasing power parity (US\$ PPP).

Calculation of HDI

Before the calculation of HDI an index for each key dimension is calculated separately.

To calculate the indices of these dimensions: (longevity, education and GDP per capita), maximum and minimum values (posted goals) of the indicators are determined internationally as follows:

| Indicator | Maximum Value | Minimum Value |
|--------------------------------|---------------|---------------|
| Life expectancy at birth | 85 | 25 |
| Literacy (%) | 100 | 0 |
| Combined gross enrolment ratio | % 100 | 0 |
| GDP per capita (\$PPP) | 40,000 | 100 |

The index for any component of HDI can be computed as follows:

- $(\text{the actual value} - \text{the minimum value}) / (\text{the maximum value} - \text{the minimum value})$
- HDI is then calculated as the simple average of the three indices.

The HDI value indicates the level of development. When the HDI value is below the value of one, this shows how far the country or the governorate is from the maximum achieved by any country. In this case, the development plan should explore the gaps that hinder the enhancement of the development level and set up the policies and programs to accelerate achievement of the goals, which are more inclusive and comprehensive than just increasing the income level.

The benefit of ranking the governorates in descending order is limited, as it does not indicate areas in which differences between governorates exist. Are the differences due to economic, health, environmental or educational factors? The differences might be related to all these factors, and perhaps what is more important is speeding up the development process.

CAPMAS has been the major source of data for calculating the HDI measures throughout the period since the first HDI was produced in 1994. It must be noted however that the data produced by CAPMAS for this year's HDR are those of the 2006 census and may therefore be more reliable but also show significant gaps with the inter-census period.

The following example of Port Said governorate may illustrate steps for calculating the human development index:

1. Calculating the Longevity Index

Life expectancy at birth in the governorates is estimated using the detailed data on mortality and population by age groups. Life expectancy at birth for Port Said governorate in 2007 is estimated at 72.7 years, therefore, the life expectancy index = $(72.7 - 25) / (85 - 25) = 0.795$

2. Calculating the Education Index

The education index measures the relative achievement of Port Said governorate in literacy rate (15+) and the combined gross enrolment ratio (basic, secondary and tertiary). The literacy index (15+) and the gross enrolment index are calculated separately and added together to form the education index,

giving a weight of two-thirds to literacy rate (15+) and one third to the combined gross enrolment ratio as follows:

- Literacy index for the population of Port Said governorate (15+) = $(83.6 - 0) / (100 - 0) = 0.836$.
- Combined gross enrolment index = $(70.1 - 0) / (100 - 0) = 0.701$
- Education index = $2/3 (0.836) + 1/3 (0.701) = 0.791$

3. Calculating GDP Per Capita Index

GDP per capita for Egypt is estimated from the National Income Accounts of 2006/2007. The estimated GDP per capita in local currency (LE) is transformed to its value in US\$ using an appropriate exchange rate (taking into consideration the estimations of the Ministry of State for Economic Development). Then the real GDP per capita (ppp US\$) is calculated by applying a suitable factor to the estimated GDP per capita in US\$ (the factor used in the International Human Development Report for 2008). This resulted in a national GDP per capita index for Egypt of 0.727 in 2008.

For income per capita at the governorate level, the report has benefited from the latest Household Income, Expenditure and Consumption Survey (HIEC) conducted by CAPMAS in 2008/2009. In the HDI, income (GDP per capita) is a substitute for all other dimensions of human development that are not reflected in education or life expectancy at birth. Income per capita is adjusted because achieving a suitable level of development does not require a specific level of income. Therefore, the logarithm of the income (GDP per capita) is used as follows:

GDP per capita index for Port Said governorate = $\log(9590.6) - \log(100) / \log(40000) - \log(100) = 0.762$

4. Calculating HDI, using the results of the three indices

HDI is calculated as a simple average of the three indices. HDI for Port Said governorate = $1/3 (0.795 + 0.791 + 0.762) = 1/3 (2.348) = 0.783$.

B. DEMOGRAPHIC ASPECTS

The main sources of demographic data are population censuses, vital statistics and special national surveys. CAPMAS is the official national agency responsible for carrying out and/ or publishing the results of some of these sources (such as the population censuses and the vital registration). CAPMAS is also a partner or consultant in carrying out other surveys and sources of data. Indicators derived from these sources reflect the population situation and its trends. Some of these indicators are used in other fields (e.g. health). In addition, population figures (total, or for specific categories or groups) are necessary for calculating many indicators in different fields. CAPMAS provided all data related to the demographic aspects for 2006 from the 2006 Population and Establishments Census.

The present report includes the following demographic indicators:

- Population counts (thousands);
- Population annual growth rate (%);
- Rural population as % of total;
- Urban population as % of total;
- Annual growth rate of urban population (%);
- Population of the largest city as % of total urban

- population in the governorate;
- Demographic dependency rate (%);
- Net lifetime internal migration as % of total population;
- Population density per km²;
- Population doubling date at current growth rate;
- Crude birth rate (per 1000 population);
- Total fertility rate;
- Ratio of 1960 fertility to 2005;
- Contraceptive prevalence rate (%);
- Average age at first marriage;
- Crude death rate (per 1000 population);
- Infant mortality rate (per 1000 live births);
- Under five mortality rate (per 1000 live births);
- Under five mortality (thousands);
- Maternal mortality rate (per 100,000 live births);
- Life expectancy at birth.

The first ten indicators listed above are derived from the final data of the 2006 Population and Establishments Census, in addition to data included in the statistical Year Book 2008, except for population doubling date, which is calculated at the national level only. The latter indicator is calculated by the exponential function using the annual growth rate for the period 1996 – 2006.

Mortality measures and crude birth rates rely on data from the National Center for Health and Population Information (Ministry of Health for 2008). The average age at the first marriage relies on the data of the Demographic and Health Survey 2008 (DHS).

Life expectancies at birth for 1976 and 2007 at the national and different governorate levels are computed from the detailed data on population and deaths by age and gender. Motherhood and childhood mortality rates are available from data of the National Center for Health and Population Information (Ministry of Health) for 2008. Data on contraceptive prevalence rate are taken from the Demographic and Health Survey.

C. LABOR FORCE AND UNEMPLOYMENT (15+)

Labor force and unemployment indicators in this report rely on CAPMAS data on labor force and its various distribution (by gender, age, economic activity, occupation, employment status, etc) for rural and urban areas of each governorate in 2007. This report includes the following labor force and unemployment indicators:

- Labor force (15+) as % of total population;
- % of females in the total labor force (15+);
- Labor force (15+) in agriculture, industry and services %;
- Wage earner (i.e. employees) as % of total labor force (15+);
- Employees in scientific and technical professions as % of labor force (15+);
- % of females in legislation and organization professions;
- % of females in scientific and technical professions;
- Employees in government, public sector and public business sector as % of total labor force (15+);
- Unemployment rate % (total and female);
- Urban and rural unemployment rates (15+);
- Unemployment rate by education level (15+);
- Absolute numbers of unemployed (15+);
- Future labor force replacement ratio (%), i.e. population under 15 years divided by one third of population (15 – 64).

D. EDUCATION AND LITERACY

Education and literacy indicators require three types of data:

1. Standard educational data, i.e. number of students (enrolled or graduate), teachers, classes, etc. The primary sources of this type of data are the annual bulletins of the Ministry of Education and Al- Azhar Education Administration. These data are disaggregated by gender for each governorate and for all pre-university levels. The Information Center of the Ministry of Education and Al- Azhar Education Administration provide these data at the governorate level for 2007/2008.

Data on university and tertiary education are published annually by the Information and Documentation Center at the Ministry of Higher Education for government, private and Al- Azhar universities and faculties and for government or private intermediate or high institutes.

The Supreme Council of Universities also publishes data on government university education at the university and faculty levels.

2. Literacy data (15+). This data is published through population censuses. CAPMAS provided data on the illiterate population in 2007.

3. Economic data required to derive indicators of public expenditure on education. The State budget, published annually by the Ministry of Finance, is the primary source of this data on expenditure on education. However, this data is not available at the governorate level.

Based on these different types of data, the report includes the following indicators on education and literacy:

- Apparent primary intake rate (%).
- Primary gross enrolment ratio (%);
- Preparatory gross enrolment ratio (%);
- Basic gross enrolment ratio (%);
- Secondary gross enrolment ratio (%);
- Combined basic and secondary gross enrolment ratio (%);
- Tertiary enrolment ratio (university and high institutes);
- Combined first, second and third level gross enrolment ratio (%);
- Primary repeaters as % of primary enrolment;
- Preparatory repeaters as % of preparatory enrolment;
- Secondary repeaters as % of secondary enrolment;
- Transition to preparatory education as % of enrolment in the final grade
 - of primary education in the preceding year;
- Transition to secondary education as % of preparatory completers;
- Primary students /teacher ratio(i.e. average number of students per teacher);
- Preparatory students/teacher ratio;
- Class density(average number of students per class) at the primary level;
- Class density at the preparatory level;
- Secondary technical enrolment as % of total secondary;
- Tertiary enrolment in science as % of total tertiary enrolment;
- Public expenditure on education as % of total;
- Public expenditure on education as % of GDP;
- % of basic and secondary enrolment in government, private and El-Azhar schools (%);
- % of unfit school buildings (total, completely unfit, badly maintained);

- Literacy rate (15+) %;
- Secondary or university graduates as % of total population (15+);
- Tertiary science graduates as % of total graduates;
- Numbers of illiterate (15+).
-

These indicators are calculated by gender at the national and governorate levels. Literacy rates for rural and urban areas are also derived. However, indicators of public expenditure on education and those for tertiary education are calculated at the national level only.

The following are notes pertain to indicators listed above:

1. Because data on enrolment by age are not available, especially for primary education, gross enrolment ratios are calculated for all educational levels.
2. The number of people in the age groups corresponding to different educational level is estimated by applying "Sprague Multipliers" to the number of population by age groups in 1960 and 1/1/2008. Estimation issued by CAPMAS are used.
3. Some of the enrolment and transition ratios exceed 100% due to the number of students above (or below) the age limits of the education level.
4. Enrolment in university and higher education by governorate is not available. The combined first, second and third level gross enrolment ratios for various governorates are derived after distributing total tertiary enrolment at the national level according to the relative shares of the governorates in pre-university (basic and secondary) enrolment.

E. NUTRITION AND FOOD SECURITY

The report includes the following nutrition and food security indicators:

- Daily calorie intake per capita;
- Shares in daily calorie intake per capita (vegetables, animal products and fish) (%);
- Children ever breastfed (%);
- Underweight children below the age of five (%);
- Food production per capita index (1999 – 2001 = 100);
- Agricultural product as % of GDP;
- Cereal imports (1000 metric tons);
- Food exports as % of food imports;
- Food imports as % of merchandise exports;
- Food self- sufficiency ratio (%);
- Food import dependency ratio (%).

The first two indicators are based on the Food Balance Sheet (FBS) published by the Ministry of Agriculture and Land Reclamation. The next two indicators on children are taken from the Demographic and Health Survey for 2008 at the national, rural and urban levels as a whole and according to governorates groups (urban – Lower Egypt – Upper Egypt and frontiers governorates). The data are derived at the governorates level.

Food production per capita index is taken from the web site of the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO).

The agricultural product as % of GDP is derived from the web site of the Ministry of State for Economic Development. Data on cereal imports, food imports and food and merchandize exports are taken from the Ministry of Agriculture and Land Reclamation (Study on Foreign Trade Indicators of Major Crops and Food Products, 2007).

As for food self- sufficiency, the quantity of consumption of food commodities is taken from the Agricultural Income Bulletin issued by the Ministry of Agriculture and Land Reclamation in 2007 and the domestic prices are derived from the same bulletin. Data on quantities and prices of exports and imports are taken from the Bulletin of Statistics of Foreign Trade of Major Crops and Agricultural Commodities issued by the Ministry of Agriculture and Land Reclamation in 2007. The food self- sufficiency ratio is computed by estimating the values of both the domestic production and consumption of food commodities according to the Free on Board (FOB) prices of export commodities, the Cost Insurance Freight (CIF) of food imports and the domestic prices of the non-tradable commodities

The overall food self – sufficiency ratio and the corresponding ratios of the commodity groups are derived by dividing the value of the local food production by the value of food consumption. The food import dependency ratio was computed by dividing the value of food imports by the value of food consumption.

F. HEALTH AND UTILITIES

In addition to health – related indicators covered in other sections, this report includes the following indicators on health and public utilities:

- Children dying before age of five (thousands);
- Malnourished children under age of five (thousands);
- Maternal mortality rate per 100,000 live births;
- Pregnant women with prenatal care (%);
- Infant mortality rate per 1000 live births;
- Under five mortality rate per 1000 live births;
- Children ever breastfed (%);
- Births attended by health personnel (%);
- Children (12-23 months) fully immunized (%);
- Underweight below age of five (%);
- Doctors (MOH) per 10,000 people;
- Nurses (MOH) per 10,000 people;
- Nurses / doctors ratio (MOH);
- Beds per 10,000 people (total and MOH);
- Health units with beds per 10,000 people;
- Contraceptive prevalence rate (%);
- Crude birth rate (per 1000 population);
- Crude death rate (per 1000 population);
- Public expenditure on health as % of total;
- Public expenditure on health as % of GDP;
- Population or households with access to piped water (%);
- Population or households with access to sanitation (%);

The Demographic and Health Survey for 2008 provided the indicators 2, 4, 7, 8, 9, 10, 16 at the national, urban and rural levels as a whole and for main groups of governorates. Data are derived for each governorate separately.

The National Center for Health and Population Information provided indicators 1,3,5,6,11,15,17,18 at the national level as whole, for the main groups of governorates and for each governorate separately.

Data for public expenditure on health indicators relied on the Statistical Year Book for 2008. GDP data are taken from the National Income Accounts provided by the Ministry of State for Economic Development.

The following notes pertain to the indicators listed above:

1. Children (12 – 23) months fully immunized are those who

- receive DCG, Measles, German Measles, the Parotid Gland , three dozes of DPT and Polio vaccine.
2. The contraceptive prevalence indicator (%) is taken from data of the Demographic and Health Survey for 2008. Rates for the five frontier governorates are not included because the sample of the households in these governorates is small, so a separate estimation of contraceptive prevalence rates could not be calculated.
 3. Indicator of underweight children below five (%) is the ratio of children under five years who are classified as underweight, according to weight/age measure provided by the Demographic and Health Survey for 2008. The indicator is expressed in the standard deviation units (-2) from the median of the WHO Child Growth Standards reference population adopted in 2006. Thus, the indicator is not comparable to that based on the previously used by the USA National Center for Health Statistics(NCHS) / Center of Disease Control (CDC) / WHO.
 4. Percentage of pregnant women who received pre-natal care is the percentage of all births whose mothers received, during pregnancy, any medical care (pregnancy care, pregnancy related care, or a tetanus injection).
 5. The indicators of the public expenditure on health rely on the State budget data issued annually by the Ministry of Finance, in addition to GDP data taken from the National Income Accounts provided by the Ministry of State for Economic development.
These indicators are computed by gender at the national and governorates levels. However, the indicators of public expenditure on health are computed at the national level only.
 6. Data on total health personnel are not accurate because there is no effective system for updating their number, taking into consideration factors such as migration, retirement, on-leave periods and duplication in the statistics of these personnel in private or government institutions. The relevant indicators in this report include only health personnel in the Ministry of Health. Therefore, they do not accurately reflect the regional disparities in this respect.
 7. It should be noted that health personnel attending births include doctors, nurses and trained midwives. The traditional birth attendants (dayas) play an important role, especially in rural areas. This is reflected in the high rate of births attended by health personnel at the national and governorate levels.
 8. The indicator of the households with access to sanitation reflects the percentage of population that use a proper sanitation system such as a connection to a sink, under ground sanitation tank, a toilet linked to public network, a simple pit latrine or an improved pit latrine. According to the concept of health science, any private or joint (but not public) disposal system is considered healthy if it separates human excreta from contact with people, in spite of the reservations connected with this concept.

G. NATURAL RESOURCES AND ENERGY CONSUMPTION:

The report includes the following indicators on natural resources and energy consumption.

- Land area (thousand km²);
- Cultivated area (thousand feddans):
 - As %of total land area;
 - Persons per feddan.

- Irrigated land as % of arable land area;
- Crop area in thousand feddans;
- Crop area as % of cultivated land;
- Total water resources (billion m³) ;
- Water consumption as % of total water resources;
- Internal renewable water as % of total water resources;
- Per capita internal renewable water (m³ /year);
- % of water withdrawal for:
 - Agriculture;
 - Localities;
 - Industry;
 - Navigation
- Total fish catch(thousand tons);
- % of fish catch from:
 - Fresh water (Nile , its branches and Naser Lake);
 - Marine(Mediterranean , Red Sea);
 - Lakes;
 - Fish farming;
- Total electricity consumption (billions of k.w.h);
- Electricity consumption per capita (k.w.h);
- Total consumption of primary energy (million tons of oil equivalent);
- Consumption of primary energy per capita (kg of oil equivalent);
- % of primary energy consumption from:
 - Crude oil;
 - Natural gas;
 - Hydro-power;
 - Coal.
- Primary energy consumption (in kg of oil equivalent per L.E 1000 of GDP);
- Net primary energy imports (% of energy consumption);
- Total final energy consumption (million tons of oil equivalent);
- % of final energy consumption from:
 - Oil products;
 - Gas;
 - Electricity;
- % of final energy consumption by:
 - Industry;
 - Transportation and communications;
 - Agriculture;
 - Households and commercial;
 - Others.

Data on land area at governorate level is available from CAPMAS. Data on arable and crop areas at governorate level are taken from publications of the Ministry of Agriculture and Land Reclamation concerning agricultural statistics.

Indicators of water resources, consumption and withdrawals pattern are derived from data of Planning Sector at the Ministry of Water Resources and Irrigation. Fish catch indicators are calculated from the Fish Production Statistics for 2007, issued by the General Authority for Development of Fish Resources.

Indicators on energy consumption for 2007 /2008 are derived from: data of Ministry of State for Economic Development, the 2007/2008 Follow Up Report of the Economic and Social Development Plan; Report of the Work Results of the Petroleum Affairs Sector at the Ministry of Petroleum in 2007/2008, unpublished , July 2008 and the unpublished data of the Egyptian General Petroleum Authority. It is worth nothing that the final energy consumption is calculated by

excluding the quantity of energy sources consumed as inputs for producing another source of energy (e.g. the use of natural gas or oil products in the production of energy). Net import of primary energy is computed by subtracting exports from imports. This includes foreign partner's exports of oil and natural gas and the pay back of the surplus of the crude oil. Imports do not include crude oil and natural gas purchased by Egypt in foreign currency from the foreign partner's share.

H. COMMUNICATIONS

The communications profile is presented by a number of indicators. The major sources of data required for deriving these indicators are population census and the annual bulletins issued by CAPMAS in cooperation with the concerned ministries, authorities and institutions.

The report includes the following communications indicators:

- Households with television (%);
- Households radio cassette (%);
- Telephones per 1000 households;
- Number of cell phones subscribers annually per 1000 people;
- Number of internet subscribers annually per 1000 people;

The first two indicators are taken from the Egypt Demographic and Health Survey for 2008.

The other indicators are derived from the data of the Population and Establishments Census provided by CAPMAS.

I. ECONOMIC ASPECTS

The report includes the following economic indicators:

- Real GDP per capita in LE and at market prices (2001/2002 prices) at the national and governorate levels for 2007/2008;
- GDP per capita (US\$ PPP) as per estimations of Ministry of State for Economic Development;
- Income share of poorest 40% of population (total and rural);
- Ratio of riches 20% to poorest 40%;
- Gini coefficient (total and rural);
- Total poor persons as% of total population;
- Ultra poor persons as% of total population;
- Total poor and ultra poor (thousands);
- Wages of poor households as % of their incomes;
- Wages of poor households as % of total wages;
- % of total public expenditure on social security;
- % of total public expenditure on defense, security and justice (in addition to % of total public expenditure on education and health referred to earlier);
- Public expenditure on social security as % of GDP;
- Public expenditure on defense, security and justice as % of GDP (in addition to % of total public expenditure on education and health as % of GDP referred to earlier);
- GDP at current market prices (LE billion);
- Agricultural product as % of GDP at factor cost;
- Industrial product as % of GDP at factor cost;
- Services as % of GDP at factor cost;
- Household consumption as % of GDP;
- Government consumption as % of GDP at market prices;
- Gross domestic investment as % of GDP at market prices;
- Gross domestic saving as % of GDP at market prices;
- Tax revenues as % of GDP at market prices;
- Exports as % of GDP at market prices;

- Imports as % of GDP at market prices;
- Civil external debt as% of GDP at market prices;
- Civil external debt service ratio (as % of exports);
- Workers` remittances from abroad (US \$ million);
- Export/ import ratio (merchandise only);
- Trade dependency (merchandise exports + merchandise imports) as % of GDP;
- Current account balance (LE billion);
- Net international reserves .(US\$ billion);
- Months of merchandise imports coverage;
- GDP at constant factor cost (US \$ billion);
- Average annual growth rate of real GDP (%), during the period1998/1999 - 2007/2008) at 1981/1982 prices;
- Average annual growth rate of GDP per capita (%) at market prices during the period (1998/1999 – 2007/2008) at 1981/1982 prices;
- Consumer price index (January 2007= 100);
- Producer price index (2004/2005= 100);
- Average annual growth rate of exports (merchandise and services) during the period (1998/1999-2007/2008);
- Average annual growth rate of tax revenues during the period (1998/1999 -2007/2008);
- Direct taxes as % of total taxes ;
- Overall budget surplus (deficit) as % of GDP at market prices ;

GDP per capita in(LE and US\$ PPP) at the national and governorate levels are derived from national income accounts , provided by the Ministry of State for Economic Development and from the results of the Income, Expenditure and Consumption Survey conducted by CAPMAS in 2008/2009 as shown earlier in section (A-3)

Physical poverty is known as the material inability of securing a decent living standard (that provides basic needs), based on which individuals status is defined as poor or non-poor. The poverty line is used to differentiate between these two categories. The most common method in this regard is the basic needs approach which is used in this report. Poverty line – via this approach – is determined by the cost of the goods and services basket that represents the basic needs. This cost comprises the cost of the basic food needs, known as the food poverty line. If non-food basic needs costs are added, we determine what is known as the absolute poverty line and the used poverty line. The used poverty line takes into consideration the disparities in prices of goods and services between various regions. It also reflects differences in “basic needs” of different family members: children versus adults and males versus females. In addition it takes account of “economics of scale” within the household – such as non-food items that can be shared among all family members, (i.e. electricity or rent value which are considered “as non-competitive items” within each household – because any member uses these items does not reduce the consumption of the other members). For that reason, living in large households can reduce the mean per capita expenditure to maintain a certain standard of living. The basic needs method is used to assess the household and regional poverty lines. The food poverty line varies between households and regions. Therefore, poverty lines reflect the disparities in prices of food and non-food commodities between different regions. They also reflect household's size, age and gender structures and their food and non-food expenditure patterns. The poor person (or household) is defined as that whose expenditure (or

income) is below the poverty line).

The results of Income, Expenditure and Consumption Survey conducted by Capmas in 2008/2009 is used in calculating the poverty line and other poverty indicators.

This methodology can be summarized as follows:

The basic step upon defining the food poverty line is to choose the food basket that meets the basic food needs agreed upon. It should be noted that each household has a minimum level of caloric needs, depending on its age and gender structure.

Based on individuals' height, weight, age and gender, we can identify what is known as Basel Metabolic Rate (BMR). Therefore, caloric needs of each age and gender category can be determined. Caloric needs set by WHO states that males in urban areas need 1.78 fold the mean metabolic rate, while females need 1.64 fold. The corresponding figure in rural areas is 2.1 for males and 1.82 for females. Accordingly, we can identify the individuals' or household's caloric needs based on his place of residence and on the age and gender of the family members. It is worthy noting that this has been applied upon calculating poverty lines in some Arab countries

The cost of obtaining the minimum level of calories is estimated by using the current prices in each region in Egypt . The cost of obtaining 1000 calories per day in different regions ranges between LE 1.935 in big cities and LE 1.77 in Upper Egypt rural areas.

The non-food expenditure for the households, who can hardly meet their food needs but choose to displace them to obtain the essential non-food needs , is estimated . Average non-food expenditure for these households is added to the poverty line which is based on food basket to obtain the poverty line that takes into consideration differences in location, age, gender and economies of scale of the households. Therefore, the minimum poverty line is specified at LE 2223, at the level of all geographical regions, and the food poverty lines at LE 1648. Poverty lines for each region is specified separately . Indicators of public expenditure on various sectors are calculated from the financial report of the Plan and Budget Committee, at the People's Assembly, on the Final Account of the State budget for 2007/2008.

The Ministry of State for Economic Development provided the data required for deriving national income accounts. These data are regularly included in the successive Follow-Up reports and on the Ministry web site : www.mop.gov.eg.

Indicators of GDP (growth rates and GDP per capita growth rates) as well as growth rates of exports and international reserves are calculated from data provided by the Ministry of State for Economic Development included in the successive Follow Up reports and in the Basic Data Series : Output, Investment, Employment and wages, during the period 1981/82-2006-2007. The data on consumer price index and producer price index, (as indicators of inflation) are taken from the monthly bulletin issued by CAPMAS.

Finally, indicators of taxes and the State budget surplus/deficit are calculated from data of the financial report of the Plan and Budget Committee, at the People's Assembly, on the Final Account of the State budget for 2007/2008 . The average annual growth rate of tax revenues is calculated from data included in the annual reports of the Plan and Budget Committee, at the People's assembly, on the draft State budgets and the Final Accounts for many fiscal years.

The data on external debts, international reserves, workers' remittances and some data on exports, imports and, US\$ exchange rate versus the Egyptian pound are obtained from the Central Bank of Egypt's reports available on its web site : www.cbe.org.eg

J PARTICIPATION

Observing that indicators can reflect some aspect of participation, the report focuses on calculating the following indicators.

1. Employees in scientific and technical profession as % of total employees (+15).
2. Ratio of gross enrolment in private education.
3. Government, public sector and public business sector employees as (%) of labor force.
4. Participation in economic activities through:
 - A. Workers in crafts occupations as (%) of labor force (+15).
 - B. Workers in the informal sector as % of labor force (+15).

National Indicators



N.1 HUMAN DEVELOPMENT INDEX

| | | |
|---|-----------|--------|
| Life Expectancy at birth (years) | 2007 | 71.7 |
| Adult Literacy rate (%) (15+) | 2007 | 70.4 |
| Combined 1st. 2nd & 3rd-level gross enrolment ratio | 2007/2008 | 66.0 |
| Real GDP per Capita (ppp) \$ | 2007/2008 | 7787.0 |
| Life Expectancy Index | 2007 | 0.778 |
| Education Index | 2007/2008 | 0.689 |
| GDP Index | 2007/2008 | 0.727 |
| Human Development Index | 2007/2008 | 0.731 |

N.2 PROFILE OF HUMAN DEVELOPMENT

| | | | | |
|--|-----------------|-----------|---------|------|
| Life Expectancy at birth (years) | | 2007 | 71.7 | |
| Households with access to: | Piped Water (%) | Total | 2008 | 98 |
| | | Rural | 2008 | 96.7 |
| | sanitation (%) | Total | 2008 | 56.5 |
| | | Rural | 2008 | 37 |
| Daily Calorie Supply per Capita | | 2007 | 4126 | |
| Adult Literacy rate (15+) (%) | | 2007 | 70.4 | |
| Combined Basic and Secondary enrolment ratio | | 2007/2008 | 77.6 | |
| Daily newspaper circulation per 1000 households) | | 2007 | 36.7 | |
| Households with television (%) | | 2008 | 94.7 | |
| GDP per capita (LE) | | 2007/2008 | 10246.1 | |

N.3 PROFILE OF HUMAN DEPREVATION

| | | | thousands |
|---|------------------------|-----------|-----------|
| Populations without access to: | Piped Water sanitation | 2008 | 341.3 |
| | | 2008 | 6964.3 |
| Children dying before age five | | 2008 | 44.2 |
| Malnourished children under five | | 2008 | 435.1 |
| Children not in basic or secondary school | | 2007/2008 | 4706.80 |
| Illiterates (15 +) | | 2007 | 17023.5 |
| Unemployed Persons (15+) | Total | 2007 | 2135 |
| | Female | 2007 | 1057 |
| Poor persons | Total | 2008/2009 | 16191.0 |
| | Ultra | 2008/2009 | 4543.4 |

N.4 TRENDS IN HUMAN DEVELOPMENT

| | | |
|---|---------|------|
| Life Expectancy At birth (years) | 1976 | 55.0 |
| | 2007 | 71.7 |
| Infant mortality rate (per 1000 live births) | 2008 | 18.0 |
| Households with access to piped water (%) | 2004 | 91.3 |
| | 2008 | 98 |
| Daily calorie supply per capita | 2004 | 4192 |
| | 2007 | 4126 |
| Literacy + (15 %) | 2007 | 70.4 |
| Combined basic and secondary enrolment ratio | 2007/08 | 77.6 |

N.5 HUMAN CAPITAL FORMATION

| | | Total | Female |
|---|---------|-------|--------|
| Literacy (15+)(%) | 2007 | 70.4 | 72.7 |
| Basic and secondary enrolment ratio (%)* | 2007/08 | 77.6 | 87.1 |
| Professionals and technicians (% of labor force) | 2008 | 20.5 | 31.0 |
| Population (15+) with secondary or higher education | 2008 | 37.9 | 33.5 |
| Tertiary graduate ratio (% of corresponding age) | 2007/08 | 6.3 | 6.5 |
| Science graduates (% of total graduates) | 2007/08 | 31.6 | 29.5 |

include El Azhar *

N.6 STATUS OF WOMEN

| | | | |
|--|---------------------|---------|--------|
| Life Expectancy At birth (years) | | 2007 | 74.0 |
| Maternal Mortality Rate (per 100000 live births) | | 2008 | 55.0 |
| Average age at first marriage* | | 2008 | 20.6 |
| Gross Enrolment Ratio | Basic education | 2007/08 | 92.99 |
| | Primary | 2007/08 | 104.75 |
| | Preparatory | 2007/08 | 89.62 |
| | Secondary education | 2007/08 | 66.78 |
| | Tertiary education | 2007/08 | 29.57 |
| Tertiary Science Enrolment (%) | | 2007/08 | 8.09 |
| Females with Secondary or Higher Education (15+) (%) | | 2007 | 33.6 |
| Professional & Technical staff (%) | | 2007 | 32.3 |
| Women in the Labor Force (%) | | 2007 | 23.9 |

N.7 FEMALE - MALE GAPS

| | | | |
|----------------------------------|--|-----------|-------|
| Life Expectancy At birth (years) | | 2007 | 106.5 |
| Population | | 2008 | 95.6 |
| literacy (15+) (%) | | 2008 | 80.7 |
| Primary Enolment | | 2007/2008 | 98.9 |
| Preparatory Enrolment | | 2007/2008 | 100.9 |
| Secondary Enrolment | | 2007/2008 | 97.40 |
| Tertiary Enrolment & Posgraduate | | 2007/2008 | 69.80 |
| Labor Force | | 2007 | 31.3 |

N.8 RURAL - URBAN GAPS

| | | | | |
|-------------------------------|------------------|-------|------|-------|
| Rural Population (% of total) | | | 2004 | 58.4 |
| | | | 2008 | 57.0 |
| Households with access to: | pipied water (%) | Urban | 2008 | 99.8 |
| | | Rural | 2008 | 96.7 |
| Households with access to: | Sanitation (%) | Urban | 2008 | 89.8 |
| | | Rural | 2008 | 37.5 |
| Literacy (15 +)(%) | | Urban | 2006 | 79.1 |
| | | Rural | 2006 | 62.0 |
| Rural -Urban disparity | pipied water | | 2008 | 96.9 |
| | sanitation | | 2008 | 41.8 |
| | Literacy | | 2008 | 79.40 |

N.9 CHILD SURVIVAL AND DEVELOPMENT

| | | | |
|--|--|------|------|
| Pregnant women with prenatal care (%) | | 2008 | 73.6 |
| Maternal mortality rate (per 100000 live birth) | | 2008 | 55.0 |
| Infant mortality rate (per 1000 live births) | | 2008 | 18.0 |
| Under five mortality rate (per 1000 live births) | | 2008 | 22.8 |
| Children never breastfed | | 2008 | 95.8 |
| Birth attended by health personnel (%) | | 2008 | 71.7 |
| Children 12-23 months old fully immunized (%) ** | | 2008 | 91.7 |
| Under weight below age 5 (%) | | 2008 | 6.0 |

*Those who received BCG, measles and three doses of DPT and polio Vaccines***

N.10 HEALTH PROFILE

| | | | | Total | Females |
|---|-----------------|-------|----------|-------|---------|
| Households with access to: | Piped Water (%) | Total | 2003/04 | 94.9 | 95.9 |
| | | Rural | 2007/08 | 112.1 | 112.3 |
| | Sanitation(%) | Total | 2003/04 | 96.4 | 86.3 |
| | | Rural | 2007/08 | 90.0 | 104.8 |
| Doctors per 10000 people (MOH) * | | | 2007/08 | 4.3 | 2.9 |
| | | | 2007/08 | 103.4 | 102.8 |
| Nurses per 10000 people (MOH)* | | | 2003/04 | 95.2 | 100.1 |
| Nurses /Doctor ratio (%) (MHO) | | | 2007/08 | 84.0 | 89.6 |
| | | | 2007/08 | 5.9 | 3.8 |
| Maternal mortality rate (per 100000 live birth | | | 2007/08 | 98.8 | 92.8 |
| Beds for 10000 people | | Total | 2003/ 04 | 77.2 | .. |
| | | MOH | 2007/08 | 46.1 | 66.8 |
| Health units per 100000 people | | | 2007/08 | 4.0 | 2.4 |
| Puplic expenditure on health | of total (%) | | 2003/04 | 29.2 | 27.7 |
| | of GDP (%) | | 2007/08 | 35.3 | 29.6 |

N.11 EDUCATION FLOW

| | | Total | Females |
|--|----------|-------|---------|
| Primary repeaters (% of primary enrolment)* | 2003/04 | 94.9 | 95.9 |
| | 2007/08 | 112.1 | 112.3 |
| Gross Primary enrolment ratio | 2003/04 | 96.4 | 86.3 |
| | 2007/08 | 90.0 | 104.8 |
| Primary repeaters (% of primary enrolment)* | 2007/08 | 4.3 | 2.9 |
| | 2007/08 | 103.4 | 102.8 |
| Transition to completers ** | 2003/ 04 | 95.2 | 100.1 |
| Gross Preparatory enrolment ratio | 2007/08 | 84.0 | 89.6 |
| | 2007/08 | 5.9 | 3.8 |
| Preparatory repeaters (% of preparatory enrolment) | 2007/08 | 98.8 | 92.8 |
| | 2003/ 04 | 77.2 | .. |
| Transition to completers | 2007/08 | 46.1 | 66.8 |
| Gross Secondary enrolment ratio | 2007/08 | 4.0 | 2.4 |
| Secondary repeaters (% of Secondary enrolment) | 2003/04 | 29.2 | 27.7 |
| Tertiary enrolment ratio (%) | 2007/08 | 35.3 | 29.6 |

(*) without El Azhar

(**) The source of percentage of transition to preparatory without El Azhar is Ministry of Education

N.12 EDUCATION IMBALANCES

| | | | |
|--|--------------------------|----------------|-------|
| Primary pupil/ teacher rate | | 2007/2008 | 21.95 |
| Preparatory pupil/ teacher rate | | 2007/2008 | 13.41 |
| Class density: | Primary | 2007/2008 | 42.54 |
| | Preparatory | 2007/2008 | 39.26 |
| Secondary technical enrollment (% of total Secondary) | | 2007/2008 | 63.44 |
| Tertiary science (% of total Tertiary) | | 2007/2008 | 37.77 |
| Puplic expenditure on education | (% of total expenditure) | Budget 2007/08 | 11.9 |
| | (% of GDP) | Budget 2007/08 | 3.8 |
| Puplic expenditure on pre-university education (% of all levels) | | 2007/2008 | 72.8 |
| Puplic expenditure on higher education (% of all levels) | | 2007/2008 | 27.2 |
| Basic and secondary enrolment(%)in: | Government school | 2007/2008 | 85.57 |
| | Private school | 2007/2008 | 3.44 |
| | El azhar school | 2007/2008 | 10.99 |
| Unfit school buildings (%) | Completely unfit | 2009 | 1.51 |
| | Maintance | 2009 | 1.5 |

N.13 COMMUNICATIONS

| | | | |
|---|------------|------|---------|
| Percentage of Households with: | Radio | 2008 | 73.7 |
| | Television | 2008 | 94.7 |
| Telephones (per 1000 households | | 2008 | 621.0 |
| Average number of people served by one post office | | 2008 | 10922.0 |
| Number of cell phone subscribers (per 1000 people) | | 2008 | 296 |
| Number of Internet subscribers (per 1000 people) | | 2008 | 94.0 |

N. 14 LABOR FORCE

| | | | |
|---|-------------|------|------|
| Labor force (15+) (% of total population) | | 2007 | 32.4 |
| Females in the labor force (15 +) (%) | | 2007 | 23.9 |
| Labor force (15+) (%) in: | Agriculture | 2007 | 31.7 |
| | Industry | 2007 | 22.1 |
| | Services | 2007 | 46.2 |
| Wage earners (% labor force 15+) | Total | 208 | 56.6 |
| | Female | 2008 | 39.8 |
| Professionals and technicians (% labor force 15+) | Total | 2007 | 18.7 |
| | Female | 2007 | 32.3 |
| Employees in government, public sector and public enterprise sector (% labor force 15+) | Total | 2008 | 25.6 |
| | Female | 2008 | 30.5 |

N.15 UNEMPLOYMENT

| | | | |
|--|------------|------|-------|
| Unemployment rate % of labor force) | Total | 2007 | 8.9 |
| | Female | 2007 | 18.6 |
| | Urban | 2007 | 11.7 |
| | Uural | 2007 | 7.0 |
| Unemployment rate be educational level (15below) (%) | Secondary | 2007 | 4.8 |
| | Secondary | 2007 | 62.4 |
| | University | 2007 | 32.8 |
| Future labor force replacement ratio (%) | Total | 2007 | 289.0 |

N.16 INCOME DISTRIBUTION, POVERTY AND SOCIAL INVESTMENT

| | | | |
|--|---------------------------|----------------|---------|
| GDP per capita (L.E) | | 2007/08 | 10246.1 |
| % Income share of lowest 40 | total | 2008/09 | 22.3 |
| | rural | 2008/09 | 26.0 |
| % Ratio of highest 20 % to lowest 20 | total | 2008/09 | 4.4 |
| | rural | 2008/09 | 3.1 |
| Gini coefficient | total | 2008/09 | 0.31 |
| | rural | 2008/09 | 0.22 |
| The Poor (as % of total population) | Total | 2008/09 | 21.6 |
| | Ultra | 2008/09 | 6.1 |
| Wages of poor households | as (%) of their income | 2008/09 | 41.3 |
| | as (%) of total wages | 2008/09 | 15.2 |
| Total public expenditure spent on (%): | Education | Budget 2007/08 | 11.9 |
| | Health | Budget 2007/08 | 4.7 |
| | Social Security, defense, | Budget 2007/08 | 1.7 |
| | security & justice * | Budget 2007/08 | 10.3 |
| Public expenditure on education (% of GDP) | | Budget 2007/08 | 3.8 |
| Public expenditure on health (% of GDP) | | Budget 2007/08 | 1.5 |
| Social security benefits (% of GDP) | | Budget 2007/08 | 0.5 |
| Public expenditure on Defense (% of GDP)** | | Budget 2007/08 | 3.2 |

N.17 URBANIZATION

| | | |
|---|-----------|------|
| Urban population (% of total) | 1996 | 42.6 |
| | 2008 | 43.0 |
| Urban population annual growth rate(%) | 1976-1986 | 2.8 |
| | 1996-2006 | 2.0 |
| Population of largest city (% of total urban) | 1996 | 26.1 |
| | 2006 | 69.4 |
| Houses with electricity (%) | 2008 | 99.6 |

N.18 DEMOGRAPHIC PROFILE

| | | |
|---|-----------|---------|
| Population (in thousands) | 1996 | 59116.8 |
| | 2008 | 75097.3 |
| Annual population growth rate (%) | 1986-1996 | 2.1 |
| | 1996-2006 | 2.0 |
| Population doubling rate (current rate) | Year | 2043 |
| Ratio of 2005 fertility to 1995 (%) | 2008 | 3.0 |
| Contraceptive prevalence (%) | 2008 | 8.3 |
| Demographic Dependency ratio(%) | 2008 | 60.3 |
| | 2008 | 54.9 |

N.19 NATURAL RESOURCES

| | | | |
|---|----------------------------------|------|---------|
| Land area | (thousand (Km ²)) | 2007 | 1009.8 |
| Population density | (per Km ²) | 2007 | 73.6 |
| Cultivated Area | thousand feddans | 2007 | 8432.2 |
| | (%) of land area | 2007 | 3.5 |
| persons per feddans | | 2007 | 8.8 |
| Irrigated land | (%) of cultivated area | 2007 | 100 |
| Crop area | Thousand fedans | 2007 | 15236.7 |
| | (%) of cultivated area | 2007 | 1.81 |
| Total water resources | billion m ³ | 2008 | 58 |
| Water consumption (% of total water resources) | | 2008 | 74.8 |
| Internal renewable water (% of total water resources) | | 2008 | 97.9 |
| Per capita Internal renewable water | m ³ /year | 2008 | 757 |
| Water withdrawals by (%) | agriculture | 2008 | 73.9 |
| | Municipal | 2008 | 10.8 |
| | Industrial | 2008 | 11 |
| | Navigation | 2008 | 0.3 |
| | Fish wealth | 2008 | 1.2 |
| Total fish catch | Thousand tons | 2007 | 1008 |
| Fish catch from (%) | Fresh water (Nile & lake Naser) | 2007 | 11.6 |
| | Marine (Mediterranean & Red sea) | 2007 | 13.0 |
| | Other lakes | 2007 | 12.4 |
| | Aqua culture | 2007 | 63.0 |

N.20 ENERGY CONSUMPTION

| | | | |
|--|-------------------------|-----------|--------|
| Total electricity consumption (Billions of Kilowatt/hour) | | 2007/2008 | 106.9 |
| Electricity consumption per capita (Kilowatt/hour) | | 2007/2008 | 1438.5 |
| Total Primary energy consumption million tons of oil equivalent) | | 2007/2008 | 67.5 |
| Primary energy consumption per capita (Kg of oil equivalent) | | 2007/2008 | 908.2 |
| Commercial energy consumption from (%) | Oil product | 2007/2008 | 45.6 |
| | Gas | 2007/2008 | 48.9 |
| | Electricity | 2007/2008 | 5.2 |
| Primary energy consumed in Kg of oil equivalent per 1000 L.E of GDP* | | 2007/2008 | 88.6 |
| Net Primary energy imports (as % of primary energy consumed) | | 2007/2008 | -34.5 |
| Total final energy consumption (million tons of oil equivalent)** | | 2007/2008 | 46.9 |
| Final energy consumed from (%) | Oil product | 2007/2008 | 53.3 |
| | Gas | 2007/2008 | 27.1 |
| | Electricity | 2007/2008 | 19.6 |
| | Coal | 2007/2008 | 0.06 |
| Final energy consumed by (%) | Industry * | 2007/2008 | 42 |
| | Transportation | 2007/2008 | 26.5 |
| | Agriculture | 2007/2008 | 1.1 |
| | Households & commercial | 2007/2008 | 13.8 |
| | Other | 2007/2008 | 16.6 |

By using the cost of production factor and in constant prices of 2006/2007 *** Net Primary energy imports = Imports - exports includes the exports to the foreign partner of crude oil and natural gas

N.21 FOOD SECURITY

| | | | |
|--|----------------------|---------|--------|
| Food production per capita Index (99-2000=100) | | 2007 | 102 |
| Agricultural production (% of GDP) | | 2007/08 | 13.2 |
| Daily calorie per capita | | 2004 | 4192 |
| | | 2007 | 4126 |
| Shares in daily calorie per capita (%) | Vegetable production | 2004 | 92.5 |
| | | 2007 | 92.1 |
| | Animal production | 2004 | 6.8 |
| | | 2007 | 7.3 |
| | Fish production | 2004 | 0.7 |
| | | 2007 | 0.6 |
| Cereal imports (1000 metric tons) | | 2007 | 1422.7 |
| Food exports (% of food imports) | | 2007 | 24.7 |
| Food imports (% of merchandise exports) | | 2007 | 28.3 |
| Food self sufficiency ratio (%) | | 2007 | 81.8 |
| Food import dependency ratio (%) | | 2007 | 13.1 |

N.22 RESOURCE FLOW IMBALANCES

| | | | |
|--|---------------------------|-----------|-------|
| Total Civil external debt (% of GDP) * | | 2007/2008 | 19.7 |
| Civil external debt service ratio (% exports) | | 2007/2008 | 5.1 |
| Workers' remittances from abroad (L.E millions) | | 2007/2008 | 83771 |
| Exports/ Imports ratio (%) | | 2007/2008 | 55.6 |
| Trade dependency (Exports + Imports) (%) of GDP | | 2007/2008 | 50.5 |
| Current account balance (L.E billions) | | 2007/2008 | 4.9 |
| Gross International reserves including gold (U\$\$ Billions) | | June 2008 | 34.6 |
| | Months of import coverage | June 2008 | 7.9 |

*The 2007/2008 average exchange rate is used for transformation which is: 1\$ = 5.51 LE

N.23 NATIONAL INCOME ACCOUNTS

| | | |
|--|-----------|-----------|
| Total GDP at current market prices L.E billions) | 1992/1991 | 2007/2008 |
| Agricultural product (% of GDP at factor cost) | 139.1 | 896.5 |
| Industrial product (% of GDP at factor cost) | 16.5 | 13.2 |
| Services (% of GDP at factor cost) | 33.3 | 16.3 |
| Household consumption (% of GDP) | 50.2 | 54.1 |
| Government consumption (% of GDP) | 74.2 | 72.9 |
| Gross domestic Investment (% of GDP) | 10.4 | 10.9 |
| Gross domestic Saving (% of GDP) | 18.2 | 22.3 |
| Tax revenue (% of GDP) | 15.4 | 22.8 |
| Exports revenue (% of GDP) | 16.0 | 15.3 |
| Imports Payments (% of GD) | 29.0 | 32.8 |
| | 31.8 | 38.8 |

N.24 ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE

| | | | |
|--|-------|--------------------|------------|
| GDP at a constant factor cost (L.E billions | | 1997/1998 | 253.1 |
| | | 2007/2008 | 761.4 |
| Annual growth rate of real GDP (%) | | 1981/82-91/1992 | 6.0 |
| | | 1998/99 -2007/08 | 5.0 |
| Annual growth rate of real per capita GDP (%) | | 1981/82-1991/92 | 3.6 |
| | | 1998/99 -2005/2006 | 3.0 |
| Consumer price index (1995/1996 =100) | Urban | 39600 | 121.5 |
| Wholesale price index(1986/1987 = 100) | | 39600 | 168.5 |
| Annual growth rate of exports (%) | | 81/1982-91/1992 | (- 10.8) |
| | | 1997/98 -2007/08 | 16.3 |
| Annual growth rate of Tax revenue (%) | | 81/1982-91/1992 | 2.6 |
| | | 97/1998 -2007/2008 | 12.3 |
| Direct Taxes (% total taxes) | | 2007/2008 | 50.4 |
| Overall budget surpl/deficit (% of GDP at market prices) | | 1996/97 | (-0.9) |
| | | 2007/08 | (-6.8) |

N.25 PARTICIPATION IN DEVELOPMENT

| | | | |
|--|--------|------|------|
| Professionals and technicians (% of labor force) | Total | 2008 | 20.5 |
| | Female | 2008 | 31.0 |
| Basic & Secondary enrolment in private schools (%) | | 2007 | 3.4 |
| Employees in government, puplic sector and | Total | 2008 | 25.6 |
| puplic enterprise sector (% labor force 15+) | Female | 2008 | 30.5 |
| Employees in hand craftsmen activities | Total | 2006 | 13.7 |
| % of labore force(15+) | Female | 2006 | 1.7 |
| Employees in informal sectors | Total | 2008 | 45.4 |
| (% of labore force) | Female | 2008 | 37.6 |

Governorate Indicators



G.2 PROFILE ON HUMAN DEVELOPMENT

| | Life expectancy at birth | Households with access to: | | Literacy Rate (15+) (%) | Combined basic and secondary enroll. (%) | GDP per capita (L.E) | Households with: | | |
|-----------------|--------------------------|----------------------------|----------------|-------------------------|--|----------------------|------------------|-----------|----------------|
| | | Piped water (%) | Sanitation (%) | | | | Electricity (%) | Radio (%) | Television (%) |
| | 2007 | 2008 | 2008 | 2007 | 2008/2007 | 008/2007 | 2008 | 2008 | 2008 |
| Cairo | 71.3 | 00 | 00 | 80.7 | 82.2 | 7726.4 | 00 | 00 | 00 |
| Alexandria | 72.0 | 00 | 00 | 80.5 | 93.6 | 8978.3 | 00 | 00 | 00 |
| Port Said | 72.7 | 00 | 00 | 83.6 | 92.1 | 10549.7 | 00 | 00 | 00 |
| Suez | 72.3 | 00 | 00 | 82.9 | 98.1 | 8745.8 | 00 | 00 | 00 |
| Urban Govs | 72.2 | 99.9 | 96.8 | 0.0 | 71.5 | 8282.4 | 99.9 | 81.7 | 96.7 |
| Damietta | 72.6 | 00 | 00 | 77.6 | 101.5 | 7883.5 | 00 | 00 | 00 |
| Dakahlia | 71.8 | 00 | 00 | 72.1 | 96.6 | 9111.5 | 00 | 00 | 00 |
| Shrkia | 71.2 | 00 | 00 | 67.8 | 97.5 | 8700.4 | 00 | 00 | 00 |
| Kalyoubia | 72.7 | 00 | 00 | 72.5 | 91.7 | 8134.4 | 00 | 00 | 00 |
| Kafir El Sheikh | 70.6 | 00 | 00 | 65.7 | 99.6 | 8927.9 | 00 | 00 | 00 |
| Gharbia | 72.3 | 00 | 00 | 74.1 | 96.5 | 8799.6 | 00 | 00 | 00 |
| Menoufia | 71.5 | 00 | 00 | 72.6 | 95.6 | 9854.0 | 00 | 00 | 00 |
| Behera | 71.5 | 00 | 00 | 63.4 | 99.0 | 9451.6 | 00 | 00 | 00 |
| Ismailia | 70.9 | 00 | 00 | 77.2 | 97.4 | 8970.2 | 00 | 00 | 00 |
| Lower Egypt | 71.5 | 98.6 | 64.6 | 00 | 80.2 | 8934.8 | 99.8 | 78.1 | 96.7 |
| Urban | 00 | 99.8 | 93.1 | 00 | 00 | 00 | 99.9 | 81.3 | 97.7 |
| Rural | 00 | 98.1 | 52.6 | 00 | 00 | 00 | 99.8 | 76.8 | 96.3 |
| Giza | 69.5 | 00 | 00 | 80.3 | 98.2 | 8242.8 | 00 | 00 | 00 |
| Beni Suef | 71.6 | 00 | 00 | 59.5 | 88.7 | 8857.4 | 00 | 00 | 00 |
| Fayoum | 69.5 | 00 | 00 | 59.1 | 86.2 | 8433.7 | 00 | 00 | 00 |
| Menia | 69.3 | 00 | 00 | 58.7 | 88.5 | 8655.9 | 00 | 00 | 00 |
| Assiut | 70.7 | 00 | 00 | 60.9 | 88.5 | 8019.6 | 00 | 00 | 00 |
| Suhag | 70.5 | 00 | 00 | 61.5 | 94.7 | 7329.7 | 00 | 00 | 00 |
| Qena | 70.5 | 00 | 00 | 65.2 | 96.2 | 6387.5 | 00 | 00 | 00 |
| Luxor | 69.8 | 00 | 00 | 72.2 | 105.5 | 9105.6 | 00 | 00 | 00 |
| Aswan | 71.2 | 00 | 00 | 77.0 | 97.1 | 7057.4 | 00 | 00 | 00 |
| Upper Egypt | 70.2 | 96.9 | 37.2 | 00 | 77.4 | 7978.9 | 99.0 | 62.4 | 90.8 |
| Urban | 00 | 100.0 | 76.5 | 00 | 00 | 00 | 99.8 | 76.0 | 96.1 |
| Rural | 00 | 95.1 | 13.5 | 00 | 00 | 00 | 98.5 | 54.1 | 87.5 |
| Red sea | 71.2 | 00 | 00 | 87.3 | 96.3 | 8460.7 | 00 | 00 | 00 |
| New valley | 71.2 | 00 | 00 | 81.8 | 100.0 | 12682.2 | 00 | 00 | 00 |
| Matrouh | 71.1 | 00 | 00 | 64.9 | 87.1 | 10346.1 | 00 | 00 | 00 |
| North Sinai | 71.2 | 00 | 00 | 75.8 | 91.6 | 8884.0 | 00 | 00 | 00 |
| South Sinai | 71.1 | 00 | 00 | 88.4 | 84.0 | 12454.6 | 00 | 00 | 00 |
| Frontier Govs | 71.1 | 88.4 | 42.8 | 00 | 78.2 | 10116.1 | 98.6 | 70.8 | 92.1 |
| Urban | 00 | 00 | 00 | 00 | 00 | 00 | 00 | 00 | 00 |
| Rural | 0.0 | 00 | 00 | 00 | 00 | 00 | 00 | 00 | 00 |
| EGYPT | 71.7 | 98.0 | 56.5 | 70.4 | 77.6 | 10246.1 | 99.6 | 73.7 | 94.7 |
| Urban | 00 | 99.8 | 89.8 | 00 | 00 | 00 | 99.6 | 80.0 | 96.8 |
| Rural | 00 | 96.7 | 37.0 | 00 | 00 | 00 | 99.3 | 67.8 | 92.8 |

G.3 PROFILE ON HUMAN DEPRIVATION

Thousands

| | Households without access to | | Children dying before age 5 | Children not in basic or sec. schools | Illiterates (15+) | Poor Persons | | Mal-nourished children below age 5 | Unemployed persons | |
|----------------|------------------------------|------------|-----------------------------|---------------------------------------|-------------------|--------------|--------|------------------------------------|--------------------|--------|
| | piped water | Sanitation | | | | Total | Ultra | | Total | Female |
| | | | | | | | | | | |
| Cairo | 00 | 00 | 6.5 | 315.1 | 1085.7 | 619.4 | 134.1 | 00 | 283.1 | 109.6 |
| Alexandria | 00 | 00 | 2.2 | 53.9 | 664.9 | 271.2 | 50.8 | 00 | 162.7 | 51.9 |
| Port Said | 00 | 00 | 0.3 | 9.5 | 76.9 | 25.9 | 10.1 | 00 | 22.8 | 11.6 |
| Suez | 00 | 00 | 0.3 | 2.2 | 69.4 | 10.3 | 1.7 | 00 | 15.9 | 10.6 |
| Urban Govs | 3.5 | 111.9 | 0.0 | 984.9 | 00 | 927.0 | 196.7 | 79.7 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| Damietta | 00 | 00 | 0.4 | -3.7 | 194.8 | 12.6 | 2.0 | 00 | 24.4 | 13.8 |
| Dakahlia | 00 | 00 | 2.2 | 39.6 | 1106.8 | 478.0 | 50.9 | 00 | 208.6 | 136.7 |
| Shrkia | 00 | 00 | 2.8 | 32.8 | 1342.5 | 1058.9 | 105.6 | 00 | 220.0 | 95.0 |
| Kalyoubia | 00 | 00 | 1.9 | 81.9 | 913.3 | 497.0 | 76.8 | 00 | 105.4 | 64.2 |
| Kafr El Sheikh | 00 | 00 | 0.8 | 2.5 | 717.8 | 303.0 | 57.6 | 00 | 95.0 | 48.6 |
| Gharbia | 00 | 00 | 1.7 | 31.5 | 834.0 | 315.2 | 33.8 | 00 | 166.3 | 99.0 |
| Menoufia | 00 | 00 | 1.5 | 33.4 | 708.1 | 605.0 | 105.6 | 00 | 75.1 | 39.1 |
| Behera | 00 | 00 | 1.7 | 10.9 | 1388.5 | 1152.2 | 183.8 | 00 | 124.2 | 76.9 |
| Ismailia | 00 | 00 | 0.5 | 6.0 | 1703.6 | 186.2 | 42.0 | 00 | 34.8 | 17.5 |
| Lower Egypt | 108.5 | 2744.7 | 0.0 | 1758.0 | 0.0 | 4575.1 | 658.7 | 175.5 | 00 | 00 |
| Urban | 00 | 00 | 00 | 00 | 00 | 00 | 00 | 00 | 00 | 00 |
| Rural | 00 | 00 | 00 | 00 | 00 | 00 | 00 | 00 | 00 | 00 |
| Giza | 00 | 00 | 2.7 | 24.2 | 505.3 | 1490.9 | 492.7 | 00 | 124.2 | 37.3 |
| Beni Suef | 00 | 00 | 2.0 | 71.4 | 707.1 | 982.8 | 272.9 | 00 | 29.4 | 13.6 |
| Fayoum | 00 | 00 | 1.7 | 93.8 | 781.0 | 748.0 | 154.2 | 00 | 25.5 | 17.6 |
| Menia | 00 | 00 | 3.8 | 131.8 | 1304.7 | 1332.6 | 302.9 | 00 | 82.1 | 42.0 |
| Assiut | 00 | 00 | 4.5 | 110.3 | 1013.1 | 2170.6 | 1117.2 | 00 | 82.0 | 44.6 |
| Suhag | 00 | 00 | 3.0 | 55.0 | 1091.7 | 1841.7 | 716.7 | 00 | 98.6 | 56.9 |
| Qena | 00 | 00 | 2.0 | 31.1 | 808.8 | 1208.4 | 355.2 | 00 | 61.2 | 27.1 |
| Luxor | 00 | 00 | 0.6 | -6.0 | 102.4 | 192.1 | 67.3 | 00 | 23.4 | 10.6 |
| Aswan | 00 | 00 | 0.4 | 8.3 | 217.2 | 225.4 | 48.5 | 00 | 54.4 | 17.1 |
| Upper Egypt | 194.2 | 3934.8 | 0.0 | 1887.0 | 00 | 10339.8 | 3572.6 | 187.2 | 00 | 00 |
| Urban | 00 | 00 | 00 | 00 | 00 | 00 | 00 | 00 | 00 | 00 |
| Rural | 00 | 00 | 00 | 00 | 00 | 00 | 00 | 00 | 00 | 00 |
| Red sea | 00 | 00 | 0.1 | 1.9 | 29.9 | 00 | 00 | 00 | 1.8 | 1.0 |
| New valley | 00 | 00 | 0.1 | 0.0 | 26.4 | 00 | 00 | 00 | 10.6 | 9.7 |
| Matrouh | 00 | 00 | 0.3 | 11.7 | 84.9 | 00 | 00 | 00 | 3.5 | 1.5 |
| North Sinai | 00 | 00 | 0.3 | 7.8 | 61.4 | 00 | 00 | 00 | 3.7 | 2.6 |
| South Sinai | 00 | 00 | 0.03 | 3.3 | 15.2 | 00 | 00 | 00 | 4.6 | 0.9 |
| Frontier Govs | 35.1 | 172.9 | 0.0 | 76.8 | 00 | 387.1 | 113.0 | 5.6 | 00 | 00 |
| Urban | 00 | 00 | 00 | 00 | 00 | 00 | 00 | 00 | 00 | 00 |
| Rural | 00 | 00 | 00 | 00 | 00 | 00 | 00 | 00 | 00 | 00 |
| EGYPT | 341.3 | 6964.3 | 44.2 | 4706.80 | 17023.5 | 16191.0 | 4543.4 | 435.1 | 2135.0 | 1057.0 |
| Urban | 00 | 00 | 00 | 00 | 00 | 00 | 00 | 00 | 00 | 00 |
| Rural | 00 | 00 | 00 | 00 | 00 | 00 | 00 | 00 | 00 | 00 |

* Total may not equal the sum of the governorates due to excluding the governorates of Helwan, 6 October (the final results of Census 2006).

G.4 TRENDS IN HUMAN DEVELOPMENT

| | Life expectancy at birth (years) | | Infant mortality (per 1000 live births) | Households with access to piped water (%) | literacy Rate (15+)(%) | Combined basic and secondary enrollment (%) |
|----------------|----------------------------------|------|---|---|------------------------------|---|
| | 1976 | 2007 | 2008 | 2008 | 2007 | 2007/2008 |
| Cairo | 57.0 | 71.3 | 29.5 | 00 | 80.7 | 82.2 |
| Alexandria | 59.1 | 72.0 | 19.7 | 00 | 80.5 | 93.6 |
| Port Said | 59.2 | 72.7 | 23.4 | 00 | 83.6 | 92.1 |
| Suez | 52.6 | 72.3 | 14.7 | 00 | 82.9 | 98.1 |
| Urban Govs | 57.6 | 72.2 | 19.5 | 99.9 | 00 | 71.5 |
| Damietta | 57.5 | 72.6 | 11.8 | 00 | 77.6 | 101.5 |
| Dakahlia | 56.9 | 71.8 | 12.4 | 00 | 72.1 | 96.6 |
| Shrkia | 54.6 | 71.2 | 14.8 | 00 | 67.8 | 97.5 |
| Kalyoubia | 53.9 | 72.7 | 12.0 | 00 | 72.5 | 91.7 |
| Kafr El Sheikh | 56.6 | 70.6 | 10.7 | 00 | 65.7 | 99.6 |
| Gharbia | 55.5 | 72.3 | 12.6 | 00 | 74.1 | 96.5 |
| Menoufia | 54.8 | 71.5 | 13.0 | 00 | 72.6 | 95.6 |
| Behera | 56.0 | 71.5 | 10.6 | 00 | 63.4 | 99.0 |
| Ismailia | 57.7 | 70.9 | 15.5 | 00 | 77.2 | 97.4 |
| Lower Egypt | 55.6 | 71.5 | 12.6 | 98.6 | 00 | 80.2 |
| Urban | 00 | 00 | 00 | 99.8 | 00 | 00 |
| Rural | 00 | 00 | 00 | 98.1 | 00 | 00 |
| Giza | 55.2 | 69.5 | 12.9 | 00 | 80.3 | 98.2 |
| Beni Suef | 50.1 | 71.6 | 25.5 | 00 | 59.5 | 88.7 |
| Fayoum | 49.3 | 69.5 | 17.3 | 00 | 59.1 | 86.2 |
| Menia | 52.1 | 69.3 | 24.0 | 00 | 58.7 | 88.5 |
| Assiut | 53.2 | 70.7 | 35.2 | 00 | 60.9 | 88.5 |
| Suhag | 54.7 | 70.5 | 22.8 | 00 | 61.5 | 94.7 |
| Qena | *53.6 | 70.5 | 20.6 | 00 | 65.2 | 96.2 |
| Luxor | 0.0 | 69.8 | 22.3 | 00 | 72.2 | 105.5 |
| Aswan | 51.4 | 71.2 | 20.6 | 00 | 77.0 | 97.1 |
| Upper Egypt | 53.0 | 70.2 | 24.5 | 96.9 | 00 | 77.4 |
| Urban | 00 | 00 | 00 | 100.0 | 00 | 00 |
| Rural | 00 | 00 | 00 | 95.1 | 00 | 00 |
| Red sea | 00 | 71.2 | 13.2 | 00 | 87.3 | 96.3 |
| New valley | 00 | 71.2 | 12.6 | 00 | 81.8 | 100.0 |
| Matrouh | 00 | 71.1 | 11.0 | 00 | 64.9 | 87.1 |
| North Sinai | 00 | 71.2 | 21.3 | 00 | 75.8 | 91.6 |
| South Sinai | 00 | 71.1 | 14.7 | 00 | 88.4 | 84.0 |
| Frontier Govs | 0.0 | 71.1 | 14.7 | 88.4 | 00 | 78.2 |
| Urban | 0.0 | 00 | 00 | 00 | 00 | 00 |
| Rural | 0.0 | 00 | 00 | 00 | 00 | 00 |
| EGYPT | 55.0 | 71.7 | 18.0 | 98.0 | 70.4 | 77.6 |
| Urban | 0.0 | 00 | 00 | 99.8 | 00 | 00 |
| Rural | 0.0 | 00 | 00 | 96.7 | 00 | 00 |

* Qena and Luxor combined

G.6 STATUS OF WOMEN

| | Life expectancy at birth (years) | Maternal mortality rate(per 100000 live births)* | Average age at first marriage (years)** | Total | Gross Enrollment ratio | | | Females (15+) with secondary/higher edu, (%) | Professional technical staff (% of females) | Woman in labor force (%) of total) |
|-----------------|----------------------------------|--|---|-------|------------------------|-------------|-----------|--|---|------------------------------------|
| | | | | | Basic education | | Secondary | | | |
| | | | | | Primary | Preparatory | | | | |
| 2007 | 2008 | 2008 | 2007 | 2007 | 2007 | 2007 | 2008 | 2007 | 2007 | |
| Cairo | 75.2 | 53.0 | 00 | 83.0 | 88.5 | 88.6 | 62.5 | 48.9 | 33.5 | 20.3 |
| Alexandria | 75.3 | 70.0 | 00 | 94.6 | 108.1 | 96.6 | 60.3 | 43.6 | 31.6 | 21.7 |
| Port Said | 75.0 | 42.0 | 00 | 91.8 | 103.5 | 94.0 | 61.2 | 52.1 | 45.3 | 24.8 |
| Suez | 75.3 | 56.0 | 00 | 98.0 | 106.3 | 96.0 | 77.8 | 44.5 | 35.9 | 22.1 |
| Urban Govs | 00 | 00 | 22.6 | 87.4 | 95.6 | 91.5 | 62.4 | 47.1 | 00 | 00 |
| Damietta | 75.7 | 59.0 | 00 | 104.2 | 116.1 | 103.5 | 74.0 | 41.09 | 45.6 | 18.6 |
| Dakahlia | 76.3 | 60.0 | 00 | 98.7 | 108.7 | 97.1 | 75.8 | 38.57 | 35.5 | 24.7 |
| Shrkia | 74.8 | 49.0 | 00 | 98.6 | 110.5 | 93.3 | 74.4 | 32.97 | 30.8 | 28.7 |
| Kalyoubia | 74.9 | 41.0 | 00 | 92.3 | 106.8 | 82.8 | 66.1 | 35.60 | 29.8 | 18.7 |
| Kafir El Sheikh | 74.4 | 36.0 | 00 | 101.0 | 111.4 | 99.5 | 77.6 | 31.83 | 32.7 | 24.7 |
| Gharbia | 75.9 | 44.0 | 00 | 97.4 | 107.1 | 96.2 | 75.5 | 38.77 | 36.1 | 25.5 |
| Menoufia | 74.7 | 45.0 | 00 | 96.2 | 107.6 | 91.6 | 73.5 | 36.74 | 33.7 | 26.1 |
| Behera | 74.1 | 38.0 | 00 | 98.5 | 113.4 | 93.7 | 68.2 | 26.84 | 31.8 | 30.6 |
| Ismailia | 73.2 | 62.0 | 00 | 96.5 | 111.2 | 90.2 | 65.6 | 37.84 | 36.8 | 24.8 |
| Lower Egypt | 00 | 00 | 20.5 | 97.7 | 109.7 | 93.5 | 72.6 | 34.8 | 00 | 00 |
| Urban | 00 | 00 | 22.0 | 00 | 00 | 00 | 00 | 00 | 00 | 00 |
| Rural | 00 | 00 | 20.0 | 00 | 00 | 00 | 00 | 00 | 00 | 00 |
| Giza | 72.5 | 45.0 | 00 | 98.9 | 114.2 | 96.6 | 61.6 | 47.18 | 30.6 | 14.4 |
| Beni Suef | 74.5 | 65.0 | 00 | 86.3 | 102.4 | 78.6 | 51.4 | 20.68 | 33.6 | 33.7 |
| Fayoum | 72.3 | 43.0 | 00 | 84.9 | 99.2 | 77.6 | 55.4 | 22.54 | 34.1 | 24.9 |
| Menia | 71.9 | 64.0 | 00 | 85.2 | 98.4 | 76.0 | 60.7 | 19.99 | 31.7 | 31.4 |
| Assiut | 73.1 | 93.0 | 00 | 85.6 | 97.6 | 80.2 | 59.6 | 23.12 | 34.8 | 21.9 |
| Suhag | 72.1 | 48.0 | 00 | 91.3 | 102.2 | 84.4 | 70.3 | 19.27 | 28.5 | 25.0 |
| Qena | 73.2 | 65.0 | 00 | 92.9 | 102.9 | 92.2 | 67.6 | 21.70 | 25.4 | 17.6 |
| Luxor | 72.9 | 93.0 | 00 | 105.8 | 112.6 | 111.6 | 82.0 | 31.06 | 27.6 | 21.9 |
| Aswan | 74.3 | 45.0 | 00 | 96.1 | 106.2 | 99.3 | 67.9 | 33.00 | 29.5 | 14.1 |
| Upper Egypt | 00 | 00 | 19.4 | 90.5 | 103.4 | 85.5 | 62.3 | 25.5 | 00 | 00 |
| Urban | 00 | 00 | 21.7 | 00 | 00 | 00 | 00 | 00 | 00 | 00 |
| Rural | 00 | 00 | 18.3 | 00 | 00 | 00 | 00 | 00 | 00 | 00 |
| Red sea | 74.3 | 14.0 | 00 | 99.1 | 106.1 | 85.7 | 98.0 | 39.02 | 24.5 | 6.9 |
| New valley | 74.3 | 19.0 | 00 | 99.0 | 105.1 | 92.1 | 90.9 | 41.40 | 39.0 | 42.7 |
| Matrouh | 74.2 | 58.0 | 00 | 77.0 | 102.0 | 57.6 | 28.6 | 15.58 | 30.9 | 19.0 |
| North Sinai | 74.2 | 67.0 | 00 | 88.3 | 98.9 | 81.1 | 64.7 | 31.07 | 33.8 | 20.2 |
| South Sinai | 74.2 | 0.0 | 00 | 86.8 | 102.8 | 72.4 | 52.9 | 24.44 | 18.8 | 7.7 |
| Frontier Govs | 00 | 00 | 20.6 | 88.2 | 102.3 | 75.8 | 62.3 | 29.7 | 00 | 00 |
| Urban | 00 | 00 | 00 | 00 | 00 | 00 | 00 | 00 | 00 | 00 |
| Rural | 00 | 00 | 00 | 00 | 00 | 00 | 00 | 00 | 00 | 00 |
| EGYPT | 74.0 | 55.0 | 20.6 | 93.0 | 104.8 | 89.6 | 66.8 | 33.6 | 32.3 | 23.9 |
| Urban | 00 | 00 | 22.2 | 00 | 00 | 00 | 00 | 00 | 00 | 00 |
| Rural | 00 | 00 | 19.4 | 00 | 00 | 00 | 00 | 00 | 00 | 00 |

* Data of Cairo excludes Helwan. Data of Giza excludes 6 October

** Based on DHS

G.7 FEMALE - MALE GAPS

| | Life expectancy at birth (years) | Population | Literacy Rate | Primary enrollment | Preparatory enrollment | Secondary enrollment | Labor Force (15+) |
|----------------|----------------------------------|------------|---------------|--------------------|------------------------|----------------------|-------------------|
| | 2007 | 2008 | 2007 | 2007/2008 | 2007/2008 | 2007/2008 | 2007 |
| Cairo | 106.4 | 96.8 | 90.8 | 100.0 | 104.1 | 105.4 | 25.5 |
| Alexandria | 105.2 | 95.8 | 90.6 | 100.1 | 106.6 | 102.3 | 27.8 |
| Port Said | 105.8 | 96.4 | 93.0 | 97.6 | 99.7 | 102.2 | 33.0 |
| Suez | 106.4 | 96.3 | 89.7 | 98.8 | 100.0 | 101.5 | 28.4 |
| Urban Govs | 00 | 96.4 | 00 | 99.8 | 104.5 | 104.2 | 26.7 |
| Damietta | 106.7 | 95.6 | 95.8 | 98.1 | 112.9 | 126.9 | 22.8 |
| Dakahlia | 108.6 | 96.9 | 85.1 | 99.4 | 108.9 | 117.1 | 32.9 |
| Shrkia | 107.1 | 95.0 | 80.6 | 100.6 | 104.5 | 103.5 | 40.2 |
| Kalyoubia | 106.3 | 94.4 | 82.7 | 99.9 | 104.9 | 101.0 | 23.0 |
| Kafr El Sheikh | 107.7 | 97.9 | 77.5 | 100.8 | 104.5 | 107.0 | 32.8 |
| Gharbia | 107.4 | 97.2 | 81.3 | 99.2 | 102.7 | 110.2 | 34.1 |
| Menoufia | 106.6 | 94.1 | 79.3 | 99.1 | 101.2 | 108.1 | 35.2 |
| Behera | 106.7 | 95.1 | 75.3 | 98.6 | 102.0 | 95.2 | 44.1 |
| Ismailia | 106.3 | 96.5 | 85.3 | 99.5 | 102.8 | 87.1 | 32.9 |
| Lower Egypt | 00 | 95.7 | 00 | 99.6 | 104.5 | 105.6 | 34.6 |
| Urban | 00 | 00 | 00 | 00 | 00 | 00 | 00 |
| Rural | 00 | 00 | 00 | 00 | 00 | 00 | 00 |
| Giza | 106.5 | 93.8 | 90.3 | 101.0 | 102.3 | 100.7 | 16.8 |
| Beni Suef | 106.3 | 96.5 | 67.5 | 97.6 | 91.5 | 86.8 | 50.8 |
| Fayoum | 105.0 | 93.5 | 73.7 | 99.1 | 96.3 | 88.2 | 33.1 |
| Menia | 106.1 | 95.9 | 67.4 | 95.5 | 93.1 | 83.0 | 45.7 |
| Assiut | 106.0 | 95.9 | 72.2 | 93.9 | 94.3 | 93.6 | 28.0 |
| Suhag | 104.5 | 97.6 | 68.7 | 97.3 | 94.8 | 77.5 | 33.4 |
| Qena | 106.6 | 98.9 | 71.9 | 98.5 | 93.3 | 78.8 | 21.4 |
| Luxor | 106.6 | 95.7 | 80.4 | 101.7 | 101.3 | 96.3 | 28.1 |
| Aswan | 106.7 | 98.6 | 82.8 | 100.8 | 101.1 | 85.4 | 16.4 |
| Upper Egypt | 00 | 95.9 | 00 | 97.9 | 96.1 | 86.7 | 29.9 |
| Urban | 00 | 00 | 00 | 00 | 00 | 00 | 00 |
| Rural | 00 | 00 | 00 | 00 | 00 | 00 | 00 |
| Red sea | 106.7 | 64.6 | 89.4 | 99.6 | 108.3 | 122.4 | 7.5 |
| New valley | 106.7 | 94.6 | 86.2 | 98.9 | 100.6 | 92.2 | 74.4 |
| Matrouh | 106.7 | 90.8 | 66.2 | 92.2 | 65.5 | 43.4 | 23.4 |
| North Sinai | 106.5 | 92.5 | 77.8 | 96.9 | 98.3 | 71.9 | 25.4 |
| South Sinai | 106.7 | 50.1 | 87.7 | 98.3 | 96.7 | 149.9 | 8.3 |
| Frontier Govs | 00 | 79.8 | 00 | 96.3 | 89.9 | 80.5 | 24.4 |
| Urban | 00 | 00 | 00 | 00 | 00 | 00 | 00 |
| Rural | 00 | 00 | 00 | 00 | 00 | 00 | 00 |
| EGYPT | 106.5 | 95.6 | 80.7 | 98.9 | 100.9 | 97.4 | 31.3 |
| Urban | 00 | 00 | 00 | 00 | 00 | 00 | 00 |
| Rural | 00 | 00 | 00 | 00 | 00 | 00 | 00 |

G.9 CHILD SURVIVAL AND DEVELOPMENT

| | Pregnant women with prenatal care (%) | Maternal mortality rate (per 100000 live births) | Infant mortality rate (per 1000 live births)* | | Under five mortality rate (per 1000 live births)* | | Children ever breastfed (%) | Births attended by health personnel (%) | Children** 12-23 month, fully immunized (%) | Under weight (below age 5) (%) |
|----------------|---------------------------------------|--|---|----------|---|----------|-----------------------------|---|---|--------------------------------|
| | | | Registered | Adjusted | Registered | Adjusted | | | | |
| | 2008 | 2008 | 1961 | 2008 | 1961 | 2008 | 2008 | 2008 | 2008 | 2008 |
| Cairo | 00 | 53.0 | 151.0 | 29.5 | 24.0 | 35.5 | 00 | 00 | 00 | 00 |
| Alexandria | 00 | 70.0 | 139.0 | 19.7 | 216.0 | 24.2 | 00 | 00 | 00 | 00 |
| Port Said | 00 | 42.0 | 108.0 | 23.4 | 147.0 | 25.8 | 00 | 00 | 00 | 00 |
| Suez | 00 | 56.0 | 163.0 | 14.7 | 236.0 | 17.4 | 00 | 00 | 00 | 00 |
| Urban Govs | 89.2 | 00 | 147.0 | 19.5 | 231.0 | 23.6 | 95.2 | 89.4 | 94.3 | 5.9 |
| Damietta | 00 | 59.0 | 82.0 | 11.8 | 136.0 | 14.4 | 00 | 00 | 00 | 00 |
| Dakahlia | 00 | 60.0 | 71.0 | 12.4 | 179.0 | 16.6 | 00 | 00 | 00 | 00 |
| Shrkia | 00 | 49.0 | 72.0 | 14.8 | 159.0 | 19.7 | 00 | 00 | 00 | 00 |
| Kalyoubia | 00 | 41.0 | 133.0 | 12.0 | 297.0 | 15.5 | 00 | 00 | 00 | 00 |
| Kafr El Sheikh | 00 | 36.0 | 60.0 | 10.7 | 125.0 | 14.2 | 00 | 00 | 00 | 00 |
| Gharbia | 00 | 44.0 | 107.0 | 12.6 | 215.0 | 14.3 | 00 | 00 | 00 | 00 |
| Menoufia | 00 | 45.0 | 130.0 | 13.0 | 275.0 | 17.3 | 00 | 00 | 00 | 00 |
| Behera | 00 | 38.0 | 77.0 | 10.6 | 158.0 | 15.3 | 00 | 00 | 00 | 00 |
| Ismailia | 00 | 62.0 | 99.0 | 15.5 | 161.0 | 20.7 | 00 | 00 | 00 | 00 |
| Lower Egypt | 75.0 | 00 | 93.0 | 12.6 | 194.0 | 13.7 | 96.1 | 78.1 | 93.7 | 5.5 |
| Urban | 82.8 | 00 | 00 | 00 | 00 | 00 | 00 | 00 | 00 | 00 |
| Rural | 72.8 | 00 | 00 | 00 | 00 | 00 | 00 | 00 | 00 | 00 |
| Giza | 00 | 45.0 | 126.0 | 12.9 | 254.0 | 16.2 | 00 | 00 | 00 | 00 |
| Beni Suef | 00 | 65.0 | 106.0 | 25.5 | 196.0 | 30.5 | 00 | 00 | 00 | 00 |
| Fayoum | 00 | 43.0 | 151.0 | 17.3 | 290.0 | 22.0 | 00 | 00 | 00 | 00 |
| Menia | 00 | 64.0 | 108.0 | 24.0 | 213.0 | 30.3 | 00 | 00 | 00 | 00 |
| Assiut | 00 | 93.0 | 107.0 | 35.2 | 207.0 | 43.5 | 00 | 00 | 00 | 00 |
| Suhag | 00 | 48.0 | 86.0 | 22.8 | 173.0 | 28.9 | 00 | 00 | 00 | 00 |
| Qena | 00 | 65.0 | *80 | 20.6 | *154 | 25.9 | 00 | 00 | 00 | 00 |
| Luxor | 00 | 93.0 | 00 | 22.3 | 00 | 28.9 | 00 | 00 | 00 | 00 |
| Aswan | 00 | 45.0 | 109.0 | 20.6 | 191.0 | 14.8 | 00 | 00 | 00 | 00 |
| Upper Egypt | 65.9 | 00 | 102.0 | 24.5 | 199.0 | 29.9 | 95.6 | 57.5 | 88.4 | 6.7 |
| Urban | 81.8 | 00 | 00 | 00 | 00 | 00 | 00 | 00 | 00 | 00 |
| Rural | 59.9 | 00 | 00 | 00 | 00 | 00 | 00 | 00 | 00 | 00 |
| Red sea | 00 | 14.0 | 191.0 | 13.2 | 266.0 | 16.6 | 00 | 00 | 00 | 00 |
| New valley | 00 | 19.0 | 181.0 | 12.6 | 334.0 | 17.2 | 00 | 00 | 00 | 00 |
| Matrouh | 00 | 58.0 | 98.0 | 11.0 | 176.0 | 14.2 | 00 | 00 | 00 | 00 |
| North Sinai | 00 | 67.0 | 94.0 | 21.3 | 136.0 | 26.8 | 00 | 00 | 00 | 00 |
| South Sinai | 00 | 0.0 | 00 | 14.7 | 00 | 22.5 | 00 | 00 | 00 | 00 |
| Frontier Govs | 71.0 | 00 | 124.0 | 14.7 | 210.0 | 19.0 | 95.7 | 72.9 | 86.2 | 4.2 |
| Urban | 00 | 00 | 00 | 00 | 00 | 00 | 00 | 00 | 00 | 00 |
| Rural | 00 | 00 | 00 | 00 | 00 | 00 | 00 | 00 | 00 | 00 |
| EGYPT | 73.6 | 55.0 | 108.0 | 18.0 | 204.0 | 22.8 | 95.8 | 71.7 | 91.7 | 6.0 |
| Urban | 85.0 | 00 | 00 | 00 | 00 | 00 | 95.2 | 85.5 | 93.7 | 6.0 |
| Rural | 66.9 | 00 | 00 | 00 | 00 | 00 | 96.1 | 63.6 | 90.5 | 6.0 |

* Calculated for urban govts without governorates of Cairo, and for Lower Egypt, govts without governorates of Qalyubia and for Upper Egypt govts without governorates of Giza.

** A child is considered to be fully immunized if the child has received BCG, a measles or MMR vaccination, three DPT vaccinations, and three polio vaccinations.

G.10 HEALTH PROFILE

| | Households with access to: | | *Doctors Per 10000 People MOH | *Nurses per 10000 people MOH | Nurse/Doctors* ratio MOH | Maternal mortality rate (per 1000000 live births) | Beds per* 10000 people | | Health units per 100000 Population |
|----------------|----------------------------|----------------|-------------------------------|------------------------------|--------------------------|---|------------------------|------|------------------------------------|
| | Piped Water (%) | Sanitation (%) | | | | | Total | MOH | |
| | 2008 | 2008 | 2008 | 2008 | 2008 | 2008 | 2008 | 2008 | 2008 |
| Cairo | 00 | 00 | 5.0 | 4.4 | 88.2 | 53.0 | 37.4 | 8.6 | 5.0 |
| Alexandria | 00 | 00 | 13.1 | 13.4 | 101.9 | 70.0 | 30.0 | 8.5 | 3.4 |
| Port Said | 00 | 00 | 13.5 | 25.0 | 185.6 | 42.0 | 29.4 | 15.8 | 4.6 |
| Suez | 00 | 00 | 10.4 | 21.9 | 209.6 | 56.0 | 27.4 | 14.6 | 4.7 |
| Urban Govs | 99.9 | 96.8 | 12.9 | 15.5 | 120.1 | 0.0 | 29.8 | 9.9 | 3.6 |
| Damietta | 00 | 00 | 13.1 | 43.2 | 331.1 | 59.0 | 23.2 | 18.9 | 3.3 |
| Dakahlia | 00 | 00 | 8.2 | 15.8 | 193.0 | 60.0 | 15.3 | 7.3 | 2.8 |
| Sharkia | 00 | 00 | 5.2 | 12.9 | 247.2 | 49.0 | 12.5 | 5.0 | 1.6 |
| Qalyubia | 00 | 00 | 3.7 | 12.2 | 335.1 | 41.0 | 21.4 | 13.7 | 2.3 |
| Kafr El Sheikh | 00 | 00 | 8.6 | 28.5 | 330.0 | 36.0 | 10.4 | 7.6 | 1.3 |
| Gharbia | 00 | 00 | 10.2 | 24.5 | 239.9 | 44.0 | 18.2 | 7.7 | 2.3 |
| Menoufia | 00 | 00 | 11.3 | 19.2 | 169.9 | 45.0 | 14.7 | 7.8 | 2.0 |
| Behera | 00 | 00 | 5.4 | 18.9 | 347.1 | 38.0 | 8.9 | 5.8 | 1.0 |
| Ismailia | 00 | 00 | 6.4 | 16.1 | 152.5 | 62.0 | 21.4 | 10.6 | 3.7 |
| Lower Egypt | 98.6 | 64.6 | 8.0 | 10.3 | 248.7 | 00 | 14.0 | 7.3 | 1.0 |
| Urban | 99.8 | 93.1 | 24.6 | 47.7 | 194 | 00 | 00 | 00 | 00 |
| Rural | 98.1 | 52.6 | 2.3 | 10.3 | 446 | 00 | 00 | 00 | 00 |
| Giza | 00 | 00 | 4.0 | 3.0 | 74.2 | 45.0 | 13.0 | 4.4 | 3.2 |
| Beni Suef | 00 | 00 | 3.5 | 14.7 | 421.5 | 65.0 | 9.2 | 7.1 | 0.9 |
| Fayoum | 00 | 00 | 4.0 | 13.5 | 334.0 | 43.0 | 6.7 | 4.5 | 0.7 |
| Menia | 00 | 00 | 5.6 | 8.7 | 156.2 | 64.0 | 11.5 | 7.3 | 1.2 |
| Assiut | 00 | 00 | 7.9 | 24.0 | 303.6 | 93.0 | 17.9 | 8.3 | 2.0 |
| Suhag | 00 | 00 | 5.6 | 5.4 | 96.2 | 48.0 | 11.6 | 7.5 | 1.2 |
| Qena | 00 | 00 | 4.4 | 8.0 | 180.4 | 65.0 | 8.7 | 7.4 | 1.1 |
| Luxor | 00 | 00 | 8.7 | 11.3 | 129.6 | 93.0 | 16.8 | 15.9 | 2.1 |
| Aswan | 00 | 00 | 5.4 | 19.0 | 353.6 | 45.0 | 19.2 | 11.9 | 2.8 |
| Upper Egypt | 96.9 | 37.2 | 5.4 | 12.4 | 228.1 | 00 | 11.9 | 7.6 | 1.3 |
| Urban | 100.0 | 76.5 | 16.8 | 30.6 | 186 | 00 | 00 | 00 | 00 |
| Rural | 95.0 | 13.5 | 1.9 | 6.7 | 355 | 00 | 00 | 00 | 00 |
| Red sea | 00 | 00 | 11.3 | 13.0 | 115.2 | 14.0 | 20.9 | 15.0 | 4.0 |
| New valley | 00 | 00 | 8.1 | 66.4 | 822.2 | 19.0 | 36.2 | 32.4 | 5.7 |
| Matrouh | 00 | 00 | 11.1 | 32.9 | 295.9 | 58.0 | 25.4 | 23.2 | 4.7 |
| North Sinai | 00 | 00 | 15.5 | 39.2 | 252.9 | 67.0 | 15.3 | 13.8 | 3.4 |
| South Sinai | 00 | 00 | 15.8 | 30.0 | 189.5 | 0.0 | 35.1 | 32.5 | 5.9 |
| Frontier Govs | 88.4 | 42.8 | 12.4 | 34.7 | 279.0 | 00 | 24.4 | 21.3 | 4.5 |
| Urban | 00 | 00 | 14.2 | 34.6 | 214 | 00 | 00 | 00 | 00 |
| Rural | 00 | 00 | 8.6 | 34.8 | 393 | 00 | 00 | 00 | 00 |
| EGYPT | 98.2 | 62.5 | 6.9 | 14.3 | 209 | 55.0 | 18.2 | 8.4 | 2.6 |
| Urban | 99.8 | 89.8 | 13.1 | 21.6 | 165 | 00 | 00 | 00 | 00 |
| Rural | 96.7 | 37.5 | 2.1 | 8.9 | 414 | 00 | 00 | 00 | 00 |

* Calculated for urban govns without governorates of Cairo, and for Lower Egypt, govns without governorates of Qalyubia and for Upper Egypt govns without governorates of Giza

G.11 EDUCATION FLOWS

| | Primary intake rate (%) | | Gross Primary enrollment Ratio | *Primary repeaters (% primary enrollment.) | **Transition to prep. (% of primary completers) | Preparatory enrollment ratio (%) | Preparatory repeaters (% of preparatory enrollment) | Transition to secondary (% of preparatory completers) | Secondary enrollment ratio (%) | Secondary repeaters (% of secondary enrollm.) |
|----------------|-------------------------|---------|--------------------------------|--|---|----------------------------------|---|---|--------------------------------|---|
| | Total | Female | | | | | | | | |
| | 2007/08 | 2007/08 | 2007/08 | 2007/08 | 2007/08 | 2007/08 | 2007/08 | 2007/08 | 2007/08 | 2007/08 |
| Cairo | 102.4 | 102.5 | 88.5 | 3.7 | 103.5 | 86.8 | 3.9 | 87.1 | 60.8 | 3.9 |
| Alexandria | 114.8 | 116.5 | 108.1 | 8.6 | 102.5 | 93.5 | 6.2 | 96.5 | 59.5 | 3.8 |
| Port Said | 108.2 | 109.0 | 104.8 | 4.0 | 102.1 | 94.2 | 1.9 | 83.0 | 60.5 | 3.3 |
| Suez | 111.6 | 111.8 | 106.9 | 3.5 | 104.5 | 96.0 | 5.6 | 95.7 | 77.2 | 3.0 |
| Urban Govs | 106.7 | 107.2 | 81.8 | 5.4 | 103.1 | 82.4 | 4.6 | 90.6 | 41.6 | 3.8 |
| Damietta | 123.3 | 123.7 | 117.3 | 4.1 | 102.5 | 97.4 | 5.6 | 94.7 | 65.8 | 2.5 |
| Dakahlia | 111.0 | 111.9 | 109.0 | 3.8 | 102.0 | 93.0 | 3.9 | 91.0 | 70.1 | 2.9 |
| Shrkia | 116.9 | 118.4 | 110.1 | 2.9 | 103.0 | 91.2 | 4.4 | 109.5 | 73.1 | 2.2 |
| Kalyoubia | 121.2 | 121.1 | 106.9 | 4.4 | 103.3 | 80.8 | 7.5 | 107.1 | 65.7 | 3.5 |
| Kafr El Sheikh | 116.8 | 117.3 | 110.9 | 2.3 | 99.1 | 97.3 | 3.8 | 96.9 | 75.0 | 4.5 |
| Gharbia | 110.0 | 110.3 | 107.5 | 4.5 | 104.3 | 94.9 | 5.3 | 93.4 | 71.9 | 2.9 |
| Menoufia | 116.5 | 116.3 | 108.1 | 3.7 | 109.6 | 91.0 | 6.3 | 94.3 | 70.7 | 3.8 |
| Behera | 111.6 | 111.9 | 114.2 | 6.1 | 105.6 | 92.8 | 7.3 | 93.0 | 69.9 | 4.9 |
| Ismailia | 124.8 | 125.1 | 111.5 | 2.9 | 102.4 | 88.9 | 7.0 | 105.7 | 70.6 | 3.4 |
| Lower Egypt | 115.3 | 115.9 | 94.0 | 4.0 | 103.5 | 85.0 | 5.6 | 98.4 | 48.1 | 3.4 |
| Urban | 00 | 00 | 00 | 00 | 00 | 00 | 00 | 00 | 00 | 00 |
| Rural | 00 | 00 | 00 | 00 | 00 | 00 | 00 | 00 | 00 | 00 |
| Giza | 129.3 | 130.6 | 113.7 | 4.2 | 101.0 | 95.5 | 5.2 | 91.0 | 61.4 | 5.3 |
| Beni Suef | 105.1 | 106.4 | 103.8 | 6.5 | 104.1 | 82.4 | 8.0 | 102.0 | 55.5 | 3.4 |
| Fayoum | 102.3 | 102.1 | 99.7 | 3.5 | 101.7 | 79.1 | 6.1 | 120.9 | 59.3 | 3.7 |
| Menia | 103.6 | 102.4 | 100.9 | 4.8 | 101.8 | 79.0 | 7.6 | 112.9 | 67.2 | 3.8 |
| Assiut | 105.6 | 104.2 | 100.9 | 4.5 | 106.1 | 82.8 | 9.0 | 93.9 | 61.7 | 4.4 |
| Suhag | 111.5 | 110.9 | 103.7 | 4.4 | 106.0 | 86.8 | 7.8 | 101.6 | 81.0 | 4.6 |
| Qena | 108.9 | 107.3 | 103.7 | 1.8 | 103.7 | 95.7 | 5.1 | 90.2 | 77.1 | 5.1 |
| Luxor | 117.2 | 116.6 | 111.6 | 2.0 | 109.2 | 110.8 | 11.3 | 99.3 | 83.6 | 9.9 |
| Aswan | 111.3 | 110.9 | 105.8 | 1.1 | 99.8 | 98.7 | 5.0 | 97.1 | 73.8 | 4.6 |
| Upper Egypt | 111.0 | 110.7 | 89.3 | 4.1 | 104.0 | 83.6 | 6.8 | 101.0 | 45.8 | 4.6 |
| Urban | 00 | 00 | 00 | 00 | 00 | 00 | 00 | 00 | 00 | 00 |
| Rural | 00 | 00 | 00 | 00 | 00 | 00 | 00 | 00 | 00 | 00 |
| Red sea | 114.2 | 115.7 | 106.3 | 5.4 | 109.2 | 82.2 | 5.9 | 107.1 | 87.6 | 3.3 |
| New valley | 86.6 | 83.5 | 105.7 | 2.1 | 98.6 | 91.8 | 2.6 | 93.8 | 94.9 | 1.6 |
| Matrouh | 105.2 | 101.2 | 106.5 | 3.4 | 100.2 | 73.4 | 6.9 | 67.8 | 48.6 | 7.1 |
| North Sinai | 117.0 | 117.7 | 100.6 | 2.2 | 100.9 | 81.9 | 2.7 | 77.8 | 78.0 | 10.0 |
| South Sinai | 134.8 | 133.7 | 103.8 | 3.6 | 97.4 | 73.7 | 9.2 | 77.6 | 41.7 | 2.8 |
| Frontier Govs | 109.7 | 108.4 | 89.1 | 3.2 | 101.3 | 80.9 | 4.8 | 84.8 | 48.0 | 6.0 |
| Urban | 00 | 00 | 00 | 00 | 00 | 00 | 00 | 00 | 00 | 00 |
| Rural | 00 | 00 | 00 | 00 | 00 | 00 | 00 | 00 | 00 | 00 |
| EGYPT | 112.1 | 112.3 | 90.0 | 4.3 | 103.4 | 84.0 | 5.9 | 98.8 | 46.1 | 4.0 |
| Urban | 00 | 00 | 00 | 00 | 00 | 00 | 00 | 00 | 00 | 00 |
| Rural | 00 | 00 | 00 | 00 | 00 | 00 | 00 | 00 | 00 | 00 |

* Primary Repeaters without El-Azhar

** The Source of Data (with out El- Azhar) is Minsitery of Education

G.12 EDUCATION IMBALANCES

| | Primary Pupil/teacher Ratio | Preparatory Pupil/teacher Ratio | Primary Class Density | Preparatory Class Density | Secondary. Technical Enroll. (% of total sec.) | Basic and secondary enrollment in: | | | Percentage of unfit school buildings* |
|----------------|-----------------------------------|---------------------------------------|-----------------------------|---------------------------------|---|---------------------------------------|------------------------|-------------------------|--|
| | | | | | | Public schools (%) | Private schools (%) | El Azhar schools (%) | |
| | 2007/08 | 2007/08 | 2007/08 | 2007/08 | 2007/08 | 2007/08 | 2007/08 | 2009 | 2009 |
| Cairo | 21.4 | 7.3 | 53.1 | 34.0 | 77.7 | 15.7 | 6.6 | 1.39 | 0.93 |
| Alexandria | 25.1 | 8.6 | 37.5 | 33.6 | 86.9 | 9.3 | 3.8 | 0.28 | 0.55 |
| Port Said | 7.1 | 5.6 | 40.4 | 38.0 | 89.7 | 3.5 | 6.8 | 0.97 | 0.00 |
| Suez | 5.6 | 5.0 | 47.1 | 36.9 | 88.8 | 4.9 | 6.3 | 0.49 | 0.00 |
| Urban Govs | 18.2 | 7.4 | 40.3 | 37.6 | 81.7 | 12.6 | 5.7 | 00 | 00 |
| Damietta | 9.8 | 7.1 | 40.6 | 37.3 | 89.6 | 1.1 | 9.3 | 3.58 | 1.68 |
| Dakahlia | 16.1 | 13.1 | 41.0 | 40.8 | 86.6 | 0.9 | 12.6 | 1.00 | 1.26 |
| Shrkia | 23.7 | 17.7 | 48.0 | 38.5 | 81.6 | 1.8 | 16.6 | 4.34 | 4.04 |
| Kalyoubia | 22.4 | 15.5 | 38.7 | 39.1 | 90.8 | 2.7 | 6.4 | 0.75 | 0.43 |
| Kafr El Sheikh | 24.6 | 21.0 | 41.7 | 37.7 | 82.3 | 0.1 | 17.6 | 1.48 | 0.46 |
| Gharbia | 25.3 | 15.0 | 41.3 | 40.3 | 84.2 | 0.9 | 14.9 | 3.52 | 1.90 |
| Menoufia | 20.2 | 14.3 | 41.3 | 33.3 | 89.8 | 0.9 | 9.3 | 0.72 | 0.90 |
| Behera | 27.9 | 22.8 | 34.2 | 38.4 | 87.2 | 0.6 | 12.3 | 1.81 | 2.02 |
| Ismailia | 21.3 | 13.4 | 41.4 | 00 | 87.2 | 1.6 | 11.2 | 0.87 | 0.17 |
| Lower Egypt | 21.2 | 15.6 | 00 | 00 | 86.1 | 1.2 | 12.7 | 00 | 00 |
| Urban | 00 | 00 | 00 | 42.8 | 00 | 00 | 00 | 00 | 00 |
| Rural | 00 | 00 | 51.0 | 41.2 | 00 | 00 | 00 | 00 | 00 |
| Giza | 34.9 | 11.7 | 38.7 | 43.2 | 81.4 | 10.3 | 8.3 | 0.00 | 0.51 |
| Beni Suef | 30.4 | 22.6 | 42.9 | 43.6 | 90.2 | 0.9 | 9.0 | 1.42 | 0.83 |
| Fayoum | 30.9 | 22.4 | 44.7 | 41.8 | 91.4 | 1.0 | 7.6 | 0.56 | 0.24 |
| Menia | 36.4 | 18.3 | 44.7 | 41.4 | 92.5 | 0.7 | 6.8 | 2.42 | 0.60 |
| Assiut | 28.5 | 21.3 | 42.5 | 41.1 | 88.9 | 0.7 | 10.4 | 1.15 | 0.48 |
| Suhag | 24.5 | 23.1 | 40.9 | 38.9 | 79.8 | 0.4 | 19.8 | 1.32 | 1.32 |
| Qena | 22.6 | 23.9 | 35.7 | 34.9 | 83.9 | 0.1 | 16.0 | 0.88 | 1.43 |
| Luxor | 10.3 | 10.0 | 34.1 | 41.8 | 81.4 | 0.2 | 18.5 | 0.91 | 2.73 |
| Aswan | 18.6 | 16.3 | 43.5 | 00 | 90.8 | 0.0 | 9.2 | 1.32 | 4.22 |
| Upper Egypt | 28.0 | 17.8 | 00 | 00 | 86.3 | 2.5 | 11.2 | 00 | 00 |
| Urban | 00 | 00 | 00 | 27.8 | 00 | 00 | 00 | 00 | 00 |
| Rural | 00 | 00 | 34.0 | 19.0 | 00 | 00 | 00 | 00 | 00 |
| Red sea | 3.4 | 2.4 | 19.5 | 32.2 | 90.6 | 2.1 | 7.3 | 0.0 | 0.67 |
| New valley | 3.2 | 2.8 | 29.4 | 27.0 | 91.4 | 0.0 | 8.6 | 1.38 | 1.38 |
| Matrouh | 17.9 | 13.9 | 26.7 | 15.7 | 92.0 | 0.7 | 7.3 | 0.00 | 5.03 |
| North Sinai | 14.4 | 11.0 | 16.7 | 25.3 | 90.6 | 0.6 | 8.8 | 0.64 | 3.53 |
| South Sinai | 4.9 | 3.1 | 26.0 | 00 | 78.5 | 1.8 | 19.7 | 0.00 | 1.46 |
| Frontier Govs | 6.7 | 4.9 | 00 | 00 | 90.4 | 0.9 | 8.8 | 00 | 00 |
| Urban | 00 | 00 | 00 | 39.3 | 00 | 00 | 00 | 00 | 00 |
| Rural | 00 | 00 | 42.5 | 00 | 00 | 00 | 00 | 00 | 00 |
| EGYPT | 22.0 | 13.4 | 00 | 00 40.7 | 85.6 | 3.4 | 11.0 | 1.53 | 1.51 |
| Urban | 00 | 00 | 00 36.7 | 44.6 | 00 | 00 | 00 | 00 | 00 |
| Rural | 00 | 00 45.6 | 42.6 | 56.2 | 00 | 00 | 00 | 00 | 00 |

* Without governorates of Helwan (0.23% - 1.15%) & 6 October (0.43% - 1.5%)

G.13 COMMUNICATION

| | Percentage of households with: | | Telephones per 1000) households) | Average number of people served by one post office | * Number of Cell Phone Subscribers | * Number of Internet subscribers (per 1000 People) |
|----------------|--------------------------------|------------|--|--|--|--|
| | Radio | Television | | | | |
| | 2008 | 2008 | 2007 | 2008 | 2008 | 2007 |
| Cairo | 00 | 00 | 00 | 21079 | 00 | 00 |
| Alexandria | 00 | 00 | 00 | 18812 | 00 | 00 |
| Port Said | 00 | 00 | 00 | 14507 | 00 | 00 |
| Suez | 00 | 00 | 00 | 7815 | 00 | 00 |
| Urban ovs | 81.7 | 96.7 | 00 | 00 | 00 | 00 |
| Damietta | 00 | 00 | 00 | 11126 | 00 | 00 |
| Dakahlia | 00 | 00 | 00 | 10781 | 00 | 00 |
| Shrkia | 00 | 00 | 00 | 8848 | 00 | 00 |
| Kalyoubia | 00 | 00 | 00 | 13200 | 00 | 00 |
| Kafr El Sheikh | 00 | 00 | 00 | 9200 | 00 | 00 |
| Gharbia | 00 | 00 | 00 | 11351 | 00 | 00 |
| Menoufia | 00 | 00 | 00 | 8026 | 00 | 00 |
| Behera | 00 | 00 | 00 | 9471 | 00 | 00 |
| Ismailia | 00 | 00 | 00 | 11762 | 00 | 00 |
| Lower Egypt | 78.1 | 96.7 | 00 | 00 | 00 | 00 |
| Urban | 81.3 | 97.7 | 00 | 00 | 00 | 00 |
| Rural | 76.8 | 96.3 | 00 | 00 | 00 | 00 |
| Giza | 00 | 00 | 00 | 28932 | 00 | 00 |
| Beni Suef | 00 | 00 | 00 | 10417 | 00 | 00 |
| Fayoum | 00 | 00 | 00 | 10171 | 00 | 00 |
| Menia | 00 | 00 | 00 | 10240 | 00 | 00 |
| Assiut | 00 | 00 | 00 | 11737 | 00 | 00 |
| Suhag | 00 | 00 | 00 | 9616 | 00 | 00 |
| Qena | 00 | 00 | 00 | 8933 | 00 | 00 |
| Luxor | 00 | 00 | 00 | 4228 | 00 | 00 |
| Aswan | 00 | 00 | 00 | 4877 | 00 | 00 |
| Upper Egypt | 62.4 | 90.8 | 00 | 00 | 00 | 00 |
| Urban | 76.0 | 96.1 | 00 | 00 | 00 | 00 |
| Rural | 54.1 | 87.5 | 00 | 00 | 00 | 00 |
| Red sea | 00 | 00 | 00 | 8398 | 00 | 00 |
| New valley | 00 | 00 | 00 | 3605 | 00 | 00 |
| Matrouh | 00 | 00 | 00 | 7915 | 00 | 00 |
| North Sinai | 00 | 00 | 00 | 7057 | 00 | 00 |
| South Sinai | 00 | 00 | 00 | 5831 | 00 | 00 |
| Frontier Govs | 70.8 | 92.1 | 00 | 00 | 00 | 00 |
| Urban | 00 | 00 | 00 | 00 | 00 | 00 |
| Rural | 00 | 00 | 00 | 00 | 00 | 00 |
| EGYPT | 73.7 | 94.7 | 621.0 | 10922 | 296.0 | 94.0 |
| Urban | 80.0 | 96.8 | 00 | 00 | 00 | 00 |
| Rural | 67.8 | 92.8 | 00 | 00 | 00 | 00 |

* Data is Available at National Level only

G.15 UNEMPLOYMENT

| | Unemployment rate (%) | | Unemployment rate (%) | | Unemployment rate by education (15+ %) | | | Future labor force Replacement ratio |
|----------------|------------------------|--------|------------------------|-------|--|-----------|--------------|--------------------------------------|
| | Total | Female | Urban | Rural | * Below | Secondary | **University | |
| | | | | | Secondary | | | |
| | 2007 | 2007 | 2007 | 2007 | 2007 | 2007 | 2007 | 2007 |
| Cairo | 11.9 | 22.6 | 11.8 | 00 | 9.7 | 44.2 | 46.1 | 200.2 |
| Alexandria | 12.2 | 17.9 | 12.2 | 00 | 13.5 | 51.6 | 34.9 | 239.9 |
| Port Said | 11.2 | 23.0 | 11.1 | 00 | 11.8 | 46.1 | 42.1 | 221.9 |
| Suez | 9.7 | 29.4 | 9.9 | 00 | 6.3 | 64.2 | 29.6 | 283.9 |
| Urban Govs | 11.8 | 21.3 | 00 | 00 | 00 | 00 | 00 | 00 |
| Damietta | 6.7 | 20.4 | 10.7 | 4.5 | 0.8 | 66.4 | 32.8 | 285.3 |
| Dakahlia | 12.0 | 31.7 | 17.8 | 9.6 | 1.1 | 66.5 | 32.5 | 268.5 |
| Shrkia | 11.7 | 17.7 | 13.5 | 11.3 | 4.9 | 63.4 | 31.8 | 287.7 |
| Kalyoubia | 8.0 | 26.2 | 10.4 | 6.6 | 2.8 | 59.3 | 37.9 | 304.6 |
| Kafr El Sheikh | 10.0 | 20.7 | 16.1 | 8.3 | 0.8 | 68.1 | 31.1 | 253.2 |
| Gharbia | 12.0 | 28.0 | 14.3 | 11.0 | 2.5 | 66.2 | 31.3 | 250.3 |
| Menoufia | 6.5 | 13.0 | 10.0 | 5.6 | 3.9 | 53.4 | 42.7 | 259.1 |
| Behera | 6.8 | 13.7 | 11.8 | 5.7 | 1.9 | 76.9 | 21.2 | 236.8 |
| Ismailia | 11.1 | 22.6 | 13.2 | 9.2 | 9.5 | 68.7 | 21.8 | 296.7 |
| Lower Egypt | 9.6 | 21.0 | 00 | 00 | 00 | 00 | 00 | 00 |
| Urban | 00 | 00 | 00 | 00 | 00 | 00 | 00 | 00 |
| Rural | 00 | 00 | 00 | 00 | 00 | 00 | 00 | 00 |
| Giza | 6.7 | 13.9 | 8.3 | 4.1 | 9.7 | 55.9 | 34.5 | 139.5 |
| Beni Suef | 3.5 | 4.8 | 11.4 | 1.4 | 0.7 | 68.7 | 30.6 | 297.2 |
| Fayoum | 2.9 | 8.0 | 5.4 | 2.2 | 1.6 | 72.9 | 25.5 | 307.7 |
| Menia | 5.5 | 9.0 | 10.4 | 4.4 | 1.9 | 66.8 | 31.3 | 308.1 |
| Assiut | 8.3 | 20.7 | 13.6 | 6.1 | 2.0 | 71.0 | 27.1 | 386.7 |
| Suhag | 9.4 | 21.7 | 14.3 | 7.9 | 0.6 | 71.6 | 27.8 | 396.3 |
| Qena | 7.5 | 18.8 | 11.7 | 6.1 | 0.3 | 73.4 | 26.3 | 378.8 |
| Luxor | 17.2 | 35.5 | 21.5 | 11.8 | 0.0 | 76.1 | 23.9 | 300.3 |
| Aswan | 12.9 | 34.5 | 11.4 | 14.1 | 3.1 | 85.7 | 11.2 | 307.6 |
| Upper Egypt | 6.8 | 13.8 | 00 | 00 | 00 | 00 | 00 | 00 |
| Urban | 00 | 00 | 00 | 00 | 00 | 00 | 00 | 00 |
| Rural | 00 | 00 | 00 | 00 | 00 | 00 | 00 | 00 |
| Red sea | 2.0 | 16.1 | 2 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 100.0 | 0.0 | 245.3 |
| New valley | 13.3 | 28.5 | 16.9 | 10.0 | 2.8 | 77.4 | 19.8 | 222.4 |
| Matrouh | 3.6 | 8.2 | 0 | 10.6 | 14.3 | 80.0 | 5.7 | 374.3 |
| North Sinai | 3.8 | 13.3 | 5.7 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 54.1 | 45.9 | 406.3 |
| South Sinai | 7.8 | 20.0 | 9.5 | 5.6 | 4.0 | 90.7 | 5.3 | 144.1 |
| Frontier Govs | 5.7 | 19.0 | 00 | 00 | 00 | 00 | 00 | 00 |
| Urban | 00 | 00 | 00 | 00 | 00 | 00 | 00 | 00 |
| Rural | 00 | 00 | 00 | 00 | 00 | 00 | 00 | 00 |
| EGYPT | 8.9 | 18.6 | 11.7 | 7.0 | 4.8 | 62.4 | 32.8 | 289.0 |
| Urban | 00 | 00 | 00 | 00 | 00 | 00 | 00 | 00 |
| Rural | 00 | 00 | 00 | 00 | 00 | 00 | 00 | 00 |

* Below Secondary include less than secondary
 ** include more than university education

G.16 INCOME DISTRIBUTION AND POVERTY

| | GDP per capita (L.E) | Expenditure per capita (L.E) | Income share | | Gini coefficient | Poor persons (of total Population %) | | Wages of poor households (%) of | |
|----------------|---------------------------------|---|----------------------------|---|---------------------|---|-------|------------------------------------|-----------------|
| | | | Lowest 40% of People | Ratio of highest 20% to lowest 20% | | Total | Ultra | Total Wages | Their Income |
| | | | | | | | | | |
| Cairo | 7726.4 | 6151 | 18.8 | 6.1 | 0.38 | 7.6 | 1.7 | 4.9 | 43.2 |
| Alexandria | 8978.3 | 5139 | 22.6 | 4.2 | 0.30 | 6.4 | 1.2 | 4.5 | 44.4 |
| Port Said | 10549.7 | 5895 | 20.1 | 5.2 | 0.34 | 4.4 | 1.7 | 2.4 | 37.0 |
| Suez | 8745.8 | 6485 | 22.6 | 4.2 | 0.29 | 1.9 | 0.3 | 1.5 | 43.8 |
| Urban Govs | 00 | 5832 | 20.1 | 5.4 | 0.35 | 6.9 | 1.5 | 4.6 | 43.5 |
| Damietta | 7883.5 | 4678 | 27.2 | 2.8 | 0.21 | 1.1 | 0.2 | 1.2 | 31.8 |
| Dakahlia | 9111.5 | 3796 | 26.6 | 3.0 | 0.22 | 9.3 | 1.0 | 6.4 | 40.1 |
| Shrkia | 8700.4 | 3108 | 28.0 | 2.6 | 0.19 | 19.2 | 1.9 | 13.0 | 37.3 |
| Kalyoubia | 8134.4 | 3754 | 25.8 | 3.1 | 0.23 | 11.3 | 1.8 | 9.3 | 52.6 |
| Kafr El Sheikh | 8927.9 | 3526 | 27.1 | 2.8 | 0.21 | 11.2 | 2.1 | 6.9 | 39.7 |
| Gharbia | 8799.6 | 4057 | 25.9 | 3.2 | 0.24 | 7.6 | 0.8 | 6.9 | 52.7 |
| Menoufia | 9854.0 | 3355 | 26.4 | 3.1 | 0.23 | 17.9 | 3.1 | 14.2 | 39.0 |
| Behera | 9451.6 | 3039 | 28.2 | 2.6 | 0.19 | 23.5 | 3.8 | 17.8 | 39.0 |
| Ismailia | 8970.2 | 3785 | 24.1 | 3.7 | 0.27 | 18.8 | 4.3 | 13.7 | 40.2 |
| Lower Egypt | 00 | 3556 | 26.3 | 3.0 | 0.23 | 14.2 | 2.0 | 10.3 | 41.0 |
| Urban | 00 | 4327 | 15.1 | 8.0 | 0.27 | 7.3 | 0.8 | 4.9 | 38.4 |
| Rural | 00 | 3275 | 32.3 | 1.8 | 0.20 | 16.7 | 2.5 | 12.5 | 41.4 |
| Giza | 8242.8 | 3960 | 20.2 | 5.2 | 0.34 | 23.0 | 7.6 | 16.5 | 43.2 |
| Beni Suef | 8857.4 | 2555 | 27.0 | 2.8 | 0.21 | 41.5 | 11.5 | 33.1 | 44.8 |
| Fayoum | 8433.7 | 2778 | 27.5 | 2.8 | 0.21 | 28.7 | 5.9 | 19.8 | 36.0 |
| Menia | 8655.9 | 2901 | 25.6 | 3.2 | 0.24 | 30.9 | 7.0 | 23.7 | 39.4 |
| Assiut | 8019.6 | 2220 | 23.8 | 3.7 | 0.27 | 61.0 | 31.4 | 48.3 | 40.4 |
| Suhag | 7329.7 | 2392 | 25.8 | 3.1 | 0.23 | 47.5 | 18.5 | 36.3 | 41.2 |
| Qena | 6387.5 | 2646 | 25.8 | 3.1 | 0.23 | 39.0 | 11.5 | 28.5 | 40.2 |
| Luxor | 9105.6 | 2714 | 25.4 | 3.2 | 0.24 | 40.9 | 14.3 | 30.8 | 42.3 |
| Aswan | 7057.4 | 3590 | 23.6 | 3.6 | 0.27 | 18.4 | 4.0 | 13.9 | 40.3 |
| Upper Egypt | 00 | 2916 | 23.4 | 4.0 | 0.28 | 36.9 | 12.8 | 27.7 | 41.0 |
| Urban | 00 | 3879 | 12.8 | 11.0 | 0.33 | 21.3 | 6.3 | 14.7 | 41.6 |
| Rural | 00 | 2501 | 31.6 | 1.9 | 0.23 | 43.7 | 15.6 | 34.6 | 40.9 |
| Red sea | 8460.7 | 00 | 00 | 00 | 00 | 00 | 00 | 00 | 00 |
| New valley | 12682.2 | 00 | 00 | 00 | 00 | 00 | 00 | 00 | 00 |
| Matrouh | 10346.1 | 00 | 00 | 00 | 00 | 00 | 00 | 00 | 00 |
| North Sinai | 8884.0 | 00 | 00 | 00 | 00 | 00 | 00 | 00 | 00 |
| South Sinai | 12454.6 | 00 | 00 | 00 | 00 | 00 | 00 | 00 | 00 |
| Frontier Govs | 00 | 4380 | 22.8 | 4.3 | 0.30 | 11.1 | 3.8 | 9.2 | 46.1 |
| Urban | 00 | 5016 | 17.0 | 7.8 | 0.30 | 4.8 | 1.2 | 2.5 | 31.3 |
| Rural | 00 | 3165 | 48.2 | 0.7 | 0.23 | 23.2 | 8.7 | 23.4 | 51.9 |
| EGYPT | 10246.1 | 3712 | 22.3 | 4.4 | 0.31 | 21.6 | 6.1 | 15.2 | 41.3 |
| Urban | 00 | 4843 | 20.7 | 5.1 | 0.34 | 11.0 | 2.6 | 7.2 | 41.4 |
| Rural | 00 | 2924 | 26.0 | 3.1 | 0.22 | 28.9 | 8.5 | 21.8 | 41.2 |

G.17 URBANIZATION

| | **Urban population (% of total) | | Urban population annual growth (% rate) | | Population of largest city as (% of total urban) | | Households with (%) electricity |
|----------------|---------------------------------|------|---|-----------|--|------|---------------------------------|
| | 1996 | 2008 | 1976/86 | 1996/2006 | 1996 | 2006 | 2008 |
| Cairo | 100 | 100 | 1.8 | 1.4 | 100 | 100 | 00 |
| Alexandria | 100 | 99.0 | 2.4 | 2.1 | 100 | 100 | 00 |
| Port Said | 100 | 100 | 4.3 | 1.9 | 100 | 100 | 00 |
| Suez | 100 | 100 | 5.4 | 2.0 | 100 | 100 | 00 |
| Urban Govs | 100 | 99.7 | 2.2 | 1.6 | 61.6 | 100 | 99.9 |
| Damietta | 27.4 | 38.7 | 2.7 | 5.3 | 31.2 | 32.2 | 00 |
| Dakahlia | 27.8 | 28.0 | 3.3 | 1.7 | 30.8 | 30.1 | 00 |
| Shrkia | 22.5 | 23.1 | 3.1 | 2.5 | 29.2 | 26.9 | 00 |
| Kalyoubia | 40.6 | 44.7 | 4.9 | 1.8 | 58.0 | 64.1 | 00 |
| Kafr El Sheikh | 22.9 | 23.1 | 3.5 | 1.7 | 24.5 | 23.8 | 00 |
| Gharbia | 31.1 | 29.9 | 2.1 | 1.3 | 37.3 | 37.1 | 00 |
| Menoufia | 19.9 | 20.5 | 2.9 | 2.0 | 28.6 | 28.1 | 00 |
| Behera | 22.8 | 19.1 | 2.5 | 0.0 | 25.5 | 25.4 | 00 |
| Ismailia | 50.3 | 45.3 | 4.3 | 2.0 | 70.9 | 68.9 | 00 |
| Lower Egypt | 26.6 | 28.0 | 3.2 | 1.7 | 12.4 | 38.1 | 99.8 |
| Urban | 00 | 00 | 00 | 00 | 00 | 00 | 99.8 |
| Rural | 00 | 00 | 00 | 00 | 00 | 00 | 99.8 |
| Giza | 54.1 | 58.7 | 4.5 | 3.6 | 85.8 | 76.9 | 00 |
| Beni Suef | 23.5 | 23.2 | 2.8 | 2.0 | 39.2 | 38.0 | 00 |
| Fayoum | 22.5 | 22.5 | 2.7 | 2.4 | 58.4 | 56.5 | 00 |
| Menia | 19.4 | 18.9 | 2.5 | 2.0 | 31.3 | 29.9 | 00 |
| Assiut | 27.3 | 26.5 | 2.8 | 1.7 | 45.0 | 43.0 | 00 |
| Suhag | 21.7 | 21.4 | 2.7 | 1.7 | 25.1 | 25.0 | 00 |
| Qena | *24.4 | 21.3 | *3 | 2.2 | 30.0 | 29.3 | 00 |
| Luxor | 00 | 47.8 | 00 | 2.5 | 92.5 | 91.9 | 00 |
| Aswan | 42.6 | 42.5 | 3.2 | 1.9 | 52.9 | 52.2 | 00 |
| Upper Egypt | 30.8 | 32.8 | 3.4 | 2.6 | 33.2 | 55.1 | 99.0 |
| Urban | 00 | 00 | 00 | 00 | 00 | 00 | 99.8 |
| Rural | 00 | 00 | 00 | 00 | 00 | 00 | 98.5 |
| Red sea | 74.7 | 95.5 | 4.7 | 8.9 | 30.7 | 31.5 | 00 |
| New valley | 48.3 | 48.1 | 3.8 | 2.8 | 72.3 | 72.4 | 00 |
| Matrouh | 55.5 | 70.4 | 4.7 | 6.8 | 44.4 | 44.8 | 00 |
| North Sinai | 59.1 | 60.4 | 28.2 | 3.2 | 67.3 | 66.5 | 00 |
| South Sinai | 50.0 | 50.9 | 00 | 12.0 | 38.6 | 39.2 | 00 |
| Frontier Govs | 58.7 | 67.9 | 7.9 | 6.3 | 21.9 | 52.1 | 98.6 |
| Urban | 00 | 00 | 00 | 00 | 00 | 00 | 00 |
| Rural | 00 | 00 | 00 | 00 | 00 | 00 | 00 |
| EGYPT | 42.6 | 43.1 | 2.8 | 2.0 | 26.1 | 69.4 | 99.6 |
| Urban | 00 | 00 | 00 | 00 | 00 | 00 | 99.9 |
| Rural | 00 | 00 | 00 | 00 | 00 | 00 | 99.3 |

* Qena and Luxor combined, *Helwan (70.3%) & 6 October (28.9%)

** Without 6 October

G.18 DEMOGRAPHIC PROFILE

| | Population (thousands) | | Annual population (%) growth rate | | Crude birth rate | Crude death rate | Contraceptive prevalence rate (%) | Net Lifetime internal migration* (% of total) | Population Demographic dependency ratio |
|----------------|------------------------|---------|-----------------------------------|-----------|------------------|------------------|-----------------------------------|---|---|
| | 1996 | 2008 | 1986/1996 | 1996/2008 | 2008 | 2008 | 2008 | 2007 | 2008 |
| Cairo | 6813.2 | 8128.7 | 1.1 | 1.5 | 28.7 | 9.1 | 66.8 | 11.9 | 41.4 |
| Alexandria | 3339.1 | 4230.6 | 1.3 | 2.0 | 26.1 | 7.7 | 63.7 | 6.7 | 43.2 |
| Port Said | 472.3 | 585.0 | 1.6 | 1.8 | 23.4 | 6.3 | 54.7 | 34.0 | 42.3 |
| Suez | 417.5 | 529.6 | 2.5 | 2.0 | 28.9 | 6.0 | 65.8 | 37.9 | 50.1 |
| Urban Govs | 11042.1 | 13473.8 | 1.3 | 1.7 | 27.6 | 8.4 | 65.2 | 00 | 42.3 |
| Damietta | 913.6 | 1136.3 | 2.1 | 1.8 | 30.2 | 6.3 | 64.2 | 5.4 | 49.5 |
| Dakahlia | 4223.9 | 5139.5 | 1.9 | 1.6 | 26.8 | 6.2 | 64.4 | 1.9 | 51.5 |
| Shrkia | 4281.1 | 5529.6 | 2.3 | 2.1 | 27.4 | 5.4 | 65.7 | 4.6 | 56.4 |
| Kalyoubia | 3301.2 | 4386.8 | 2.8 | 2.4 | 26.4 | 4.9 | 59.9 | 14.4 | 53.0 |
| Kafr El Sheikh | 2223.7 | 2705.7 | 2.1 | 1.6 | 24.0 | 4.8 | 62.1 | 2.6 | 54.4 |
| Gharbia | 3406.0 | 4125.9 | 1.7 | 1.6 | 25.3 | 5.8 | 67.1 | 1.7 | 51.0 |
| Menoufia | 2760.4 | 3374.2 | 2.2 | 1.7 | 27.5 | 6.1 | 66.3 | 2.1 | 54.8 |
| Behera | 3994.3 | 4900.9 | 2.1 | 1.7 | 28.5 | 5.2 | 66.1 | 4.1 | 55.5 |
| Ismailia | 714.8 | 988.5 | 2.8 | 2.7 | 30.9 | 6.0 | 56.5 | 31.3 | 52.3 |
| Lower Egypt | 25819.0 | 32287.5 | 2.2 | 1.9 | 27.0 | 5.5 | 64.3 | 00 | 53.6 |
| Urban | 7252.2 | 9045.0 | 2.2 | 1.8 | 00 | 00 | 00 | 00 | 00 |
| Rural | 18566.8 | 23242.5 | 2.2 | 1.9 | 00 | 00 | 00 | 00 | 00 |
| Giza | 4784.1 | 6490.8 | 2.5 | 2.5 | 27.8 | 5.3 | 62.4 | 20.4 | 52.1 |
| Beni Suef | 1859.2 | 2371.0 | 2.5 | 2.0 | 30.3 | 5.9 | 56.9 | 2.2 | 69.3 |
| Fayoum | 1989.8 | 2605.2 | 2.5 | 2.2 | 30.1 | 4.8 | 55.7 | 0.6 | 69.5 |
| Menia | 3310.1 | 4308.4 | 2.3 | 2.2 | 30.4 | 6.0 | 54.1 | 0.7 | 67.7 |
| Assiut | 2802.3 | 3560.1 | 2.4 | 2.0 | 30.5 | 6.8 | 47.4 | 1.2 | 67.9 |
| Suhag | 2914.9 | 3874.0 | 2.5 | 2.4 | 29.3 | 6.1 | 36.3 | 0.6 | 67.2 |
| Qena | 2442.0 | 3096.9 | 2.2 | 2.0 | 26.3 | 5.7 | 48.0 | 1.4 | 67.6 |
| Luxor | 361.1 | 469.5 | 1.9 | 2.2 | 26.0 | 6.8 | 54.5 | 1.3 | 57.2 |
| Aswan | 974.1 | 1222.3 | 1.9 | 1.9 | 25.5 | 3.8 | 53.4 | 3.6 | 58.1 |
| Upper Egypt | 21437.6 | 27998.4 | 2.4 | 2.2 | 28.9 | 5.7 | 52.7 | 00 | 63.6 |
| Urban | 6659.3 | 8938.0 | 2.1 | 2.5 | 00 | 00 | 00 | 00 | 00 |
| Rural | 14778.3 | 19060.4 | 2.5 | 2.1 | 00 | 00 | 00 | 00 | 00 |
| Red sea | 157.3 | 296.8 | 5.7 | 5.3 | 21.9 | 3.8 | 0.0 | 28.7 | 46.5 |
| New valley | 141.8 | 193.0 | 2.3 | 2.6 | 25.2 | 4.1 | 0.0 | 16.7 | 54.2 |
| Matrouh | 212.0 | 337.4 | 2.8 | 3.9 | 31.4 | 3.3 | 0.0 | 13.5 | 59.3 |
| North Sinai | 252.2 | 357.9 | 4.0 | 2.9 | 31.3 | 4.4 | 0.0 | 14.1 | 60.4 |
| South Sinai | 54.8 | 152.5 | 6.6 | 8.5 | 14.0 | 3.5 | 0.0 | 27.4 | 46.8 |
| Frontier Govs | 818.1 | 1337.6 | 3.8 | 4.1 | 26.4 | 3.9 | 0.0 | 00 | 55.4 |
| Urban | 480.2 | 908.0 | 3.9 | 5.3 | 00 | 00 | 00 | 00 | 00 |
| Rural | 337.9 | 429.6 | 3.6 | 2.0 | 00 | 00 | 00 | 00 | 00 |
| EGYPT | 59116.8 | 75097.3 | 2.1 | 2.0 | 27.8 | 6.1 | 60.3 | 6.6 | 54.9 |
| Urban | 25433.8 | 32325.0 | 1.8 | 2.0 | 00 | 00 | 00 | 00 | 00 |
| Rural | 33683.0 | 42773.0 | 2.3 | 2.0 | 00 | 00 | 00 | 00 | 00 |

* Without governorates of Helwan (11.2%) and 6 October (10.5%)

G.19 NATURAL RESOURCES

| | Land area Km ² | Population density (per Km ²)* | Cultivated area** | | Person per feddan | Crop area | |
|----------------|------------------------------|--|---------------------|------------------------|-------------------------|---------------------|-------------------------------|
| | | | Thousand feddans | as (%) of land area | | Thousand feddans | Crop cultivated land ratio |
| | 2007 | 2007 | 2007 | 2007 | 2007 | 2007 | 2007 |
| Cairo | 3085.0 | 2610.1 | 15.6 | 2.1 | 514.8 | 18.7 | 1.20 |
| Alexandria | 2300.0 | 1824.0 | 252.5 | 46.1 | 16.6 | 493.7 | 1.96 |
| Port Said | 1351.1 | 429.5 | 61.8 | 19.2 | 9.4 | 113.3 | 1.83 |
| Suez | 9002.2 | 58.2 | 35.4 | 1.7 | 14.8 | 52.8 | 1.49 |
| Urban Govs | 15738.3 | 848.3 | 365.3 | 9.7 | 36.5 | 678.6 | 1.86 |
| Damietta | 910.0 | 1234.9 | 111.9 | 51.6 | 10.0 | 217.2 | 1.94 |
| Dakahlia | 3716.0 | 1369.5 | 619.7 | 70.0 | 8.2 | 1273.7 | 2.06 |
| Shrkia | 4911.0 | 1113.4 | 799.3 | 68.4 | 6.8 | 1534.1 | 1.92 |
| Kalyoubia | 1124.0 | 3863.6 | 173.4 | 64.8 | 25.0 | 316.1 | 1.82 |
| Kafr El Sheikh | 3748.0 | 714.3 | 567.5 | 63.6 | 4.7 | 1097.9 | 1.93 |
| Gharbia | 1947.5 | 2098.2 | 371.9 | 80.2 | 11.0 | 719.1 | 1.93 |
| Menoufia | 2499.0 | 1336.1 | 509.3 | 85.6 | 6.6 | 831.5 | 1.63 |
| Behera | 9826.0 | 493.5 | 1221.0 | 52.2 | 4.0 | 2355.5 | 1.93 |
| Ismailia | 5067.0 | 192.7 | 321.6 | 26.7 | 3.0 | 468.1 | 1.46 |
| Lower Egypt | 33748.5 | 946.8 | 4695.6 | 58.4 | 6.8 | 8813.1 | 1.88 |
| Urban | 00 | 00 | 00 | 00 | 00 | 00 | 00 |
| Rural | 00 | 00 | 00 | 00 | 00 | 00 | 00 |
| Giza | 13184.0 | 487.2 | 343.3 | 10.9 | 18.7 | 646.8 | 1.88 |
| Beni Suef | 10954.0 | 214.0 | 290.1 | 11.1 | 8.1 | 559.8 | 1.93 |
| Fayoum | 6068.0 | 424.1 | 399.1 | 27.6 | 6.4 | 779.1 | 1.95 |
| Menia | 32279.0 | 132.0 | 468.3 | 6.1 | 9.1 | 906.9 | 1.94 |
| Assiut | 25926.0 | 135.8 | 330.6 | 5.4 | 10.6 | 641.3 | 1.94 |
| Suhag | 11022.0 | 347.2 | 294.7 | 11.2 | 13.0 | 571.6 | 1.94 |
| Qena | 10798.0 | 283.7 | 351.6 | 13.7 | 8.7 | 499.0 | 1.42 |
| Luxor | 2410.0 | 193.0 | 47.8 | 8.3 | 9.7 | 74.6 | 1.56 |
| Aswan | 62726.0 | 19.3 | 174.2 | 1.2 | 6.9 | 237.1 | 1.36 |
| Upper Egypt | 175367.0 | 157.9 | 2699.8 | 6.5 | 10.3 | 4916.1 | 1.82 |
| Urban | 00 | 00 | 00 | 00 | 00 | 00 | 00 |
| Rural | 00 | 00 | 00 | 00 | 00 | 00 | 00 |
| Red sea | 119099.0 | 2.5 | 0.7 | 0.0 | 408.8 | 1.0 | 1.45 |
| New valley | 440098.0 | 0.4 | 159.3 | 0.2 | 1.2 | 206.6 | 1.30 |
| Matrouh | 166563.0 | 2.0 | 345.3 | 0.9 | 1.0 | 442.5 | 1.28 |
| North Sinai | 27564.0 | 12.8 | 154.7 | 2.4 | 2.3 | 167.2 | 1.08 |
| South Sinai | 31272.0 | 4.8 | 11.4 | 0.2 | 13.3 | 11.5 | 1.01 |
| Frontier Govs | 784596.0 | 1.7 | 671.5 | 0.4 | 2.0 | 828.8 | 1.23 |
| Urban | 00 | 00 | 00 | 00 | 00 | 00 | 00 |
| Rural | 00 | 00 | 00 | 00 | 00 | 00 | 00 |
| EGYPT | 1009449.8 | 73.6 | 8432.2 | 3.5 | 8.8 | 15236.7 | 1.81 |
| Urban | 00 | 00 | 00 | 00 | 00 | 00 | 00 |
| Rural | 00 | 00 | 00 | 00 | 00 | 00 | 00 |

* Average population density is estimated around 42286.7, 5392.9, 4048.3, 11322, 1491.3, 2212.3, 919.7, 940.8 per Km² in Cairo, Giza, Kalyoubia, urban Govs, lower Egypt, upper Egypt, Frontier Govs and Egypt respectively .

**New land area is estimated around 1925.6 thousand feddans and its crop area about 2955.3 thousand feddans.

